# Office Hours at Startup School NY 2014  

> `[00:00:05]` So Gary tan and I are going to do on stage office hours.

`[00:00:05]` 因此，Gary tan 和我将在舞台办公时间做。

> This is most of what happens during my see the partners meet individually with startups and we give them advice about whatever problems they\'re facing.

这是我看到合伙人与初创公司单独会面时所发生的大部分事情，我们会就他们面临的任何问题给他们建议。

> It\'s usually Twenty five minutes per startup.

每一家公司通常只有二十五分钟。

> But we\'re going to try to do three startups in 25 minutes.

但我们将尝试在 25 分钟内完成三家初创公司。

> We\'ll see how that goes.

我们看看结果如何。

> And.

和

> `[00:00:25]` Yeah look for them.

`[00:00:25]` 是的，去找他们。

> So can you send out the first.

所以你能送出第一个。

> Alright  `[00:00:33]` first started and we know there either.

好吧，`[00:00:33]` 第一次开始，我们也知道。

> I see you.

我看见你了。

> Sam.

山姆。

> I\'m.

我是。

> `[00:00:38]` I\'m going.

`[00:00:38]` 我要走了。

> Nice to meet you.

见到你很高兴

> Very nice to see you.

很高兴见到你。

> Great.

太棒了

> So I guess to start you just tell us what you do.

所以我想你先告诉我们你是怎么做的。

> `[00:00:47]` We are Salovey.

`[00:00:47]` 我们是萨洛维。

> We had our users learned their value in the job market.

我们让用户了解了他们在就业市场上的价值。

> And we do that by crowdsourcing they\'re selling a prediction.

我们通过众包来做到这一点，他们销售的是一个预测。

> `[00:00:57]` Do users mostly look at this when they\'re changing jobs they don\'t necessarily have to be changing or looking for jobs.

`[00:00:57]` 当用户换工作时，他们不一定要换工作或找工作时，大多数人都会看这个吗？

> But.

但

> Dale.

戴尔。

> `[00:01:06]` According to these 40 percent of American professionals have docked in line that they might be underpaid.

`[00:01:06]` 据这 40%的美国专业人士说，他们可能收入过低。

> You have those kind of users too.

你也有这样的用户。

> `[00:01:17]` So are users using this just to find out if they\'re underpaid or because they\'re using it in salary negotiations.

`[00:01:17]` 因此，用户使用这个工具只是为了找出他们是否薪酬过低，还是因为他们在薪酬谈判中使用它。

> Is it just for curiosity or are they really like saying I\'m underpaid.

是出于好奇还是他们真的喜欢说我报酬太低。

> `[00:01:27]` So far we have been out partying each month.

`[00:01:27]` 到目前为止，我们每个月都在外面聚会。

> They are using it for two years.

他们用了两年。

> Now how many users do you have.

现在你有多少用户。

> We currently have 9000 users and growing so fast.

我们目前拥有 9000 名用户，而且增长如此之快。

> Our weekly growth rate is 10 percent.

我们每周的增长率是 10%。

> `[00:01:42]` So like these services tend to be most valuable when you actually give people something not just for their curiosity but this like this critical thing they need to have for something they really care about.

`[00:01:42]` 所以，当你给人们一些东西时，这些服务往往是最有价值的，这不仅是因为他们的好奇心，而且也是因为他们真正关心的事情需要他们拥有的这种关键的东西。

> So how can you make this something that people are now using just for curiosity.

那么，你如何才能使它成为人们现在只是出于好奇而使用的东西呢？

> But but they\'re using because they really desperately need this information they\'re acting on it.

但是他们正在使用这些信息，因为他们非常需要这些信息，他们正在对此采取行动。

> `[00:02:02]` So you need to create an efficient market for phones to Jack Murtha tonight.

`[00:02:02]` 所以今晚你需要为杰克·默莎的手机创造一个有效的市场。

> So basically make the jump.

所以基本上可以跳下去。

> It could be more like the stock market.

这可能更像股票市场。

> So this is the first step for gold to price he\'s accurately and then get one step closer to that stock market for apps.

因此，这是黄金准确定价的第一步，然后在应用程序上离股市更近一步。

> `[00:02:21]` So you have 9000 users already.

`[00:02:21]` 所以你已经有 9000 名用户了。

> Yes.

是

> `[00:02:24]` What\'s the most surprising thing surely you found people who are radically underpaid can get them better jobs like creating to other parts of the platform that employers come and they are going to able to he.

`[00:02:24]` 最令人惊讶的是，你发现薪酬极低的人能为他们找到更好的工作，比如为雇主来和他们能够胜任的平台的其他部分创造更好的工作。

> Professional profiles long been predicted and they will be able to make any offers based on that information.

职业简介早就被预测了，他们将能够根据这些信息提供任何报价。

> And before that you\'ve been below that we have users who have at least I am told that they\'re you your prediction had Dyche boost their courage to ask for more money.

在此之前，你一直低于我们的用户，至少我被告知，他们是你的预测，如果 Dyche 增强他们的勇气，要求更多的钱。

> `[00:02:59]` It\'s really hard to try to do multiple things at once as a startup and if you\'re trying to sort of make this great for for workers and for employees at the same time that\'s that\'s usually more than one startup can handle.

`[00:02:59]` 作为一家初创公司，尝试一次做多件事情是非常困难的，如果你想让这件事对员工和员工都有好处的话，那么通常一家初创公司就不止一家能做到这一点。

> I would just focus entirely on making something that that please really love and that really helps them sort of get their market value.

我只想把注意力完全集中在制作一些让人非常喜欢的东西上，这样才能真正帮助他们获得市场价值。

> And and you should track like how many employees come to your site find that they\'re underpaid and are able to use that to make sure they\'re getting a fair offer and market comp and that\'s like you really can only you have to just focus on one one one tiny little thing and then you can expand from there.

你应该跟踪有多少员工来到你的网站，发现他们工资过低，并且能够用这个来确保他们得到公平的待遇和市场竞争，这就好像你真的可以，你只需要专注于一件小小的事情，然后你就可以从那里扩张了。

> But until you know until you have users that are telling you like this is the best thing ever.

但直到你知道，直到你有用户告诉你，这是最好的事情。

> You know I got a 20 percent raise and I told all my friends sign up for the service.

你知道，我得到了 20%的加薪，我告诉我所有的朋友都报名参加这项服务。

> You definitely shouldn\'t expand to other areas.

你绝对不应该扩大到其他领域。

> And I would try to really find out I\'d like to try and really find a metric that lets you focus on how many people are not just using you for idle curiosity where they use one time forget about it five minutes later not tell their friends not come back.

我会努力找出真正的答案

> But how many people you can actually sort of like make this big difference.

但你到底能有多少人能让这件事发生很大的变化。

> And if you can do that then you\'ll have all these other high class problems later.

如果你能做到这一点，那么以后你就会遇到其他所有的高级问题。

> Like how you get employers into the market and how you make this efficient market.

比如你如何让雇主进入市场，以及如何使这个有效的市场。

> `[00:04:18]` But  `[00:04:19]` one of the things that we always tell startups during white see is that it\'s way more important to build something a small number of users really love than something that a lot of users find a little bit interesting or you\'d like to do is make something that a lot of people really love.

`[00:04:18]` `[00:04:19]` `[00:04:19]` `[00:04:19]` 我们在“看白眼”的时候总是对初创公司说，建立一小部分用户真正喜欢的东西比许多用户觉得有点有趣或者你想做的事情更重要的是做一些很多人真的喜欢的东西。

> But a startup can never do that.

但创业公司永远不会这么做。

> Like Google gets to do that.

就像谷歌可以这么做。

> And so you end up having to choose one of those two and a narrow focus on something that users become really dependent on you want to get to the place where where your users are telling you like I would be so bummed if this product went away.

所以你不得不选择这两种产品中的一种，狭隘地专注于用户真正依赖的东西-你想要到达你的用户告诉你的地方，就像如果这个产品消失了我会很沮丧一样。

> I\'m so dependent on this I\'m going to use this for every future negotiating negotiation.

我如此依赖于此，我将在今后的每一次谈判中使用这个。

> Do you have like a retention metric.

你有保留标准吗。

> Do you know how much users come back.

你知道有多少用户回来。

> `[00:04:57]` We have 30 percent return rate.

`[00:04:57]` 我们有 30%的回报率。

> How much.

多少钱

> 70 percent 30 yeah over what time period will be just like two months ago.

70%，30%，是关于两个月前的时间。

> So for every everyone who\'s tried the service there this thing can come back at least once.

因此，每个尝试过这种服务的人都可以至少回来一次。

> And what are they.

他们是什么。

> What are they doing that second time.

他们第二次在做什么。

> You know they\'ve already checked.

你知道他们已经查过了。

> So there are two sets of people.

所以有两组人。

> `[00:05:18]` They are checking their results.

`[00:05:18]` 他们正在检查他们的结果。

> They do want to see if they have new name predictions.

他们确实想知道他们是否有新的名字预测。

> And the second group is just coming back to make more predictions because we have scores.

而第二组只是回来做更多的预测，因为我们有分数。

> If you have there are politicians who get more cars and we have users that have made hundreds of predictions.

如果你有，有政治家谁得到更多的汽车，我们有用户，作出了数以百计的预测。

> `[00:05:37]` How do you know that it\'s working like hiding other predictions are accurate.

`[00:05:37]` 你怎么知道它就像隐藏其他预言一样准确。

> `[00:05:40]` We ask users if they find their prediction fair and 40 percent say it\'s fair.

`[00:05:40]` 我们询问用户是否认为他们的预测公平，40%的人认为这是公平的。

> About 30 percent says.

大约 30%的人说。

> It\'s low and 30 percent say it\'s high.

它很低，30%的人说它很高。

> `[00:05:56]` Or maybe 35 lo 35 25.

`[00:05:56]` 或者大概 35：35 25。

> You.

你，你们

> What.

什么

> `[00:06:07]` How will you know when you have found like something that users have become really dependent on what are you looking for in terms of behavior you\'d like to Zain when we first started everybody in our platform are able to predict each of their salaries anywhere in the.

`[00:06:07]` 当你发现一些用户真正依赖于你想要的行为的东西时，你怎么知道当我们第一次开始工作的时候，我们平台上的每个人都能预测他们的薪水。

> `[00:06:21]` And then we got enough users are able to divide into countries and you know the users so that we were able to divide into cities.

`[00:06:21]` 然后我们得到了足够多的用户能够划分成国家，你们知道用户，这样我们就能够划分成城市。

> And then in the streets right now for instance my predictors will be technology folks in New York City.

例如，在街上，我的预测者将是纽约市的技术人员。

> You want to go from here even farther down that you want to be able to divide people into companies divide people into a usual experience for instance say that you have got a job offer from Microsoft and you want to build it and offer it then you will be able to crowdsource your prediction from folks who have worked at Microsoft as the same title as you.

你想从这里走得更远，你想要把人分成几个公司，把人划分成一种通常的经验，例如，你从微软得到了一份工作机会，你想建立它并提供它，那么你就可以从那些在微软工作过的人那里收集你的预测，就像你一样的头衔。

> `[00:06:57]` That\'s right why you want to go slow and there is no way to validate if you are on their page right.

`[00:06:57]` 这是你想慢慢来的原因，如果你在他们的页面上，就无法验证你是否正确。

> You need to find a job that pays you that a month.

你需要找到一份能给你一个月的薪水的工作。

> Yeah.

嗯

> Well there is no other way.

没有别的办法了。

> Even if these statistics if you look at labor labor data you can say that you are not underpaid because you are paid paid the same because the market has moved and the landscape changed on the way to day these predictions that we give back is to find them a job at that price point.

即使这些统计数据，如果你看一看劳动力数据，你可以说你的工资并不低，因为你得到了同样的报酬，因为市场已经发生了变化，我们给出的预测是在那个价格点找到一份工作。

> `[00:07:27]` How are you getting users now.

`[00:07:27]` 你现在是怎么得到用户的？

> `[00:07:28]` How many users are going to use it for that and shredded Product Hunt and we are pitching to be partners using helping partners and blogs picked it up so that the finger remembers that that is great.

\`[00:07:28]` 有多少用户会使用它，并将产品搜索分解，我们将通过帮助合作伙伴和博客来成为合作伙伴，这样手指就能记住这一点了。

> `[00:07:44]` Those are great ways to get initial users but that that does not scale forever and it is worth thinking you know there are a lot of different sites where people can come to get salary information and you guys need to be like 10 times better than any of these other sites and it\'s worth thinking about what you\'re going to do to make yourself so much better that people will tell their friends your salary fairy not any of his other salary sites and b if there\'s some way you can build growth into the product.

`[00:07:44]` 这些都是获得初始用户的好方法，但这种方式不会永远扩展，值得思考的是，你知道有很多不同的网站可以让人们获得薪水信息，而你们需要比其他任何网站更好的 10 倍，这是值得思考的，你们要做些什么才能让自己变得更好。人们会告诉他们的朋友你的工资仙女，而不是他的任何其他工资网站和 b，如果有什么办法，你可以建立增长的产品。

> Because this is not there\'s not any like inherent Viral Peace in this but you could probably build something really cool where you know you send out like an e-mail saying guess my salary to a bunch of your friends and then they sign up and building those.

因为这并不是一种与生俱来的病毒式的平静，但是你可能会建立一些很酷的东西，在那里你会像一封电子邮件一样发出去，告诉你的一群朋友我的薪水，然后他们注册并建立它们。

> Like a lot of people think about I\'m gonna build this product and I\'m making my users on Hacker News and then it\'s just going to grow.

就像很多人想的那样，我要生产这个产品，我让我的用户上黑客新闻，然后它就会增长。

> And that\'s not.

但事实并非如此。

> Usually what happens if you build a sufficiently great product.

通常情况下，如果您构建了一个足够优秀的产品，会发生什么。

> Sometimes that happens but you don\'t want to have growth be an afterthought and if you can build growth into the product in this early stage that can be really helpful.

有时会发生这种情况，但你不想让增长成为事后考虑，如果你能在这个早期阶段将增长融入到产品中，那将是非常有帮助的。

> `[00:08:45]` And I would definitely think really of how to do that.

`[00:08:45]` 我肯定会想出怎么做的。

> What else or better on this one.

还有什么更好的吗？

> `[00:08:52]` Okay well I\'m a believer in crowd market coproduction so something.

`[00:08:52]` 好吧，我是一个大众市场联合制作的信徒，诸如此类。

> Thank you.

谢谢。

> Thank you.

谢谢。

> `[00:09:12]` All right.

`[00:09:12]` 好的。

> Hey Sam that\'s me Jason.

嘿，山姆，那是我，杰森。

> Thank you.

谢谢。

> Great to see you guys sort of the two of you working out.

很高兴看到你们俩一起锻炼。

> `[00:09:24]` So we\'re working on Parap Pappas safely the hotel tonight for Putin mentoring what is this rudimentary ecstasy in the trains.

`[00:09:24]` 今晚我们正在帕普帕帕斯酒店工作，为普京提供指导，这是火车上最基本的摇头丸。

> Often you know some stores are pulled from shelves to three days in advance to sell buy stuff that stores can\'t sell here at the end of the day or that they\'re throwing away turning over every four to six hours.

你通常知道，有些商店会提前三天从货架上撤下来，出售商店在一天结束时不能在这里销售的东西，或者他们扔掉的东西，每隔四到六个小时就会翻过一次。

> They have a like French daily policy or like a fresh every quarter.

他们每季度都有类似的法国日报政策或新鲜食品。

> It\'s our policy.

这是我们的政策。

> It\'s food that doesn\'t necessarily have a place to go.

食物不一定有地方可去。

> So if you\'re thinking about Oh well you know what I thought growing up you know things if you can\'t you take care of this access and I\'ll go somewhere.

所以，如果你在想，哦，你知道我的想法，在成长过程中，你知道一些事情，如果你不能，你处理好这个通道，我会去别的地方。

> We found in our research that that\'s actually not the case.

我们在研究中发现，事实并非如此。

> We talked to Feeding America.

我们跟喂美国谈过了。

> We talked to City Harvest because of their own budgetary limitations they\'re not as nimble in terms of pickup and so see hires for example has a 50 pound minimum when it comes to pick up and a lot of small to medium sized businesses in New York City just aren\'t going to have that on a daily basis.

我们和嘉实市谈过，因为他们自己的预算限制，他们在收货方面不够灵活，因此，例如，招聘人员在接货时有 50 英镑的最低限额，而纽约市的许多中小型企业只是不可能每天都有这样的情况发生。

> And so what they\'ve got now is basically like you can throw it away and even like pay action Holling to pick it up or is that most what happens it just gets thrown away.

所以他们现在所得到的基本上就像你可以扔掉它，甚至像薪酬行动霍林去捡起它，或者是大多数发生的事情都被扔掉了。

> `[00:10:28]` Yeah yeah.

`[00:10:28]` 是的。

> And so we found that to be highly efficient very wasteful and so what we\'re actually building is a marketplace that allows vendors to sell through that access commentary at a discount to users who are willing to buy that excess inventory.

因此我们发现，为了高效，非常浪费，我们实际上正在建设一个市场，允许供应商通过访问评论向愿意购买过剩库存的用户打折销售。

> So what do you do now.

那你现在做什么。

> What do you use hotel tonight as the metaphor.

你用什么来比喻今晚的酒店。

> `[00:10:46]` What\'s a hotel tonight is basically kind of what we\'re doing only in the kind of travel and hospitality industry right because they sell excess hotel rooms hotel rooms that the hotels themselves can\'t sell through kind of whatever services they use.

`[00:10:46]` 今晚的酒店基本上是我们只在旅游和酒店业所做的事情，因为他们出售过多的酒店客房，而酒店本身却无法通过任何服务出售这些客房。

> Who is eyeing.

他在盯着我。

> Out.

出去。

> Who\'s buying.

是谁买的。

> At this point.

在这一点上。

> So so people like the target demographic of kind of what we\'re looking at or like people like us more like college students those types of folks who are interested in kind of early tech adoption but still don\'t have.

所以人们喜欢我们所看到的目标人群，或者像我们这样的人更像大学生，那些对早期科技应用感兴趣但仍然没有的人。

> `[00:11:19]` Or want to have kind of food at a discount and what\'s kind of typical they would buy an individual meal for you know for them and their roommate or or like a parasite or a sandwich or like a half dozen donuts or you know eventually being like the box to Trader Joe\'s or something of the prepared foods counter animal foods you have this running yet.

`[00:11:19]` 或者想以折扣的价格买一种食物，通常他们会给你买一顿单独的食物，比如给他们和他们的室友，或者像寄生虫，三明治，或者半打的甜甜圈，或者你知道，最终你会像商人的盒子一样，乔的或者其他的准备好的食品柜台，动物食品，你已经有了这样的运行。

> `[00:11:41]` So we launched a kind of e-mail proof of concept about two months ago.

`[00:11:41]` 大约两个月前，我们推出了一种概念的电子邮件证明。

> Basically we just wanted to test hypotheses if people would actually go into the store if they got that information.

基本上，我们只是想检验假设，如果人们得到这些信息，他们是否真的会走进商店。

> And so we had a subscriber base of maybe like 350 people.

所以我们有一个大概 350 人的用户群。

> We ran it with six or seven benders and it turned out that they did.

我们用了六七个弯杆，结果发现他们做到了。

> So we had open rates of about 40 percent of our email people actually went into the store per listing was maybe like four or five people per listing so that\'s actually pretty decent given that the quantities were fairly low anyway.

因此，我们有大约 40%的电子邮件开放率-实际上，每个列表上的人进入商店的次数大概是 4 到 5 人-因此，考虑到数量很低，这实际上是相当不错的。

> And Joe did you get everything that was listed sold.

乔，你拿到所有上市的东西了吗？

> So it wasn\'t entirely wasn\'t a hundred percent but some stores were better than other stores based on the items that they were selling.

所以，这并不完全是百分之百，但一些商店比其他商店更好，因为他们出售的商品。

> `[00:12:22]` So their location or I mean exactly what were the things that sold well and what didn\'t.

`[00:12:22]` 所以他们的位置，或者我的意思是，什么东西卖得好，什么东西卖不好。

> `[00:12:27]` Yeah.

`[00:12:27]` 是的。

> So the things are sold well were like Sahim which is in callsigns and those types of things the things that didn\'t sell well was kind of like.

所以这些东西卖得很好，就像萨希姆，在呼号里，那些类型的东西，那些卖得不好的东西，有点像。

> There was this one bakery that had kind of an evergreen bread deal.

有一家面包店做了一份常绿面包生意。

> So they knew people knew that this was kind of running every single day.

所以他们知道人们知道这是每天都在运行的。

> So they weren\'t kind of incentivized to go in today versus tomorrow versus the next because they knew that was available.

所以他们并没有被激励去参加今天和明天的比赛，因为他们知道这是可行的。

> `[00:12:49]` And it was also a more like residential neighborhood.

`[00:12:49]` 这也是一个更像住宅区。

> People don\'t really work around there.

那里的人并不是真正的工作。

> They\'re like all outworks across.

他们就像其他人一样。

> `[00:12:55]` So location matter a lot right.

`[00:12:55]` 所以位置很重要。

> On day.

在白天。

> My sense is that this will be one it is that list still going by the way we still do not know so we found the list to be fairly restrictive and there are a lot of issues with their basic set successful and looked kind of like what we wanted to test but it wasn\'t successful in the sense that users only wanted one e-mail a day but venders are all very different.

我的感觉是，这将是一个，它仍然是按照我们仍然不知道的方式，所以我们发现这个列表是相当严格的，并且他们的基本设置有很多问题-成功并且看起来有点像我们想要测试的东西-但是它不是成功的，因为用户每天只需要一封电子邮件，但是供应商都是非常不同的。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So they all had different closing hours and they all have different abilities to estimate there have been.

因此，他们都有不同的关闭时间，他们都有不同的能力来估计有。

> So when will you have the mobile app.

那么你什么时候会有移动应用程序呢？

> So yes.

所以是的。

> So actually I just finished wire framing them this morning and we\'re hoping to have it developed in the next two or three weeks which yeah kind of you know and kind of what the move is is we are building this web app now to kind of test our hypotheses around lives listings and kind of location based searches and through searches and then the mobile app will hopefully be able to kind of take that even further.

所以实际上我今天早上刚刚完成了线框，我们希望能在接下来的两三个星期内开发出来，是的，你知道，我们现在正在构建这个网络应用程序，来测试我们关于生命列表和基于位置的搜索的假设，然后移动应用程序就有希望了。可以更进一步。

> `[00:13:50]` With alerts and being able to kind of do location based searches kind of like when you\'re out and about in city and so it might might to two thoughts would be I\'d try to get the mobile app as quickly as possible that when people try to test these things on the Web if it\'s really the sort of thing people want to use on mobile it never works as well.

`[00:13:50]` 有警报和能够进行基于位置的搜索，就像你外出和在城市里一样，所以我可能会有两种想法：我会尽可能快地获得移动应用程序，如果人们试图在网络上测试这些东西，如果它真的是人们想在手机上使用的东西，它永远也不会起作用。

> And you often end up with bad data.

结果往往是糟糕的数据。

> And the other thing would be like.

另一件事就是。

> Hyper focused when you start it like not even a whole specific city but very specific areas and like the specific verticals like Chris Johnson sandwiches that you learned work the product matters a lot.

当你开始的时候非常专注，就像一个甚至不是一个特定的城市，但是非常具体的地区，像克里斯约翰逊三明治这样的特定的垂直，你学到的工作，产品非常重要。

> `[00:14:25]` Yeah this product matters and density definitely matters as well.

`[00:14:25]` 是的，这个产品很重要，密度也很重要。

> `[00:14:29]` Yeah and also the types of vendors that we\'re working with we want to make sure at the place that people want to go on a regular basis to that if there is a discount like even more incentivized in.

`[00:14:29]` 是的，还有我们与之合作的供应商类型，我们想要确保在人们想要定期去的地方，如果有折扣，比如更多的激励措施。

> `[00:14:38]` Yeah but like making sure that everyone that uses it has a good experience so that they find something that they like and that there\'s something nearby.

`[00:14:38]` 是的，但是要确保每个使用它的人都有好的体验，这样他们就能找到他们喜欢的东西，并在附近找到一些东西。

> And no matter how much you have to limit it to make sure that this first like thousand users really really love it it\'s almost always worth doing.

不管你如何限制它，以确保它首先像上千个用户一样真正地喜欢它，它几乎总是值得去做的。

> `[00:14:52]` How are you going to get all of the sort of people that have this access food to sign up.

`[00:14:52]` 你怎样才能让所有这种食物的人注册。

> Are you just going around and like banging on the door.

你只是四处走动就像敲门一样。

> `[00:14:59]` Yes.

`[00:14:59]` 是。

> Currently it\'s literally the two of us walking around and talking to every coffee shop we can find every sandwich shop.

目前，我们两人走来走去，和每一家咖啡店交谈，我们可以找到每一家三明治店。

> We have some advisers who we\'ve been working with who are food waste consultants who they work with restaurant chains New York City and they\'ve actually started to recommend us as a potential option.

我们有一些顾问，我们一直和他们一起工作，他们是食物浪费顾问，他们在纽约市的连锁餐厅工作，他们实际上已经开始推荐我们作为一个潜在的选择。

> People have also emailed us saying like hey I worked really closely with like Safeway or Kroger or whatever if and when you\'re ready you know I\'d love to introduce you.

人们也给我们发邮件说，“嘿，我和像 Safeway 或 Kroger 这样的人非常密切地合作，或者什么的，如果你准备好了，你知道我很想介绍你。”

> But mostly right now it\'s really just that\'s like having really high touch.

但现在大多数情况下，这就像有很高的触觉一样。

> Question Is it.

问题是。

> `[00:15:28]` What is the plan to get those first thousand users and users to buy.

`[00:15:28]` 让第一批用户和用户购买的计划是什么？

> Yeah.

嗯

> So for on the user side we got a little bit of press and just kind of through word of mouth.

因此，在用户方面，我们得到了一些新闻，只是通过口碑。

> We were able to grow from about 350 to about 2500 now.

我们能够从大约 350 人增长到现在的 2500 人左右。

> Yeah.

嗯

> It\'s just people who are kind of like interested in what we\'re doing.

只是那些对我们所做的事情感兴趣的人。

> And then in terms of moving forward what we\'re thinking about is is basically thinking about the target populations that we want and a lot of those are on college campuses so working with the college caterer\'s folks that have those kind of connections and then working with students to be student representatives on campus and things like that to kind of get the word out and we think that because there is that density of population on college campuses it makes a lot more sense.

然后，就前进而言，我们所考虑的基本上是我们想要的目标人群，其中很多人都在大学校园里，所以和那些有这种联系的大学宴会的人一起工作，然后和学生们一起在校园里做学生代表之类的事情，我们认为是这样的。因为大学校园里的人口密度更有意义。

> When you describe the product to just someone who finds out about the app.

当你把产品描述给那些发现这个应用程序的人时。

> How do you think about.

你觉得。

> Describing it.

描述它。

> `[00:16:18]` Around waste.

`[00:16:18]` 在废物周围。

> Is it around really great food near you the low cost store.

你附近的食物真的很好吗？低成本的商店。

> You know what\'s what has worked and how do you think about it.

你知道什么是有效的，你是如何看待它的。

> `[00:16:26]` Yeah I think it\'s primarily like really great food at low cost and then secondary to that.

`[00:16:26]` 是的，我认为它主要是像非常好的食物，低成本，然后再其次。

> It\'s like what is your social impact like your environmental impact rate for every dollar of food that\'s wasted.

这就像你对社会的影响，就像浪费掉的每一美元食物对环境的影响一样。

> There\'s like five and a half dollars of inputs behind that that are also than wasted in terms of like land use water use sleepetc.

有大约五美元的投入背后，这些投入也比浪费在类似土地利用，水的使用。

> So we\'re also hoping to be able to play that back to both vendors and users in the future.

因此，我们也希望将来能够向供应商和用户回放这些信息。

> So with vendors it\'s how much have you save when it comes to trash hauling.

因此，对于供应商来说，当涉及到垃圾运输时，你节省了多少钱。

> How much have you made on stuff that you otherwise would have had a loss on.

你赚了多少钱的东西，否则你会有损失。

> `[00:16:53]` What\'s the normal discount rate that stuff sells for.

`[00:16:53]` 一般的折扣率是多少？

> So.

所以

> Our average right now is 50 percent.

我们现在的平均水平是百分之五十。

> `[00:17:00]` Our range that we\'re allowing vendors to discount is around 25 to 75 rate it\'s like lower than 25 customers and I don\'t really have incentive to walk in and then hire the 35 it\'s just like total lottery business.

`[00:17:00]` 我们允许销售商打折的范围大约在 25 到 75 之间，大约低于 25 位顾客，而我并没有真正的动力走进来，然后再雇佣 35 家，这就像整个彩票业务一样。

> `[00:17:11]` So  `[00:17:12]` that\'s kind of what we\'re playing with now and the highest that someone is actually listed for with 60 percent and the lowest was 30 percent.

`[00:17:11]` 所以`[00:17:12]` 这是我们现在正在玩的东西，也是我们现在所要做的最高的，是 60%的人，最低的是 30%。

> Yeah.

嗯

> `[00:17:19]` That feels about right like there.

`[00:17:19]` 那种感觉就像在那里一样。

> Unfortunate we\'re out of time but this sounds bad and I would like to try it.

不幸的是，我们没有时间了，但这听起来很糟糕，我想试试。

> Thank you.

谢谢。

> You guys.

伙计们。

> Have to some you guys come a fence.

你们一定要来个篱笆。

> `[00:17:48]` All right.

`[00:17:48]` 好的。

> What are you guys doing here.

你们在这里做什么。

> So we\'re building an app that makes it way less painful for couples to share expenses.

因此，我们正在开发一个应用程序，可以减少夫妻分担费用的痛苦。

> We think with your credit card transactions you can go through refeed and just easily split expenses that way.

我们认为，通过您的信用卡交易，您可以通过重新饲料，只是简单地分摊费用的方式。

> `[00:18:02]` How do you know people need something new for this idea of an existing services.

`[00:18:02]` 你怎么知道人们需要一些新的东西来实现现有的服务。

> `[00:18:06]` So it\'s actually a problem that I\'m personally very familiar with laughter I\'ve just finished with my fiancee for eight years now and over the years I\'ve tried lots of different things.

`[00:18:06]` 事实上，这是我个人非常熟悉笑的一个问题，我和未婚妻刚刚结束了八年，多年来我尝试了很多不同的事情。

> Initially you know we try to keep a mental tab for you and your Panax that sort of put you broke down because as soon as they go out of sync this creates awkward moments and is prone to conflict.

一开始，你知道，我们试着为你和你的 Panax 保留一个心理标签，这让你崩溃了，因为一旦它们失去同步，就会产生尴尬的时刻，并且容易发生冲突。

> We all know we tried spreadsheets where they were paid to manage you know we tried Venmo.

我们都知道，我们尝试了电子表格，在那里他们是为了管理，你知道，我们尝试了文莫。

> Was sort of the fun of the moment and you know changing 50 bucks back and forth free time same day just seems silly.

这是一种有趣的时刻，你知道，在同一天来回变换 50 美元的空闲时间似乎很愚蠢。

> `[00:18:39]` But what about something like split wise.

`[00:18:39]` 但是分裂智慧之类的东西呢？

> Like what.

比如什么。

> What\'s the specific difference or the need here for work.

这里有什么特别的区别或工作的需要。

> `[00:18:43]` Right exactly.

`[00:18:43]` 对极了。

> So it\'s just spillways basically you can you can enter IOUs right on the flight.

所以它只是溢流道，基本上你可以在飞机上输入欠条。

> Basically enter what it\'s for what the amount is and with whom.

基本上输入它是什么数量和与谁。

> The nice thing about linking with your card or debit credit card transactions.

与您的信用卡或借记卡交易连接的好处。

> Basically it\'s all there.

基本上一切都在那里。

> All you have to do is tap it.

你要做的就是点击它。

> So that means a big difference for us.

所以这对我们来说意味着很大的不同。

> `[00:19:00]` That\'s.

`[00:19:00]` 那.

> Can you explain how it works.

你能解释一下它是怎么工作的吗。

> And it just sort of the whole sort of user experience.

它只是某种程度上的用户体验。

> `[00:19:05]` Yeah sure.

`[00:19:05]` 是的。

> So basically you sync your credit up from your actions the same way you sync with Entercom all your child coming into a feed and then.

因此，基本上，您同步您的信用从您的行动，就像您与 Entercom 同步，所有您的孩子进入一个提要，然后。

> Whichever ones are shared just happened.

不管哪个是共享的，都是刚刚发生的。

> And that\'s it.

仅此而已。

> And then it says at the end of the month whatever settle up and break it you get it gets added to a tab where you can easily see sort of who owes what you can sell to the app.

然后，它说，在月底，无论是什么结算和打破它，你得到它被添加到一个标签，你可以很容易地看到谁欠你可以出售的应用程序。

> But interesting thing that we learned from users that even just knowing what the tab is having always be in sync already quite a lot about.

但有趣的是，我们从用户那里学到的是，即使仅仅知道标签的内容总是同步的，已经有相当多的内容了。

> `[00:19:33]` Yeah that\'s cool.

`[00:19:33]` 是的，那很酷。

> And certainly couples would be willing to sort of share just the full transaction stream in a way that you might not with a group on Spotify or something.

当然，情侣们也愿意在某种程度上分享完整的交易流，而不是与 Spotify 上的某个组分享。

> Is this why was it up early.

所以才早起。

> `[00:19:43]` Yeah we\'re currently one thing but what you just said is you don\'t you don\'t get my personal transactions in your field you just get the transactions for you.

`[00:19:43]` 是的，我们目前是一回事，但你刚才说的是，你没有得到我在你的领域的个人事务，你只是得到交易给你。

> You wouldn\'t sign it.

你不会签的。

> My personal.

我的私人恩怨。

> You know what I mean.

你知道我的意思

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So just whatever you click charging.

所以不管你怎么点击充电。

> Exactly.

一点儿没错

> So we\'re currently in private bedroom but we\'re going to submit at the outset in the next two weeks.

因此，我们目前在私人卧室，但我们将在未来两周开始提交。

> We started working out in January.

我们从一月份开始锻炼。

> One thing that we sort of made a mistake early on was that we wanted to accommodate oh like is this could work for roommates.

我们很早就犯了一个错误，那就是我们想要适应-哦，就像这样-这对室友来说是可行的。

> This could work for groups that are travelling.

这对于正在旅行的团体来说是可行的。

> And what really happened was we had all these different ways of using the app and we didn\'t have any one way that was very very good.

而真正发生的是，我们有所有这些不同的方式使用这个应用程序，我们没有任何一种方式是非常好的。

> So you made a comment to the salutary team about focusing on something very small that a lot of users would actually like.

因此，你向有益的团队发表了一个关于关注一些非常小的东西的评论，这是很多用户实际上会喜欢的。

> So about a month ago we made a decision to sort of.

大约一个月前我们决定。

> Just simplify the product and focus just on couples and so we feel you know to push out to a lot of people.

只需简化产品，只关注情侣，我们就会觉得你知道要向很多人推介。

> `[00:20:35]` It\'s good to focus the downside of focusing on couples is right.

`[00:20:35]` 把注意力集中在夫妻身上的缺点是对的。

> Just curious what you\'re planning to do is that you there\'s no inherent morality in there either.

奇怪的是，你的计划是，你在那里也没有固有的道德。

> You know like it\'s you use it with your partner and that\'s that.

你知道，就像你和你的搭档一起用它一样。

> And like it\'s not like something where you\'re sharing it with friends or roommates and brainteaser is that that\'s actually something that we\'ve been going back and forth on.

而不是那种你和朋友或室友分享的东西，而是我们一直在来回交流的东西。

> `[00:20:57]` During those months.

`[00:20:57]` 在这几个月里。

> You know our initial stage is basically you know try to accommodate every use case.

你知道，我们的初始阶段基本上是你知道的，试着适应每一个用例。

> So to see what a beta testers do judging that data and then like focus I think they\'re just Berzina which is too small.

所以，要看测试版测试人员是做什么的，判断这些数据，然后像焦点一样，我认为它们只是 Berzina，太小了。

> `[00:21:09]` And you know we\'ve built a part like focus.

`[00:21:09]` 你知道我们已经建立了一个类似焦点的部分。

> But to answer your question.

而是回答你的问题。

> `[00:21:14]` So couple the app we were interested to learn from them because they seemed to grow pretty.

`[00:21:14]` 所以，让我们有兴趣向他们学习的应用程序，因为他们似乎长得很漂亮。

> `[00:21:21]` So they were wise the are they are quite right and they have certainly I mean they have managed to grow but they\'ve had to do it in spite of this huge drag which is the sort of lack of it\'s not any here any of our nature.

`[00:21:00]` 所以他们很聪明，他们是对的，我的意思是，他们已经成功地成长了，但是他们不得不这样做，尽管有着巨大的阻力，这是我们的本性所没有的。

> Did you have couples using it during your beta period.

你有夫妇在你的测试期使用它吗。

> Yes.

是

> With those like the best users is that why you decided to focus on this.

对于那些最好的用户来说，这就是你决定关注这个问题的原因。

> Yes based basically most of them.

是的，基本上大部分都是这样。

> `[00:21:44]` That used it tend to be couples.

`[00:21:44]` 使用它的人往往是夫妻。

> You know.

你知道

> That was an interesting thing to me because initially I always thought that maybe I was a little.

这对我来说是一件有趣的事情，因为一开始我一直以为我有点小。

> `[00:21:52]` Unique maybe or crazy in the way that I dealt with my fantasies fantasies with my my fiancee now and so we did early artlessly we went out and talked to lots of people.

`[00:21:52]` 独特的，也许是疯狂的，就像我现在和我的未婚妻处理我的幻想一样，所以我们早早就做得很好，我们出去和很多人交谈。

> And so while expense sharing may not be something that you flaunt in from your friends.

因此，虽然费用分摊可能不是你从朋友那里炫耀的东西。

> Usually when you ask them a lot of people go through.

通常当你问他们很多人都会经历。

> A very stiff and very painful Maniel ways to deal with it.

一种非常僵硬和痛苦的处理方法。

> `[00:22:13]` Yep.

`[00:22:13]` 是的。

> No I like the hyperfocus.

不我喜欢超焦距。

> It\'s definitely good and if you can if you can figure out a way that this is way better for couples then another solution.

这绝对是好的，如果你能想出一种更适合夫妻的方法，那么另一种解决办法。

> And you know I believe you are.

你知道我相信你是的。

> We\'ll figure out some way to grow this dumb one.

我们会想办法让这个蠢蛋长大的。

> I think it\'s just it\'s really important to keep yourselves disciplined too.

我认为保持自我约束也是非常重要的。

> Why.

为什么

> Why do people need this product.

为什么人们需要这种产品。

> And what are they going to do with this that they haven\'t with others.

如果他们没有和其他人在一起的话，他们会怎么做呢？

> It\'s sort of like the you know split bills with friends or roommates or whatever is one of these sort of canonical startup ideas.

这有点像你所知道的与朋友或室友分开的账单，或诸如此类的典型的创业想法之一。

> I would bet my Seagate\'s 100 applications a year for some version of splitting bills and splitting expenses.

我敢打赌，我的希捷(Seagate)每年会有 100 份申请，以申请某种版本的分摊账单和分摊费用。

> `[00:22:55]` We funded a bunch and we found that a bunch and I think it\'s it\'s really important to just be very disciplined about what you know like what is what what\'s new about this and why.

`[00:22:55]` 我们资助了一群人，我们发现这一群人-我认为-非常重要的是，对你所知道的东西-什么是新的-和为什么-保持严格的纪律。

> Why is this going to work when so many of us feel.

为什么这么多人觉得。

> I love the idea of making things as simple as possible.

我喜欢让事情尽可能简单的想法。

> And I think I\'m actually I don\'t use a lot of these products but I have not heard myself before this idea of pulling your transaction stream.

我认为我实际上我不使用很多这些产品，但我从来没有听说过自己之前，这个想法，拉动你的交易流程。

> `[00:23:23]` And I think that\'s that sounds really cool.

`[00:23:23]` 我觉得这听起来很酷。

> `[00:23:29]` It might be that you\'ve built this great initial tool to be able to split bills and then you end up kind of adapting it and you know back in.

`[00:23:29]` 也许你已经建立了这个很好的初始工具，可以分摊账单，然后你就会对它进行调整，然后你就知道了。

> Know this is kind of like your initial stab your initial beachhead into this and then you figure out well in order to support the roommate scenario than this it\'s so hard you know at the end date for all of these scenarios though you still have this inherent.

你要知道，这就像你一开始就把你最初的滩头刺进去，然后你想好了，为了支持室友的场景，这是非常困难的，你知道，在所有这些场景的结束日期，尽管你仍然有这种内在的想法。

> Kind of.

有点

> `[00:23:55]` Viral distribution problem or you know how do you acquire users.

`[00:23:55]` 病毒的分发问题，或者你知道如何获得用户。

> This isn\'t one of those things where you can necessarily charge a lot upfront so you can\'t pay for it.

这不是那种你必须预先收取很多钱的东西，所以你不能为此付出代价。

> And so you do need some sort of free way whether it\'s PR or some invite flow or you know it\'s just you know almost too difficult to talk just about this in eight minutes.

所以你确实需要一些自由的方式，不管是公关，还是邀请流，或者你知道，在八分钟内谈论这件事几乎太难了。

> It\'s a much longer topic.

这是一个更长的话题。

> `[00:24:18]` But just get users like that.

`[00:24:18]` 但是请这样的用户。

> `[00:24:19]` The mistake you know you could sort of like there\'s so many different things you could do here and until you get like the first few hundred or a thousand users really above this you end up shooting in the dark.

`[00:24:19]` 你知道你可能会犯的错误-你可以在这里做很多不同的事情-直到你像最初的几百到 1000 个用户那样，你才能在黑暗中拍摄。

> And when you get people that are really using this like for their daily lives all the time and then like if you in my CV we would tell you like golf and get your first few hundred users and then we can actually give you real advice.

当你让那些经常在日常生活中使用这个的人，就像你在我的简历里一样，我们会告诉你喜欢高尔夫，得到你最初的几百个用户，然后我们可以给你真正的建议。

> But in the meantime it\'s going to be a lot of guesswork and this very promising idea.

但在此期间，这将是许多猜测和这个非常有希望的想法。

> And it\'s really hard to decide what to do about that but I\'m sure you learned a lot in the beta and I\'m just from your friends like if you can\'t get enough users just from your friends your friends are generally pretty obligated to use your products like.

很难决定该怎么做，但我确信你在测试版中学到了很多，而我只是从你的朋友那里学到了很多，比如如果你不能从朋友那里得到足够的用户，从你的朋友那里得到的用户一般都是非常有义务使用你的产品的。

> So you can\'t do that in the first just like a few weeks right.

所以你不能在第一周就这么做，对吧。

> Then you know you have a problem.

那你就知道你有麻烦了。

> But my my my expectation is you\'ll definitely be able to and then don\'t feel bad about like.

但我的期望是，你一定能做到，然后就不会觉得有什么不好了。

> Calling them every week and saying how\'s it going what are you using.

每周给他们打电话，问他们你在用什么。

> What you know what can we do differently.

你知道我们能做什么不一样。

> That is the way that these things working.

这就是这些东西起作用的方式。

> So would you say you know.

所以你会说你知道。

> `[00:25:23]` Right now should we should we get on the app stores that we can distribute more easily or should we how many users right now again we have about like 40 beta test and then do they use it daily or weekly like what percentage you\'re using it just incorporate it into their lives.

`[00:25:23]` 现在，我们应该进入我们可以更容易发布的应用程序商店，或者我们现在应该有多少用户，我们有大约 40 测试，然后他们是否每天或每周使用它，就像你使用它的百分比，只是将它融入他们的生活。

> `[00:25:37]` Of those 40 I\'d say probably about like 25 hours a day.

`[00:25:37]` 在这 40 人中，我会说大概一天大约 25 小时。

> That\'s a pretty high rate actually actually every regular like every few days that\'s great.

这是一个相当高的比率，实际上，每隔几天就有一次，这很好。

> It is.

它是

> That\'s what it\'s right on.

这就对了。

> Activity rates are one of the most promising things for early stage startups.

对于早期创业公司来说，活动率是最有希望的事情之一。

> It\'s not clear to me that the app store is the most important thing to do right now because like you know you can get a small number of users without it but it would.

我不清楚现在应用程序商店是最重要的事情，因为就像你知道的那样，没有它你可以得到少量的用户。

> It does log around the margins make the whole process a little smoother.

它确实在边距附近记录，使整个过程更加流畅。

> So I would probably do it because it shouldn\'t be that much harder but don\'t expect that to give you a lot of traction.

所以我可能会这么做，因为应该不会太困难，但不要指望这会给你带来很大的吸引力。

> Okay we\'re unfortunately out of time.

好吧，我们很不幸没时间了。

> Sadhus shonk-simmons thanks so much.

施德胡斯-西蒙斯非常感谢。

