# Alfred Lin with Justin Kan  

> `[00:00:02]` Next up I\'m pleased to introduce Alfred Lynn who\'s a partner at Sequoia Capital One of the top investors in Silicon Valley and the world.

`[00:00:02]` 下一节我很高兴地介绍阿尔弗雷德·林恩，他是红杉资本的合伙人，是硅谷和世界顶级投资者之一。

> He serves as a director on a bunch of awesome Silicon Valley companies like Airbnb Inbee and house.

他是一群令人敬畏的硅谷公司的董事，比如 Airbnb、In 蜜蜂和 House。

> And before that he was the CFO of Zappos.

在此之前，他是 Zappos 的首席财务官。

> Worked in startups for a long time.

在初创公司工作了很长时间。

> So we\'ll have a chat.

那我们就聊聊吧。

> Over here.

在这边。

> `[00:00:37]` Thanks Justin.

`[00:00:37]` 谢谢贾斯汀。

> Thanks for having me.

谢谢你邀请我。

> All right cool.

好酷。

> Thanks for being here.

谢谢你能来这里。

> So.

所以

> Let\'s just start off in the early days and tell us like how you got started with your first startup at an exchange.

让我们从早期开始，告诉我们你是如何在交易所第一家创业的。

> `[00:00:51]` So I knew Tony and Sandra in college.

`[00:00:51]` 所以我在大学认识托尼和桑德拉。

> And originally Tony.

原来是托尼。

> So I came out to the Bay Area one year before Tony.

所以我比托尼早一年来到湾区。

> He had originally wanted to scope out a place on campus at Stanford to open up a Subway\'s franchise because he was always into food.

他原本想在斯坦福大学的校园里找个地方开一家地铁专卖店，因为他总是喜欢吃东西。

> Before that he and I had met through his pizza business and I told him I\'m sorry there\'s already one on University Avenue happened to be a half mile away from the university but the union and at the time the university would not allow commercial entities to be on campus.

在那之前，他和我是通过他的披萨生意认识的，我告诉他，我很抱歉，在大学大道上已经有一个了，正好离大学只有半英里远，但是工会和当时的大学不允许商业实体在校园里。

> I said you know what.

我说了你知道吗。

> When you come out you\'re going to have to do something else.

当你出来的时候，你将不得不做些别的事情。

> So he and Sanjay came out to the Bay Area.

于是他和桑杰来到海湾地区。

> They were working for Oracle and they were extremely bored so they started a company on their side.

他们为甲骨文工作，非常无聊，所以他们在自己的公司里创立了一家公司。

> `[00:01:43]` Building Web sites and they had built these Web sites.

`[00:01:43]` 建立网站，他们建立了这些网站。

> They had put their hearts and souls into making them beautiful at the time.

他们用他们的心灵和灵魂使他们在当时美丽。

> This is 1996 97 so now a lot of people knew how to code an HMO.

这是 1996 年的 97 年，现在很多人都知道如何编码 HMO 了。

> And they were solving a problem that a lot of people wanted a website because the Web was coming up to speed and they built these great websites.

他们解决了一个很多人都想要一个网站的问题，因为网络正在加速发展，他们建立了这些伟大的网站。

> But there was no traffic.

但是没有交通。

> So they like GS spent all this time on this.

所以他们喜欢 GS 花了这么长时间在这上面。

> And so how do we get these Web sites to get traffic.

那么，我们如何才能让这些网站获得流量。

> And one of if you had Bhoja you can go.

如果你有 Bhoja 你就可以走了。

> Buy advertising on Yahoo or AOL Amazon at that time.

在那个时候购买雅虎或 AOL 亚马逊的广告。

> But if you\'re a small Web site how do you get traffic and that\'s the problem that they.

但是，如果你是一个小网站，你如何获得流量，这就是他们的问题。

> Experience and the problem that they went out solving and so they left these websites together.

经验和他们出去解决的问题，所以他们离开这些网站在一起。

> And so.

而且如此。

> That became like an interesting thing and they link them so that if you showed a banner on your site you\'d get to show a banner somewhere else on the network and as the network grew the network became more and more powerful because of network effects.

这就像一件有趣的事情，他们把它们连接起来，如果你在你的网站上展示了一个横幅，你就可以在网络上的其他地方展示一个横幅，随着网络的发展，网络变得越来越强大，因为网络效应。

> And we had some pretty interesting companies that were part of that network.

我们有一些非常有趣的公司也是这个网络的一部分。

> And when we sold the company to Microsoft it arguably had the largest audience on the web at the time.

当我们把公司卖给微软时，它可以说是当时网络上最大的受众。

> `[00:02:55]` How did we get you to join an exchange that was the conversation.

`[00:02:55]` 我们是如何让你参加一次交流的，那是我们的谈话。

> What were you doing.

你当时在做什么。

> Well I was.

我曾经是。

> `[00:03:02]` I was in a PHC program and statistics.

`[00:03:02]` 我在 PHC 程序和统计中。

> And as Tony would like to say that\'s like watching paint dry on the wall in the dark.

正如托尼想说的那样，这就像在黑暗中看着墙上的油漆干了一样。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:03:14]` And look I love numbers and I and I really enjoyed what I was studying.

`[00:03:14]` 看，我喜欢数字，我真的很喜欢我正在学习的东西。

> But I did have a passion for business.

但我对生意很有热情。

> And my parents being very traditional Asian parents had this hierarchy of jobs that you can get one the highest.

我的父母是一个非常传统的亚洲父母，他们的工作等级是最高的。

> Type of job you can do is to be a scholar and contribute to society.

你所能做的工作就是成为一名学者，为社会做出贡献。

> `[00:03:33]` Then if you can\'t do that then be a doctor and then if you can\'t do that be a lawyer if you can\'t do that be an engineer and all the way down on the list is to be in business.

`[00:03:33]` 如果你不能那么做，那你就当医生，如果你不能做律师，如果你做不到，那就做一名工程师。

> It was a hard conversation with my parents for me to leave myPh.D.

我要离开博士学位对我来说和父母的谈话很难。

> program but I know Antonians Aunger for a long time and there were people that I bonded with in college and so they needed someone who could work on the finance side.

但是我认识安东尼·安格尔很长一段时间，我在大学里和一些人建立了联系，所以他们需要一个能在金融方面工作的人。

> And I told them I had no experience in finance but I\'m happy to learn.

我告诉他们我没有金融方面的经验，但我很高兴学习。

> `[00:04:02]` I\'m good with numbers and I became finance and Link Exchange.

`[00:04:02]` 我对数字很在行，我成了金融和链接交换。

> `[00:04:08]` And how did you guys in the early days give your initial customers like what was that when you decide to do an exchange.

`[00:04:08]` 在最初的日子里，你们是怎么给你们最初的顾客的，就像你们决定交换的时候是什么样子的。

> What was the process like to actually build it into big company.

把它建设成大公司的过程是什么样子的。

> `[00:04:16]` Well so they had a net.

`[00:04:16]` 那么他们就有了网。

> They had an initial Web sites that they had already built.

他们已经建立了一个最初的网站。

> That was part of the sort of thing that basically pivoted their way.

这是那种基本上按自己的方式旋转的东西的一部分。

> It was a nice little side business by being able to charge per hour to create these Web sites whereas not very scalable and then decided you know what we\'re get for all this money we can forego all of that and we\'re going to just try to get people to join that network and back.

这是一项不错的小生意，它可以每小时收费来创建这些网站，但并不能很好地扩展，然后你决定你知道我们从所有这些钱中得到了什么，我们可以放弃所有这些，我们只想让人们加入这个网络，然后再回来。

> And there is this directory called Yahoo.

还有一个叫做 Yahoo 的目录。

> So they went down to some of these Web sites that were very popular and reached the popular ranks in Yahoo.

因此，他们进入了一些非常受欢迎的网站，并进入了雅虎的受欢迎行列。

> And they just contacted them and asked them Would you like more promotion.

他们只是联系了他们，问他们你想要更多的晋升。

> And of course everybody would say yes.

当然每个人都会答应。

> And they joined the network up more and more powerful and it got easier and easier to sell the next company to join because of network effects your arguably better off joining leik exchange.

他们加入了网络，越来越强大，出售下一家公司加入变得越来越容易，因为网络效应，你可以说加入莱克交易所更好。

> You know after that the last person joined.

你知道在那之后最后一个人加入了。

> And so one of the more interesting things is.

所以更有趣的是。

> The one of the very early.

很早的那个。

> People who joined was a company called Auction Web.

加入的人是一家叫做“拍卖网”的公司。

> Nobody probably ever heard of AuctionWatch but if you go to Wikipedia and look up eBay you\'ll see in the very early days their original name was AuctionWatch.

也许没人听说过 AuctionWatch，但是如果你去维基百科查阅 eBay，你会发现在早期你会看到他们最初的名字是 AuctionWatch。

> So even companies like eBay need a promotion.

所以即使像 eBay 这样的公司也需要升职。

> Back then of course they\'re worth 65 billion dollars and we were only able to sell the company for 265 no and so.

当然，当时他们的身价为 650 亿美元，我们只能以 265 英镑的价格出售该公司，诸如此类。

> They had a much better business.

他们的生意好多了。

> `[00:05:49]` How did how did you guys end up having that conversation about selling the company wants you.

`[00:05:49]` 你们怎么会有关于出售公司想要的你的谈话呢？

> You have this business that was generating revenue and.

你有一项能创造收入的生意。

> How do you decide what you wanted to do with it.

你怎么决定你想用它做什么。

> `[00:05:59]` Thank you is our first company we had.

`[00:05:59]` 谢谢你是我们的第一家公司。

> Tony has been very public about this in his book.

托尼在他的书中对这件事非常公开。

> We had hired people that were.

我们雇了以前的人。

> In it to basically let\'s call it murse mercenaries.

基本上让我们称其为雇佣兵。

> They wanted to sort of.

他们想说的是。

> Join the company because it was a rocket ship.

加入公司是因为它是一艘火箭飞船。

> The metrics looked exponential from the growth perspective and they were trying to build enough business so they can monetize.

从增长的角度来看，这些指标看上去是指数级的，他们正试图建立足够的业务，以便能够实现货币化。

> The.

这，这个，那，那个

> Company.

连在一起。

> And.

和

> Day by day went by and the place became less and less fun.

日复一日，这个地方变得越来越不好玩了。

> To work at.

去工作。

> And we had decided that you know what this is our first company and it was a good offer and we decide to sell the company.

我们已经决定，你知道这是我们的第一家公司，这是一个很好的报价，我们决定出售该公司。

> And arguably we sold the company to too early and.

可以说我们把公司卖得太早了。

> `[00:06:49]` It was a difficult decision but I think everybody was pretty happy after the fact because we all got to do what we wanted to do.

`[00:06:49]` 这是一个艰难的决定，但我认为每个人都很高兴，因为我们都要做我们想做的事。

> Tony and I started at the very early days of the startup was a lot of fun.

我和托尼在创业初期就开始了，非常有趣。

> So we after we sold the company to Microsoft.

所以我们把公司卖给微软之后。

> We left and started a small Angel Fund called Venture Frogs in 1999.

1999 年，我们离开并成立了一个名为“风险青蛙”的小天使基金。

> Probably the worst time ever to start a fund.

可能是启动基金的最糟糕的时候了。

> Right before the dot com crash.

就在网络崩溃之前。

> `[00:07:14]` But you know we got I wouldn\'t say that we were smart we just got lucky because we invest in some pretty amazing companies like Astley\'s and Open Table and a few others that got sold pretty quickly in 1999 2000 and then we made 27 investments.

`[00:07:14]` 但是你知道，我不会说我们很聪明，我们只是运气好，因为我们投资了一些非常棒的公司，比如 Astley‘s 和 Open Table，还有几家在 1999 到 2000 年很快卖出的公司，然后我们进行了 27 次投资。

> We went through a fund we were supposed to invest that fund over a two or three years.

我们经历了一只我们应该在两三年内投资的基金。

> We invested then and I think in nine months another not such great idea.

我们当时进行了投资，我认为在九个月内，另一个不太好的主意。

> `[00:07:45]` But we were left in 2000 2001 with basically a portfolio of 20 companies seven of them.

`[00:07:45]` 但我们在 2000 年留下的基本上是 20 家公司，其中 7 家。

> We thought we were going to war sold or we\'re going to do fine without us.

我们以为我们要去打仗，被卖了，或者没有我们，我们会过得很好的。

> And then we looked at the 20 and we ourselves or most of these are going to do well or not to world despite our help.

然后我们看了这 20 个，尽管我们帮助了世界，但我们自己或者说其中的大多数都会做得很好，或者不会做得很好。

> We\'re going to focus on two companies.

我们将专注于两家公司。

> One was tell me what works and the other was Zappos.

一种是告诉我什么有效，另一种是 Zappos。

> They.

他（她，它）们

> Spent some time at tell me now works at the time the company was losing.

花了一些时间告诉我，在公司亏损的时候，我现在正在工作。

> When I joined asV.P.

当我加入副总统的时候。

> of finance they were losing.

他们失去的资金。

> Gosh I think about 60 million dollars a year.

天哪，我想一年大约 6000 万美元。

> They had just come off 1999 where they had been able to raise two hundred and sixty five million.

他们刚刚从 1999 年开始，在那里他们筹集了两亿六千五百万美元。

> It was the first time I thought well most most companies learn how to pivot and deal with things when they have so little money.

这是我第一次很好地思考，大多数公司在钱这么少的时候学会了如何转变和处理问题。

> And this is the first time when I saw a company that actually raise so much money that it was a bad thing.

这是我第一次看到一家公司筹集了这么多资金，这是一件坏事。

> And I didn\'t know that that could be a bad thing until I saw how much money you can blow because everything was just not worth your time anymore because you had so much money in the company and it\'s not the discipline of this that.

我不知道这可能是件坏事，直到我看到你能花多少钱，因为一切都不值得你花时间了，因为你在公司里有那么多钱，而这不是这方面的纪律。

> Necessarily the CEO of the management team it\'s it becomes ingrained in the company is like well we have this amount of money in the bank should we just.

必须是管理团队的首席执行官-它在公司中根深蒂固-就像我们在银行里有这么多钱，如果我们只是这样的话。

> Use that money to experiment versus being thoughtful about where you want to spend and invest your comfort your company\'s money.

用这笔钱来做实验，而不是仔细考虑你想花在哪里的钱，并把你的钱投入到公司的钱中去。

> So what habitant tell me how did you.

是什么居民告诉我你是怎么。

> `[00:09:16]` Turn this ship around.

`[00:09:16]` 让这艘船掉头。

> We became very very focused.

我们变得非常专注。

> The company had been focused on a consumer business suite pivoted city enterprise selling it and tell me for those who you don\'t know what was originally started as a voice portal as a voice recognition portal so you would call 1 800 5 4 5 tell and you can ask at any question.

该公司一直专注于一家以城市企业为中心的消费商业套件，并告诉我那些你不知道最初作为语音识别门户开始的人，所以你可以拨打 1800 5 4 5 Tell，你可以在任何问题上提问。

> We pivoted to the enterprise and we started to automate using voice recognition 1 800 numbers and it was arguably one of the first SAS company\'s cloud companies in the world.

我们转向企业，并开始使用语音识别，1800 个数字，它可以说是世界上最早的 SAS 公司的云公司之一。

> We had to build our own recognition servers and put in the cloud.

我们必须建立自己的识别服务器，并将其放入云中。

> And so we got very focused on the Enterprise very very focused on a few select customers not trying to.

因此，我们非常关注企业部，非常专注于少数选择的客户，而不是试图。

> Get any customer that we could sign up.

找任何我们能注册的客户。

> `[00:10:06]` We were very very targeted on 12 to 24 customers and making sure that those were large contracts and very very multi-year successful engagements.

`[00:10:06]` 我们的目标是 12 到 24 名客户，并确保这些都是大合同和多年成功的合同。

> And then one when when I left the company to join Zappos we basically went from zero revenues to about 150 million dollars and recurring revenue and pretty stable cash generating business and was.

然后当我离开公司加入 Zappos 的时候，我们基本上从零收入上升到了 1.5 亿美元，经常性收入和相当稳定的现金产生业务。

> Later sold to Microsoft for eight hundred million dollars or so.

后来以 8 亿美元左右的价格卖给了微软。

> So pretty successful.

非常成功。

> Seem to work out.

似乎成功了。

> `[00:10:42]` Fine.

`[00:10:42]` 好的。

> How did you so at the same time you guys threw Venture Frogs had funded Zappos.

你们是怎么做到的，同时你们还扔了风投青蛙，资助了 Zappos。

> So how did you.

那你是怎么。

> `[00:10:51]` Why did you fund that fund them.

`[00:10:51]` 你为什么资助他们。

> Well Zappos found us and it was next winner who is the founder left a voicemail which we almost deleted.

好吧，Zappos 找到了我们，下一个获奖者是创始人，他留下了一封语音邮件，我们几乎把它删除了。

> I think Tony had his hand on his finger on the delete button of the voicemail because he started saying I have this crazy idea.

我想托尼把手放在语音信箱的删除按钮上，因为他开始说我有个疯狂的想法。

> I want to sell shoes on the internet.

我想在网上卖鞋子。

> I know nobody would want to buy it on the Internet because people have to try on shoes.

我知道没有人会想在网上买，因为人们不得不试穿鞋子。

> But.

但

> Then.

然后

> `[00:11:16]` If you had deleted it you wouldn\'t have heard that but.

`[00:11:16]` 如果你删除了它，你不会听到的，但是。

> But the shoe business is a 40 billion dollar business and five percent of it or 2 billion was already being done on militar.

但鞋业是一项价值 400 亿美元的业务，其中 5%(20 亿美元)已经用于军事领域。

> Now.

现在

> That.

那，那个

> The investment thesis that the Internet was going to be bigger than mail order carried the company it was consistent all the way through the company.

关于互联网将比邮购更大的投资论断，它贯穿公司的始终是一致的。

> I\'m not saying the company didn\'t have to pivot or had lots of struggles they had tons of that but we got that right.

我并不是说公司不需要转向，也没有经历过很多困难，他们有很多这样的想法，但我们做得对。

> And.

和

> `[00:11:45]` Nick got that right.

尼克说得对。

> Which was the.

那就是。

> Which was key and allow the company to focus on.

这是关键，让公司专注于。

> Building a business that people thought couldn\'t.

做一件人们认为不能做的生意。

> Be done.

完成吧。

> And I think that\'s actually great that you see founders build businesses that logically should exist but people don\'t think that it can because.

我认为\真的很好，你看到创始人建立了逻辑上应该存在的企业，但人们不认为它可以存在，因为。

> You know if logically it should exist and you solve a real need that people want that service or that product and if people think it can\'t be made it can\'t be done or can\'t be made or can\'t for whatever reason exist.

你知道，从逻辑上讲，它是否应该存在，你解决了一个真正的需求：人们想要那种服务或那种产品，如果人们认为它不能被制造出来，那么它就不能被完成，不能制造，或者因为任何原因而不能。

> Then you have a situation where you don\'t have a lot of competition in the very early days where you do need to pivot where you do need to learn and where you need to figure out you\'re standing in the marketplace.

然后你会遇到这样一种情况：在最初的日子里，你没有太多的竞争，你确实需要转向你需要学习的地方，你需要弄清楚你在市场上的地位。

> And that was a very powerful proposition for Zappos and another powerful thing for Zappos.

对于 Zappos 来说，这是一个非常强大的提议，对 Zappos 来说，这也是一个强大的东西。

> It was a bit of a.

有点像。

> Blessing mostly a blessing but also a curse was that Zappos could never raise a lot of money.

祝福主要是一种祝福，但也是一种诅咒，那就是 Zappos 永远不会筹集到很多钱。

> And at Zappos had to figure out how to generate revenue and be proper and do it profitably relatively early.

而在 Zappos 公司，必须想出如何创造收入和适当的方法，并在相对较早的时候盈利。

> Soon after you guys investors there was really hard to raise money.

很快，你们这些投资者就很难筹到钱。

> `[00:13:00]` Yeah.

`[00:13:00]` 是的。

> You know originally we thought you know we\'ll put 500000 dollars and then we\'ll just.

你知道，最初我们以为我们会投 500000 美元，然后我们就。

> `[00:13:07]` Hit the next milestone we\'ll put another 500000 dollars and eventually we\'re 2 million dollars into the company.

`[00:13:07]` 到达下一个里程碑，我们将再投入 500000 美元，最终我们将为公司注入 200 万美元。

> Nobody really wanted to fund it in 2000 2001.

在 2000 年的 2001 年，没有人真正想为它提供资金。

> So we had to keep going and as Tony has written in his book he sold his apartment a few of his apartments that he had acquired after.

因此，我们不得不继续前进，正如托尼在他的书中所写的，他卖掉了他后来买下的几套公寓。

> Link Exchange was sold to sort of put more money in the company.

LinkExchange 出售是为了在该公司投入更多的资金。

> And so it was a long road of doing things person making personal sacrifices employees taking less salary than they would like.

因此，做事情是一条漫长的道路-一个人做出个人牺牲-员工拿的薪水比他们想要的要少。

> But it all eventually worked out.

但最终都成功了。

> But it was a.

但那是个。

> Painful process through all of that.

所有这一切都是痛苦的过程。

> Were there.

当时就在那里。

> Were times when you were.

当你在的时候。

> `[00:13:51]` Ready to throw in the towel and say look this is not going to happen.

`[00:13:51]` 准备认输，说这不会发生。

> `[00:13:55]` I don\'t think we wanted to throw in the towel.

`[00:13:55]` 我不认为我们想认输。

> I just we just didn\'t understand why people didn\'t see the world the way we saw the world.

我只是不明白为什么人们不像我们看待世界那样看待世界。

> And we kind of thought well.

我们觉得不错。

> `[00:14:06]` It\'s a pretty big market out there just in the United States.

`[00:14:06]` 在美国，这是一个相当大的市场。

> Why when people backed us and you know there are reasons why people in Baccus backed them right there.

为什么当人们支持我们，你知道，为什么在巴库斯的人们支持他们的原因就在那里。

> There are lots of e-commerce companies in 1999 2000 2001 that raise a ton of money and then blew it all in customer acquisition.

在 1999，2000，2001 年间，有许多电子商务公司筹集了大量资金，然后在客户收购上一败涂地。

> And these were smart people.

这些人都很聪明。

> And I think some of the Struth thinking was good and some of the thinking was not so good.

我认为一些“真理”的想法是好的，而有些则不是很好。

> But you know the thing that people did was they sort of calculate the lifetime value on a small base of customers and figured out how much they can spend on marketing and they spend you know basically lifetime value minus a penny a dollar or whatever it is and there is no margin for error.

但是你知道，人们所做的事情是，他们在一小部分客户的基础上计算出他们一生的价值，并计算出他们可以在营销上花费多少钱，他们基本上知道一生的价值-减去一美元或任何东西-这是没有任何可能出错的。

> `[00:14:50]` And if you model things it doesn\'t always work out like the model says.

`[00:14:50]` 如果你做模型的话，它并不总是像模型所说的那样工作。

> And secondly your early adopters are probably that long term value of your earlier doctors are probably higher than the later adopters and people who had not taken that into account.

其次，你的早期采用者可能是你早期医生的长期价值可能高于那些没有考虑到这一点的后来者和人。

> And so companies that raise 25 50 100 million dollars and in some cases billions of dollars came and gone in the e-commerce space.

因此，那些筹集了 25500 亿美元，在某些情况下数十亿美元的公司，在电子商务领域出现并消失了。

> So what we did was we tried to be profitable in the first order which was which was not heard of.

因此，我们所做的是，我们试图在第一次订单盈利，这是闻所未闻的。

> `[00:15:22]` Back then it\'s hadn\'t heard of now.

`[00:15:22]` 那时候它还没听说过呢。

> `[00:15:27]` How did you mean were the things that you like learned and you should be informed what you were doing.

`[00:15:27]` 你是什么意思？你喜欢学的东西是什么？你应该被告知你在做什么。

> `[00:15:33]` I think that the thing that we learned at Link Exchange was that we wanted to build a company that was very very much focused on having a great culture.

`[00:15:33]` 我认为我们在 LinkExchange 学到的是，我们想要建立一家非常专注于拥有一种伟大文化的公司。

> And so at Zappos we decided they were going to focus on making sure that the culture is part of the everyday sort of operating principles.

因此，在 Zappos，我们决定他们将专注于确保文化成为日常运作原则的一部分。

> And I think a lot of companies start out with great cultures and eventually they end up not having great cultures because you don\'t focus on it.

我认为很多公司都是从伟大的文化开始的，最终他们并没有拥有伟大的文化，因为你没有把注意力集中在它上。

> You focus on your day to day things that you\'re supposed to do and.

你每天都把注意力集中在你应该做的事情上。

> You forget that the culture is only good if you invest in it.

你忘记了，文化只有在你投资的时候才是好的。

> And I just point out to people when they come to when they were taking tours as opposed to the time you know how does this place remain.

我只是向人们指出，当他们去旅游的时候，你知道这个地方是如何保留下来的。

> `[00:16:18]` Focused on culture day in and day out when it gets to be big and it\'s just it\'s like a daily habit.

`[00:16:18]` 日复一日地关注文化，当它变得很大的时候，它只是它就像一种日常的习惯。

> I think the thing that customer culture and customer service and fitness and staying healthy all have in common is.

我认为，客户文化与客户服务、健身和保持健康的共同之处在于。

> `[00:16:33]` You can try to do it in upswings and downswings but if you don\'t make it a daily habit and focus on it on a daily basis it\'s not going to really be your your core competency.

`[00:16:33]` 你可以在涨跌时试着做这件事，但如果你不养成每天的习惯，每天关注它，那就不是你的核心能力了。

> `[00:16:42]` And if you want customer service or or anything or your culture or anything else to be a core competency you have to focus on on a daily basis.

`[00:16:42]` 如果你想要客户服务，或者你的文化或者任何其他东西成为你的核心能力，你必须每天都集中精力。

> `[00:16:51]` So you went from being investments up to joining as an operator how to how to be.

`[00:16:51]` 所以你从投资到加入运营商。

> How did that conversation you how do you decide.

那次谈话你是怎么决定的。

> That.

那，那个

> You need to do that.

你得这么做。

> `[00:17:03]` Well I think there was.

`[00:17:03]` 嗯，我想有。

> `[00:17:04]` Tony had joined early on as an adviser.

`[00:17:04]` 托尼很早就加入为顾问。

> And then eventually full time and then eventually big.

最后是全职，最后是大的。

> NEC decided Tony should be CEO and I had finished finish up my tour at Tell Me and.

NEC 决定托尼应该是首席执行官，我已经结束了在告诉我和。

> There was one company we thought we could make.

有一家我们认为我们可以成立的公司。

> Great and you know we had basically Venture Frogs was was.

很好，你也知道我们的冒险青蛙是。

> `[00:17:32]` Money front friends a family of ours and we wanted to make sure that even those in 1999 fund and lot of angel funds or venture funds decided that they could take a big write off for that year.

`[00:17:32]` 金钱的朋友是我们的一个家庭，我们希望确保即使是 1999 年的基金和许多天使基金或风险基金的人也决定，他们可以在那一年大减记。

> We decided that was not going to be the case.

我们决定不是这样的。

> We at least had to make sure that we provided.

我们至少要确保我们提供。

> Capital back if not a good return.

如果不是一个好的回报，资本就会回来。

> We wanted to make sure that we provide a good return and wanted to.

我们想确保我们提供一个良好的回报，并希望如此。

> So basically it was something that.

基本上是这样的。

> `[00:17:57]` I felt personally responsible and compelled to to make sure was successful.

`[00:17:57]` 我觉得自己有责任，必须确保成功。

> `[00:18:03]` You know.

`[00:18:03]` 你知道的。

> Tell me tell me was a very interesting experience where they had too much money.

告诉我，这是一个非常有趣的经历，他们有太多的钱。

> It was overcapitalized.

它被过度资本化了。

> And I would say Zappos was another story where they were undercapitalised for a long period time.

我认为 Zappos 是另一个长期资本不足的故事。

> There are very few e-commerce companies that have been built with less than Tamilians a primary equity invested in it.

很少有电子商务公司是在泰米尔人的基础上投资建立的。

> Zappos had only about 10 million hours of primary equity invested and then.

Zappos 当时只有大约 1000 万小时的初级股权投资。

> HadU.S.

哈德美

> debt and a revolving line of credit to build its business borrowed from their merchants sister continued to build its business and it was.

债务和建立从商人那里借来的业务的循环信贷，姐姐继续建立它的业务，而且它是这样做的。

> `[00:18:39]` Very scary sometimes because leverage is great on the upside it also can kill you on the downside.

`[00:18:39]` 有时候非常可怕，因为杠杆在正面是很好的，它也会在不利的情况下杀死你。

> `[00:18:47]` What was the scariest moment.

`[00:18:47]` 最可怕的时刻是什么？

> `[00:18:50]` There are a lot of scary moments I think enduring Link Exchange we almost missed payroll a few times.

`[00:18:50]` 有很多可怕的时刻，我认为持久的链接交换，我们几乎错过了几次工资。

> That sort of hardens you once you have to go through that once or twice or three times.

一旦你不得不经历一两次或三次，你就会变得坚强起来。

> My time was the tenth time you just kind of said alright we\'ll figure it out.

我的时间是你第十次说，好吧，我们会想出办法的。

> And so Zappos had many of those challenges too before I joined.

所以在我加入 Zappos 之前，Zappos 也遇到了很多这样的挑战。

> When I you know I had.

当我你知道我有。

> Just gotten married and had.

刚结婚就有了。

> `[00:19:17]` Just basically SIRF convinced my wife that we\'re gonna go move from San Francisco to Las Vegas where they where Zappos had moved to.

`[00:19:17]` 基本上，SIRF 说服了我的妻子，我们将从旧金山搬到拉斯维加斯，在那里，Zappos 已经搬到了那里。

> And then Tony tells me that we had this revolving line of credit.

然后托尼告诉我们有一个循环信贷额度。

> It had temporarily been increased from three or 40 million.

这一数字暂时从三千万到四千万增加。

> We had we had to use all.

我们不得不用尽一切。

> 40 million of it at the time but because of a glitch in an algorithm of a markdown mark up process we had.

当时有 4000 万，但因为一个标记过程的算法出现了故障。

> Sort of.

说大也大吧

> Over ordered.

点过头了。

> `[00:19:49]` A bunch of stuff and we had to sort of mark that down.

`[00:19:49]` 一堆东西，我们得把它记下来。

> And so therefore we\'re going to take a loss this quarter which would.

因此，本季度我们将遭受损失。

> I\'m like listening to all this might come on what\'s what\'s the big deal which was going to cause us to break one of our bank covenants.

我就像听着这一切可能会发生在什么大事件上，这会使我们违反银行的一条契约。

> And I\'m like thinking.

我就像在想。

> `[00:20:07]` What did I just do I just quit my last job.

`[00:20:07]` 我刚刚做了什么-我刚刚辞掉了我的上一份工作。

> I had convinced my wife to win in Vegas.

我说服我妻子在拉斯维加斯赢了。

> We\'re just sold our house.

我们刚刚卖掉了房子。

> And.

和

> Then we\'re going to pack up.

那我们就收拾行李。

> So I heard that as soon as I heard that it got on the phone we just figured we\'d just try to figure out how to.

所以我一听到电话里就知道了，我们就想办法弄清楚该怎么做。

> So we had to find 10 million dollars because the line was going from.

所以我们不得不找出 1000 万美元，因为这条线已经被切断了。

> 40 to 30 million dollars in about a month and we had to find ten dollars to reduce our debt by ten dollars and make all the payments.

四千万到三千万美元，大约一个月，我们不得不找到十美元，以减少我们的债务 10 美元，并支付所有的。

> And not missed payroll and things like that was pretty.

而且没有错过工资之类的东西很漂亮。

> `[00:20:45]` Heron\'s you know.

`[00:20:45]` 苍鹭你知道吗？

> But we got through it.

但我们挺过去了。

> I think you know once you get through it once or twice you know that you can get through it again.

我想你知道，一旦你度过了一次或两次，你就知道你能再次渡过难关。

> You know 19.

你知道 19 岁。

> 1999 2000 was a very interesting time there was a lot of ups and then 2000 2001 was a lot of downs.

1999 年-2000 年是一个非常有趣的时期，有很多起起落落，而 2000 年 2001 年则有很多起伏。

> `[00:21:04]` I think 2005 and 2006 were starting to get out of those downs for a lot of e-commerce companies and then 2008 2009 there was a lot of downs.

`[00:21:04]` 我认为 2005 年和 2006 年对于许多电子商务公司来说已经开始走出这些低谷，而 2008 年到 2009 年出现了很多下滑。

> `[00:21:15]` I think this you just have to as Hiroki said you have to be an emotional story of rock and be able to absorb these shocks the system.

`[00:21:15]` 我认为你只需要像裕基所说的那样，你必须成为一个关于摇滚的情感故事，并且能够吸收这些冲击，整个系统。

> And if you can do that you can persisting continue to go on was Zappos growing the whole time with these times and ups and downs as opposed is crying throughout this time.

如果你能做到这一点，你可以坚持下去，继续前进，Zappos 一直在增长，伴随着这些时间的起伏，而相对的是，这段时间一直在哭泣。

> But it was growing in it in an inconsistent rate.

但它是以不一致的速度增长的。

> And I think the hardest part about.

我觉得最难的是。

> Startups is the plan for what\'s going to happen.

创业是对将要发生的事情的计划。

> You think if you\'re building a product the great thing about software today is if you\'re building a software product it\'s in a cloud you can provision perfectly and anything that requires hardware that requires inventory it requires servers provisioning spaceetc.

你认为，如果你正在构建一个产品，现在软件最重要的一点是，如果你在云中构建一个软件产品，你可以完美地提供任何需要库存的硬件，它需要服务器、供应、空间等等。

> If you\'re off you can be you can be significantly off because.

如果你离开了，你可以很明显地离开，因为。

> Compounding works in mysterious ways and you can be off a lot and if you bought too much and you\'re off.

复合以神秘的方式工作，你可能会失去很多，如果你买了太多，你就走了。

> Then you\'re.

那你就是。

> You have too much inventory you bought too little and you\'re off.

你的存货太多了，你买的太少了，所以你就走了。

> You may miss out a bunch of sales missing on a bunch of sales is not as bad as being laden with a bunch of inventory.

你可能会错过一堆的销售，在一堆销售是没有那么糟糕的是满载一堆库存。

> It\'s not good either.

这也不太好。

> `[00:22:32]` Either.

`[00:22:32]` 也是。

> So what are some of the most innovative things that you think you did at Zappos that really kind of made the company what it was.

那么，你认为自己在 Zappos 所做的一些最具创新性的事情，确实让公司变得像现在这样。

> Talking about the culture we\'re talking about things in ways that you were.

说到我们谈论的文化，我们谈论的事情就像你所说的那样。

> `[00:22:46]` I think the culture is very important.

`[00:22:46]` 我认为文化是非常重要的。

> I think you\'re building a company that was focused on customer service that was very important.

我认为你正在建立一家专注于客户服务的公司，这是非常重要的。

> So focus on customer service one back then nobody really focused on customer service.

所以把重点放在客户服务上，那么就没有人真正关注客户服务了。

> If you said to me today I\'m building the Zappos of another category it\'s probably not as interesting but if you come up if you solve a hard problem and make that your core competency I think that\'s a very very important lesson because.

如果你今天对我说，我正在建造另一类的 Zappos，它可能没那么有趣，但如果你想解决一个难题，并把它作为你的核心竞争力，我认为这是一个非常重要的教训，因为。

> First of all hopefully that problem you\'ve lived and you\'re personally passionate about and you\'re solving it.

首先，希望你曾经经历过的问题，你个人对它充满激情，并且你正在解决这个问题。

> That\'s probably because.

那可能是因为。

> There are other people who face that problem and make that a priority in their lives and find value in that.

还有一些人面对这一问题，并将此作为他们生活中的优先事项，并从中找到价值。

> So we found lots of people missed the fact that stories provided actually good customer service and online online provided not so great customer service and we\'re going to bring that back.

所以我们发现很多人忽略了这样一个事实：故事提供了良好的客户服务，而在线则提供了不太好的客户服务，我们将把它带回过来。

> So that was another innovation.

这是另一项创新。

> I think the fact that we were running our distribution center and our call center 24/7 was seemingly.

我认为，我们管理着我们的配送中心和呼叫中心，这似乎是一件很有意义的事情。

> You know today may not seem like.

你知道今天可能不像。

> An innovation but back then it was we had figured out ways of picking.

这是一项创新，但当时我们已经想出了选择的方法。

> `[00:23:52]` When you place an order we would pick pack and ship within four hours whereas other people were batching them the next day and sending it out.

`[00:23:52]` 当你下订单时，我们会在四个小时内挑选包裹并装运，而其他人则在第二天把它们分批送出去。

> Little things add up.

小事情加起来。

> And so.

而且如此。

> We figured out how to get products to people after the order of between five to seven days when we started.

我们在五到七天的订单开始后，我们想出了如何把产品送到人们手中。

> And then eventually we cut that time little by little by little to overnight before we sold the company to Amazon.

最后，在我们把公司卖给亚马逊之前，我们一点地缩短了这段时间。

> So I think those things were all very innovative.

所以我认为这些东西都很有创意。

> Obviously we had some other technology advantages such as we had a full warehouse that was.

显然，我们还有其他一些技术优势，比如我们有一个完整的仓库。

> `[00:24:29]` That every single item we had and license plate unique license plate number assigned to it.

`[00:24:29]` 我们所拥有的每一件物品，以及分配给它的唯一车牌号码。

> So we knew exactly where it was in inventory so we had close to 100 percent accuracy in inventory management which had not been heard of before and direct to consumer fulfillment.

因此，我们确切地知道它在库存中的位置，所以我们在库存管理方面有接近 100%的准确性，这在以前从未听说过，并且直接影响到消费者的实现。

> And so those are some.

所以这些都是一些。

> `[00:24:48]` Examples.

`[00:24:48]` 例子。

> So you talked about selling the company how did after surviving all these different ups and downs for years and years how did that conversation come about how you\'d make that decision.

所以你谈到了出售公司，在经历了这么多年的不同起起落落之后，你是如何做出这个决定的呢？

> Well Amazon had those actually disclose both Tony\'s book and the recent book about Amazon Amazon had been following the company and.

亚马逊确实披露了托尼的书和最近出版的关于亚马逊的书。

> `[00:25:10]` Wanted to buy the company for a long period of time.

`[00:25:10]` 想要长期收购这家公司。

> They had started to compete with us and.

他们已经开始和我们竞争了。

> They made an offer that was much more compelling.

他们提出了一个更有说服力的提议。

> `[00:25:19]` Most most of the time acquisitions what happened you\'d get absorbed by the parent company.

`[00:25:19]` 大多数情况下，发生的事情你都会被母公司所吸收。

> Here is a situation where Still\'s appears today as a separate brand a separate business has a separate culture and a separate location.

在这种情况下，时至今日仍是一个独立的品牌，一个独立的企业拥有一个独立的文化和一个独立的位置。

> And left to the.

然后离开了。

> The current.

电流。

> Team there to run as a wholly owned subsidiary but a separate business and that was much more compelling than being absorbed into a mothership.

在那里的团队以全资子公司的身份运作，但却是一家独立的公司，这比被母舰吸收要引人注目得多。

> `[00:25:46]` What do some of the lessons that you learned about Zappos.

`[00:25:46]` 你学到的一些关于 Zappos 的课程是什么？

> Do you know today that you wish you knew.

你今天知道你希望你知道。

> In the beginning about supporting startups.

一开始支持初创公司。

> `[00:25:56]` I think you know a lot of the things we\'ve just talked about.

`[00:25:56]` 我想你知道很多我们刚刚谈过的事情。

> Yeah.

嗯

> You want to continue to price progress and not give up on the.

你要继续为进步定价，而不是放弃。

> On the.

在.。

> On your big dream.

在你的大梦想上。

> You need to sort of maybe make calls and pivot and write off certain thingsetc.

你需要打几个电话，转一下，然后注销某些东西。

> But the courses as people have pointed out here non-linear and pivoting is okay but you don\'t want to give up.

但是，正如人们所指出的，非线性的和旋转的课程是可以的，但是你不想放弃。

> The second thing is.

第二件事是。

> `[00:26:21]` You know I think companies that get started by personal passion and solving a personal pain seems to do a lot better than those do not.

`[00:26:21]` 你知道，我认为那些以个人激情和解决个人痛苦为出发点的公司，似乎比那些没有的公司做得更好。

> Third is those charts that are.

第三是那些图表。

> `[00:26:33]` Sort of exponential growth.

`[00:26:33]` 某种指数增长。

> If you do you know in all these talks if you sort of narrow it down to the very early beginnings it looks very very flat.

如果你知道，在所有这些谈话中，如果你把它缩小到很开始的时候，它看起来很平淡。

> It takes a long time to get the flywheel going and so don\'t be discouraged if the flywheel hasn\'t gone.

飞轮的运转需要很长时间，所以如果飞轮没有消失，不要气馁。

> As smoothly as you expected it to go.

就像你预料的那样顺利。

> But just keep at it keep at it get stronger and stronger every single day.

但只要坚持下去，一天比一天强。

> What do you think the core the core problem that you\'re solving for.

你认为你要解决的核心问题是什么。

> And when you sort of pivot and you think about what the next thing that you\'re trying to do solve a real heart problem that nobody else is solving.

当你有点支点的时候，你会想一想接下来你要做的事情是什么，去解决一个没有人能解决的真正的心脏问题。

> And.

和

> Find a core competency that you can own and you can talk about all the companies you\'ve heard on stage today whether it\'s stri for Homejoy or.

找到一个你可以拥有的核心竞争力，你就可以谈论你今天在舞台上听到的所有公司，不管是 Homejoy 的战略，还是。

> `[00:27:22]` Go paperless all these companies are trying to solve problems that they had personal pain with and they had to sort of get the flywheel going over a number of trials.

`[00:27:22]` 无纸化-所有这些公司都在试图解决他们个人痛苦的问题，他们不得不让飞轮通过一些试验。

> `[00:27:33]` So now you\'ve move back to the Bay Area to become professional investors again and working at Sequoia.

`[00:27:33]` 现在你又搬回湾区去做专业投资者，在红杉工作。

> What.

什么

> Would you think.

你觉得。

> How do you think companies should ideally try to work with their investors.

你认为公司应该如何在理想的情况下与投资者合作。

> What do you think.

你怎么认为

> Good Vs Veazey does.

好的比维西更好。

> `[00:27:49]` It\'s funny that you ask that question.

`[00:27:49]` 你问这个问题很有趣。

> Look he\'s been so I\'ve been on both sides and I think it\'s a privilege they\'ve been on both sides.

听着，他一直是这样的，我一直在两边，我认为这是一种特权，他们一直在双方。

> And I think the reason the reason I joined Sequoia is that you know personally I think it\'s a very special place because most of the partners there have.

我认为我加入红杉的原因是，你知道，我个人认为这是一个非常特别的地方，因为那里的大多数合伙人都有。

> Worked at companies start a company has been met been part of the Managed chain of companies that have done pretty extraordinary things.

在公司工作，开始一家公司已经遇到了被管理的公司链的一部分，这些公司都做了非常不寻常的事情。

> And we don\'t see ourselves as as investors.

我们不认为自己是投资者。

> We\'re not looking to buy low sell high.

我们不想买低卖高。

> I think that\'s what you should look for.

我想这就是你应该找的。

> In someone who is an investor you want a partner you don\'t want an investor.

对于一个投资者来说，你想要的是一个合伙人，而不是一个投资者。

> And.

和

> That\'s that\'s probably something that I would coach all of you to sort of think about.

这可能是我教你们大家要考虑的事情。

> The other thing is.

另一件事是。

> Often pitches are very short.

投球往往很短。

> We\'re trying to assess you.

我们在试着评估你。

> You\'re trying to assess us.

你在试着评估我们。

> I would just point out a statistic that you should think about which is you know people date for many years and they get married where they decide to have a partnership whether it\'s it\'s marriage or or.

我只想指出一项统计数字，你应该考虑的是，你认识的人约会了很多年，他们结婚后决定结婚，不管是结婚还是结婚。

> `[00:28:59]` Or a business partnership.

`[00:28:59]` 或商业合伙。

> And 50 percent of those relationships still end up.

而这些关系中的 50%最终还是会结束。

> Breaking up or in divorce a break.

分手或离婚。

> So I would spend more time getting to know your investors before you let them and us in your company because if things go well it\'s a 5 10 15 year journey.

因此，我会花更多的时间来了解你的投资者，然后再让他们和我们进入你的公司，因为如果一切顺利的话，那将是一段 5、10、15 年的旅程。

> So.

所以

> My advice.

我的建议。

> `[00:29:23]` To you guys have invested in a very high percentage of some of the top seed companies.

`[00:29:23]` 对你们来说，一些顶尖种子公司的投资比例很高。

> How do.

你好啊。

> `[00:29:30]` You How do you how do you pick the companies that you work with.

`[00:29:30]` 你是如何挑选与你合作的公司的？

> `[00:29:34]` Well look I mean we\'ve been very very fortunate to be in business with Y see for many many years since the very beginning.

`[00:29:34]` 嗯，我的意思是，从一开始，我们就很幸运能和 Y See 做生意很多年了。

> And.

和

> I think we try we try to be.

我想我们试着成为。

> `[00:29:47]` Try to understand who the founders are.

`[00:29:47]` 试着了解创建者是谁。

> `[00:29:49]` Again back to what I said before we\'re looking for people we want to work with for the next 5 10 15 years.

`[00:29:49]` 再次回到我说过的话，在我们寻找我们想要在未来的 5，10，15 年中与之共事的人之前。

> We\'re looking for founders that will not will our unstoppable will not stop and they will figure out ways to get to the next level next level that we\'re looking for.

我们正在寻找那些不会停止的创始人，我们无法阻挡的创始人不会停止，他们会想办法达到我们想要的下一个水平。

> People who have deep insight into an industry and have asked why and why again.

那些对一个行业有深刻洞察力的人，他们又一次问了为什么和为什么。

> `[00:30:13]` And challenge all the assumptions on the whole industry that they\'re trying to disrupt and decide that these are the five things they\'re going to try to do.

`[00:30:00]` 并挑战所有他们试图破坏的整个行业的假设，并决定这是他们将要做的五件事。

> Not a hundred things.

不是一百件事。

> These are the five things they\'re going to do to disrupt the industry.

这是他们要做的五件事来扰乱这个行业。

> And have a clear sense of what that wedge into that industry would be.

并清楚地意识到这一行业的楔子会是什么。

> `[00:30:32]` So we hear the early days of trying to restart stripe or Air B and B or Dropbox.

`[00:30:32]` 所以我们听到了早期尝试重新启动条纹、B 和 B 或 Dropbox 的声音。

> All of them had very clear reasons why they\'re going to be a destructive destructive force.

他们都有非常清楚的理由说明为什么他们会成为一股毁灭性的力量。

> In.

在……里面

> `[00:30:45]` Their particular domain or in their particular industry.

`[00:30:45]` 他们的特定领域或特定行业。

> Go.

去

> `[00:30:50]` Figure running out of time.

`[00:30:50]` 时间不多了。

> So thanks a lot for joining us.

所以非常感谢你加入我们。

> All right.

好的

> Thank you.

谢谢。

