# Ron Conway at Startup School 2012  

> `[00:00:00]` The funny thing is we\'re we\'re sitting in the back seeing which switch stories can we tell in which ones are too secret because for every wrong who is like an iceberg for every story.

`[00:00:00]` 有趣的是，我们坐在后面，看哪些故事太秘密了，因为对于每一个错误，谁就像每一个故事的冰山。

> Where were you where you hear how he saved the day.

你在哪里听说他救了我。

> There\'s a bunch where you can never tell how he saved the day he was ever seen Pulp Fiction sort of like the Wolf.

有一群人，你永远不知道他是如何拯救了他曾经被看到的纸浆小说，有点像“狼”。

> He\'s clean cleaned a lot of brains off the back wins windows and cars.

他干干净净地洗了很多后脑勺，赢得了窗户和汽车。

> `[00:00:27]` He laughs nervously but does not contradict me.

`[00:00:27]` 他紧张地笑着，但没有反驳我。

> So Ron and Ron like officially Ron is ASV angel right.

所以罗恩和罗恩就像正式的罗恩一样，是 ASV 天使对吧。

> `[00:00:38]` You are the limited partners.

`[00:00:38]` 你们是有限合伙人。

> Something like that of SB angel.

就像某人的天使。

> `[00:00:41]` I\'m not a managing partner.

`[00:00:41]` 我不是管理合伙人。

> David Leighs the managing partner because I don\'t like being a fiduciary.

大卫·雷伊是执行合伙人，因为我不喜欢做信托人。

> I am just the largest investor.

我只是最大的投资者。

> `[00:00:50]` But officially Ron Conway doesn\'t invest in your company worthS.V.

`[00:00:50]` 但根据官方说法，罗恩·康维并不投资于你的公司。

> angel investor right.

天使投资者是对的。

> So if you ever see that in a cap table that\'s that\'s Ranko.

所以，如果你在帽子桌上看到这个，那就是兰科。

> `[00:00:59]` So how many startups have you funded now since 1994.

`[00:00:59]` 自 1994 年以来，你资助了多少家初创公司？

> About six hundred and fifty 1994.

大约六百五十个 1994 年。

> `[00:01:08]` How many and we\'re not born yet in 1994.

`[00:01:08]` 1994 年有多少人还没有出生。

> It\'s not that many 650 including Can you name some of the more successful ones.

它没有那么多 650，你能说出其中一些比较成功的吗？

> `[00:01:21]` Ask Jeeves was the first.

`[00:01:21]` 问吉夫斯是第一个。

> A good quality event that we had Google Facebook Twitter page how Pinterest.

一个高质量的事件，我们有谷歌 Facebook Twitter 页面如何 Pinterest。

> `[00:01:30]` OK.

`[00:01:30]` 好的。

> You\'re doing pretty well.

你做得很好。

> `[00:01:33]` And then and then the see companies air BMV and Dropbox.

`[00:01:33]` 然后看公司的航空 BMV 和 Dropbox。

> The way I see companies that are already getting very big scale.

在我看来，已经有了很大规模的公司。

> `[00:01:43]` How did you how did you get into this.

`[00:01:43]` 你是怎么弄到这件事的。

> You started out as a founder yourself right back when startups made computers.

当创业公司制造电脑的时候，你开始是一个创立者。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:01:52]` Even though I don\'t invest in hardware today the company that I cofounded was Alto\'s computer back in the late 70s and we ended up taking their company public in 1982 and and my experience at Alto\'s plus two other startups that I cofounded is what gives me such respect for what entrepreneurs go through.

`[00:01:52]` 尽管我今天不投资硬件，但我共同创立的公司是 20 世纪 70 年代末的 Alto 电脑，我们最终在 1982 年将他们的公司上市，而我在阿尔托公司(Alto‘s)的经历，再加上我共同创立的另外两家初创公司，让我对企业家的经历产生了如此的尊重。

> The theme all day is that hey it\'s not easy it\'s it\'s actually hard.

整天的主题是，嘿，这不容易，实际上很难。

> I know that because I did it it was even harder then in a lot of ways.

我知道，因为我做到了，在很多方面甚至更难。

> You\'re raising money stories.

你在筹钱。

> Yes.

是

> Back in 0 back in the late 70s in order to get venture capital you had to have high growth and be profitable if you weren\'t you didn\'t even qualify.

回到 70 年代末的 0，为了获得风险投资，你必须有高增长，如果你没有资格的话，你就能盈利。

> `[00:02:48]` So why did people take venture capital profitable and growing fast.

`[00:02:48]` 那么，为什么人们会拿风险投资赚钱，而且增长很快。

> Well in the case of Alto it was a hardware company.

就阿尔托而言，那是一家硬件公司。

> `[00:02:56]` So we had a lot of cost of goods and marketing.

`[00:02:56]` 所以我们的商品和营销成本很高。

> And so we wanted to build a war chest to keep building the business.

所以我们想要建立一个战争基金来继续建立业务。

> `[00:03:06]` Okay.

`[00:03:06]` 好的。

> `[00:03:07]` So that in fact Da Vinci was Don Valentine from Sequoia who you know is really I think the patron saint of venture capital patron.

`[00:03:07]` 事实上，达·芬奇是红杉的唐·瓦伦丁，你知道吗，我认为他是风投赞助人的守护神。

> `[00:03:18]` He\'s retired now.

`[00:03:18]` 他现在退休了。

> What was.

是什么。

> What\'s changed about startups since then.

从那以后，初创公司发生了什么变化。

> `[00:03:27]` Well I I think it\'s I\'d rather talk about what\'s not changed.

`[00:03:27]` 嗯，我想我宁愿说什么没有改变。

> `[00:03:33]` OK sure.

`[00:03:33]` 好的。

> That was going to be my next question.

这将是我的下一个问题。

> Oh yes.

哦，是的。

> `[00:03:37]` Because what\'s not changed is what Jessica talked about which is you have to have determination and conviction.

`[00:03:37]` 因为杰西卡所说的没有改变，那就是你必须有决心和信念。

> You have to be a leader.

你必须是一个领导者。

> You know what has changed is in the workplace people drink less at Alto\'s.

你知道，改变的是在工作场所，人们在阿尔托喝得更少。

> `[00:04:01]` That\'s not what I thought you were going to buy in the back of my mind.

`[00:04:01]` 那不是我以为你会在我脑子里买的东西。

> `[00:04:03]` I\'ve been saying hey wait a minute I want to answer the question about what has changed at Alto\'s.

‘

> We had a CFO who is in her 60s and at five o\'clock everyday she would wheel around the booze cart everyone would have a drink chit chat for a little bit.

我们有一位 60 多岁的首席财务官，每天五点左右，她会在酒车里转来转去，每个人都会喝一杯，聊一聊。

> It wasn\'t even a happy hour.

那不是一个快乐的时刻。

> It was a happy 10 minutes.

这是一个快乐的 10 分钟。

> But then it motivated everyone to stay till 9 or 10 o\'clock at night.

但它激励着每个人在晚上 9 点或 10 点之前。

> Now our Modou are kind of a model was work hard and play hard.

现在，我们的 MOMOU 是一种模式，是努力工作和娱乐的。

> `[00:04:38]` And at the same time Yeah we actually we did it via multitasking I think the startup\'s today know how to segment a little better and they have happy hour at the on a Friday instead of everyday instead of everyday.

`[00:04:38]` 同时，是的，我们实际上是通过多任务完成的，我认为今天的初创公司知道如何更好地分割，他们在星期五而不是每天都有快乐的时间。

> So what else is changing besides breaking.

所以除了破碎之外还有什么变化。

> `[00:05:00]` Well I think what has not changed is is the fact that once you you have to focus on growth.

`[00:05:00]` 我认为没有改变的是，一旦你必须专注于增长。

> Back in the hardware days you didn\'t have to focus.

在硬件时代，你不需要集中精力。

> In my opinion on product or consumer satisfaction is much interesting.

在我看来，对产品或消费者的满意是非常有趣的。

> Yeah it was more like you know Ship Ship Ship and get it out and if it doesn\'t work take it back and fix it because hardware was so hard to ship that if you could ship at all.

是的，它更像是你知道船，把它拿出来，如果它不能工作，把它拿回来修理它，因为硬件太难出货了，如果你能出货的话。

> `[00:05:31]` That was consumer satisfaction.

`[00:05:31]` 那是消费者的满意。

> Exactly.

一点儿没错

> Customers were happy just to get it back at the end of it if it didn\'t work.

如果它不起作用的话，顾客们很乐意在它结束的时候把它拿回来。

> `[00:05:38]` We had this big RMV department return material authorizations.

`[00:05:38]` 我们有一个很大的 RMV 部门退回材料授权书。

> But today what\'s changed.

但今天一切都变了。

> And now whileS.V.

而现在.。

> ángela the best decision I ever made in 1994 was only to invest in Internet software in 1994 in 1994 so I think hardware scarred me.

1994 年我所做的最好的决定就是在 1994 年投资于互联网软件，所以我认为硬件给我留下了伤痕。

> But but that was the best decision I ever made is that in 94 thinking this thing called the Internet is going to be really disruptive.

但这是我做过的最好的决定，在 94 年的时候，我认为这个叫做互联网的东西会带来很大的破坏。

> `[00:06:12]` Back then like 1984.

`[00:06:12]` 那时就像 1984 年。

> It probably meant the Internet not the web like the web sort of existed.

它可能意味着互联网，而不是像网络那样存在的网络。

> `[00:06:17]` Had you heard of it when you decided to go into Internet investing back in 1990 were you thinking like FPP in e-mail.

`[00:06:17]` 当你在 1990 年决定投资互联网的时候，你听说过吗？你在电子邮件中想过像 FPP 那样的想法吗？

> Well it would be it would be more like people would say TCP/IP.

这更像是人们所说的 TCP/IP。

> `[00:06:30]` Yeah as often as they would say the Internet.

`[00:06:30]` 是的，就像他们常说的互联网一样。

> And I remember it as TCP/IP at the time but in the end people would talk about email but know they\'d have to explain what e-mail was.

我记得当时它是 TCP/IP，但最终人们会谈论电子邮件，但他们知道他们必须解释电子邮件是什么。

> `[00:06:44]` It was this protocol on TCP/IP.

`[00:06:44]` 这是 TCP/IP 上的协议。

> `[00:06:49]` So you sort of didn\'t get in at the ground floor of an idiot investor and you got it in a basement or in the basement go up say yes to the lowly went up the stairs to the to the first floor.

`[00:06:49]` 所以你不是在一个白痴投资者的底层，而是在地下室或者地下室里，对低层的人说“是的”，然后爬到第一层。

> How did you like that was a really good decision.

你觉得这是个很好的决定。

> It turns out to get into Internet investing in 1994.

结果是在 1994 年进入互联网投资。

> But like why did how did you do that.

但就像你为什么要这么做。

> `[00:07:08]` Well I was in CO investing with Ben Rosen at the time after founding a couple of companies I discovered because I started dabbling in angel investing that I really enjoyed mentoring entrepreneurs more than being the entrepreneur or myself.

`[00:07:08]` 在我创立了几家公司后，我在 CO 投资公司工作，因为我开始涉足天使投资，我更喜欢指导企业家，而不是作为企业家或我自己。

> So in 94 is when I sold my second company and went home and told my wife hey you know I found a new job and she said I didn\'t know you were looking.

所以，在 94 年，我卖掉了第二家公司，回家对妻子说嘿，你知道我找到了一份新工作，她说我不知道你在找什么。

> And I said Yeah I\'m going to do this angel investing for the rest of my life.

我说，是的，我要做这个天使投资我的余生。

> `[00:07:44]` What did she think of that.

`[00:07:44]` 她是怎么想的。

> Did she know what she was getting into.

她知道她在做什么吗。

> `[00:07:47]` She\'s always thought it was crazy so she thinks I\'m crazy today.

`[00:07:47]` 她总是认为这很疯狂，所以她认为我今天疯了。

> But but.

但是.。

> `[00:07:56]` I sat with Ben Rosen who is then the chairman of Compaq.

`[00:07:56]` 我和当时担任康柏公司主席的本·罗森坐在一起。

> Ben lives in New York and we said.

本住在纽约我们说。

> Innovation is all about growth.

创新就是增长。

> So we said let\'s just find a sector that\'s growing like crazy or is going to grow like crazy and be disruptive because innovation is disruptive.

所以我们说，让我们找到一个正在疯狂成长的行业，或者是一个疯狂的行业，因为创新是颠覆性的。

> And we said hey let\'s let\'s just throw all in on the internet so our only rural is Internet software and off we went in sitting here today still only Internet software.

我们说，嘿，让我们把一切都投入到互联网上吧，所以我们唯一的农村是互联网软件，今天我们坐在这里，仍然只有互联网软件。

> Now the market\'s gotten huge.

现在市场变得很大。

> I still think we\'re in the infancy on the internet though I\'ve been saying this since 1994 I believe it more than ever.

我仍然认为我们在互联网上还处于起步阶段，尽管我从 1994 年就开始这么说了，我比以往任何时候都更相信这一点。

> Just add a little touch of e-commerce on top of the Internet and you\'re talking about you know an opportunity that\'s as big as all the Internet today especially with with Facebook an open graph helping companies go find their customers and Pinterest will probably be an effect fact I\'ll quote the monetization guy on twitter.

只要在互联网上加上一点电子商务，你就会知道一个机会和今天所有的互联网一样大，特别是在 Facebook 上，一个开放的图表帮助公司找到他们的客户，Pinterest 可能会成为一个影响的事实，我会在 Twitter 上引用这个赚钱的家伙的话。

> I won\'t even take the risk of misquoting but the monetization guy at Twitter told me a couple of weeks ago he goes a Twitter is on a tear.

我甚至不愿意冒错误引用的风险，但 Twitter 的货币化者几周前告诉我，他去推特(Twitter)是一滴眼泪。

> Now you know like Google and Facebook once they get to stride you know Twitter\'s got a really nice growth rate now took awhile more than normal revenue growth revenue growth.

现在你知道了，就像谷歌和 Facebook 一样，一旦他们开始大步前进，你就知道 Twitter 的增长速度非常好，现在的增长速度要比正常的收入增长要花上一段时间。

> Okay this is about revenue growth and this guy said to me it will never grow like Pinterest was once they decide to monetize because they will be an e-commerce engine like never before and they\'ll there\'ll be many other companies like that that take advantage of e-commerce.

好吧，这是关于收入增长的，这个人对我说，Pinterest 公司永远不会像 Pinterest 那样，决定赚钱，因为他们将成为一个前所未有的电子商务引擎，他们还会有许多像这样的公司利用电子商务。

> So it\'s it\'s early days.

所以现在还早呢。

> `[00:09:53]` That\'s encouraging.

`[00:09:53]` 这是鼓舞人心的。

> Yeah I couldn\'t be more and you agree with you agree with Ben Horowitz there\'s still stuff left here and lots of lots.

是的，我不能再多了，你同意本？霍洛维茨的观点，这里还有很多东西。

> So what are the biggest.

那么最大的是什么。

> What are the biggest misses you\'ve had.

你最大的失误是什么？

> You remember some big ones you missed.

你还记得一些你错过的大案子。

> `[00:10:08]` Well yes.

`[00:10:08]` 是的。

> This is in 1998 99 when the bubble was starting to take effect and I thought 30 million dollar valuation forSalesforce.com was a little too high.

这是在 1998 年 99 年泡沫开始生效的时候，我认为 Salesforce.com 3000 万美元的估值有点太高了。

> It\'s 21 billion today.

今天是 210 亿。

> Pandora Pandora.

潘多拉。

> I had just gotten out of Napster Napster fire and finally had to declare bankruptcy because of all the egos in the world and in the music world.

我刚刚从纳普斯特大火中解脱出来，最后因为世界上和音乐世界里所有的自我，我不得不宣布破产。

> I don\'t think it\'s just egos in them.

我不认为这只是他们的自我。

> I wish.

我希望。

> And so I was I was hedging on the music space so for that reason I didn\'t invest in Pandora Palin Teer could have injured invested there didn\'t understand the size of the market even though we invest in the entrepreneur first.

因此，我在音乐领域进行对冲，因此我没有投资潘多拉·佩林·蒂尔(Pandora Palin Teer)，这可能会伤害我在那里的投资，他不了解市场的规模，尽管我们首先投资的是企业家。

> In the case of Pandora you know I made a dumb move and said hey I\'m not sure I get how big that market is.

在潘多拉的例子中，你知道我做了一个愚蠢的举动，说：嘿，我不确定我是否知道这个市场有多大。

> Kickstarter we could have invested in it in early as well didn\'t really get what.

Kickstarter，我们可以在早期投资它，但没有真正得到什么。

> What crowdsourcing was.

众包是什么。

> And look at that space today.

看看今天的空间。

> It\'s it\'s the lifeblood for a lot of startups and we have the.

这是许多初创公司的命脉，我们有。

> The jobs act that takes the legal confusion out of crowdsourcing.

就业法案从众包中消除了法律上的混乱。

> `[00:11:43]` Do you think.

`[00:11:43]` 你认为。

> Do you think there\'s a pattern to what investors miss.

你认为投资者所错过的东西是有规律的吗？

> In general not just you but investors in general.

一般来说，不仅仅是你，还有一般的投资者。

> If there\'s a founders are working on something that\'s good but investors are not going to get like what kind of things do investors not get.

如果有一位创始人正在做一件好事，但投资者不会得到投资者所没有的那种东西。

> `[00:11:59]` Well I think investors don\'t get probably the stuff that is you know is the first one.

`[00:11:59]` 我认为投资者可能没有得到你知道的第一件事。

> Pinterest would be an example.

Pinterest 就是一个例子。

> Ben talked about how hard it was to raise money.

本谈到筹集资金有多难。

> And if you look at a virtual Pinboard you know that\'s a brand new idea.

如果你看一下虚拟棋盘，你就会知道这是一个全新的想法。

> So I think investors even though they like to say I\'m in venture capital I take risk.

因此，我认为投资者，即使他们喜欢说我在风险投资，我承担风险。

> They look for pattern recognition which in this business is probably a mistake.

他们寻找模式识别，这在这个行业可能是一个错误。

> Look at Twitter in the early days you know that was that was a brand that was a brand new idea and lots of Easy\'s turned down Twitter.

看看早期的 Twitter，你知道这是一个全新的想法，很多人都很容易拒绝 Twitter。

> `[00:12:46]` So with SFE you\'ll tell the story of how you ended up investing in Twitter.

`[00:12:46]` 有了 SFE，你会讲述你是如何在 Twitter 上投资的。

> Sure that\'s a funny story with a way it is with V Angel though we invest in in the entrepreneur first.

当然，这是一个有趣的故事，虽然我们首先投资的是企业家，但 V 天使也是如此。

> `[00:13:00]` We invest in the human being and all of our biggest successes is when we said hey wow that\'s a really forward thinking idea but let\'s go run with it.

`[00:13:00]` 我们投资于人类，我们最大的成功是当我们说嗨，哇，这是一个非常前瞻的想法，但让我们继续努力吧。

> I love that entrepreneur.

我喜欢那个企业家。

> I want to invest in every one of their companies.

我想投资他们的每一家公司。

> So so when I invest in an entrepreneur I\'m investing for life unless they do something wrong.

因此，当我投资于一位企业家时，我将终生投资，除非他们做错了什么。

> I want to invest for example in Shawn Fanning\'s sixth startup airtime.

例如，我想投资于肖恩·范宁(ShawnFning)的第六个创业时间。

> So for me it\'s it\'s a lifelong commitment.

所以对我来说，这是一种终生的承诺。

> It makes it more interesting when you have this awesome relationship with a founder where they know me like a book and I know them like a book so we can move fast and give each other advice.

当你和一位创始人建立了一段令人敬畏的关系时，他们就像一本书一样了解我，而我就像一本书一样了解他们，这样我们就能快速行动，给对方建议。

> So you invested in Odeo right.

所以你投资了 Odeo 对吧。

> Yeah.

嗯

> So back to Twitter.

回到推特。

> Back to Twitter I invested in Odeo with Evan Williams and his team Jack Dorsey was part of that team.

回到 Twitter，我与 EvanWilliams 和他的团队投资了 Odeo，杰克·多尔西也是这个团队的一员。

> So is Biz Stone and ODEIO didn\'t work out and Odeo was in an incubator called ObviousCorp.

BizStone 和 ODEIO 也没有成功，Odeo 也在一个名为 ObviousCorp 的孵化器里。

> So it is a classical innovator incubator who had like four or five projects going on Twitter was one of those other projects.

所以，这是一个经典的创新者孵化器，在 Twitter 上有四五个项目，也是其他项目之一。

> Jack was the father of the Twitter project and Odeo ended up shutting down.

杰克是 Twitter 项目的父亲，Odeo 最终被关闭。

> `[00:14:21]` Evan Williams was magnanimous to the investors and gave the investors their money back.

埃文·威廉姆斯对投资者宽宏大量，把他们的钱还给了投资者。

> Here\'s an entrepreneur.

这是一位企业家。

> Felt so bad and he had made a little bit of money not a ton of money certainly not enough to give your money back.

他感到很难过，他赚了一点钱，没有一吨钱，当然也不足以把你的钱还给你。

> He made a little bit of money selling Blogger to Google but he he felt an obligation to pay the investors back and I said this is going to sit in the bank until your next one and the next one was Twitter.

他把博客卖给谷歌，赚了点钱，但他觉得有义务回报投资者，我说过，这会一直呆在银行里，直到你的下一个博客，下一个是推特(Twitter)。

> So I invested 75 K in Twitter site on scene zero due diligence because I believed in that entrepreneur and then I got to know Jack and and look at Twitter today.

所以我在 Twitter 网站上投入了 75K，因为我相信这位企业家，然后我认识了杰克，今天看了 Twitter。

> `[00:15:01]` So you just you were already signed up for Twitter.

`[00:15:01]` 你刚刚注册了 Twitter。

> I was free where it was three three boarded on that airplane.

在那架飞机上有三个人登上的地方我是自由的。

> That\'s what I called betting on foul with no with no questions asked.

这就是我所谓的下注犯规，不问任何问题。

> What did you think of Twitter as an idea.

你认为 Twitter 是什么想法。

> Guess what.

猜猜看

> Never.

绝不可能

> `[00:15:20]` Never argue with the metrics.

`[00:15:20]` 永远不要与度量标准争论。

> So Twitter.

所以推特。

> It wasn\'t long before Twitter\'s growth rate on users and numbers of tweets was straight up there just now revenues going to catch up with it.

不久之后，Twitter 在用户上的增长速度和推特的数量都直线上升，而现在，Twitter 的收入将迎头赶上。

> It\'s going to be an awesome company but I never argue with growth so whenever we see a company that\'s growing at a thousand percent a month and in the early days when you\'re successful you will grow at a thousand percent a month because going from one users to 10 users.

这将是一家了不起的公司，但我从来不反对增长，所以每当我们看到一家公司以每月 1000%的速度增长，在你成功的初期，你就会因为从一个用户增加到 10 个用户而每月增长百分之一。

> But if if they\'re happy users and there\'s word of mouth because Twitter never advertise and there\'s good word of mouth and good PR that\'s the greatest company you can get.

但如果用户很满意，因为 Twitter 从来不做广告，而且有好的口碑和公关，那么这是你能得到的最好的公司。

> Look at the growth of Google.

看看谷歌的发展。

> Google was the very same way.

谷歌也是如此。

> `[00:16:10]` So Twitter you thought basically I don\'t know what this thing is.

`[00:16:10]` 所以 Twitter 你认为基本上我不知道这是什么。

> The graphs seem to be going about it.

这些图表似乎正在进行中。

> But yeah but it\'s growing which means users like it which means it\'s going to be successful.

但是的，但是它正在增长，这意味着用户喜欢它，这意味着它将是成功的。

> `[00:16:19]` There must be something there because if you look at Google Facebook and Twitter none of them had any idea what the monetization outcome was going to be.

`[00:16:19]` 一定有一些东西，因为如果你看看谷歌，Facebook 和 Twitter，他们都不知道货币化的结果会是什么。

> All they focused on was happy users and getting lots of them quickly.

他们所关注的只是快乐的用户，很快就能得到很多用户。

> And that ends up that\'s a great strategy.

最后那是个很好的策略。

> That\'s what Ben Silverman is doing at Pinterest today.

这就是本？西尔弗曼今天在 Pinterest 所做的事情。

> `[00:16:40]` They just knew that there was an important problem to be solved and they sort of had faith they would be able to make money somehow of course.

`[00:16:40]` 他们只是知道有一个重要的问题需要解决，他们有信心，他们当然能够赚钱。

> `[00:16:47]` And now Google is the one who probably took the biggest risk because now Ben can at least look back to Google Facebook and Twitter and say wow they made sure they had like a hundred million happy users and then they thought about monetization and you actually don\'t need to think about monetization that much.

`[00:16:47]` 现在谷歌可能是冒最大风险的人，因为现在 Ben 至少可以回顾谷歌的 Facebook 和 Twitter，并说哇，他们确保拥有大约一亿快乐的用户，然后他们考虑了货币化，而你实际上不需要考虑那么多货币化。

> Once you get to 100 million users gives you time to figure out hey wait a minute you know there\'s there\'s ways to turn this into a really viable business.

一旦你有了 1 亿用户，你就有时间去弄清楚，嘿，等一下，你知道有办法把它变成一家真正可行的企业。

> `[00:17:16]` So  `[00:17:16]` when Larry and Sergei were starting out doing Google they really didn\'t have they didn\'t know how they were going to make money.

所以`[00:17:16]` 拉里和谢尔盖刚开始做谷歌的时候，他们真的不知道该如何赚钱。

> `[00:17:23]` No not at all.

`[00:17:23]` 不，一点也不。

> I still have Google\'s first ten page investor slide deck and you get to the last page and it says thank you it doesn\'t.

我还有谷歌前十页的投资者幻灯片，你可以看到最后一页，上面写着“谢谢”-它没有。

> `[00:17:37]` It does not have the spreadsheet that is usually the last page.

`[00:17:37]` 它没有通常是最后一页的电子表格。

> `[00:17:42]` Yeah.

`[00:17:42]` 是的。

> And they were not apologetic about it.

他们并没有为此道歉。

> They said we have awesome technology and it will lead to monetization and we\'re not going to tell you something we don\'t know because we don\'t know how we\'re going to monetize it.

他们说我们有超棒的技术，它将导致货币化，我们不会告诉你一些我们不知道的事情，因为我们不知道我们将如何将它货币化。

> They were very honest about it and that was a novel thing in those days that was very novel and that\'s why people misconstrued that as arrogance when in fact Larry and Serguei were just being really bluntly honest with the investors that came in to see them.

他们对此非常诚实，这在当时是一件很新奇的事，这也是为什么人们把它误解为傲慢，而实际上，拉里和塞尔盖只是对前来看他们的投资者非常坦率地诚实。

> They were like hey if you look at our search results and they were so much better than the prior search engine which I was an investor in Ask Jeeves you know if you can\'t figure that out you\'re crazy.

如果你看一下我们的搜索结果，它们会比我以前的搜索引擎要好得多，我是 AskJeeves 的投资者，你知道如果你不知道你是不是疯了。

> Now I know I figured it out and I knew Ask Jeeves really well the minute we started doing Google searches when we went in to see Larry and Serguei we we said hey can one of our guys play with the search engine.

现在我知道我明白了，我知道，当我们开始谷歌搜索的时候，当我们去看拉里和塞尔盖的时候，我就知道问吉维斯，我们中的一个人能和搜索引擎一起玩吗？

> While I talked to Larry and Sergei and just because Google said we\'re based on relevance and page rank those are really easy words today.

当我和拉里和谢尔盖交谈的时候，就因为谷歌说我们是基于相关性和页面排名的，所以今天这些词都很简单。

> But back in 1997 when you said I have a search engine based on page rank if other people like that page and they they springboard off of that page then that page must be awfully good.

但早在 1997 年，你说我有一个基于页面排名的搜索引擎，如果其他人喜欢这个页面，然后他们跳板，那么这个页面一定是非常好的。

> So I\'m going to send more people to the pages that people like.

所以我会派更多的人到人们喜欢的网页上。

> And and it was all motivated by relevancy.

而且所有的动机都是相关的。

> `[00:19:20]` So what did you think when you first met them.

`[00:19:20]` 当你第一次见到他们的时候，你是怎么想的。

> Where did you first meet them.

你第一次见到他们是在哪里。

> Do you remember.

你还记得吗。

> `[00:19:24]` Oh of course I do on University Avenue.

`[00:19:24]` 哦，我当然在大学大道上。

> They had moved out of the garage in Menlo Park into the office lesy office the lucky office this is where people thought I was.

他们已经从门罗公园的车库搬到了办公室，这间幸运的办公室，人们以为我在那里。

> And then I think danger after that which is now Android was in that one office saw I actually heard about Google through David Cheriton who is a very famous Stanford professor and a founder himself.

然后我认为，在那之后的危险，也就是现在的 Android 就在那个办公室里，我通过大卫·切里顿(DavidCheriton)听说过谷歌，他是斯坦福大学的一位非常著名的教授，也是

> We were at a holiday party six months before I actually met Larry and Sergei and I said Hey you\'re on the you\'re in the labs at Stanford.

在我见到拉里和谢尔盖的六个月前，我们在一个假日派对上，我说，嘿，你在斯坦福的实验室里。

> You know what\'s cooking there.

你知道那里在做什么。

> David was an investor in our fund and we said all of our investors you know a David you can invest in the fund but you got to tell us when you see something interesting so at this Christmas party we were both in tuxedos and we both hate tuxedos.

大卫是我们基金的投资者，我们说我们所有的投资者，你知道，大卫，你可以投资这个基金，但你要告诉我们，当你看到有趣的东西，所以在圣诞晚会上，我们都穿着晚礼服，我们都讨厌晚礼服。

> I said to get our mind off this.

我说了让我们别再想这件事了。

> `[00:20:24]` Tell me about what\'s going on at Stanford to get your mind off the uncomfortable tuxedo.

`[00:20:24]` 告诉我斯坦福大学发生了什么事，让你从不舒服的燕尾服中解脱出来。

> Yes.

是

> That\'s how it all started.

一切都是这样开始的。

> Yes it did.

是的。

> `[00:20:34]` And he said There\'s this company called back Rob.

`[00:20:34]` 他说有一家公司叫罗布回来。

> But they\'re not ready to see you yet but when they are you know all.

但他们还没准备好见你，但他们都知道了。

> I\'ll introduce you.

我来介绍你。

> `[00:20:43]` Did he say you should invest is going to be the biggest.

`[00:20:43]` 他有没有说你应该投资将是最大的。

> Oh yeah.

哦，是的

> Edgy company in a decade.

十年后的新公司。

> `[00:20:48]` David Cheriton was the one who said the two magic words page rank and relevance and back in 1997 those were not buzz words.

大卫·切里顿说了两个神奇的词-页面排名和相关性-而早在 1997 年，这些词就不是热门词了。

> Those were like hey talk to me about.

就像跟我说。

> And then he explained what what they meant.

然后他解释了他们的意思。

> `[00:21:01]` So what did you think of Larry and Sergei when you met him.

`[00:21:01]` 当你遇见拉里和谢尔盖时，你觉得他怎么样？

> Did they seem like they were going to be super successful.

他们看上去会超级成功吗。

> Oh as soon as you met them and this was like a historic historic company.

哦，一旦你遇到他们，这就像一家历史悠久的公司。

> `[00:21:11]` Well because we\'ve invested in 650 companies by then it was probably 300 companies in 1997.

`[00:21:11]` 因为那时我们已经投资了 650 家公司，1997 年大概有 300 家公司。

> You had a good read on entrepreneurs.

你对企业家有很好的了解。

> And keep in mind for every company we invest in we say no to 30.

记住，对于我们投资的每一家公司，我们都会拒绝 30 家。

> So we we see a lot of entrepreneurs.

所以我们看到很多企业家。

> So what I saw was two on two entrepreneurs that were great scientists but very very strategic and determined.

所以，我看到的是两位企业家，他们都是伟大的科学家，但非常有策略和决心。

> Because they said to me once they said hey we want you to invest.

因为他们对我说，“嗨，我们要你投资。”

> They said hey you have to go get Mike Moritz to invest in our company.

他们说你得去找迈克·莫里茨来投资我们公司。

> So you introduced I introduced you to to Google in that round and ice and I said Hey Mike Mars is a great guy.

所以你介绍给我，我把你介绍给谷歌，在那一轮和冰，我说，嘿，迈克，火星是一个伟大的家伙。

> Why.

为什么

> What made you pick him.

是什么让你选择了他。

> Oh he\'s on the board of Yahoo.

哦，他是雅虎董事会的成员。

> And one of the Yahoo search do you get to bootstrap this company.

其中一个雅虎搜索，你可以引导这家公司。

> Because at the time they\'re out of Vista was the search engine they had to displace an incumbent.

因为当他们离开 Vista 的时候，他们不得不取代现有的搜索引擎。

> And they said to do that we\'ve got to do two.

他们说要这么做我们得做两个。

> We\'ve got to do two big OEM deals.

我们得做两笔大的 OEM 交易。

> Yahoo\'s one more so arrange that for us if we get em and that happened.

雅虎是另外一家，所以如果我们得到了他们，就为我们安排一下，这样的事情就发生了。

> And then they were already talking to John door at that at kepi and I didn\'t have to figure out the door Bpeace door andK.P.

然后他们已经和约翰门在 kepi 谈了，我不需要弄清楚门，BPeace 门和 K.P。

> were on the board of AOL.

是美国在线的董事会成员。

> `[00:22:37]` And so they got Google and Kleiner in that first round because they were on the boards of AOL and Yahoo respectively.

`[00:22:37]` 所以他们在第一轮中得到了谷歌和凯鹏华盈，因为他们分别是美国在线和雅虎的董事会成员。

> Yes which is boy.

是的，哪个是男孩。

> `[00:22:45]` Yes.

`[00:22:45]` 是的。

> And that.

还有那个。

> OK.

好的

> So once they got both to agree to invest then kepi didn\'t want Secoya and Sequoia didn\'t want kepi that took a month of wrangling and Larian Serguei.

因此，一旦他们双方都同意投资，凯皮就不想要塞科亚和红杉，不想要一个月的争吵和拉里安·塞尔盖(LarianSerguei)的凯皮(Kepi)。

> You almost got the whole deal you almost got the whole deal ourselves.

你几乎得到了全部交易，我们自己也几乎得到了全部交易。

> After a month Larry and Serguei said.

一个月后拉里和塞尔盖说。

> Now after a month Google is exploding.

现在，在一个月后，谷歌正在爆炸。

> You can tell that this is a technology that people are going to use for 50 years.

你可以看出，这是一种人们将使用 50 年的技术。

> And Google\'s 14 years old now and Larry and Sergei got exasperated and they called me one Friday and they said hey Yuto the first day I went in there I said hey let\'s do a quick 10 million dollar round all lead it and I\'m an angel investor.

谷歌现在 14 岁了，拉里和谢尔盖生气了，他们在一个星期五打电话给我，他们说嘿，Yuto，我第一天去那里，我说，嘿，让我们做一个一千万美元的快速循环，所有这一切都是由我领导的，我是一个天使投资者。

> But I knew for this technology we we could round up the money and syndicate that and they said hey you said you said a month ago you can do that can you do it.

但我知道，对于这项技术，我们可以把钱集中起来，然后联合起来。他们说，嘿，你一个月前说过，你能做到的。

> I said I can do it by Monday.

我说我星期一就能搞定。

> And I actually believed it because then I knew even more about the company and the quality of these two founders.

我相信这一点，因为那时我对公司和这两位创始人的素质了解得更多了。

> But I did call KPN Sequoia and I said hey these founders are very determined they\'re going to do it with your we\'re not bullshit artists.

但我确实给 KPN 红杉公司打了电话，我说，嘿，这些创始人非常坚定，他们会和你们一起做这件事，我们不是胡说八道的艺术家。

> They really are telling you it\'s over on Monday.

他们真的告诉你星期一就结束了。

> And I told them why I said I\'m going to do the funding myself.

我告诉他们为什么我说我要自己做资金。

> If you guys can\'t you know get.

如果你们不能\你们不知道。

> `[00:24:17]` This is this is possibly the most generous moment in the history of Silicon Valley.

`[00:24:17]` 这可能是硅谷历史上最慷慨的时刻。

> Can I just I just not made that call right.

我能不能别打错电话了。

> Of course there\'s a lot of people in this venture business who have made the call and said Oh yeah they\'re bullshitting.

当然，在这个风投行业里，有很多人打过电话说，哦，是的，他们在胡说八道。

> `[00:24:29]` Don\'t worry they have no option except you guys are here.

`[00:24:29]` 别担心，除了你们，他们别无选择。

> They know they\'d read about it around here\'s another here\'s another.

他们知道他们会在这附近读到这件事。

> `[00:24:37]` Your wife thinks you\'re crazy.

你妻子认为你疯了。

> So so Friday I called John door and Mike Moretz said it\'s over on Monday.

所以星期五我给约翰门打了电话，迈克？莫雷茨说星期一就结束了。

> `[00:24:47]` Sure enough it only took them just Saturday morning.

`[00:24:47]` 足够肯定的是，他们只花了星期六早上的时间。

> I know exactly what effect that I got.

我很清楚我有什么效果。

> `[00:24:55]` I was sitting in a Starbucks in foster city.

`[00:24:55]` 我坐在寄养城的一家星巴克里。

> I don\'t know what street it was on.

我不知道它在哪条街。

> And I got the calls and I put so close the cell phone and I said to my wife this is history.

我接到电话，把手机关得那么近，我对我妻子说，这是历史。

> And she said really.

她说真的。

> I said yes.

我答应了。

> The funding of like the biggest company ever is going to happen.

像最大的公司一样的资金将会发生。

> So you knew it you knew it.

所以你就知道你知道。

> I knew it.

我就知道。

> Like today is today that they themselves.

就像今天他们自己。

> `[00:25:33]` I don\'t always know it.

`[00:25:33]` 我并不总是知道。

> `[00:25:36]` Yeah.

`[00:25:36]` 是的。

> You know with Facebook.

你知道在 Facebook 上。

> That\'s what I wanted to say.

这就是我想说的。

> Yeah I I did not get Facebook.

是的，我没拿到脸书。

> But.

但

> But.

但

> I get growth and growth is the lifeblood of innovation.

我得到了成长，成长是创新的命脉。

> And every time I met with Zach and Sean Parker who was the president then I met Facebook through Parker because we had gone through the Napster experience together.

每次我见到扎克和肖恩·帕克时，我都是通过帕克认识 Facebook 的，因为我们一起经历了纳普斯特的经历。

> The growth was like this and I said you can\'t argue with metrics every time you met them the numbers were different and they were right way way up to the right and they were doing all the right things.

增长是这样的，我说你不能每次遇到他们的时候都和度量标准争论，数字是不同的，他们是正确的，他们在做所有正确的事情。

> What did you think of Mark the first time you met him.

你第一次见到马克时觉得他怎么样。

> I met him at university Cafe in in Palo Alto.

我在帕洛阿尔托的大学咖啡厅见过他。

> It was just him and I.

只有他和我。

> Even though Sean Parker introduced us I\'ve never told this before.

虽然肖恩·帕克介绍了我们，但我从未告诉过我们。

> You sure you want to.

你确定你想。

> Yeah.

嗯

> `[00:26:38]` OK.

`[00:26:38]` 好的。

> Go ahead.

您先请

> Number one I think everyone knows Sean Parker is an edgy person.

第一，我想大家都知道肖恩·帕克是个脾气暴躁的人。

> And so I want to just tell Zuck even though I didn\'t even I had never met Zach.

所以我想告诉扎克，即使我从来没有见过扎克。

> `[00:26:50]` Hey your prison is pretty edgy.

`[00:26:50]` 嘿，你的监狱很紧张。

> `[00:26:52]` So I just want to tell you that without him here and Zach to his credit said Yeah I have figured that out.

`[00:26:52]` 所以我只想告诉你，没有他在这里，扎克对他的功劳说：是的，我已经弄清楚了。

> `[00:27:01]` Zooks 19 years old at the time and Parkers maybe 20 or 21 Parkers probably a few years older than Zach and Zach goes Yeah I figured that out was kind of a rocky start because it was like Oh OK.

`[00:27:01]` 当时 19 岁的 Zooks 和 Parkers 可能比 Zach 和 Zach 大几岁，是的，我觉得这是个艰难的开始，因为这就像哦，好吧。

> So let\'s move and Zack was like let\'s move on.

所以让我们行动，扎克就像让我们继续前进。

> You know what.

你知道吗。

> What can you help Facebook do.

你能帮 Facebook 做什么。

> And one of the huge things that SUV Angel does is help companies get funded.

SUV 天使所做的一件大事就是帮助公司获得资金。

> We help Google with their funding issue help Twitter with their funding issues especially in the benchmark round.

我们帮助谷歌解决他们的资金问题，帮助 Twitter 解决他们的资金问题，特别是在基准回合中。

> So did you get involved with Facebook.

你和 Facebook 有关系吗。

> DC right.

右转。

> Oh yeah yeah.

哦，是的。

> So they had taken the PTO money and they were getting ready to do the V C round.

因此，他们已经拿了 PTO 的钱，他们正在准备做 VC 一轮。

> So and Sean Parker because of Napster knew that as well.

所以肖恩·帕克因为纳普斯特也知道这一点。

> Angel investors at the time that we could really help work with all these vaccines and get them to close around quickly and efficiently because the process can be really painful if you know enough forcing functions you essentially orchestrate a bidding war.

天使投资者当时真的可以帮助我们处理所有这些疫苗，让他们迅速而有效地结束，因为如果你知道足够多的话，这个过程可能会很痛苦，迫使功能，你基本上策划了一场竞价战。

> And I with Facebook.

我和 Facebook 在一起。

> No I did not.

不，我没有。

> No I we triaged the list of about 20 vaccines that we wanted to go to.

不，我们对我们想要去的大约 20 种疫苗进行了分类。

> They were already talking to the Washington Post Don Graham Don Graham offered a 50 million valuation and Zerkin Parker called me when they got out of the office.

他们已经和“华盛顿邮报”谈过了，唐·格雷厄姆(DonGraham)提供了 5000 万英镑的估值，泽尔金·帕克(Zerkin Parker)离开办公室后

> Ron Ron we got a 50 million dollar valuation from from Don Graham.

罗恩，我们从唐·格雷厄姆那里得到了五千万美元的估价。

> I got a go back in.

我又进去了。

> I don\'t think you heard him right.

我觉得你听错了。

> I bet she said five million.

我打赌她说了五百万。

> Now no he said 50 million.

现在不，他说了五千万。

> I said hurry up and get it to happen.

我说快点让它发生。

> So in this case I didn\'t need to do anything in that process.

所以在这个过程中，我不需要做任何事情。

> Jim Bryer was looking at the company and decided to offer 80 million.

吉姆·布里耶(JimBryer)正看着这家公司，决定出价 8000 万英镑。

> I think it was 80 million pre 90 million post which you know that that was the rebirth of Excel right there after the bubble.

我想这是九千万篇文章中的八千万篇，你知道，这是 Excel 在泡沫之后的重生。

> `[00:29:15]` So Jim where did the funding that was that Google\'s pre money series A Google\'s free money was 75 million free.

`[00:29:15]` 那么 Jim，Google 的预付费系列 A 的免费资金是 7500 万美元，在哪里呢？

> Do you think it was a coincidence.

你觉得这是巧合吗。

> There was a little more at Facebook.

Facebook 上还有更多。

> Yeah I would say it\'s a coincidence.

是的，我会说这是个巧合。

> `[00:29:29]` All right.

`[00:29:29]` 好的。

> If I want to sucker over to take my money I would offer them a little bit more than good.

如果我想吸走我的钱，我会给他们多一点好处。

> `[00:29:37]` Free on brand was it Facebook first.

`[00:29:37]` 自由品牌是 Facebook 的第一大品牌。

> And I I always felt bad.

我总是感觉很糟糕。

> And Don Graham was a gentleman about saying hey Excel is offering 30 million more than me.

唐·格雷厄姆是个绅士，他说：“嗨，Excel 比我多出 3000 万美元。”

> Excel should be easy and fast forward five years Don Gram\'s on the board of Facebook today which I think is awesome because Don Gramm was a mentor to Mark Zuckerberg in the early days.

Excel 应该是轻松而快速的，五年前唐·格拉姆(DonGram)在 Facebook 的董事会工作，我认为这很棒，因为唐·格拉姆(DonGramm)在早期曾是马克·扎克伯格的导师。

> Did any BCSC network went and spent two weeks at the post just following Don Graham around while the company was growing like a weed.

是否有任何 BCSC 网络在公司像杂草一样长的时候，跟随唐·格雷厄姆(DonGraham)，在邮报上呆了两个星期。

> Because he wanted to see what a CEO did.

因为他想看看 CEO 做了什么。

> `[00:30:16]` And he followed suit in the journalism business.

`[00:30:16]` 他在新闻业也是这样。

> Yeah.

嗯

> So was I going to ask kind of completely forgotten I was surprised by that.

所以我要问的是，我完全忘记了，我对此感到惊讶。

> Oh yes.

哦，是的。

> Did say no to Facebook in that round yeah any I said no that is not going to work.

在那一轮中对 Facebook 说了不，是的，我说了，不，那是行不通的。

> Oh no I have the e-mails.

哦，不，我有电子邮件。

> `[00:30:38]` And I am not naming them.

`[00:30:38]` 我不给他们起名字。

> OK.

好的

> Now I want to ask you.

现在我想问你。

> `[00:30:42]` Privately hey this is really this is really early days.

`[00:30:42]` 私下里嘿，这真是太早了。

> Yeah.

嗯

> Did they say no because they didn\'t believe in the business.

他们说不是因为他们不相信这一行。

> What did they say no because the price was too high.

因为价格太高，他们拒绝了什么？

> No I did not believe in the business.

不，我不相信这个生意。

> This is wacky like the social network for college dude.

这就像大学男生的社交网络一样古怪。

> Yeah right.

对。

> Like who cares.

比如谁在乎。

> So let\'s see them do you do you know incidentally what multiple you got on Google.

那么让我们看看他们，你知道你在 Google 上的倍数是多少吗？

> It was Google Google.

是谷歌。

> `[00:31:13]` Goog.

`[00:31:13]` 

> I don\'t think so.

我不这么认为。

> No no.

不，不。

> `[00:31:21]` Roughly three.

`[00:31:21]` 大概三点。

> Three hundred to one.

三百比一。

> Three hundred.

三百。

> That\'s right.

那是正确的。

> If you sold it the all time high you would get like 700 dollars for each dollar you invested.

如果你把它卖到历史高点，你每投资一美元就能得到 700 美元。

> Some high might be in the future.

未来可能会有一些高企。

> Yes the all time high for Google is definitely in the future.

是的，谷歌的历史高点肯定是在未来。

> `[00:31:40]` Do you think Larry and Sergey knew that they were gonna be that big.

`[00:31:40]` 你认为拉里和谢尔盖知道他们会这么大吗？

> `[00:31:46]` No definitely not.

`[00:31:46]` 不，绝对不是。

> Which makes me think of a story can I.

这让我想起了一个故事。

> Yes.

是

> How are we doing on time.

我们准时过得怎么样。

> `[00:31:55]` We\'re minutes.

`[00:31:55]` 我们只剩几分钟了。

> You bet.

行!没问题

> This is a good story so.

这是个很好的故事。

> So Ben Horowitz showed his picture with Warren Buffett.

因此，本·霍洛维茨向沃伦·巴菲特展示了他的照片。

> `[00:32:06]` At a party at my home when he talked.

`[00:32:06]` 在我家的一个聚会上，他说话的时候。

> `[00:32:09]` It was his first slide.

`[00:32:09]` 这是他的第一张幻灯片。

> Iran is running secretly behind everything at that at that they\'re attending that party along with with Ben.

伊朗正在暗中操纵一切，因为他们和本一起参加了那次聚会。

> `[00:32:23]` This party was sponsored by Angel investors at the time which was my fund at the time.

`[00:32:23]` 这个聚会当时是由天使投资人赞助的，当时是我的基金。

> And we had in our yard every internet person known to man including Sean Parker Shawn Fanning and Larry and Serguei.

在我们的院子里，包括肖恩·帕克、肖恩·范宁、拉里和塞尔盖在内的所有人都认识我们。

> And it was in 1998.

那是在 1998 年。

> Let\'s say so google was like one year old Napster probably a year and a half old and the day of this party Napster was at its all time high.

让我们说，Google 就像一年前的 Napster，大概有一年半了，而这次聚会的那一天，Napster 达到了空前的高度。

> Forty million users Sean Parker has been on the cover of every major magazine in America.

肖恩·帕克(SeanParker)在美国的每一本主要杂志的封面上都有 4000 万用户。

> Within three weeks and major magazines in America don\'t put the same guy on the cover.

三个星期之内，美国的主要杂志就不会把同一个人放到封面上了。

> But Napster was so disruptive they said the hell with it.

但是纳普斯特是如此的混乱，他们说去死吧。

> This kid\'s got to go on the cover Shawn Fanning is really famous.

这孩子必须上封面肖恩范宁是真的很有名。

> He is the shyest person on the Earth not a malicious bone in his body.

他是地球上最害羞的人，而不是他身体里的一根恶意骨头。

> He had a keeper with them at the party even though I knew him really well.

虽然我很了解他，但他在晚会上还是有个看门人。

> He was like You know I don\'t like all this attention.

他就像你知道的我不喜欢这么多注意力。

> So Larry Larian Serguei say hey will you introduce us to.

拉里·拉里安·塞尔盖说，嘿，你能给我们介绍一下。

> Fanning I golf course I will.

范宁我的高尔夫球场我会的。

> Google is barely known.

谷歌几乎不为人所知。

> Probably a third of the people at this party he would say Google and they\'d say I\'ve heard it good.

在这个聚会上，他可能会说三分之一的人会说谷歌，他们会说我听得很好。

> You know what do they do.

你知道他们是做什么的。

> So I take them off when I say to Fanning I said this will be the biggest company on or some day because their search results are so accurate and so good.

所以，当我对范宁说，我说这将是最大的公司，或有一天，因为他们的搜索结果是如此准确和如此好，我就把它们摘掉。

> And Fanning is fascinated.

范宁被迷住了。

> Talks to him shake hands.

和他握手。

> We go.

我们走吧。

> We walk away.

我们走开。

> And Larry and Sergei follow me and I go.

拉里和谢尔盖跟着我就走。

> Is there somebody else you want to meet.

你还想见见其他人吗。

> They go No no we have to talk to you.

他们走了不我们得和你谈谈。

> They said it is so frustrating.

他们说这太令人沮丧了。

> We will we will never be famous like him.

我们永远不会像他那样出名。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> And they were looking at me like.

他们看着我就像。

> Tell us.

告诉我们。

> Were right.

都是对的。

> And I said You guys are so wrong because you\'re going to make money while this guy fights with the record labels.

我说你们错了，因为你们会赚钱的，而这家伙却在和唱片公司打架。

> `[00:34:42]` Let\'s  `[00:34:42]` not end on that.

`[00:34:42]` `[00:34:42]` 不要就此结束。

> No no no.

不不不。

> Won\'t.

不会的。

> And with that we\'ll end with the question everybody in this.

到此为止，我们将以这件事中的每一个人的问题结束。

> `[00:34:50]` Well a lot of people in audience probably want to know which is how do they get your money.

`[00:34:50]` 很多观众可能想知道他们是怎么得到你的钱的。

> Well you makes you want to invest in somebody.

你让你想投资于某个人。

> Well we invest in people first.

我们先投资人。

> `[00:35:00]` There will be people but they they have to they have to be people with personalities with drive they know it\'s 24 by 7.

`[00:35:00]` 会有人的，但他们必须是有动力的人，他们知道是 24 比 7。

> They have to be a leader because if you\'re going to build a big company you have to have enough charisma to get other people to work on your team.

他们必须是一个领导者，因为如果你要建立一个大公司，你必须有足够的魅力，让其他人在你的团队中工作。

> You\'ve got a Renoir what he\'s saying is yeah.

你有一个雷诺阿他说的是对的。

> So Andy termination what what Jessica talked about you you have to be completely fearless.

所以安迪终止了杰西卡所说的你必须无所畏惧。

> How can you tell when you meet somebody that they have these qualities.

当你遇到一个人时，你怎么知道他们有这些品质。

> In fact I want to be doing it so long that I can just tell after 10 minutes I\'ve made up my mind.

事实上，我想做的时间太长了，所以 10 分钟后我就知道了，我已经下定决心了。

> So the SVM you I have to keep saying hey I don\'t want to come across as rude but after 10 minutes I\'ve decided if I like the company or not because I\'m looking at the personality of the individual how can they build a great company.

所以，支持向量机，我必须一直说，嘿，我不想被视为粗鲁，但 10 分钟后，我决定我是否喜欢公司，因为我看的是个人的个性，他们如何才能建立一个伟大的公司。

> So there\'s like a 50 I\'m an algorithm in my brain that goes through like 50 traits that person\'s got it and you don\'t have this.

所以在我的大脑中有一种类似于 50 我的算法，它经历了一个人所拥有的 50 个特征，而你却没有这样的特性。

> I want to invest I don\'t I\'m not I really don\'t care what the company does today.

我想投资，我不是真的不在乎公司今天做什么。

> I want to invest in that entrepreneurs company like their sixth seventh a company.

我想投资那家企业家公司，就像他们的第六家第七家公司。

> You know it\'s a lifelong commitment.

你知道这是一种终生的承诺。

> I don\'t think other investors look at it that way.

我不认为其他投资者会这么看。

> It\'s not very useful advice either you got it or you don\'t.

无论你得到了还是没有得到它，这都不是很有用的建议。

> `[00:36:37]` No no no no no no no.

`[00:36:37]` 不，不。

> I\'m looking for traits that are all identifiable you know.

我在寻找你所知道的所有可以识别的特征。

> `[00:36:42]` Are you a good communicator.

`[00:36:42]` 你是个善于沟通的人吗？

> Are you a leader.

你是领导者吗。

> Are you driven.

你开车吗。

> You can tell that when you\'re talking to somebody.

当你和别人说话的时候你就知道了。

> `[00:36:48]` I suppose the good news is if the person has these traits even if they don\'t think they would necessarily make a good startup founders something like that you\'ll back them while they figure it out.

`[00:36:48]` 我想好消息是，如果一个人有这些特质，即使他们不认为他们一定会成为一个好的初创公司创始人，当他们想出办法的时候，你就会支持他们。

> Of course very well right.

当然很好。

> `[00:36:58]` Yeah that\'s as unique about as V Angel.

`[00:36:58]` 是的，这和 V 天使一样独特。

> The other thing is product focus.

另一件事是关注产品。

> So if you look at the success of Facebook and Pinterest and square these founders are focused on the product and they are focused on the product because they know if the products good they\'re gonna have a happy customer they care almost too much about it.

所以，如果你看看 Facebook 和 Pinterest 的成功，这些创始人关注的是产品，他们关注的是产品，因为他们知道如果产品好的话，他们会有一个快乐的客户，他们几乎太在意它了。

> You clearly never care too much craftsmen who really care.

很明显，你从来不关心那些真正在乎你的工匠。

> They are all graphs.

它们都是图表。

> You know in this day and age.

你知道在这个时代。

> So much of the success is about UI.

很多成功都是关于 UI 的。

> So if you look at Ben Silverman Jack Dorsey and Zuck they they care about happy users and in a perfect world they will go back in their Harvel and just make their product great.

所以，如果你看看本·西尔弗曼、杰克·多尔西和扎克，他们关心的是快乐的用户，在一个完美的世界里，他们会回到他们的哈维尔，让他们的产品变得更棒。

> They hate coming out in public takes them away from from the brass ring which is millions and millions of happy customers.

他们讨厌当众出柜，把他们从数百万快乐顾客的黄铜戒指上带走。

> `[00:38:07]` Robert there\'s no Q and A\'s we don\'t win outright on an awkward note.

`[00:38:07]` 罗伯特，我们没有问题，也没有 A，我们不能以尴尬的口吻彻底赢球。

> These press guys a gentleman.

这些记者是个绅士。

> Thanks Ron.

谢谢罗恩。
