# Phil Libin at Startup School 2013  

> `[00:00:00]` Good morning.

`[00:00:00]` 早上好。

> I think this is literally the largest number of people have ever spoken to.

我认为这是有史以来与之交谈的人数最多的一次。

> `[00:00:07]` Pretty sure it is.

`[00:00:07]` 很肯定是的。

> `[00:00:18]` Very cool very impressive.

`[00:00:18]` 非常酷，非常令人印象深刻。

> Thank you for coming.

谢谢你的光临。

> I\'m super psyched to talk to you.

我很想和你谈谈。

> You know Paul asked me to come in and talk a little bit about what we went through at Evernote especially in the early years and the mistakes we made and the lessons we learned.

你知道保罗让我来谈谈我们在 Evernote 的经历，特别是在早期，我们犯的错误和我们学到的教训。

> And I\'m happy to do that.

我很乐意这么做。

> You know Evernote didn\'t come out of nothing.

你知道埃弗诺特不是凭空而来的。

> It was our third startup and we learned a lot kind of all the way through the process.

这是我们的第三次创业，我们在整个过程中学到了很多东西。

> The first real startup that I was involved with I started with with a few college roommates of mine you know my best friends in Boston who called to engine five.

我参与的第一个真正的创业项目是从我的几个大学室友开始的，你知道我在波士顿的最好的朋友，他打电话给我的 5 号引擎。

> And  `[00:01:05]` that was I think the first and probably the most important lesson to me right there was was that I had great cofounders.

`[00:01:05]` 那是我认为的第一个，也可能是最重要的一课，对我来说，就是我有伟大的联合创始人。

> The most important thing and this is very much the same team of people that was with me at the first startup and then the second startup and then many of them are even at Evernote.

最重要的是，这和我在第一家初创公司，然后是第二家创业公司的团队是一样的，他们中的很多人甚至都在 Evernote。

> `[00:01:24]` And so I think the most important thing to do and as young an age as possible is to just cultivate this group of really really really and high energy willing to work for free.

`[00:01:24]` 所以我认为，最重要的事情是尽可能年轻地去做，就是培养这群真正的、高能量的人，他们愿意免费工作。

> `[00:01:37]` Best friends for life.

`[00:01:37]` 终身挚友。

> `[00:01:40]` And it\'s super important to do that.

`[00:01:40]` 这样做非常重要。

> And you have to pay attention like I got lucky I got lucky that that the people that I that I happened to meet in college in the computer science department a boss university or people that have stuck with me for four.

你得注意，好像我很幸运，我碰巧在大学里遇到的人，在计算机科学系，一个老板的大学，或者和我在一起呆了四个小时的人。

> `[00:01:54]` So far the rest of our lives.

`[00:01:54]` 到目前为止，我们的余生。

> And I fully expect much longer.

我完全期待更长的时间。

> `[00:01:59]` In fact I would go so far as to say that you shouldn\'t even make friends with people that you don\'t see starting your company with.

`[00:01:59]` 事实上，我甚至会说，你甚至不应该和那些你不认为与你一起建立公司的人交朋友。

> `[00:02:07]` Laughter.

`[00:02:07]` 笑声。

> It  `[00:02:10]` kind of sounds Dikkers shale gas but thank you.

`[00:02:10]` 听起来有点像迪克斯页岩气，但谢谢你。

> To be honest with you.

老实对你说。

> Like why.

比如为什么。

> Why bother.

何必费心呢。

> You only have nearly so many best friends that you\'re going to have and if you can\'t if you can\'t imagine counting on them in a Pinterest co-founder you know use those.

你只有那么多最好的朋友，而你将拥有这些朋友，如果你无法想象在 Pinterest 联合创始人身上指望他们，你知道，就用这些吧。

> `[00:02:25]` Yeah use those resources wisely.

`[00:02:25]` 是的，明智地使用这些资源。

> `[00:02:28]` And so I just looked into it I happened to get these great people and and I\'ve been able to get really great people in in every other company.

`[00:02:28]` 所以我刚刚调查了一下，我碰巧找到了这些很棒的人，而且我在其他公司都能找到非常优秀的人。

> So basically we started our first company engine 5 the core group of those people went on to found the second company core street the core group of those people went on to found Evernote Evernote.

所以基本上，我们启动了我们的第一个公司引擎 5，这些人的核心小组继续找到了第二家公司的核心街道，这些人的核心小组继续创建了 Evernote。

> I really hope is is my life\'s work.

我真的希望这是我一生的工作。

> I don\'t intend to really work on anything else but if I ever do I already know the 50 or so people that Evernote that you know that are going to hopefully be with me for whatever the next thing is and so developing this crew.

我不打算做任何其他的事情，但如果我真的做了，我已经认识了 50 多个人，你知道，无论下一件事是什么，以及发展这支队伍，他们都希望能和我在一起。

> Is super huge and.

超级巨大。

> Can kind of tell from most of you.

从你们大多数人身上可以看出。

> `[00:03:07]` You look like you\'re right at about that age and in an area of life where you\'re making these connections you\'re making these friendships and it\'s going to go by really fast.

`[00:03:07]` 你看起来就像你在那个年龄左右，在生活的某个领域里，你正在建立这些联系，你正在建立这些友谊，而且这种友谊会很快就会过去的。

> `[00:03:14]` So make the most of it.

`[00:03:14]` 所以要充分利用它。

> `[00:03:16]` So engine 5 was a consultant.

`[00:03:16]` 所以 5 号发动机是一名顾问。

> We started this company that was original going to be five of us but then two people chickened out but we really had the domain name and it was just all three of us were computer programmers were all developers and we literally didn\'t know that there was such a thing as investors.

我们创办了一家公司，原来是我们五个人，但后来有两个人退缩了，但我们真的有了域名，我们三个人都是电脑程序员，都是开发人员，我们根本不知道有投资者这样的东西。

> `[00:03:34]` But this was a new concept to us.

`[00:03:34]` 但这对我们来说是一个新概念。

> We didn\'t know that there were people who would give you money so that you could build something.

我们不知道有人会给你钱，这样你就能建造一些东西。

> `[00:03:39]` We just assumed that the way you build a business is you know you start working and you get paid and you make more money that you spend and so on.

`[00:03:39]` 我们只是假设你建立一家企业的方式是你知道你开始工作，你得到了报酬，你赚了更多的钱，你花了这么多钱等等。

> And luckily this was right at the lead up to the original dotcom bubble in the very late 90s and so if you could program people would just throw money at you.

幸运的是，这正是 90 年代末互联网泡沫的源头，所以如果你能编程，人们就会把钱投到你身上。

> And we didn\'t have much motivation in starting this company other than we just wanted to work together.

除了我们只是想一起工作之外，我们创办这家公司没有什么动力。

> We want to see what it would be like to have a company to be our own boss to you know to call the rules.

我们想看看拥有一家公司做我们自己的老板会是什么感觉，你知道，把这些规则称为“规则”。

> And so we did a lot of you know programming consulting mostly on e-commerce stuff and what we learned and this is probably the second most important lesson is.

所以我们做了很多你们都知道的编程咨询，主要是关于电子商务和我们学到的东西，这可能是第二个最重要的教训。

> `[00:04:14]` You know being your own boss and having your own company and making the rules kind of sucks.

`[00:04:14]` 你知道，做你自己的老板，拥有自己的公司，制定规则是很糟糕的。

> `[00:04:22]` If what you\'re doing ultimately is you know being a consultant it\'s just like you just getting paid by somebody else to write some code because you\'re not actually building any value any long term value.

`[00:04:22]` 如果你最终要做的是你知道你是一名顾问，那就像你得到别人的报酬去写一些代码，因为你实际上并没有构建任何长期价值。

> You can you can be getting paid you could be making a decent amount of money while you\'re working.

你可以-你可以得到报酬-当你工作的时候，你可以赚到相当多的钱。

> But all of this idea that you\'re actually calling the shots and you\'re in control is because a complete illusion.

但是，所有这些认为你实际上是在发号施令，并由你来控制的想法，都是因为一个完全的幻想。

> If what you\'re really doing is working for building something for some other company.

如果你真正做的是为其他公司建东西。

> So it\'s amazingly hard work.

所以这是一项令人惊讶的艰苦工作。

> And the rewards are very immediate but they\'re not they\'re not lasting.

回报是即时的，但不是持久的。

> You don\'t you don\'t build anything up.

你什么都不做。

> `[00:04:57]` And so after working harder than we\'ve ever worked for for about two and a half years you know 16 hour days on average.

`[00:04:57]` 你知道，在我们工作了两年半之后，平均每天工作 16 个小时。

> I remember I would come into the office at like 2a.m.

我记得我大约在凌晨 2 点来到办公室。

> and there would be people you know leaning out of the windows smoking because you don\'t have time to even go outside and back then people used to smoke.

还有一些你认识的人，从窗户里探出头来抽烟，因为你甚至没有时间出去或者回去，那时人们习惯抽烟。

> `[00:05:17]` Ask your parents.

`[00:05:17]` 问你父母。

> `[00:05:21]` And we finally did so that we sold a company to a big company called vignette in Austin Texas about two and a half years later and we were super happy to sell it because we didn\'t we didn\'t love this work.

`[00:05:21]` 我们终于把一家公司卖给了得克萨斯州奥斯汀市的一家名为 Vignette 的大公司，大约两年半后，我们非常高兴地卖掉了它，因为我们不喜欢这件作品。

> We\'re just working for somebody else.

我们只是在为别人工作。

> We\'re building stores and e-commerce things and so we sold it and it was pretty cool but we didn\'t know how to sell a company that became to Austin and it was totally the acquirers did everything that you would expect.

我们正在建立商店和电子商务，所以我们卖掉了它，它很酷，但我们不知道如何出售一家公司，后来变成了奥斯汀，完全是收购者做了你所期望的一切。

> Like we thought we would like slid the paper across the table with like I\'m going to write down a figure and split it across the table in totally two years was exactly like that if any of you have seen.

就像我们想的那样，我们希望把纸滑到桌子上，就像我要写下一个数字，在两年内把它平分到桌子上，如果你们中的任何人都看到的话，就是这样的。

> `[00:05:50]` He always sunny in philadelphia episode it was it was just that.

`[00:05:50]` 在费城，他总是阳光明媚，就是这样。

> `[00:05:58]` So we sold that company a couple of years later we be left wing and we decided OK what did we learn.

`[00:05:58]` 几年后，我们卖掉了那家公司，然后我们决定，我们学到了什么。

> You know it\'s time to do something new.

你知道是时候做些新的事了。

> Time to start a company because obviously were going to go and get real jobs at this point but what lesson to be learned.

是时候开始一家公司了，因为很明显，在这一点上，他们会找到真正的工作，但是要吸取什么教训。

> We said well our lesson is we don\'t want to be consultants we don\'t just want to develop stuff for somebody else want to build a product.

我们说，我们的教训是，我们不想成为顾问，我们不只是想为别人开发东西，想要制造产品。

> And so we started our second company which is a mighty spinoff of the title cause Street where we got together with this brilliant mighty cryptographer to build a cryptography and security stuff for banks and for governments you know products.

于是我们开始了我们的第二家公司，这是“事业街”的一个强大的衍生，我们和这位杰出的密码专家一起为银行和政府建立了一个密码学和安全方面的东西，你知道的产品。

> And that was better in the sense that we were building a product we were building something reusable we were building something that we can add value to.

这是更好的，因为我们正在建造一个产品，我们正在建造一个可重用的东西，我们正在建造一些我们可以为之增加价值的东西。

> But what we got wrong was it turned out that it wasn\'t a product that any of us were madly in love with because turns out nobody is madly in love with government security and cryptography stuff.

但我们错了，事实证明，这不是我们中的任何一个人疯狂地爱上的产品，因为事实证明，没有人疯狂地爱着政府的安全和密码学的东西。

> `[00:06:53]` People don\'t wake up in the morning like Oh yeah I\'m so excited the new government standard for contactless smart cards is out today.

`[00:06:53]` 人们不会在早上醒来，就像哦，是的，我太兴奋了，政府关于非接触式智能卡的新标准今天出来了。

> `[00:07:02]` Well like one guy does that.

`[00:07:02]` 就像一个人那样做。

> I was like I was me.

我就像我自己一样。

> So it\'s like doubly sad.

所以这就像双重悲伤。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:07:09]` And at some point basically we decided after about seven years of this and you know we had a good experience.

`[00:07:09]` 在某种程度上，我们决定了大约七年之后，你知道我们有一个很好的经历。

> We set out to change the world a little bit to redefine security I think we did that in a small way.

我们开始稍微改变世界，重新定义安全-我认为我们是以一种小的方式做到的。

> `[00:07:22]` But what we started realizing was I mean we just like I\'d sooner chew my own arm off than like sit through one more.

`[00:07:22]` 但我们开始意识到，我的意思是，我们就像我宁愿咬掉自己的胳膊，也不愿再坐一次。

> You know the Department of Defense procurement process hearing.

你知道国防部采购程序听证会。

> `[00:07:35]` And so we we exited that company.

`[00:07:35]` 所以我们离开了那家公司。

> We brought on adult leadership and we were able to sell that that second company as well and then got together in 2007 and said okay now we\'re all in our in our mid 30s and we\'ve had two companies and we\'ve had some exits.

我们有了成年人的领导，我们也卖掉了第二家公司，然后在 2007 年聚在一起，说：好吧，现在我们都是 30 多岁了，我们有两家公司，我们已经退出了一些公司。

> We\'ve made a little bit of money.

我们赚了一点钱。

> What do we want to do now.

我们现在想做什么。

> What lesson to be learned.

该吸取什么教训。

> When we said Okay well the first lesson we were right.

当我们说好的时候，第一课我们是对的。

> You know let\'s not be consultants that\'s build a product.

你知道的，让我们不要成为制造产品的顾问。

> But the second lesson is Shinji\'s be any product.

但第二个教训是，辛吉是任何产品。

> It shouldn\'t be a product about we shouldn\'t sit around thinking you know what does the market want.

它不应该是一种产品，我们不应该坐视不管，以为你知道市场想要什么。

> Know what does the market fit.

知道市场适合什么。

> How do we build something that we can sell.

我们如何建造一些我们可以出售的东西。

> What will people buy.

人们会买什么。

> We got really tired of that.

我们对此感到厌倦了。

> I got tired of board members and investors constantly telling me which would happen all the time.

我厌倦了董事会成员和投资者不断地告诉我什么会一直发生。

> They would constantly tell me you know remember Phil you\'re not the target audience.

他们总是告诉我，你知道，记住，菲尔，你不是目标观众。

> Know your customers are the target audience and you know remember the best product doesn\'t always win.

要知道你的客户是你的目标受众，你知道最好的产品并不总是赢的。

> `[00:08:29]` But all those things are all those things are true and especially true if you\'re building stuff or you know systems for banks and for governments but they were just boring.

`[00:08:29]` 但所有这些都是真的，尤其是如果你在为银行和政府建立系统，但它们只是无聊。

> And we said okay the third time around let\'s do this again but let\'s only build something for us.

我们说，好的，第三次，让我们再做一次，但我们只为我们建立一些东西。

> Let\'s build something that we love.

让我们来做一些我们喜欢的东西。

> Let\'s build something we love so that we are the target audience.

让我们创造一些我们喜欢的东西，让我们成为目标观众。

> `[00:08:50]` And let\'s do it in a way that we\'re not going to try to sell a company because we\'ve sold too.

`[00:08:50]` 让我们这样做吧，这样我们就不会试图卖掉一家公司，因为我们也已经卖掉了。

> And you know selling a company is his.

你知道出售一家公司是他的。

> It\'s a mixed feeling.

这是一种喜忧参半的感觉。

> I mean it\'s nice especially the first time you do it if you have a decent exit and you make some money.

我的意思是这很好，尤其是当你第一次这么做的时候，如果你有一个体面的出口，并且你赚了一些钱。

> But you are you know you\'ve put your entire life into this for years and then you know and then it\'s not yours anymore.

但是你.你知道你已经把你的一生都投入到这件事上了，然后你知道，然后它就不再是你的了。

> So it\'s at best a bittersweet feeling.

所以这充其量是一种苦乐参半的感觉。

> And we said the third time around let\'s do it differently let\'s let\'s have two guiding principles.

我们说，第三次，让我们做不同的事情，让我们有两个指导原则。

> It\'s only build things for us that we\'re in love with that we want to use and let\'s build a company that we want to keep Let\'s explicitly say there is no exit strategy.

我们只想为我们打造我们想要使用的东西，让我们创建一家我们想要保持的公司-让我们明确表示没有退出战略。

> `[00:09:26]` Let\'s make something that is sufficiently epic to be our life\'s work.

`[00:09:26]` 让我们创造一些足以成为我们一生工作的史诗。

> `[00:09:32]` And if you have something that\'s your life\'s work you don\'t need an exit strategy.

`[00:09:32]` 如果你有什么东西是你一生的工作，你就不需要一个退出策略。

> There is no exit strategy for your life\'s work.

你的工作没有退出策略。

> You should have a liquidity strategy especially if you\'re going to raise money you shouldn\'t.

你应该有一个流动性策略，尤其是如果你想筹集资金的话，你不应该这么做。

> You don\'t need an exit strategy.

你不需要退出战略。

> Let\'s make something sufficiently epic let\'s make something that we can devote our lives to that we can devote our lives to building to building for us.

让我们创造一些足够史诗的东西，让我们创造一些我们可以把我们的生命奉献给我们的东西。

> And that was that was the motivation for Evernote.

这就是 Evernote 的动机。

> So we we sat around thinking OK well what should we build.

所以我们围坐在周围想，好吧，我们应该建什么。

> Well let\'s start with stuff that we like.

让我们从我们喜欢的东西开始吧。

> You know what are we like.

你知道我们是什么样的人。

> And we said I said you know I play a lot of video games so I love videogames.

我们说我说你知道我玩了很多电子游戏所以我喜欢电子游戏。

> Let\'s you know maybe we should start videogame company and we thought okay.

让你知道，也许我们应该成立一家电子游戏公司，然后我们想得很好。

> But we already have really great experiences with video games.

但是我们已经有了非常棒的视频游戏体验。

> You know even back then there was already like a giant stack of games that I wanted to play that I couldn\'t play through.

你知道，即使是在那个时候，我也已经有了一堆我想玩的游戏，而我却无法完成这些游戏。

> I thought the world isn\'t like the world isn\'t going to be significantly better if we had another one because there\'s already people doing a great job keeping us entertained with video games.

我认为这个世界不像这个世界，如果我们有另一个世界的话，这个世界就不会变得更好，因为已经有很多人在做一项伟大的工作，让我们继续玩电子游戏。

> So then we thought okay well what else do we like them.

所以我们想，好吧，那我们还喜欢他们什么呢。

> And one of my co-founder said Well you know I kind of like the new social networking social media stuff.

我的一位联合创始人说，你知道，我有点喜欢新的社交网络社交媒体之类的东西。

> And we forget that it\'s kind of cool.

我们忘了这很酷。

> You know Twitter was just kind of getting started.

你知道 Twitter 刚刚起步。

> There was a few other things but we thought you know what there\'s already so many companies doing it and it\'s already a great experience and you know I mean MySpace has already done everything you\'d ever do with a social network like why why would we want to start something you know to compete with MySpace or really providing great great service or could be nothing better.

还有一些其他的事情，但我们以为你知道，已经有那么多公司在做这件事了，这已经是一次很棒的经历了，你知道我的意思是，我的空间已经做了你在社交网络上所做的一切，比如为什么我们想要开始一些你知道的东西来和 MySpace 竞争，或者提供更好的服务，或者没有什么比这更好的了。

> `[00:10:56]` So we have we decided not to do that.

`[00:10:56]` 所以我们决定不这么做了。

> `[00:11:01]` By the way a sock is an angel investor just goes.

`[00:11:01]` 顺便说一句，袜子是天使投资者。

> `[00:11:05]` Now but then we thought OK well we have pretty good experiences with entertainment.

`[00:11:05]` 现在，但我们认为，好吧，我们有相当好的娱乐经验。

> `[00:11:13]` We have pretty good experiences with communication and social networking but when we were using productivity stuff when we\'re using stuff to try to make us smarter try to actually accomplish something.

`[00:11:13]` 我们在交流和社交网络方面有很好的经验，但当我们使用生产力的东西时，我们使用的是东西，试图使我们变得更聪明，尝试去真正地完成一些事情。

> It\'s for the most part just a really crappy experience.

这在很大程度上只是一次非常糟糕的经历。

> `[00:11:26]` Every time we use productivity software it feels either old or kind of cultish.

`[00:11:26]` 每当我们使用生产力软件时，都会觉得有些过时，有的甚至有点崇拜。

> It doesn\'t really get the job done as it feel very elegant and we thought OK that\'s cool that we were all nerds.

它并没有真正完成它的工作，因为它感觉非常优雅，我们认为好吧，这是很酷的，我们都是书呆子。

> We all want to build a second brain.

我们都想建立第二个大脑。

> We all want to be smarter.

我们都想变得更聪明。

> It isn\'t a good experience right now.

这不是一次好的经历。

> It really feels like things like smart phones and app stores are about to take off and get started.

它真的感觉像智能手机和应用商店即将起飞和开始。

> Let\'s let\'s build something that is that it\'s going to be the modern definition of what it means to be effective and productive as a knowledge worker.

让我们来构建一个东西，那就是，作为一个知识工作者，它将是一个现代定义，它意味着什么才是有效的和有生产力的。

> `[00:11:56]` And we set out to do that.

`[00:11:56]` 我们开始这么做。

> `[00:11:58]` So we made a plan.

`[00:11:58]` 所以我们制定了一个计划。

> We were going to call the company ribbon like Utai ribbon round your finger to remember and then in in my due diligence in my research about it we were in Boston we were going into this other group of people here in actually very close to here in Cupertino in Sunnyvale that was called Evernote that was started by this guy named Stefan Pacheco.

我们要给公司的丝带打电话，就像乌泰丝带绕着你的手指记住，然后在我的尽职调查中，我们在波士顿，我们接触到了另一群人，实际上离这里很近，在桑尼维尔的库比蒂诺，这个人叫 Evernote，是由一个叫 Stefan Pacheco 的家伙创立的。

> And he had a team of people upon it sort of this this genius kind of mad scientist inventor entrepreneur kind of Russian American guy.

他有一队人，有点像个天才，一个疯狂的科学家，发明家，企业家，一个俄罗斯裔美国人。

> He had a team of people that actually worked with the went all the way back to the Apple Newton days.

他有一个团队，他们实际上是和苹果牛顿时代一起工作的。

> The Apple Newton was kind of the way ahead of its time.

苹果牛顿在某种程度上领先于它的时代。

> You know first a portable device with handwriting recognition and everything.

你首先知道的是一种带有手写识别和其他功能的便携设备。

> And they were working on this idea of a second memory to everyone you know building a second brain.

他们正在研究第二次记忆的想法，每个人都知道，建立第二个大脑。

> We were seeing the same things.

我们看到的都是一样的东西。

> `[00:12:44]` So Snap-On they got together and we decided hey instead of you know of competing let\'s let\'s actually just merge the companies let\'s merge the teams and make something Evernote and so we merge the two teams in in 07 and we kind of recreate it the company relaunched it as a new company called Evernote.

`[00:12:44]` 因此，我们决定，嘿，而不是你知道的竞争，让我们真正地合并公司，让我们合并团队，做一些 Evernote，所以我们在 07 年合并了这两个团队，我们重新创建了它，公司重新创建了一个新的公司，叫做 Evernote。

> `[00:13:01]` We recapitalized it which means it\'s a technical financial term it means that it used up capital and Evernote and we made it lower case and we also changed the investment structure that was less important to me.

`[00:13:01]` 我们对它进行了资本重组，这意味着它是一个技术性的金融术语，意味着它耗尽了资本和 Evernote，我们降低了它的规模，我们还改变了对我来说不太重要的投资结构。

> And we launched the new product in 2008 and it was an important lesson there too which is this was a mistake that I think we made was a very unconventional start that this wasn\'t the typical start Silicon Valley startup start where you know you go to Y Combinator and you have you know a couple of cofounders and you get them a round and you start something we didn\'t do that it was a weird complicated structure with two teams coming together and one of the already had some investments and it will have to get redone.

我们在 2008 年推出了这款新产品，这也是一个重要的教训，这是一个错误，我认为这是一个非常非常规的开始，这不是典型的硅谷初创公司，你知道你去了 Y Combinator，你认识了几位联合创始人，你让他们开始了一轮新的创业。没有做到这一点，这是一个奇怪的，复杂的结构，两支球队走到一起，其中一个已经有一些投资，它将不得不重新做。

> And this was a big mistake.

这是个大错误。

> I mean it was great that week combined the teams that we merged and the personalities were great.

我的意思是，那一周我们合并的团队很棒，个性也很棒。

> We were able to build something really fantastic but we were way too clever with the structure and I\'ll never repeat that mistake it does not pay to be clever to be innovative on.

我们能够建造一些非常棒的东西，但是我们在结构上太聪明了，我再也不会重复这个错误了，聪明就不值得去创新了。

> I\'m kind of the structure on the legal entity and how you divvy up your stock and any of that kind of stuff because it basically made us on fundable for a couple of years because until we were significant enough that it was actually worth a BCR time actually understanding WHY we were different and figuring out how to unwind it and how to fix it until we were significant enough to get over that barrier like no one would even even take a look at us.

我是法律实体的一种结构，以及你如何分配你的股票和诸如此类的东西，因为它基本上让我们在几年内都是可供支付的，因为直到我们变得足够重要，实际上值得花一段时间，才能真正理解为什么我们是不同的，并弄清楚如何解除它，以及如何修复它直到我们变了为止。有足够的意义来克服这个障碍，就像没有人会看我们一样。

> And it took us you know the fact that we were clever in the end in the early days and tried to kind of preserve this this incremental structure probably cost us 18 months of not being able to raise money.

我们花了很长时间，你知道，我们在早期的时候很聪明，并且试图保持这种渐进的结构，这可能要花我们 18 个月的时间才能筹集到资金。

> So I definitely don\'t advise that I don\'t advise doing anything particularly clever or different about how you how you do the basics and the dynamics.

所以我绝对不建议我不建议做任何特别聪明或不同的事情，比如你是如何做基础和动力的。

> So just pay attention to what people here will tell you and it might see in other resources and just do exactly that be innovative about one thing only which is your idea.

所以，只要注意这里的人会告诉你什么，它可能会在其他资源中看到，并且做的正是创新的事情，只有一件事，那就是你的想法。

> Like that\'s the only thing you can afford a startup founders to really be innovative about as the main thing that you\'re doing everything else you want to do as by the book as possible at least in the early days to to minimize your chances of failing for a stupid reason.

就像这样，你唯一能让初创公司创始人真正创新的事情，就是你正在做的所有你想做的事情，至少在最初的几天里，尽量减少你因为一个愚蠢的原因而失败的可能性。

> And we almost almost fail for the stupid reason that we were too clever with our legal forms early on so we cleaned up everything.

我们几乎失败了，因为我们很早就对法律形式太聪明了，所以我们清理了所有的东西。

> And you know have self funded and I put some money in the pot of money and we had some friends and family investors but we were just about ready to raise a big round.

你知道，我们有自筹资金，我把一些钱放进了一壶钱，我们有一些朋友和家庭投资者，但我们正准备筹到一大笔钱。

> And it took a long time but we finally got a 10 million dollar term sheet.

它花了很长时间，但我们终于得到了一千万美元的条款表。

> Not from a Silicon Valley investor from a European investor.

不是来自硅谷的投资者，而是来自欧洲的投资者。

> The Silicon Valley guys still excited and want to talk to us and we had about three weeks of cash in the bank left it was a very long due diligence because we had to fix all the structure stuff but the deal was supposed to close.

硅谷的人仍然很兴奋，想和我们谈谈，我们银行里有大约三周的现金，这是一项非常长的尽职调查，因为我们必须修复所有的结构性问题，但这笔交易本应完成。

> Finally it was so close in 2008 in the fall and the day it was the closing date was actually the day that Lehman Brothers collapsed.

最后，它在 2008 年秋天非常接近，而关闭的那一天实际上是雷曼兄弟倒闭的那一天。

> And the investor called me on the day of closing and said Hey we just lost 60 percent of our fund value in one day we\'re not going to do the investment.

投资者在收市当天打电话给我说，嘿，我们只是在一天之内损失了 60%的基金价值，我们不打算投资。

> And I had we had three weeks of cash left.

我还有三个星期的现金。

> At that point we hadn\'t we hadn\'t been able to talk to too many other investors about the previous three months because we were kind of locked up and due diligence you know with exclusivity and you know so we panicked at that point already had 20 something people in the company.

那时，我们无法与太多其他投资者谈论过去三个月的事情，因为我们处于某种程度上的封闭状态，尽职调查，你知道的，你知道，所以我们当时惊慌失措，公司里已经有 20 多人了。

> So we spent a week just frantically calling everyone calling everyone I knew everyone I didn\'t know just trying to get you know trying to get meeting trying to get investment.

所以我们花了一周的时间疯狂地打电话给我认识的人，我不认识的人，只想让你知道，试着开个会，争取投资。

> Nothing absolutely nothing.

没什么绝对没什么。

> It was arguably the worst time to be doing it in the history of the universe.

这可以说是宇宙历史上最糟糕的时候。

> It was you know like late October 2008.

你知道，就在 2008 年 10 月底。

> I wasn\'t particularly good at it.

我不是很擅长这个。

> We had a spectacularly bad ABC pinch ABC pitchman something like this with the quick version that would say Hi I\'m Phillipine you\'ve never heard of me.

我们有一个非常糟糕的 ABC，捏了 ABC 的广告员，就像这样的快速版本，上面写着“嗨，我是菲利普，你从来没听说过我。”

> We\'re going to do this.

我们要这么做。

> We\'re gonna make this thing called Evernote.

我们要把这个叫做 Evernote 的东西。

> It\'s gonna let you you know write step down remember things using computers.

它会让你知道，写下来，放下，记住用电脑做的事情。

> And we\'re gonna give it away for free.

我们会免费送出去。

> Please give me Tomingley dot.

请给我托明利点。

> `[00:17:13]` Laughter and applause.

`[00:17:13]` 笑声和掌声。

> `[00:17:23]` It worked in Europe.

`[00:17:23]` 它在欧洲奏效了。

> It did.

是的。

> It worked in Europe.

它在欧洲奏效了。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:17:30]` And then usually you know usually they\'ll would be enough to get us thrown out in Silicon Valley.

`[00:17:30]` 然后你通常知道他们会把我们赶出硅谷。

> But but but sometimes just out of politeness they would like ask a follow up question.

但有时出于礼貌，他们想问一个后续问题。

> And the most common question would be like So who is your competition.

最常见的问题是谁是你的竞争对手。

> Oh man.

哦伙计。

> I would I would nail this one.

我会把这个钉死的。

> This would be great.

这会很棒的。

> I would say a competition.

我可以说是一场比赛。

> Well pretty much every single computer or phone or a PDA or any other device that\'s ever come out in the last 50 years already has a pretty good free notetaking solution on it.

在过去 50 年里，几乎每一台电脑、手机、PDA 或任何其他设备都已经有了很好的免费笔记解决方案。

> And that didn\'t help us see it.

但这并没有帮助我们看到它。

> Anyway I digress.

总之我离题了。

> So we\'re out of cash.

所以我们没有现金了。

> I spent a week trying to give cash nothing.

我花了一个星期试图不给现金。

> Now we have two weeks to cash off in the bank it\'s 3:00a.m.

现在我们有两周的时间在银行里兑现，时间是凌晨 3 点。

> and I totally remember the day I was sitting there atA.M.

我完全记得早上我坐在那里的那一天。

> and I decided finally this is it it\'s going to shut down the company tomorrow morning.

我终于决定了，明天早上公司就会倒闭。

> Go to sleep.

去睡觉吧。

> You\'re going to stand up from my desk and go to sleep.

你要从我的桌子上站起来睡觉。

> And it forces us to sleep and come into the office tomorrow to lay everyone off.

它迫使我们睡觉，明天到办公室来解雇所有人。

> Shut the company because we only have two weeks of cash left and you can\'t really take it to zero and you get into legal trouble so you have to make sure you pay the last bills and all that stuff and they decided this was going to happen.

关闭这家公司，因为我们只剩下两周的现金，你不能把它变成零，你就会遇到法律上的麻烦，所以你必须确保你支付最后的账单和所有的东西，他们决定这一切都会发生。

> `[00:18:34]` And I remember sitting there at 3:00a.m.

`[00:18:34]` 我记得我凌晨 3 点坐在那里。

> when I finally decided to do this.

当我最终决定这么做的时候。

> And I kind of had an epiphany.

我有种顿悟。

> I kind of thought oh this is what it must feel like to be an adult for the first time in my life I felt like I was an adult this is what it feels like to be an adult to make an adult decision.

我想，哦，这是我人生中第一次成为成年人的感觉，我觉得自己是个成年人，这是成年人做出成人决定的感觉。

> Socks whatever happens afterwards and when to optimize my life for being as childish as possible from here on out.

袜子，无论发生什么事之后，以及什么时候优化我的生活，因为从现在起，我尽可能地孩子气。

> But I decided that this was what was going to happen.

但我决定这就是将要发生的事。

> `[00:19:03]` And at about 3:00a.m.

`[00:19:03]` 和凌晨 3 点左右。

> right before I went to sleep I got I got an e-mail and so I said alright I\'ll read one more e-mail.

就在我睡觉之前，我收到了一封电子邮件，所以我说，好吧，我再读一封电子邮件。

> And this e-mail was from some random guy in Sweden and he said You\'re Phil I\'m a random guy in Sweden.

这封电子邮件是来自瑞典的一个随便的人，他说你是菲尔，我在瑞典是个随机的人。

> And I I\'m just writing to let you know that I love ever no I\'ve been using it for about about two months.

我写这封信只是想让你知道我爱过你，不，我已经用了大约两个月了。

> It\'s only been out for about two months that we have been using it for about two months.

我们已经用了大约两个月的时间了。

> And I love it.

我爱死它了。

> It\'s changed my life.

它改变了我的生活。

> It\'s made me happy to be more organized.

这使我很高兴能更有条理。

> It\'s it\'s really great.

真的很棒。

> And I remember thinking Oh that\'s nice.

我记得我在想，哦，那太好了。

> That makes me feel better.

这让我感觉好多了。

> You know they say like if you could make a difference to one random guy in Sweden you\'ve kind of achieved something.

你知道，他们说，如果你能对瑞典的一个随机的人有所改变，你就能取得一些成就。

> But then then he went on to say in his e-mail.

但后来他继续在他的电子邮件中说。

> I\'m just writing to see if you guys need any investment.

我只是写信看看你们是否需要投资。

> `[00:19:53]` And I wrote back and I wrote Why yes we would like some investment.

`[00:19:53]` 我回信，写了为什么我们想要一些投资。

> And then I stayed up it didn\'t go to sleep.

然后我就熬夜了-没有睡着。

> `[00:20:03]` And 20 minutes later I was in a skype call with him and we told him the whole situation and two weeks after that he wired us half a million dollars.

`[00:20:03]` 20 分钟后，我和他打了一个 Skype 电话，我们告诉了他整个情况，两周后，他给我们打了五十万美元。

> And it was exactly enough that half a million dollars was exactly enough that we cut back ice.

只要 50 万美元就够了，我们就可以减少冰了。

> I had stopped drawing a salary a while ago and some of the management staff wasn\'t drawing a salary.

我一段时间前就不再领薪水了，一些管理人员没有领工资。

> Really could really tighten their belt but that half million dollars was enough.

他们真的可以勒紧裤腰带，但那 50 万美元就足够了。

> It got us.

它抓住了我们。

> It lasted about six months and then the worst of the crisis was over.

它持续了大约六个月，然后最严重的危机结束了。

> But more importantly we had already cleaned up all of our structure in the most important thing is we finally had traction.

但更重要的是，我们已经清理了我们所有的结构，最重要的是我们终于有了牵引力。

> We finally had enough data where I could do aB.S.

我们终于有了足够的数据，我可以做 aB.S。

> presentation that wasn\'t awful where I can actually say this is the model.

在我可以说这是模型的地方，这并不是很糟糕的演示。

> These are the cohort charts these are the human unit economics.

这些是队列图，这些是人类单位经济学。

> Here\'s how the business is actually working.

这是业务的实际运作方式。

> Here\'s how we are making money today and here\'s why it\'s going to scale and that\'s it\'s made all the difference.

这是我们今天赚钱的方式，也是我们为什么要扩大规模的原因，这就是我们所做的一切。

> And then we were able to to to get financing still not from Silicon Valley people.

然后我们还能从硅谷人那里得到资金。

> Now the first investors were actually Russians and Canadians and Japanese.

现在第一批投资者实际上是俄罗斯人、加拿大人和日本人。

> We got one of our first investors professional visionaries DoCoMo capital you know the giant telecom in Japan.

我们有我们的第一批投资者之一，专业的远见家 DoCoMo 资本，你知道的，日本的电信巨头。

> The reason we got that was pretty good.

我们得到这个的原因是很好的。

> You know they reached out somehow on Twitter because they liked Evernote.

你知道他们在推特上联系是因为他们喜欢 Evernote。

> By the way every single investor in Evernote from the early days down to the people that they were bringing in.

顺便说一句，Evernote 的每一位投资者，从最初的几天，到他们所引进的人，都是如此。

> Now last year every single investor is a fan of the product.

去年，每一个投资者都是该产品的粉丝。

> We don\'t even talk to people anymore who don\'t love Evernote but even early on when no one knew what it was.

我们甚至不再和那些不爱 Evernote 的人交谈，甚至在很小的时候，没有人知道它是什么。

> The investors were all Giant fans of the product.

投资者都是该产品的超级粉丝。

> So we build it for us.

所以我们为自己建造它。

> But it turns out we also build it for our investors and for our employees and for the media and for everyone.

但事实证明，我们也为我们的投资者，为我们的员工，为媒体，为每个人建设它。

> Every other constituency that was important to us.

其他对我们很重要的选民。

> So DoCoMo came in we were still struggling at that point we still didn\'t have too much personal investment.

所以 DoCoMo 进来了，那时我们还在挣扎，我们仍然没有太多的个人投资。

> But a couple of a couple of executives flew in from Japan.

但有几位高管从日本飞来。

> They had a meeting with myself and our CTO Dave Engberg when my co-founder is in our office in Sunnyvale and you know they came in to the room and would bound and say hello and then in back of me here Dave was talking to them and I hear Dave say thank you very much to them in Korean.

他们和我们的首席技术官戴夫·恩伯格(DaveEngberg)有个会面，当时我的联合创始人在我们位于桑尼维尔的办公室里，你知道，他们来到房间里，绑起来打个招呼，然后在我后面和他们交谈，我听到戴夫用韩语对他们说非常感谢你们。

> And I hear this and my thought is why is Dave speaking to these people in Korean.

我听到这个，我的想法是为什么戴夫要用韩语跟这些人说话。

> And I kind of look at him and he immediately realized what he had done because he would just in Korea.

我看着他，他立刻意识到自己做了什么，因为他只会在韩国。

> And he was just you know his brain just got frazzled so he immediately realized what he had just done that he misspoke.

他只是.你知道他的大脑刚刚疲劳，所以他立刻意识到他刚才做了什么，他说错了话。

> You know you just said thank you.

你知道你刚刚说了谢谢。

> He meant to say hello in Japanese but he said thank you in Korean.

他想用日语打招呼，但他用韩语说谢谢。

> And he\'s like he\'s totally pale like he\'s just ashen.

他就像面色苍白，就像脸色灰白。

> He was so embarrassed.

他很尴尬。

> And then look at the DoCoMo guys and the DoCoMo guys are completely completely embarrassed.

然后看看 DoCoMo 的家伙和 DoCoMo 的家伙都很尴尬。

> And the thing with Japanese people is they\'re so like for the most part they\'re so emphatic that they have so much empathy like they feel your embarrassment worse than you do.

日本人的特点是，他们大多数时候都是这样的，他们是如此的坚定，以至于他们有如此多的同理心，就像他们觉得你的尴尬程度比你更糟一样。

> Laughter and like they\'re mortified about how bad we feel.

笑，就像他们为我们的感觉感到羞愧。

> `[00:23:01]` Laughter.

`[00:23:01]` 笑声。

> `[00:23:03]` And so the only way out of the situation was for them to just give us several million dollars Sumathi just to prove that you know there no hard feelings.

`[00:23:03]` 所以，唯一的出路就是让他们给我们几百万美元，苏门提，只是为了证明你知道没有什么不好的感觉。

> `[00:23:18]` So we felt lucky in that in that as well.

`[00:23:18]` 所以我们也感到很幸运。

> But then you know then things that get a lot better.

但你知道之后事情会好得多。

> And we did have traction and then a lot of Morgentaler came in as the first US Silicon Valley firm and then Sequoia went in big you know several times and it got you know it got a lot harder.

我们的确很有吸引力，后来很多 Morgentaler 作为美国硅谷的第一家公司进入，然后红杉进入了大公司，你知道了好几次，它让你知道它变得更难了。

> It got a lot harder once we were a real company.

一旦我们成为一家真正的公司，事情就变得更加艰难。

> And I didn\'t I didn\'t appreciate that at the time that actually the most fun I ever had the most carefree that I ever was the least stressed that I ever had was back when that low tech and go out of business any day was back when the only priority was to raise money because things were things were really simple things were really simple and there was one fitness function.

我没有意识到，在那个时候，我有过最快乐的时候，我有过的最无忧无虑的时候，我有过的压力最小-当我回到那个低科技时代，任何一天都会停业，而那时，唯一的首要任务是筹集资金，因为事情非常简单，而且有一个健身功能。

> You know as an engineer I just appreciated this is the only job is to raise money to make sure that we can meet payroll and have enough you know have enough cash.

你知道，作为一名工程师，我刚刚意识到，这是唯一的工作是筹集资金，以确保我们能够满足工资和有足够的，你知道，有足够的现金。

> And so you know when you\'re successful when the check when you when you call the bank and you see that there\'s a few more million dollars a you\'re.

所以你知道当你成功的时候，当你打电话给银行的时候，你会发现你还有几百万美元。

> Yes.

是

> And you\'re totally ready to fail at that point.

那时你完全准备好失败了。

> You know you just you expect to fail.

你知道你只是想失败。

> You\'re ready to do it.

你已经准备好了。

> You\'ve made peace with it.

你已经和好了。

> You know what\'s going to happen.

你知道会发生什么

> And in fact it\'s kind of liberating.

事实上，这是一种解放。

> And the day after we raise they think our B round which was the first time where we had you know a couple of years of cash in the bank and we really felt like we weren\'t we were Nolt we were out of immediate existential danger.

第二天，他们认为我们的 B 回合，这是我们第一次让你知道银行里有几年的现金，我们真的觉得我们是，不是，我们已经脱离了直接的生存危险。

> You know that day we had you know we celebrated we a big party felt great and like the next morning is when it got hard.

你知道，那天我们庆祝了，我们举行了一次盛大的聚会，感觉很棒，就像第二天早上，事情变得很艰难。

> The next morning when I said okay.

第二天早上我说好的时候。

> Now there\'s an actual company and others people depending on us.

现在有一家真正的公司和其他人依靠我们。

> Now there\'s millions of users now there\'s expectations.

现在有了数以百万计的用户，现在有了期望。

> `[00:24:52]` Now is when we actually have to now when we actually have to do something.

`[00:24:52]` 现在是当我们不得不去做一些事情的时候。

> `[00:24:58]` And so so you know I can stand here and say traditionally the you know it gets better.

`[00:24:58]` 所以你知道我可以站在这里，传统上说，你知道它会变得更好。

> It does very much.

它做得很好。

> `[00:25:08]` But it also gets harder it doesn\'t it doesn\'t get easier.

`[00:25:08]` 但也越来越难，也不会变得更容易。

> `[00:25:11]` And so you shouldn\'t be in this business you shouldn\'t be thinking about founding a company.

`[00:25:11]` 所以你不应该从事这个行业，你不应该考虑创立一家公司。

> If what you\'re trying to optimize for is easy it\'s never gotten easier for me it gets harder and harder all the time but it also becomes more and more important and more and more rewarding and in some sense more and more fun.

如果你想优化的东西很简单，对我来说就永远不会变得更容易，但它也变得越来越重要，越来越有价值，在某种意义上也变得越来越有趣。

> You know somebody asked me a reporter asked me the other day if if I was still having fun day to day and I had to be honest to say you know what not it\'s not a fun day today.

你知道，前几天有人问我，一位记者问我，我是否每天都过得很开心，而我不得不诚实地说，你知道什么不是，今天不是一个有趣的日子。

> It\'s a huge amount of fun month to month but it\'s not fun day today.

这是一个月到一个月的巨大乐趣，但今天不是有趣的一天。

> You know when I look back.

你知道当我回头看的时候。

> What do we achieve in the past 30 days.

我们在过去 30 天里取得了什么成就。

> It\'s awesome.

太棒了。

> It\'s really fun.

真的很有趣。

> It\'s really gratifying but day in and day out when you\'re like doing the job.

当你喜欢做这份工作的时候，这确实是令人欣慰的，但是日复一日。

> `[00:25:53]` Difficult is kind of the main thing.

`[00:25:53]` 困难是最主要的事情之一。

> Difficult.

很难。

> But since I still have this amazing team of people this team with people who are much smarter than I am we\'re much more capable than I am.

但是，由于我还有这支了不起的团队，这个团队的人比我聪明得多，我们比我更有能力。

> `[00:26:03]` Many of which have been with me now for 20 years.

`[00:26:03]` 许多人已经和我在一起 20 年了。

> But you know many have only been there for a couple of months.

但你知道很多人只在那里呆了几个月。

> `[00:26:10]` It\'s vastly satisfying and the only reason this works.

`[00:26:10]` 这是非常令人满意的，也是唯一的原因。

> The only reason that that I can see myself doing this even though it\'s super difficult and super stressful I can see myself doing this from the rest of my life.

我能看到我自己做这件事的唯一原因，即使它是超级困难和超级压力，我可以看到我自己做这个从我的余生。

> And and it stays rewarding is because we found something sufficiently epic to do.

而这也是值得的，因为我们找到了足够的史诗来做这件事。

> We didn\'t try to think about what piece of crap can we sell someone to make some money and flip the company.

我们没有想过我们能卖给别人什么垃圾来赚钱，然后把公司搞垮。

> We thought about what can we do that we will continue to stay in love with.

我们在想我们能做些什么，我们将继续相爱。

> And this is the main this is the main way that starting a business right now is different from starting a business even five years ago.

这是现在创业的主要方式，与五年前的创业是不同的。

> You were starting a business even five years ago.

你五年前就开始做生意了。

> It would have been stupid advice to say build it for yourself if you\'re starting off now.

如果你现在就开始的话，说“自己动手”是个愚蠢的建议。

> It\'s stupid advice to do anything else because if you build something for yourself if you build something that you love that you think is sufficiently epic if you make something that you love there\'s probably another billion people in the world that love it as well.

做任何其他事情都是愚蠢的建议，因为如果你为自己建造了一些你喜欢的东西，如果你做了你喜欢的东西，那么世界上可能还有另外十亿人也喜欢它。

> And unless you\'re like a really weird list you\'re just like a starter unless you\'re like a spectacular weirdo.

除非你是一个非常奇怪的名单，否则你就像个初学者，除非你是个了不起的怪人。

> But even if you are even if you\'re like even if you\'re several standard deviations away from a from the center of the bell curve on weirdness it\'s probably still 10 million people that love something just as weird as you and because the tech world because of the way that the tech world has assembled itself because of app stores and smartphones and social media the tech world is more of a meritocracy than it\'s ever been.

但是，即使你像你一样，即使你偏离了奇怪的钟形曲线的中心，也可能仍然有 1 千万人喜欢和你一样奇怪的东西，因为科技世界因为应用商店、智能手机和社交媒体而组装自己的方式。比以往任何时候都更多的是精英主义。

> And so if you build something you love those ten million or billion other people will also love it they\'ll know about it the next day they\'ll be able to find that they will be able to use it they\'ll be able to pay you and if you\'re making it for yourself you\'re making something great.

所以，如果你建造了你所爱的东西，其他人也会喜欢它，第二天他们就会知道，他们会发现他们能够使用它，他们将能够付钱给你，如果你为自己制作它，你就能制造出很棒的东西。

> You had a huge advantage over somebody who\'s making something for somebody else because you can at least tell when it\'s great you know you\'re making it for yourself.

你比那些为别人做东西的人有着巨大的优势，因为你至少可以知道什么时候很棒，你知道你是为自己做的。

> You could be an honest critic and an honest judge of your own products and if you\'re not doing that it\'s just it\'s just much harder.

你可以是一个诚实的评论家和一个诚实的判断你自己的产品，如果你不这样做，这将是困难得多。

> `[00:28:03]` So make something sufficiently epic make something that you will be able to be a fair judge of when it\'s a cheap greatness or at least when it\'s close to it.

`[00:28:03]` 所以，让某件事足够史诗，使你能够公正地判断它是什么时候，它是一个廉价的伟大，或至少当它接近它。

> I don\'t think we achieve greatness in Evernote but I think we get closer to it everyday and don\'t bother making friends with people who can\'t start a company with thank you.

我不认为我们在 Evernote 上取得了伟大的成就，但我认为我们每天都会更接近它，也不会费心与那些不能用感谢建立一家公司的人交朋友。

