# Chris Dixon at Startup School 2013  

> `[00:00:00]` So today I want to talk about good ideas or look like bad ideas.

`[00:00:00]` 所以今天我想谈谈好主意或者看起来像坏主意。

> So there\'s a great.

所以有个很棒的。

> `[00:00:07]` Clickers not working.

`[00:00:07]` 点击不工作。

> `[00:00:14]` Technical problems OK thanks.

`[00:00:14]` 技术问题好的，谢谢。

> So there\'s a greatP.G.

所以这里有个很棒的 P.G。

> blog post where he talks about Peter Teil came to talk.

他在博客上发表了关于彼得·泰尔的文章。

> `[00:00:26]` And he said basically there\'s two kinds of ideas.

`[00:00:26]` 他说，基本上有两种想法。

> There are good ideas and there are things that seem like bad ideas and most startups are in the sweet spot in the middle which are good ideas that seem like bad ideas.

有好的想法，有些东西看起来像是坏的想法，而大多数创业公司都处于中间的甜蜜地带，而好的想法似乎是坏的想法。

> Today I\'m going to basically expound on this idea a little bit.

今天，我将对这个概念做一些基本的阐述。

> So why good ideas like bad ideas.

那么为什么好的想法和坏的想法一样。

> The kind of the intuition is that good ideas that look like good ideas are already being worked on by academics governments and most of all kind of large companies.

这种直觉是，看起来像好主意的好主意已经被学术界、政府以及所有大公司所研究。

> So for example you know I want a smartphone that has 10x the battery life and a better screen and more apps and everything else.

例如，你知道我想要一部电池寿命 10 倍的智能手机，更好的屏幕，更多的应用程序等等。

> Apple and Samsung and everyone else are hard at work on that.

苹果(Apple)、三星(Samsung)和其他所有人都在努力工作。

> So by definition you know we investors and entrepreneurs are kind of in the business of the leftovers of the things that everyone else thinks are bad ideas but that we think are you know we discover actually good ideas and I\'m going to give some me start some sort of high profile historical example so it\'s hard to to sort of imagine this now but back in I think it was 98 when Google first launched they were actually very late to the search engine world at the time.

所以从定义上来说，你知道我们投资者和企业家在某种程度上是在做其他人认为是不好的想法的剩菜，但我们认为我们发现了真正的好主意吗？我会给一些我一个高调的历史例子，所以现在很难想象这一点，但我认为。谷歌第一次推出的时候已经是 98 岁了，当时他们进入搜索引擎领域的时间已经很晚了。

> The search search was dominated by large portals like Yahoo and Lykos and excite and they actually thought of search as kind of a loss leader.

搜索被雅虎和 Lykos 这样的大型门户网站所主导，他们认为搜索是一种失败的领导者。

> The real business was being a portal and and putting display ads everywhere.

真正的生意是一个门户网站，到处都是展示广告。

> In fact if you go back and look at all of the literature at the time people are sort of the media the press reports and things like this.

事实上，如果你回顾一下当时的所有文献，人们都是某种程度上的媒体，媒体报道，诸如此类的东西。

> Everyone was talking about stickiness stickiness was kind of the key and it was like sort of today it would be like vitality or whatever some of the sort of things everyone is trying to have.

每个人都在谈论粘性，这是关键，就像今天一样，它会像活力，或者任何其他的东西，都是每个人都想要的。

> You want it sticking this mutable stuck on your Web site so that you can show them more ads.

你想让它把这个可变的东西粘在你的网站上，这样你就可以给他们看更多的广告。

> Google was the opposite of it it was so incredibly good at finding the right search results that people would immediately leave the Web site and in fact there\'s a famous anecdote where the Google guys were trying to when they first started off trying to sell their technology for like a million dollars to one of the large portals in the city of large portal tried out like this works too well.

与之相反的是，谷歌非常擅长找到正确的搜索结果，以至于人们会立即离开这个网站。事实上，有一件著名的轶事是，谷歌的家伙们刚开始尝试把自己的技术以 100 万美元的价格卖给大门户城市的一个大型门户网站，这种做法效果太好了。

> The problem is people are going to leave my site.

问题是人们会离开我的网站。

> Can you make it work less well.

你能让它不那么好用吗？

> And like actually give me bad results is a true story.

就像实际给我的坏结果是一个真实的故事。

> And so the point is that Google came in.

所以重点是谷歌进来了。

> I mean obviously Google had an amazing technology but in some ways their insight was actually this very contrarian business idea of getting people off the Web site and that no one had any idea how they\'d make money.

我的意思是，谷歌显然拥有一项令人惊叹的技术，但在某些方面，他们的洞察力实际上是一个非常相反的商业想法，即让人们离开网站，而没有人知道他们是如何赚钱的。

> No oneV.C.

没有单人越野车。

> who went to visit the house of the Google founders were staying there working.

他去拜访了谷歌创始人的家，一直呆在那里工作。

> `[00:03:03]` They were kind of the garage and actually snuck out the back.

`[00:03:03]` 他们是那种车库，实际上是偷偷溜出后面的。

> So he wouldn\'t have to meet somebody who working on a search engine because you why such an obviously bad idea.

这样他就不用去见一个在搜索引擎上工作的人了，因为你为什么会有这样一个明显的坏主意。

> `[00:03:11]` Another good example here is Airbnb Inbee which we all know now is one of the great successes of our modern startup era and because course came from my C and D when it first started off seemed to most people like this kind of weird niche kind of hipster activity something that maybe you\'d see in like the Missioner of Brooklyn or something like this you know like who\'s going to stay on someone else\'s couch you know.

`[00:03:11]` 另一个很好的例子是 Airbnb In 蜜蜂，我们现在都知道它是我们现代创业时代的巨大成功之一，因为它起源于我的 C 和 D，当它刚开始的时候，对大多数人来说，似乎就像这种奇怪的利基式的嬉皮士活动-也许你会在布鲁克林的传教士那里看到，或者类似这样的东西-你知道。你知道谁会呆在别人的沙发上。

> You know lots of great people investors who you know and sort of industry observers who\'ve been very smart about things all thought this is sort of this weird niche behavior and you know it\'s jury\'s still out but it seems as if it\'s on its way to being kind of almost a replacement to the hotel industry.

你知道很多很棒的人，你认识的投资者，还有一些行业观察家，他们都认为这是一种奇怪的利基行为，你也知道这还没有定论，但似乎它正在走向一个替代酒店业的道路上。

> `[00:03:53]` It is another one which maybe this crowd is a little bit going back in time but it\'s hard to imagine now but when they first came out the you know the Internet had just started.

`[00:03:53]` 这是另一个人，也许这群人有点倒流，但现在很难想象，但当他们第一次出来的时候，你知道互联网才刚刚开始。

> It just you know just been invented a few years ago and or at least commercialized a few years ago and to most people it looked like.

你知道，它是几年前发明的，或者至少是几年前商业化的，对大多数人来说，它就像。

> `[00:04:14]` Why would you want to go and take stuff out of your attic and stuff you\'d sell in a garage sale and sell it online like lawn gnomes and all this kind of stuff is basically.

`[00:04:14]` 为什么你想把你阁楼里的东西拿出来，你在车库里卖的东西，然后像草坪侏儒一样在网上卖，所有这些东西基本上都是。

> So it seemed like one to be kind of a niche weird behavior too by the way that was before there were kind of these modern ways to do online payments like PayPal.

因此，这似乎也是一种利基怪诞的行为，就像以前有类似贝宝(PayPal)这样的现代在线支付方式一样。

> So you literally like the idea was I\'m going to put my long Gnome on the web someone to across in Florida or something is going to buy it and they\'re going to send me a check through the mail.

所以你真的很喜欢这样的想法：我要把我的长 Gnome 放到网上，有人在佛罗里达横穿它，或者有什么东西要买它，他们会通过邮件给我寄一张支票。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Which just seemed kind of like a preposterous thing and actually a funny side anecdote is the founder here Omidyar.

这看起来就像是一件荒谬的事情，其实有趣的是奥米迪亚的创始人。

> It was sort of a hobbyist who had a bunch of different interests.

这是一个有着不同兴趣的狂热者。

> And when he pitched easy he was showing his sort of personal homepage.

当他说的很简单的时候，他是在展示他的个人主页。

> And one of his interest was the Ebola virus.

他的兴趣之一是埃博拉病毒。

> So from what I\'ve heard from that he sees that the pitch was you go to his site and there\'s Ebola virus and then eBay auction Web sites.

因此，从我听到的消息来看，他看到的是你访问他的网站，那里有埃博拉病毒，然后是 eBay 拍卖网站。

> You can imagine how that was received.

你可以想象它是如何被接收到的。

> `[00:05:06]` So then the question is if so how do you develop a good idea.

`[00:05:06]` 那么问题是，如果是这样，你如何发展一个好主意。

> `[00:05:14]` Looks like a bad idea as an entrepreneur.

`[00:05:14]` 作为一名企业家，这看起来是个坏主意。

> And the answer is you need to know a secret and by secret here I mean secret in the kind of Peter Teil sense if you\'ve read his great class notes Blake Mazur\'s class notes about the course he taught which he defines as something you believe that most other people don\'t believe.

答案是，你需要知道一个秘密，在这里，我指的是彼得·泰尔的那种秘密，如果你读过他伟大的课堂笔记，布雷克·马祖尔关于他教授的课程的课堂笔记，他把它定义为你认为大多数人都不相信的东西。

> So then the question is how how do you develop a secret and I think there are a few ways and I\'ll talk about them here.

那么问题是，你如何发展一个秘密，我认为有几种方法，我将在这里谈论它们。

> One of the ways to know the tools better than anyone else usually in our business is sort of the software business the tools means knowing you know computer science and technology.

在我们的业务中，要比任何人更好地了解这些工具的方法之一是软件业务，工具意味着知道您了解计算机科学和技术。

> Anyone else.

其他人。

> So example here is Dropbox actually knew Drew.

举个例子，Dropbox 实际上知道 Drew。

> I started my first company was in Boston when he was in Boston and I actually was trying to recruit him for a long time which is great obviously genius.

当他在波士顿的时候，我创办了我的第一家公司-波士顿，实际上我很长一段时间都在招聘他，这显然是很棒的天才。

> `[00:06:05]` And he I remember he came in he was like look I want to do a cloud storage thing this is like I forget 2007 or something.

`[00:06:05]` 他-我记得他进来了-他就像看，我想做一件云存储的事情，这就像我忘记了 2007 年什么的。

> And.

和

> At the time that actually cloud storage had been a big trend in venture capital.

在那个时候，云存储实际上是风险投资的一大趋势。

> And so I remember looking with him added like a tech crunch article that was like literally like 100 cloud storage companies that launched the last two years half of whom had been venture funded you know and just sort of step back and like look at it from the big picture point of view it seemed like a you know a crazy thing to do like to enter such a crowded market I think my take on it is what he realized is that if you actually use that software the other competitor software it was like this totally janky like web thing and the like click on it and you wait 10 minutes and you download the file and you have to upload it with all you know is just totally like it was basically made by sort of business people who are like cloud storage the future and you know what he realized was that to do it right.

所以我记得我和他一起看了看，就像一篇科技危机的文章，简直就像 100 家云存储公司在过去两年里创办的，其中一半是风险投资的，你知道，只是后退一步，从宏观的角度来看，这似乎是一件你知道的疯狂的事情，想要进入这样的市场。一个拥挤的市场，我想我的看法是，他意识到，如果你真的使用那个软件，另一个竞争对手的软件，它就像这个完全像网络一样的东西，点击它，你等待 10 分钟，你下载文件，你必须上传它与你所知道的完全是完全一样，它基本上是由排序。对于那些喜欢云存储的商业人士来说，你知道他意识到的是做好这件事。

> You know you had to do like you had to feel like it was a local hard drive right it had to there which of course we all know from the way it works now which is actually a very non-trivial technical problem to do it reliably and like you know you got to do like the net hole punching in like sinking and making sure you know taking care of all these adverse conditions.

你知道，你必须像你必须要做的那样，感觉这是一个本地硬盘，它必须存在，当然，从它现在的工作方式中我们都知道，这实际上是一个非常重要的技术问题，要可靠地做到这一点。就像你知道的那样，你必须像打孔一样钻进去，就像下沉一样，并确保你知道要照顾好所有这些不利的条件。

> It turned out to be actually like it made sense in the end that sort of anM.I.T.

事实证明，这实际上是有意义的，在最后，类似于 M.I.T。

> you know brilliant engineer was the one who kind of cracked that problem.

你知道聪明的工程师才是解决这个问题的人。

> `[00:07:32]` Another way to know a secret is to know the problems better than anyone else.

`[00:07:32]` 了解秘密的另一种方法是比任何人都更好地了解问题。

> So an example here is Kickstarter.

这里的一个例子是 Kickstarter。

> Most people.

大多数人。

> You know who probably most of you first heard of Kickstarter probably around 2010 or so and they kind of got big.

你知道谁可能是你们中的大多数人第一次听说 Kickstarter，大概在 2010 年左右，他们变得有点大了。

> `[00:07:48]` The founders were actually working on the idea for about 10 years and trying to raise money.

`[00:07:48]` 创始人们实际上花了大约 10 年的时间来研究这个想法，并试图筹集资金。

> The founder CEO Perry Chen he he he actually came from kind of the artistic community kind of one of the people that would be doing a project today on Kickstarter.

创始人佩里·陈，他实际上来自艺术界，是今天在 Kickstarter 上做一个项目的人之一。

> `[00:08:02]` He was living in New Orleans and at one point wanted to put together a music festival and had a bunch of people who wanted to go to a music festival willing to pay had musicians who were willing to play if they could do it.

`[00:08:02]` 他住在新奥尔良，曾经想组织一个音乐节，有一群想去参加音乐节的人愿意付钱，有一些乐师愿意去演奏，如果他们能做到的话。

> It had no way to coordinate the two which you know as we know now is sort of a Kickstarter does he also was aware of being deeply into that community was aware of sort of the history of it all going back to like is on steadily like you know sort of a patronage model for the Arts and just sort of understanding this was a this was a normal behavior both among the kind of backers and the project creators but many many people who whose job it is to identify good ideas thought this was a very bad idea for a long time.

它没有办法协调这两者，正如我们现在所知道的，这是一种 Kickstart，他是否也意识到深入到那个社区，意识到这一切的历史可以追溯到，就像你知道的，一种艺术的赞助模式，而只是一种理解-这是一种正常的行为，无论是在支持者还是项目创建者之间，但是很多人，他们的工作是识别好的想法，他们认为这是一个很长时间以来都是一个非常糟糕的想法。

> So another way to go to come up with the secret is to draw from your own kind of life experience background ideas Tuckahoe myself my own experience here for a second.

因此，想出秘诀的另一种方法是从你自己的生活经历中汲取背景思想，塔卡霍本人，我自己的经验，在这里一秒钟。

> So I started a company called site adviser back in 2004.

所以我在 2004 年创办了一家叫做网站顾问的公司。

> This is when this was kind of I think of that as 2004 is kind of the worst period at least in the modern probably ever.

我认为 2004 年是最糟糕的时期，至少在现代可能是如此。

> `[00:09:03]` I think on the Web in terms of security problems if you remember for those of you who remember there was there you probably all of your friends were complaining about getting pop up ads and they were using Internet Explorer on aP.C.

https://tmt.ap-beijing.tencentcloudapi.com/?Action=TextTranslate&Nonce=1234&ProjectId=1257710951&Region=ap-beijing&SecretId=AKIDPqCXo8hXckompwwu7EB4sWzTvJXboBh2&Source=en&SourceText=+%5C%5B00%3A09%3A03%5C%5D+I+think+on+the+Web+in+terms+of+security+problems+if+you+remember+for+those+of+you+who+remember+there+was+there+you+probably+all+of+your+friends+were+complaining+about+getting+pop+up+ads+and+they+were+using+Internet+Explorer+on+aP.C.&Target=zh&Timestamp=1538796591&Version=2018-03-21&Signature=Pos9cLSxz%2BvLDpamyveck94Ee84=

> And it was like pads everywhere fishing everywhere.

就像到处钓鱼的垫子。

> `[00:09:18]` It was kind of a mess.

`[00:09:18]` 当时有点乱。

> The question then was why didn\'t all of the incumbent security companies like McAfee Symantec do anything about it.

当时的问题是，为什么像 McAfee Symantec 这样的现有安保公司没有采取任何行动。

> They.

他（她，它）们

> `[00:09:27]` The reason is that they saw Stacy there they saw their mandate as being salving kind of technical problems meaning making sure there isn\'t an exploit in the browser making sure there isn\'t you know whatever exploit or something.

`[00:09:27]` 原因是他们看到了 Stacy，他们认为他们的任务是解决一些技术问题，意思是确保浏览器中没有漏洞，确保没有任何漏洞。

> And most of the problems that were happening then were what we what known as social engineering problems which means that that basically everything was all of the technical features were operating properly.

当时发生的大部分问题都是我们所谓的社会工程问题，这意味着基本上所有的技术特征都运行正常。

> `[00:09:54]` But you know users were tricked into doing things and in fact so their solution was to put out white papers that said you know users should be smarter about downloading software or something like this.

`[00:09:54]` 但是你知道用户是被骗去做事情的，事实上，他们的解决方案是发布白皮书，说明用户应该更聪明地下载软件或类似的东西。

> `[00:10:05]` And so we the idea here is I think where we had a kind of a unique advantages that we didn\'t kind of come to this from the security world.

`[00:10:05]` 所以我们这里的想法是，我认为我们有一种独特的优势，那就是我们不是从安全世界来的。

> We came to it from the consumer Internet world where we didn\'t sort of see these kinds of religious boundaries between technical social engineering threats and so much more as a consumer Internet Person Would as let\'s just try to create a better user experience using whatever kind of means necessary.

我们是从消费者互联网世界来的，在那里，我们没有看到技术社会工程威胁之间的宗教界限，也没有看到消费者互联网的人会用任何必要的手段来创造更好的用户体验。

> And it\'s funny because like we went and talked to a lot of our investors went and talked to people at the incumbent security companies and they all said it was a terrible idea for the reasons I just said.

这很有趣，因为就像我们去和很多投资者交谈一样，他们都说这是个糟糕的主意，因为我刚才说的原因。

> `[00:10:35]` And I remember pitching and I pitched a ton of CS and it was this really frustrating thing where it felt like to us like it was as obvious as like you know whatever this bottle of water sitting on the table can you see this bottle of water.

`[00:10:35]` 我记得投球和我投了一吨 CS，这是一件非常令人沮丧的事情，在我们看来，它就像你知道的，就像你知道坐在桌子上的这瓶水，你能看到这瓶水吗？

> And they were like No I can\'t see what are you talking about and like is it a fishing tool or is it enticed by it like trying to put you in all these categories.

他们说：不，我看不出你在说什么，喜欢它是一种钓鱼工具，还是被它诱惑，就像试图把你归入所有这些类别。

> And notice it like when you sort of think when you sort of really develop a secret it actually ends up being quite frustrating talking to the people that haven\'t.

注意它，就像当你在想，当你真的想出一个秘密时，它最终会让你很沮丧地和那些没有的人交谈。

> Because you\'re just sort of trying to show them what you think is obvious but they can\'t see.

因为你只是想向他们展示你认为显而易见但他们看不见的东西。

> `[00:11:10]` So now I want to just a little bit about some of the sort of high level characteristics of these kinds of good ideas look like bad ideas.

`[00:11:10]` 现在我只想谈一谈这些好主意的高层次特性，看上去就像坏主意。

> One of them is that powerful people often dismiss them as toys so.

其中之一就是有权势的人常常把他们当成玩具。

> `[00:11:26]` A very famous example here is the telephone which basically when the telephone was invented the incumbent company of the time was Western Union who used telegraph systems to you know primarily for people like railroads to communicate to communicate across the country.

`[00:11:26]` 一个非常著名的例子是电话，基本上，当电话发明时，当时的公司是西部联合公司，他使用电报系统，主要是让像铁路这样的人在全国各地进行通讯。

> The telephone was first invented it can only go like a mile or something like this.

电话是第一次发明的，它只能行驶一英里或诸如此类的东西。

> And so you know what the Western Union said is this is this doesn\'t solve the problems of our customers.

所以你知道西方联盟说的，这并不能解决我们客户的问题。

> Also the idea of like voice applications like what are you going to do with voice like you can actually go back and it\'s kind of sounds funny now but you actually go back and read it and people are like what\'s the point of voice.

还有，类似语音应用程序的想法，比如你要用声音做什么，就像你可以回去，听起来很有趣，但是你真的回去读它，人们就像声音的意义所在一样。

> We already can encode the information in Morse code.

我们已经可以用莫尔斯密码对信息进行编码了。

> And like there\'s nothing else you want to do.

就像你什么都不想做一样。

> And so they had the opportunity to buy the technology very cheaply and didn\'t.

因此，他们有机会以非常低的价格购买这项技术，但没有。

> And of course what they underestimated is kind of the classic Clay Christiansen thing where if you\'re familiar with his books innovator\'s dilemma.

当然，他们低估的是经典的克莱·克里斯蒂安，如果你熟悉他的书，创新者的困境。

> There\'s this famous curve which is sort of the rate at which technology gets better is sort of like this and the kind of demands on technology doesn\'t go up as fast and what that means is that the technology often quickly catches up and while it\'s at that kind of low point it often looks like a toy to a lot of people.

有一条著名的曲线，它是一种技术进步的速度，就像这样，对技术的要求没有那么快，这意味着技术往往会很快赶上，当它处于那种低谷时，对很多人来说，它往往就像玩具一样。

> A modern example of this is Skype.

这方面的一个现代例子是 Skype。

> Years ago I looked back in 2003 I had the opportunity to actually work on.

几年前，我回顾了 2003 年，我有机会实际工作。

> `[00:12:47]` As part of a team that worked on one of the early investments in skype and helped write one of the memos for the investment.

`[00:12:47]` 作为致力于 Skype 早期投资之一的团队的一员，并帮助为这项投资撰写了一份备忘录。

> `[00:12:53]` And our big kids it sounds funny now but all this stuff sounds funny in retrospect.

`[00:12:53]` 我们的大孩子们现在听起来很好笑，但回想起来，这一切听起来都很有趣。

> Our big concern if you go back was that people most people don\'t have microphones in their computers.

我们最担心的是，大多数人的电脑里没有麦克风。

> And would they be willing to drive down to Best Buy.

他们愿意开车去百思买吗？

> I mean is it actually in the memo you know like microphone options like the key issue.

我的意思是，它实际上在备忘录中，你知道，就像麦克风选项一样，关键问题。

> And so again like people all be willing to go and drive to Best Buy or whatever whatever and do that.

因此，再一次，就像人们一样，所有人都愿意开车去百思买或其他任何地方，然后去做这件事。

> The other thing was the quality was lower of course they got better as bandwidth got better.

另一件事是质量较低，当然，随着带宽的改善，质量也越来越好。

> `[00:13:23]` I think that was another issue with broadband narrowband adoption will broadband ever get adopted I remember hearing McKinsey like the head of McKinsey explained to me that no one would ever adopt broadband or something.

`[00:13:23]` 我认为这是宽带窄带采用的另一个问题-宽带是否会被采纳-我记得我听到麦肯锡(McKinsey)的负责人向我解释说，没有人会采用宽带或什么的。

> `[00:13:33]` So anyway so the the sky and the other at the time also if you move a vantage vantage was sort of the one that people were kind of more excited about Skype also had problems connecting to the pots or telephone system.

不管怎样，当时的天空和其他地方，如果你移动一个有利的位置，人们对 Skype 的兴奋程度会更高，连接到锅子或电话系统也会遇到一些问题。

> But you literally if you go back you\'ll see people said it like all of the telephone companies said it was a toy using those words.

但是如果你真的回去的话，你会看到人们这么说，就像所有电话公司说的那样，用这些话来说，这是个玩具。

> `[00:13:57]` So another key characteristic of good ideas like batteries is that they unbundle the functions done by others.

`[00:13:57]` 像电池这样的好主意的另一个关键特点是，它们可以解开别人所做的功能。

> So let me explain this for example newspapers.

让我来解释一下，例如报纸。

> So one way to think of newspapers is as sort of a collection of functions.

因此，把报纸看作是一种功能的集合是一种方式。

> There\'s the brand of the newspaper you know if I read The New York Times I\'m maybe more likely to trust that than if I read something else.

这是报纸的品牌，你知道，如果我看了“纽约时报”，我可能会更相信这一点，而不是看别的东西。

> There\'s a curatorial function which is you know the New York Times tells you what\'s important based on what it puts on the front page.

这里有一个馆藏功能，你知道“纽约时报”根据头版的内容告诉你什么是重要的。

> There\'s distribution.

有分布。

> You know prior to the Internet.

你知道在上网之前。

> The New York Times would print newspapers and drive around and deliver them classified ads you know back then was an important function.

“纽约时报”(NewYorkTimes)会印刷报纸，开车四处发布分类广告，那时你知道这是一项重要的功能。

> And so then you know what happened.

然后你就知道发生了什么。

> `[00:14:36]` Is over time each of those functions kind of got picked off one by one.

`[00:14:36]` 随着时间的推移，这些功能中的每一个都被一个接一个地摘掉了。

> So this is important like it doesn\'t happen a lot of these things like kind of in one fell swoop it happens piece by piece.

所以，这是很重要的，因为它不会发生很多这样的事情，比如一次又一次的猛扑，它是一件地发生的。

> `[00:14:46]` And so first the Internet itself came along and you read the New York Times online.

`[00:14:46]` 首先，互联网出现了，你在网上阅读了“纽约时报”(NewYorkTimes)。

> Suddenly what\'s the point to getting it printed and distributed to you right.

突然间，把它打印出来并分发给你的重点是什么？

> And then you know then Craigslist came along and you know it\'s a better way to do classifieds are all in the same placeetc.

然后你知道，Craigslist 出现了，你知道这是一种更好的方法，分类广告都在同一个地方，等等。

> Right so that sort of picks off that function and then social came along you know Twitter and Facebook and you know just e-mail and whatever else.

是的，这类功能被剔除了，然后社交网站出现了，你知道 Twitter 和 Facebook，而你只知道电子邮件和其他任何东西。

> And suddenly a lot of people started getting to know what the curatorial function of what\'s on the front page became less and less important right.

突然间，很多人开始了解到，头版上的馆藏功能变得越来越不重要了。

> So far more people now you know what they read if they read the New York Times today and they read it that\'s determined by what\'s shared with him on Twitter Facebook et cetera.

到目前为止，更多的人知道，如果他们今天读“纽约时报”，他们会读到什么，这是由他在 Twitter、Facebook 等网站上分享的内容决定的。

> So then the curatorial function goes away and I would argue sort of the last function is starting to go away which is Nate Silver is an example which is you know the individual reporters now because of these other distribution mechanisms and Twitter and Facebooketc.

于是，策展人的功能就消失了，我想说，最后一个功能开始消失了，Nate Silverage 就是一个例子，你知道，现在每个记者都知道，因为有了其他的分发机制，Twitter 和 Faceboketc。

> are able to build up their own audiences which in some ways becomes you know the audience becomes more loyal to the individual contributor than to the organization.

能够建立起自己的受众，在某些方面，你知道，听众对个人贡献者的忠诚度比对组织的忠诚度更高。

> `[00:15:48]` So an example here Mookie\'s Udacity is we\'re investors in.

`[00:15:48]` 这里的一个例子是 Mookie 的 Udacity，我们是投资者。

> There\'s also Coursera.

还有库瑟拉。

> So if you read a lot of the kind of.

所以如果你读了很多这样的书。

> Mainstream press about about nukes they\'ll say they\'ll say things like oh that doesn\'t replace you know the university experience and what they\'re missing is that it\'s not supposed to replace it.

主流媒体关于核武器，他们会说，哦，这并不能取代你，你知道，大学的经验，他们所缺少的是，它不应该取代它。

> You should think of the university as a bundle of multiple functions so you know it\'s a social experience.

你应该把大学看作是多功能的集合体，这样你就知道这是一种社会经验。

> It\'s a credentialing service.

这是一个认证服务。

> You know you went to so-and-so school there\'s a credential.

你知道你去过某某学校，那里有证书。

> It\'s just it\'s coursework its tests.

这只是它的课程，它的测试。

> `[00:16:21]` It\'s maybe plays a job kind of recruiting function right.

`[00:16:21]` 这可能是一种招聘职能。

> If what you should expect is that the the the same pattern that played out with newspapers have lost 20 years I believe will play out in education over the next 10 to 20 years.

如果你应该期待的是，与报纸一样的模式已经失去了 20 年，我相信在未来的 10 到 20 年里，教育领域将会出现同样的情况。

> But you\'ll see things happen layer by layer and because it happens layer by layer.

但是你会看到事情一层层地发生，因为它是层层发生的。

> All of the kind of mainstream pundits sort of look at each layer and they say that layer stupid you know it\'s only one part of it.

所有的主流专家都会对每一层进行观察，他们说这一层很愚蠢，你知道这只是其中的一部分。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Which of course is the whole point of it and that\'s why they dismiss it as a bad idea.

当然，这就是问题的关键所在，这就是为什么他们认为这是个坏主意。

> So another key characteristic of these good ideas bad ideas is they often originate as hobbies.

因此，这些好主意的另一个关键特点是，它们往往起源于业余爱好。

> The kind of the mental model I use is that in the startup world we kind of have basically two constituencies we have business people and we have technical people and each of the two constituencies has a has a method of voting on what they think is interesting in the future business people\'s way of voting is by allocating money at the workplace.

我所使用的心理模型是，在创业世界里，我们基本上有两个选区，我们有商人，我们有技术人员，每个选区都有一种投票方法，他们认为未来商业人士的投票方式是在工作场所分配资金。

> So that\'s you know now includes me as a venture capitalist includes a CEO of a company or a head of a department.

你知道的，这包括了我，作为一个风险投资家，包括一个公司的首席执行官或一个部门的主管。

> You know engineers I\'m simplifying the technical business people.

你知道工程师我在简化技术人员的工作。

> But but the basic idea is that some of the smartest engineers they don\'t get to vote with their dollars but they do get to vote with their time.

但最基本的想法是，一些最聪明的工程师，他们不能用他们的钱投票，但是他们可以用他们的时间投票。

> And so they vote with their time by working on what they think the coolest stuff is on the weekends and at night.

所以他们用时间投票，在周末和晚上做他们认为最酷的事情。

> And this plays out.

然后这一切就结束了。

> I mean it\'s amazingly how how predictable predictive this kind of heuristic is going back to.

我的意思是，令人惊讶的是，这种启发式的预测是多么的可预测。

> Obviously the Homebrew Computer Club with jobs and jobs jobs and whatnot aka.

很明显，家酿电脑俱乐部有工作和诸如此类的东西。

> `[00:18:03]` Homebrew Computer Club with jobs and Bosnak.

`[00:18:03]` 与乔布斯和博斯纳克合作的家用电脑俱乐部。

> `[00:18:07]` Of course theP.C.

`[00:18:07]` 当然是 P.C.

> you know sort of a lot of the sort of things around theP.C.

你知道很多关于 P.C.的事情。

> originated blogs started out as hobbyists among hobbyists.

最初的博客起源于狂热者中的狂热者。

> The Web did a lot of you know Web page people creating websites and browsers and things like this.

网络做了很多你们都知道的网页，人们创建网站和浏览器之类的东西。

> So many opensource things started that way.

很多开源的东西都是这样开始的。

> So today if you look around you\'ll see people working on what you know what is it like.

所以今天，如果你环顾四周，你就会看到人们在为你所知道的是什么而工作。

> I mean you guys I assume its bit coin and 3D printing and drones and the like whatever a whole bunch of interesting like you know big data frameworks and those that are kind of cool stuff.

我的意思是，我假设它的比特币、3D 打印和无人机之类的东西，诸如此类的有趣的东西，比如大数据框架，以及那些很酷的东西。

> `[00:18:44]` So you know this stuff tends to get dismissed as a as bad idea by kind of the mainstream because oh that\'s a toy that\'s a hobbyist thingetc.

`[00:18:44]` 所以你知道，这些东西往往会被主流认为是个坏主意，因为哦，那是个玩具，是个狂热者的东西，等等。

> So just give an example get Hubb which you know a lot of I mean get have of course is based literally on an open source project get as you guys know.

举个例子，你知道很多，我的意思是，GET 当然是基于开源项目 GET，就像你们所知道的那样。

> `[00:19:01]` But but also I think you can think of it as one may think of it as sort of the work the work processes that get hub the Hub enables began in the hobbyist and the open source sort of hobbyist community where you had large distributed kind of nonhierarchical or semi hierarchical groups trying to work together and coordinate.

`[00:19:01]` 但是我认为你也可以把它看作是一种工作过程，它可以作为获得枢纽的一种工作过程，集线器启用于爱好者和开源的爱好者社区，在那里你有大量分布的、非层次的或半层次的组试图一起工作和协调。

> And it turns out I think we believe where investors get it but it turns out that you have a very same kind of work process within large organizations so if you look at it like an eBay or something and people working all over the place are semi structured the way the coordinates are just an example of kind of a tool and a process that began in the in the sort of hobbyist world and has made its way into the workplace.

结果，我想我们相信投资者是从哪里得到的，但事实证明，在大型组织中，你有着非常类似的工作流程，因此，如果你把它看作是 eBay 之类的东西，那么到处工作的人都是半结构化的，就像坐标只是一个工具的例子，也是一个开始于在这种狂热的世界里，并已进入工作场所。

> Another characteristic of good ideas like bad ideas is that they often challenge social norms.

好主意和坏想法的另一个特点是，它们经常挑战社会规范。

> So you know we talked about how people sort of got that kind of queasy feeling around everybody and be an eBay.

所以你知道，我们讨论过人们是如何在每个人周围都有这种不舒服的感觉的，并成为 eBay 的一员。

> `[00:20:04]` I think that you know that it\'s hard to think about and start to realize now but flicker flicker had many innovations.

`[00:20:04]` 我想你知道现在很难思考和开始意识到，但是 Flicker 有很多创新。

> But one of the key ones was that it defaulted photos to being public.

但其中一个关键问题是，它默认公开照片。

> `[00:20:19]` So prior to flicker there were online photo repositories but they were all private ones like Shutterfly where you\'d upload your photos maybe share them with a few friends.

`[00:20:19]` 所以在闪烁之前，有在线的照片储存库，但它们都是私人的，比如 Shutterflix，在那里你可以上传你的照片，也许可以和几个朋友分享。

> And it was really shocking to people that you would go into default into public eye what kind of behaviors that Facebook is another good example where you know we\'ve seen it repeatedly where Facebook made made various changes to sort of how sharing and other things were probably most famously with the change to the news feed where there\'s sort of an outcry and you know sort of challenge the social norms but now has become you know the things that the innovations Facebook made there have now become you know mostly just sort of standard UI devices and sort of all modern social software so to wrap it up a little bit.

令人震惊的是，你会成为公众关注的默认行为，Facebook 是另一个很好的例子，你知道我们曾多次看到它，Facebook 做出了各种改变，比如分享和其他事情可能是最著名的，因为对新闻提要的改变会引起强烈的抗议，而你也知道这是一种挑战。社会规范，但现在已经成为你知道的东西，Facebook 在那里所做的创新，现在你知道了，大部分只是一些标准的 UI 设备和一些现代的社交软件，所以把它包装一下。

> `[00:21:05]` So had I learned a secret not to be kind of sort of like cutely recursive but I sort of think of this presentation itself as a secret.

`[00:21:05]` 所以我学到了一个秘密，不是那种可爱的递归，但我觉得这个演示本身就是一个秘密。

> `[00:21:15]` The way I learned this was like with all secrets sort of through direct experience just sort of both being a book Through My Eyes sort of my own startup\'s but then through angel investing I actually went back kind of systematically and looked at all of the investments the both that I\'d made and I probably just point out the thousands of investment pitches and made dozens of investments missed dozens of good investments and went through and kind of tried to look systematically at what the best predictor would have been.

`[00:21:15]` 我学到这一切的方式，就像所有的秘密一样，通过直接的经验投资错过了数十项好的投资，并经历了一段时间，并试图系统地研究什么是最好的预测因素。

> And this came out as by far sort of whether the founder had some technical expertise or a problem domain expertise or some kind of direct experience where they sort of learned a secret and then just I guess just wrapping it up I would say you know if I were this I assume a lot of people here are entrepreneurs or aspiring entrepreneurs.

这是因为到目前为止，创始人是否有一些技术专长或问题领域的专业知识，或者是某种直接的经验，他们从中学到了一个秘密，然后我想，我只是想结束它，你知道，如果我是这样的人，我假设这里的很多人都是企业家或有抱负的企业家。

> I would encourage you to think about.

我鼓励你考虑一下。

> `[00:22:16]` I think there\'s one of two ways to develop startup ideas.

`[00:22:16]` 我认为有两种发展创业点子的方法。

> One is through direct experience whether it\'s direct experience with tools as I was talking about like technologies or direct experience with some problem or direct experiences that bring you to have some perspective.

一个是通过直接的经验，无论是我所说的对工具的直接体验，比如技术，还是直接的经验，一些问题，或者直接的经验，给你带来一些视角。

> `[00:22:31]` And there\'s another way to develop them which is like through sort of abstract things like analyst reports and trends and analogies.

`[00:22:31]` 还有另一种方法来发展它们，就像通过某种抽象的事物，比如分析报告、趋势和类比。

> `[00:22:41]` You know I\'m going to do GNB for wire ruber for X or that kind of thing.

`[00:22:41]` 你知道我会为 X 做 GNB 的线材或类似的东西。

> And I think I think that in my opinion the best ideas come from direct experience not abstract things and in fact sort of by definition because the abstract things tend to like if you go read whatever an analyst reports The New York Times it tends to just be an encapsulation of conventional wisdom.

在我看来，最好的想法来自于直接的经验，而不是抽象的东西，事实上，从定义上来说，这是因为抽象的东西往往喜欢，如果你去读任何分析家的报告，“纽约时报”，它倾向于只是对传统智慧的一种概括。

> Whereas the opportunities tend to lie kind of in you know when you take your direct experience and diff it with the conventional wisdom.

然而，机会往往在某种程度上取决于你，你知道，当你拿出你的直接经验，用传统的智慧来改变它。

> `[00:23:12]` That\'s where the good startup ideas are.

`[00:23:12]` 好的创业点子就在那里。

> Thanks.

谢谢

