# Andrew Mason at Startup School SV 2014

> `[00:00:02]` That was a really good intro for making it up just then.

`[00:00:02]` 这真是一个很好的介绍，正好在那时。

> It definitely sounded like that like it was bad in the way jazz is bad.

听起来就像爵士乐不好一样。

> `[00:00:10]` Well you\'re you\'re dodging the question of that wonderful music we\'re just listening tail from your album hardly workin.

`[00:00:10]` 好吧，你在回避美妙音乐的问题，我们只是在听你专辑中的尾声，这很难奏效。

> Please check it out.

请检查一下。

> It\'s awesome.

太棒了。

> It\'s on iTunes you can buy it.

它在 iTunes 上你可以买到。

> I\'m not sure what song was that that was.

我不知道那是哪首歌。

> `[00:00:27]` Look no further.

`[00:00:27]` 别再看了。

> Yeah.

嗯

> And it\'s about how you can find.

这是关于你如何找到。

> `[00:00:33]` You don\'t need to be reading like business books or anything like that in order to learn how to be great at business.

`[00:00:33]` 你不需要像读商务书之类的东西去学习如何在商业上表现出色。

> You can find beauty in witnessing the birth of an octopus for example or other such natural wonders.

例如，你可以在见证章鱼的诞生或其他类似的自然奇观中找到美。

> `[00:00:47]` I had specifically requested risin apostrophe above the pack because that\'s my favorite.

`[00:00:47]` 我特别要求把冒号放在包上，因为那是我的最爱。

> But anyway that\'s one of my favorites Sam.

但不管怎么说，这是我的最爱之一，山姆。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:00:57]` Thank you for coming.

`[00:00:57]` 谢谢你来。

> I\'d love to spend a few minutes before we get into Groupon.

在我们进入 Groupon 之前，我想花几分钟时间。

> I know the audience is probably excited to hear about Groupon but to hear about before Groupon you started a company called The point I\'d love to hear a little bit about that specifically.

我知道观众们听到 Groupon 的消息可能很兴奋，但在 Groupon 之前，你创办了一家名为“观点”的公司，我很想专门听一些这方面的内容。

> `[00:01:14]` Like just just how you came up with the idea and what went wrong with it why it didn\'t work.

`[00:01:14]` 就像你是如何想出这个主意的，以及它出了什么问题，为什么它不起作用。

> `[00:01:22]` You know how you got started that kind of thing because it led to Groupon and led to Groupon.

`[00:01:22]` 你知道你是如何开始这种事情的，因为它导致了 Groupon 和 Groupon。

> So I think it\'s this an awkward looking way to sit in a chair.

所以我觉得这是一种尴尬的坐在椅子上的方式。

> I feel extremely awkward.

我觉得很尴尬。

> Kathleen back that\'s for sure.

凯萨琳回来了，那是肯定的。

> `[00:01:35]` So maybe just you do look a little uncomfortable.

`[00:01:35]` 也许只是你看起来有点不舒服。

> `[00:01:40]` OK so so I had the idea for this website called the point when I was a grad student at University of Chicago in public policy and the idea was it was going to be the social platform that would that would allow people to come together in order organize to either take some kind of collective action or give money toward something but only once they hit a tipping point of participation that got everybody to that everybody knew that their effort would be worthwhile.

`[00:01:40]` 好吧，当我还是芝加哥大学公共政策专业的研究生时，我对这个网站有了一个想法，那就是它将成为一个社交平台，让人们聚在一起，组织起来，采取某种集体行动，或者为某件事提供资金，但只有当他们遇到问题时，才会这样做。参与的临界点让每个人都知道他们的努力是值得的。

> `[00:02:10]` So it\'s kind of like a precursor to things like Kickstarter and others.

`[00:02:10]` 所以它就像是像 Kickstarter 和其他东西的前兆。

> `[00:02:16]` Indigo Yeah.

`[00:02:16]` 靛蓝是的。

> And why did you guys fund them.

你们为什么要资助他们。

> No she spoke today.

不她今天说了。

> `[00:02:22]` Oh OK.

`[00:02:22]` 哦，好的。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Fabulous talk.

精彩的谈话。

> `[00:02:26]` So so so I had been a developer before I went back to grad school and.

`[00:02:26]` 这么说，在我回到研究生院之前，我已经是一名开发人员了。

> `[00:02:33]` And somebody that I had worked with heard about the idea through a mutual acquaintance and called me up one day and said I want to give you a million dollars to for you to drop out of school and work on this idea.

`[00:02:33]` 和我一起工作的人通过一个相互认识的人听说了这个想法，有一天打电话给我，说我想给你一百万美元，让你辍学，为这个想法工作。

> And at the time this was 2006 I guess I didn\'t know anything about starting a tech company we were in Chicago like I didn\'t even I didn\'t know anything about.

而在 2006 年的时候，我想我对创办一家科技公司一无所知，我们在芝加哥，就像我甚至不知道任何事情一样。

> `[00:02:56]` I wasn\'t really like a student of the game so to wait it was like an inbound inbound haul.

`[00:02:56]` 我并不是真正喜欢这个游戏的学生，所以等待它就像一次进站的收获。

> Yeah.

嗯

> You had William Dollar.

你有威廉·杜拉。

> `[00:03:04]` I mean it wasn\'t on the phone like a bunch of things that a bunch of things happened between the million dollars and the phone call but the phone call was can you come to my office and pitch this thing to me.

`[00:03:04]` 我的意思是，我的意思不是电话里有一大堆事情发生在百万美元和电话之间，但电话是，你能来我的办公室把这件事介绍给我吗？

> Okay.

好的。

> And then a week later it was a million dollars.

一周后，是一百万美元。

> `[00:03:16]` And so you really didn\'t know what you were doing at this point in terms of starting a startup.

`[00:03:16]` 所以你真的不知道现在你在启动一家公司的时候在做什么。

> No.

否

> `[00:03:20]` And at later points as well it turns out.

`[00:03:20]` 后来也证明了这一点。

> `[00:03:27]` So so that\'s how it got started.

`[00:03:27]` 就是这样开始的。

> `[00:03:30]` So we started I guess in the beginning of 2006 launched the point in September 2006 floundered for about a year before pivoting into Groupon.

`[00:03:30]` 所以我们开始了-我想是在 2006 年初-在 2006 年 9 月发布了这个观点，挣扎了大约一年，然后才转向 Groupon。

> `[00:03:43]` So it\'s like the high level arc and I can dive in on any of those parts that did you just get this million dollars in funding before you did Groupon.

`[00:03:43]` 所以这就像一个高水平的弧线，我可以潜入其中的任何部分，你在 Groupon 之前就得到了这一百万美元的资助。

> `[00:03:53]` No we then we then after launching the point we raised money from NEA.

`[00:03:53]` 不，我们提出这个观点后，我们向 NEA 筹集了资金。

> `[00:03:58]` Okay.

`[00:03:58]` 好的。

> So another like four or 5 million dollars.

所以另一个像四五百万美元。

> Okay so you were floundering at what point did you realize like this isn\'t working and it\'s time to do something else because I think you know we heard a lot of advice today like you have to believe in your idea.

好吧，你在什么时候挣扎，你意识到这不管用，现在是时候做点别的事情了，因为我想你知道我们今天听到了很多建议，就像你必须相信你的想法一样。

> Even if all your friends say it stinks like at what point did you say time2.

即使你所有的朋友都说它很臭，你说的时间是什么时候呢？

> `[00:04:19]` Yeah I mean I can tell you some low points in that period in kind of the summer of 2007.

`[00:04:19]` 是的，我的意思是，在 2007 年夏天的那个时期，我可以告诉你一些低谷。

> But honestly like there was never a point when I was like This isn\'t going to work.

但老实说，当我这样做的时候，我从来没有说过这样的话是行不通的。

> We started Groupon as a side project and we\'re running at launch Groupon in about 30 days and we were running it at the same time that we were running the point.

我们将 Groupon 作为一个附带项目启动，大约 30 天后我们就会启动 Groupon，我们在运行 Groupon 的同时也在运行这个项目。

> `[00:04:40]` And I was able to kind of shift my attention to Groupon without ever admitting to myself that the point is like coming to that conclusion.

`[00:04:40]` 我能够把我的注意力转移到 Groupon 身上，而没有向自己承认这一点就像是得出了这个结论。

> I think I\'m a little bit more nimble about that the sort of decisions now in balancing the kind of resolve and stubborn stubbornness that you need while still accepting when something\'s just not working.

我想我在这方面要灵活一些-在平衡你所需要的那种决心和顽固的固执时，当某些事情不起作用的时候，我还是会接受的那种决定。

> `[00:05:03]` But at the time it wasn\'t so.

`[00:05:03]` 但当时并非如此。

> So we just did them both at the same time.

所以我们只是同时做了这两件事。

> `[00:05:09]` There were some in that period after we launched Everyday we\'d we\'d have maybe a thousand visitors to the Web site.

`[00:05:09]` 在我们每天发布后的那段时间里，我们可能会有一千人访问这个网站。

> And like sometimes we would get some press or something and it would peak but it would always come right back down and we were trying everything I remember at one time we started trying.

就像有时我们会得到一些新闻或什么的，它会达到顶峰，但它总是会回来，我们尝试了我记得的每一次，我们开始尝试。

> `[00:05:29]` We started trying to search engine marketing and we had a number of campaigns on the points in each one of these campaigns where around like a social issue typically that we were trying to drive traffic to and we thought well if we can get people to join these campaigns then they\'ll become users and then they\'ll they\'ll spread it and join other campaigns and this is how we can kind of get things going.

`[00:05:29]` 我们开始尝试搜索引擎营销，在每一项活动中，我们都做了一些活动，这些活动就像一个社会问题，我们试图把流量吸引到那里，我们认为如果我们能让人们加入这些活动，他们就会成为用户，然后他们就会传播它，加入其他运动，这就是我们如何才能让事情发展起来。

> And so one there is one campaign that we found that we could get really cheap subscribers to and it was the legalize weed campaign.

因此，有一个运动，我们发现，我们可以得到真正便宜的订户，这是合法的大麻运动。

> And there was a community of people that really rallied around this particular issue.

有一群人真的聚集在这个特定的问题上。

> Now you know what.

现在你知道吗。

> `[00:06:10]` They\'re called juggalos.

`[00:06:10]` 他们叫朱加洛斯。

> You don\'t Juggalos are you know Juggalos are so Juggalos are are insane insane clown posse fans.

你不知道胡加洛斯，你知道吗，胡加洛斯是那么的疯狂小丑群的球迷。

> And I mean you shouldn\'t you should check them out on YouTube or something like this a group of people that takes pride in being stupid and they\'re just enormous trolls.

我的意思是，你不应该在 YouTube 或类似的网站上查看他们-一群以愚蠢而自豪的人，他们只是巨大的巨魔。

> `[00:06:32]` So they ended up trolling not just like they did what we wanted them to do which was which was kind of in fact the site only instead of infecting it with joy and like you know high value customers that we could you know sell to advertisers or something like that.

`[00:06:32]` 所以他们最终不只是像我们想要他们做的那样做了-事实上，这只是网站，而不是快乐地感染它，就像你知道的，高价值的客户，我们知道，可以卖给广告商或诸如此类的东西。

> It they infected it was just trolling us.

他们感染了它只是在玩弄我们。

> So they would go to all these other great campaigns and just troll everybody that was joining them and so it was awful.

所以他们会参加所有其他伟大的竞选活动，只会对所有加入他们的人进行骚扰，所以这太可怕了。

> `[00:07:01]` Wow.

`[00:07:01]` 哇。

> `[00:07:02]` Did not know that Jaglom story if I think back on that time and I think if I ever wanted to make a movie or a documentary about how hard it was how how intense and irrational it is to build a startup I think I would go and find the people who who quit companies like the point in that phase or any other startup because most startups have this phase when things just aren\'t working.

`[00:07:02]` 我不知道 Jaglom 的故事，如果我回想起那段时间，我想如果我想拍一部电影或纪录片，说明创业有多么艰难和不合理，我想我会去找那些离开公司的人，就像那个阶段或者任何其他创业公司，因为大多数初创公司都是如此。当事情不顺利的时候，就有这个阶段。

> `[00:07:32]` And I can tell you at least for the point what you would find is they were completely like rational awesome people and they were quitting for the most awesome reasons.

`[00:07:32]` 我至少可以告诉你们，你们会发现，他们完全像理性的、令人敬畏的人，他们辞职是出于最令人敬畏的理由。

> Like if you went back and interviewed them they would say Andrew was insane like he had no idea what he was doing like we were there was there was no real strategy.

比如，如果你回去采访他们，他们会说安德鲁疯了，好像他不知道自己在做什么，就像我们一样，没有真正的策略。

> It was shifting every other day.

它每隔一天改变一次。

> I like it.

我喜欢它。

> It have made perfect sense to anyone that they told the story that those people quit.

他们讲述那些人辞职的故事，这对任何人来说都是非常有意义的。

> And it\'s the people who for whatever reason didn\'t have that perfect sense that stuck around and turned this thing into something that turned out to be huge.

正是这些人，不管出于什么原因，并没有那种完美的感觉，坚持了下来，把这件事变成了一件大事。

> `[00:08:09]` So I don\'t know what the lesson there.

`[00:08:09]` 所以我不知道那是什么课。

> `[00:08:12]` Got to be a little bit crazy and a believer you know to be in a startup.

`[00:08:12]` 一定是有点疯狂，而且是你所知道的在创业中的信徒。

> So let\'s talk about Groupon.

那么让我们谈谈 Groupon 吧。

> You said users started it simultaneously with the point why and how did you get the idea.

你说用户同时开始它的时候，为什么和你是如何得到这个想法的。

> Sort of what happened.

有点像发生了什么。

> `[00:08:27]` So the why is because it was clear to us that the point wasn\'t working.

`[00:08:27]` 所以，原因是因为我们清楚地知道，这一点是行不通的。

> Our investors were starting to hint that they wanted to take their money back.

我们的投资者开始暗示他们想收回他们的钱。

> `[00:08:36]` And `[00:08:38]` so we were just trying everything we could think of and you know the story of how I had the idea for Groupon was just well we know that group buying is one potential business model for this.

`[00:08:36]` 和`[00:08:38]` 所以我们只是在尝试我们能想到的一切-你知道我是怎么想到 Groupon 的-我们知道团购是一种潜在的商业模式。

> We know that people have been trying to do.

我们知道人们一直在努力。

> We know that people have been trying to do group purchasing campaigns using the points where you get a group of people together that try to negotiate with their with a local business in order to get a discount.

我们知道，人们一直在尝试进行集体采购活动，使用的方法是让一群人聚在一起，试图与当地企业谈判，以获得折扣。

> `[00:09:11]` Why don\'t we just go out and do that and why don\'t we do like a local version of it like it was a Web site that we all liked.

`[00:09:11]` 为什么我们不出去做那件事呢？为什么我们不喜欢它的本地版本，就像我们都喜欢的网站一样。

> And this deal a day thing really seemed really seemed compelling so.

今天的交易看起来真的很有说服力。

> So that\'s what we did.

所以这就是我们所做的。

> `[00:09:26]` And I had a hard time getting the rest of the team excited about doing this little like coupon side project.

`[00:09:26]` 我很难让团队的其他成员对做这个类似优惠券的小项目感到兴奋。

> And I knew how to code well enough that I could build a template for WordPress.

我知道如何编写足够好的代码，这样我就可以为 WordPress 构建一个模板。

> So we built a custom template for WordPress.

所以我们为 WordPress 构建了一个定制模板。

> We bought get your Groupon dot com.

我们买了 GET 你的 Groupon 网站。

> And everyday we would have a new post and embedded in that post would be a little widget that included all the e-commerce guts of the point.

每天，我们都会有一个新的帖子，在那篇文章中嵌入了一个小部件，它包含了所有电子商务的核心内容。

> But like the first version of the point of group online excuse me when you when you bought a deal you would get an e-mail that said Thanks for joining this campaign on the point.

但是，就像在线团购版的第一版一样，请原谅我，当你买了一笔交易时，你会收到一封电子邮件，上面写着感谢你在这一点上参加了这次活动。

> For 20 for ten for 20 at Motel Bar or something like that.

在汽车旅馆酒吧付 20 英镑买 10 英镑，或者诸如此类的。

> Like it was totally hacked together but it was enough to show that it was something that people really wanted.

就像它是完全被黑在一起的，但这足以证明它是人们真正想要的东西。

> `[00:10:15]` And so we were just running to try to keep up with demand pretty much from that first.

`[00:10:15]` 所以我们只是试图从一开始就跟上需求。

> `[00:10:21]` From that first deal do you remember what the first Groupon actually like.

`[00:10:21]` 从第一笔交易开始，你还记得第一张 Groupon 到底喜欢什么吗？

> `[00:10:25]` Yeah it was a a business that was in the ground floor of our building called motel bar that that had was a bar.

`[00:10:25]` 是的，在我们大楼的底层，一家叫做汽车旅馆的酒吧曾经是一家酒吧。

> But they sold pizza.

但他们卖披萨。

> `[00:10:34]` So we did two for one pizza deal that we negotiated with them up until the last minute it was going to be an E a local e-commerce company that sold sports themed garter belts.

`[00:10:34]` 所以我们做了两件比萨饼生意，我们和他们谈判了到最后一分钟，它将是一家当地的电子商务公司，销售运动主题的吊带。

> `[00:10:49]` And that wasn\'t a joke.

`[00:10:49]` 那可不是开玩笑。

> It was it wasn\'t us trying to be like funny.

不是我们想要变得有趣。

> `[00:10:53]` We had way too much of the fear of death and us to think about being funny at that time.

`[00:10:53]` 我们对死亡的恐惧太多了，我们当时根本没有想过自己是个有趣的人。

> It was it was they were the only people that we could convince to take us seriously.

是因为他们是我们唯一能说服我们认真对待我们的人。

> `[00:11:07]` So you watch this and you say Wait we might be on to something.

`[00:11:07]` 所以你看这个，你说等待，我们可能会发现什么。

> So at what point did you realize whoa all of this is taking off.

你是在什么时候意识到，哇，这一切都在起飞。

> `[00:11:16]` Like when did it really start to go up.

`[00:11:16]` 就像什么时候它真的开始上升一样。

> `[00:11:20]` Pretty soon it was.

`[00:11:20]` 很快就到了。

> After a couple of weeks it was clear that it was clear that we were on to something.

几周后，很明显我们发现了一些事情。

> And.

和

> `[00:11:30]` After a couple of months we would start doing kind of extrapolations where projections of well if this continues this is how big this thing is going to be and we\'d look at those numbers and all kind of shake our heads and say there\'s no way like this would make us the fastest growing company in history.

`[00:11:30]` 几个月后，我们开始做一些推断，如果这种预测持续下去，这件事会有多大，我们会看看这些数字，然后摇头说，这样的话，我们不可能成为历史上增长最快的公司。

> `[00:11:49]` And then it was.

`[00:11:49]` 然后是。

> `[00:11:52]` Yeah.

`[00:11:52]` 是的。

> So tell me.

那就告诉我。

> `[00:11:54]` Like you\'re the fastest growing company in history.

`[00:11:54]` 和你一样，你是历史上成长最快的公司。

> A couple things I want to ask about that.

我想问几件事。

> First of all usually fast growing companies are like sort of disastrous internally or having some disasters go on internally.

首先，通常情况下，快速增长的公司在内部就像是灾难性的，或者有一些灾难发生在内部。

> `[00:12:07]` Can you talk about some of the stuff that broke within Groupon as you\'re trying to keep up with that growth in the in the early days.

`[00:12:07]` 当你试图跟上早期的增长时，你能谈谈 Groupon 内部的一些突破吗？

> Yeah OK.

好的，好的。

> `[00:12:16]` In the early days I mean everything.

`[00:12:16]` 在早期，我是指一切。

> `[00:12:22]` Laughter We were I\'m trying to think of a good specific example of something that broke.

`[00:12:22]` `[00:12:22]` 

> `[00:12:32]` I mean for the first six months we were getting the way that we were generating the actual Groupon vouchers was a FileMaker app like we would export all the data from from the production database to a FileMaker database and then email them through life by creating a script that opened individual emails in mail dot app and would pause every every 30 emails to make sure that we didn\'t crash the computer.

`[00:12:32]` 我的意思是，在最初的六个月里，我们所获得的实际 Groupon 优惠券是一个 FileMaker 应用程序，就像我们将所有数据从生产数据库导出到 FileMaker 数据库，然后通过创建一个脚本，在邮件点应用程序中打开单独的电子邮件，然后每隔 30 封电子邮件就暂停一次，以确保我们没有使计算机崩溃。

> It was really just held together with with tape and then as we expanded internationally I mean I don\'t know how many that the maximum number of different platforms like completely independent technology platforms we were on but it was maybe like 7 or 10 or something like that.

它真的是和磁带结合在一起的，当我们在国际上扩张的时候，我的意思是，我不知道有多少个不同的平台，比如我们所使用的完全独立的技术平台，但是它可能是 7 或 10 个，或者类似的。

> So it was a very competitive environment.

所以这是一个竞争非常激烈的环境。

> And because of that and we thought that first mover advantage made a big difference.

正因为如此，我们认为先发优势带来了很大的不同。

> `[00:13:30]` So we moved very very fast and tended to push off anything that could be pushed off.

`[00:13:30]` 所以我们移动得很快，并且倾向于推开任何可能被推开的东西。

> `[00:13:39]` So first mover advantage so many people Coppedge you like the most Koppy Web site ever.

`[00:13:39]` 所以先行者优势如此之多，你喜欢科佩奇最喜欢的网站。

> Why do you think that.

你为什么认为。

> What made you guys win.

是什么让你们赢了。

> `[00:13:51]` Because it is easy to copy.

`[00:13:51]` 因为它很容易复制。

> I mean we built Groupon in a month it was basically like a newsletter right.

我是说，我们在一个月内就建立了 Groupon，这基本上就像一份时事通讯。

> And then you have to get people to go out and negotiate one deal a day in order to be in a city.

然后，你必须让人们每天出去谈判一笔交易，这样才能进入城市。

> So getting started is not hard at all.

所以起步并不难。

> Scaling it ended up being difficult providing a consistently good customer experience proved to be difficult.

事实证明，提供持续良好的客户体验是很困难的。

> `[00:14:10]` But a lot of people it\'s not hard to get started at least so back to the scaling thing again Sorry I\'m jumping but I know you have all these questions.

`[00:14:10]` 但是很多人

> Can you give any advice out there that would be for the people out there about scaling any of their thoughts on like what you need to be thinking about like what mistakes don\'t make it here.

你能不能给外面的人提供一些建议，让他们把自己的想法扩展到你需要思考的事情上，就像错误不会在这里发生一样。

> `[00:14:32]` If you\'re trying to scale a company quickly.

`[00:14:32]` 如果你想迅速扩大一家公司的规模。

> `[00:14:36]` Well I certainly wouldn\'t do what we did in less.

`[00:14:36]` 好吧，我肯定不会做我们做得更少的事。

> `[00:14:40]` You\'re in like I can\'t imagine your business is going to be in a similar competitive environment to ours.

`[00:14:40]` 你所处的环境就像我想象不到的那样，你的生意会和我们的一样，处于一个竞争的环境中。

> `[00:14:48]` But the reason that we we we were adding for example when we launched in in Europe I think we went from 50 people in the first month to a couple hundred people in the third month to 1000 people by the 6 month or the ninth month or something like that.

`[00:14:48]` 但是我们加入的原因，例如，当我们在欧洲推出的时候，我想我们从第一个月的 50 人增加到第三个月的几百人，到 6 个月或第 9 个月就增加到 1000 人，或者诸如此类的事情。

> Like we\'re adding people so fast that the tendons that usually form to hold a culture together didn\'t really have time.

就像我们把人加得太快一样，通常用来维系一种文化的肌腱没有足够的时间。

> So that\'s just one of the costs that you incur.

所以这只是你要付出的代价之一。

> And it ended up making it very difficult to to have a kind of a global value system that people just intrinsically understood how we think about customers.

最后，这使得我们很难有一个全球性的价值体系，人们只是从本质上理解我们如何看待客户。

> `[00:15:36]` So I would guess I\'m saying what I wouldn\'t do that we did what we did that worked really well was we identified like a unit a group on unit which was each city and then we came up with a playbook that we could just rinse and repeat over and over and over again.

`[00:15:36]` 所以我想说的是我不愿意做的事，我们做过的事情，我们做得很好，就像一个单位，一个小组，每个城市，然后我们想出了一个剧本，我们可以一遍又一遍地冲洗和重复。

> So when we decided we wanted to be in in 30 markets after we already had three markets where we were working we kind of said OK we know what we need for each market what is our org chart look like when we when we\'re in 30 cities let\'s work backwards and start hiring.

因此，当我们决定要进入 30 个市场时，我们已经有三个市场在工作了，我们说，好吧，我们知道每个市场需要什么，当我们在 30 个城市时，我们的组织结构图是什么样子的，让我们向后工作并开始招聘。

> And that to some degree we\'re thinking about it the same way at detour which is also a local model like once we feel like we have product market fit.

在某种程度上，我们在绕道的时候也是这样想的，这也是一种本地模式，就像我们一旦感觉到产品市场适合我们就会这样。

> It\'s gonna be a similar kind of rinse and repeat model.

这将是一种类似的漂洗和重复模式。

> `[00:16:24]` So how do you expand internationally while keeping the culture in mind.

`[00:16:24]` 那么，你是如何在牢记文化的同时，在国际上扩张的呢？

> `[00:16:30]` Koury.

`[00:16:30]` Koury.

> How do you make sure that you don\'t measure company company culture.

你如何确保你没有衡量公司文化。

> `[00:16:36]` That\'s a good question.

`[00:16:36]` 这是个好问题。

> I mean I\'m probably the wrong person to ask because I don\'t think we really succeeded at it.

我的意思是我问错人了，因为我不认为我们真的成功了。

> `[00:16:45]` I can tell you what I would do differently is is make sure that the problem.

`[00:16:45]` 我可以告诉你们，我会做不同的事情，就是确保问题。

> `[00:16:53]` Let me let me tell you about how we expanded and take a step back if that\'s OK.

`[00:16:53]` 让我来告诉你们，如果可以的话，我们是如何扩展的，并后退一步。

> `[00:17:00]` We know when we announced our funding I think in 2009 9 maybe 2010 from from Excel we knew that we\'d been intentionally keeping a low radar because we knew the business was easy easily copyable so that was like the first time we were ever in tech crunch and we knew at that point that everybody was going to start copying us.

`[00:17:00]` 我们知道，当我们宣布我们的资金时，我认为在 2009 年，9，也许是 2010 年，我们知道我们一直在故意保持低雷达，因为我们知道这个业务很容易被复制，所以这就像我们第一次处于技术危机中，我们当时知道每个人都会开始模仿我们。

> And that\'s what happened.

事情就是这样的。

> And so there was a lot of urgency to figure out our international strategy at that point and we started off by just interviewing people like you know executives that we would basing like Amsterdam or London or whatever.

因此，在那个时候，我们迫切需要制定我们的国际战略，我们一开始只是采访像你这样的人，知道我们会在阿姆斯特丹、伦敦等地工作的高管。

> `[00:17:38]` Who who would build our international operation from scratch.

`[00:17:38]` 谁会从零开始建立我们的国际业务。

> And as we were doing these interviews we were seeing even faster than we anticipated clones popping up.

当我们进行这些采访时，我们看到的速度甚至比我们预期的要快。

> And so we said God we really need to talk to these people and this was for me personally one of the most difficult growth moments because I hated the clones and I mean like I didn\'t hate them.

所以我们说，上帝，我们真的需要和这些人交谈，这对我个人来说是最艰难的成长时刻之一，因为我讨厌克隆人，我的意思是我不恨他们。

> From a business perspective.

从商业角度来看。

> I hated them as human beings.

作为人类我恨他们。

> `[00:18:05]` Like I just found I still like to be honest.

`[00:18:05]` 就像我刚发现的那样，我仍然喜欢诚实。

> `[00:18:09]` Like find it so foul like the reasons that I got into building startups and then comparing that to the reasons I like to think that somebody I mean an important lesson now because it\'s incredibly demoralizing when someone just blatantly rips you off.

`[00:18:09]` 就像我创建初创公司的原因一样，我觉得这是如此的肮脏，然后把它与我认为我现在是一个重要的教训的原因进行比较，因为当有人公然地攻击你时，这是令人难以置信的士气低落。

> Yeah.

嗯

> `[00:18:29]` So so I kind of sucked it up and we started bringing people to Chicago to meet with them and meet with these different clones.

`[00:18:29]` 所以我把它吸了起来，我们开始带人们到芝加哥去见他们，和这些不同的克隆人见面。

> I remember I remember the first one kind of sitting in my office I was going to meet them downstairs at Motel Bar where we did that deal.

我记得第一次坐在我的办公室，我打算在楼下的汽车旅馆酒吧和他们见面，我们在那里做了这笔交易。

> I remember sitting in my office and kind of trying to get my stuff in a Zen like state and try to think about like even the worst human beings you know they have there.

我记得坐在我的办公室里，试着把我的东西放在一个禅宗的状态中，试着去思考，即使是最坏的人，你知道他们在那里。

> If you try to see if you can see the world through their eyes like it makes a lot of sense.

如果你试着看看你是否能通过他们的眼睛看到世界，那就很有道理了。

> People aren\'t usually evil crazy or stupid.

人们通常不邪恶、疯狂或愚蠢。

> So I was there and I went downstairs to meet them and instead of getting right into business I was just like so let\'s just talk to each other as as humans.

所以我在那里，我下楼去见他们，而不是直接做生意，我就像这样，让我们像人类一样彼此交谈。

> `[00:19:07]` Man like what are you into.

`[00:19:07]` 你喜欢什么样的人。

> `[00:19:10]` What are your hobbies.

`[00:19:10]` 你的爱好是什么？

> And he was like well I collect coins and I thought to myself That\'s stupidest hobby that I can but I said Come on Andrew.

他就像我收集硬币，我想这是我能做的最愚蠢的爱好，但我说，得了吧，安德鲁。

> `[00:19:26]` Open mind and then I said Well like why do you collect.

`[00:19:26]` 开诚布公，然后我说，就像你为什么要收藏一样。

> Why do you collect coins and.

你为什么要收集硬币。

> And he was like Do you like to like hold them and think about all the hands that they\'ve passed through or like you know think about the history or something.

他说，你喜欢握着他们，想想他们走过的所有的手，或者像你们所知道的那样，想想历史什么的。

> `[00:19:39]` My dad collects coins like applause.

`[00:19:39]` 我爸爸像掌声一样收集硬币。

> All right well.

好吧。

> `[00:19:47]` Let me I\'m sure there are good reasons to collect coins laughter but this guy didn\'t have one.

`[00:19:47]` 让我相信有充分的理由收集硬币笑声，但这家伙没有一个。

> So what he said was I like to I like to I like to sit on my couch on the weekend and I open my safe and I take it out and I think about how valuable it is.

所以他说，周末我喜欢坐在沙发上，打开保险柜，拿出保险箱，想一想它有多值钱。

> And I was like exactly that\'s exactly who I thought you would be.

我就像我想的那样\就是我想你会成为的那个人。

> So we didn\'t do that deal.

所以我们没有做那个交易。

> But then but then we met the Samier brothers who we ended up doing a deal with.

但是后来我们遇到了萨米尔兄弟，最后我们和他们做了交易。

> `[00:20:14]` And they were just like super super smart.

`[00:20:14]` 他们就像超级聪明。

> Like clearly savvy and we it was clear that these guys were going to like if we wanted to play in Europe then we were going to play with them or we could just put it off and do something later.

很明显，如果我们想在欧洲踢球，那么我们就会和他们一起踢球，或者我们可以推迟比赛，然后再做点什么。

> `[00:20:30]` But they sort of have a bad reputation for copying people like why did you buy them.

`[00:20:30]` 但是他们有个坏名声，因为他们模仿别人，就像你为什么要买他们一样。

> `[00:20:39]` Well I think the copying thing is just emotional.

`[00:20:39]` 嗯，我认为复制的东西只是情绪化的。

> `[00:20:44]` They also they have a bad reputation for like building unsustainable businesses and that would be a better reason to question my judgment.

`[00:20:44]` 他们也因为建立不可持续的企业而声名狼藉，这将是质疑我判断的更好的理由。

> `[00:20:53]` I did.

`[00:20:53]` 我做了。

> I think I read they had like huge turnover in employees and didn\'t really care about the user experience which seemed opposite to Groupon.

我想我读到他们的员工流失率很高，并不在乎用户体验，而用户体验似乎与 Groupon 截然相反。

> `[00:21:03]` So so what I\'d say if I was doing it again I think I would be I would be very thoughtful about making sure that if I am going to do an acquisition that the people that are running the show across the pond would be 100 percent values aligned with me because as the company gets bigger like part of the reason we did an acquisition is because we were still in a knife fight in theU.S.

`[00:21:03]` 所以我要说的是，如果我再做一次，我想我会非常仔细地确保，如果我要进行一次收购，那么负责整个节目的人将百分之百地与我保持一致，因为随着公司变得越来越大，就像我们进行收购的原因一样，这是因为在美国，我们还在针锋相对。

> like we think that we would be able to pay any attention overseas.

就像我们认为我们能够在海外给予任何关注一样。

> So we really needed to have somebody that we would be able to trust.

所以我们真的需要一个我们可以信任的人。

> And you can align with them on things from time to time but it\'s the million little decisions that you\'d never that are never even brought up to your attention that really make the difference between success and failure.

你可以不时地在事情上与他们保持一致，但真正决定成功与失败的真正区别的是那些你从未被吸引过的小小的决定，而这些小小的决定却从来没有引起过你的注意。

> `[00:21:53]` So so so that\'s why it\'s so important that you find people who you\'re really aligned with on a on a values level.

`[00:21:53]` 所以，这就是为什么你能在价值观层面上找到你真正与之一致的人，这就是为什么它如此重要的原因。

> `[00:22:00]` Speaking of acquisitions Groupon almost got acquired.

`[00:22:00]` 说到收购，Groupon 几乎被收购了。

> Can you talk a little bit about that story.

你能谈谈那个故事吗。

> `[00:22:09]` Sure.

`[00:22:09]` 当然。

> So I think it started with Yahoo.

所以我认为它是从雅虎开始的。

> Approaching us unsolicited.

主动接近我们。

> If I remember correctly and they offered they made kind of over the transom offer they kind of hinted that they would they would buy us for something like 2 billion dollar range in a million dollar range.

如果我没记错的话，他们提出的建议是，他们的出价有点过了，他们暗示他们会以 20 亿美元的价格在 100 万美元的范围内买下我们。

> Yeah.

嗯

> So somewhere around there.

所以在附近的某个地方。

> And and I really did not want to sell to Yahoo.

我真的不想卖给雅虎。

> I didn\'t want to sell at all.

我根本不想卖。

> I really didn\'t want to sell to Yahoo.

我真的不想卖给雅虎。

> And the board the board was interested.

董事会对此很感兴趣。

> As is the board\'s responsibility to be interested in stuff like that.

董事会有责任对这样的事情感兴趣。

> `[00:22:55]` So I managed to get a meeting with with Google with the thought being that if we can get them interested that\'s a better place to end up than than Yahoo.

`[00:22:55]` 所以我设法和谷歌开了个会，我的想法是，如果我们能让他们感兴趣，那将是一个比雅虎更好的地方。

> `[00:23:06]` And laughter.

`[00:23:06]` 和笑声。

> `[00:23:07]` And that went really well.

`[00:23:07]` 这件事进行得很顺利。

> At the same time that was happening.

同时也发生了这样的事情。

> It was it was getting into the holiday season and the business was just taking off on a level that we had never seen before.

这是进入假日季节和业务刚刚起飞的水平，我们从来没有见过。

> So it kind of fortuitously just as that conversation was happening you know we were looking at our numbers and the board sat down and said it would be it would be foolish to sell at this point we think this company can be much more much more valuable independently.

所以，就在那次谈话发生的时候，你知道我们正在看我们的数据，董事会坐下来说，在这个时候出售股票是愚蠢的，我们认为这家公司可以独立地卖得更有价值。

> And so we kept going.

所以我们继续前进。

> `[00:23:41]` You didn\'t want to sell.

`[00:23:41]` 你不想卖。

> You were happy to keep working.

你很乐意继续工作。

> `[00:23:44]` Yeah I didn\'t want to sell you know I don\'t know why.

`[00:23:44]` 是的，我不想卖，你知道我不知道为什么。

> `[00:23:48]` Meaning I\'m meaning I don\'t know.

`[00:23:48]` 意思是我不知道。

> `[00:23:53]` I really don\'t know if I have a just deep like kind of sense of ownership around these things and I don\'t want anybody else to own the company or if I didn\'t think it was the right thing for the business.

`[00:23:53]` 我真的不知道我是否对这些事情有一种深刻的主人翁感，我不想让其他人拥有这家公司，或者我不认为这对公司来说是正确的。

> `[00:24:10]` My my point of view on it now like I\'ve I\'ve come to think are how we think about it with like with like detour and what I\'m trying to do by building a business is I think of a business as an opportunity to inject an idea into the world that hopefully makes a difference somehow.

`[00:24:10]` 我对这件事的看法是，我现在开始思考的是，我们是如何绕道看待它的，而我试图通过建立一家企业来做的事情是，我认为企业是一个机会，可以把一个想法注入世界，希望它能带来一些不同的结果。

> `[00:24:30]` And whether that actual business persists or like is kind of secondary to whether or not the idea has had an impact whether it\'s through your own company or somebody else\'s company.

`[00:24:30]` 无论是通过你自己的公司还是其他人的公司，这个想法是否已经产生了影响，这是次要的。

> So that\'s how I that\'s how I think about building businesses now.

所以我现在就是这么想做生意的。

> `[00:24:51]` OK.

`[00:24:51]` 好的。

> And I\'m running out of time.

我已经没时间了。

> I\'m going to take a few extra minutes because I have a couple more questions and I want to get to detour but just very quickly.

我要多花几分钟时间，因为我还有几个问题要问，我想绕道但很快。

> Any advice for founders in this audience thinking of going public some day.

有什么建议给这群想有一天上市的创办人吗？

> `[00:25:08]` Going public is awful.

`[00:25:08]` 上市太糟糕了。

> It\'s really the worst thing that that I think we ever did.

这是我认为我们做过的最糟糕的事情。

> `[00:25:15]` And I think Groupon would be different if it hadn\'t gone public.

`[00:25:15]` 如果 Groupon 没有上市的话，我认为 Groupon 会有所不同。

> `[00:25:23]` Let me tell you laughter let me tell you a couple.

`[00:25:23]` 让我告诉你笑声，让我告诉你几个。

> `[00:25:29]` I don\'t know why you\'re clapping.

`[00:25:29]` 我不知道你为什么鼓掌。

> Why.

为什么

> `[00:25:31]` Why are you clapping because one person to clap.

`[00:25:31]` 为什么你因为一个人鼓掌而鼓掌？

> Tell me why you clapped.

告诉我你为什么鼓掌。

> Is it because it\'s like nice to hear me admit that.

听我承认是因为我很高兴。

> Or is it because like honesty.

还是因为诚实。

> `[00:25:39]` OK so here\'s here\'s what it is like.

`[00:25:39]` 好的，这就是它的样子。

> `[00:25:44]` I think at the at the very least 10 percent of your time and for a company like group on 50 percent of your time will now be sucked up by doing something that has nothing to do with building a great company.

`[00:25:44]` 我认为你至少有 10%的时间，对于一个像你这样的公司来说，你 50%的时间都会因为做一些与建立一家伟大的公司毫无关系的事情而被吸收掉。

> It is so tragic.

太悲惨了。

> It\'s like the reason you\'re doing what you\'re doing what you\'re doing now and you\'re slaving away now like you\'re gonna be doing something entirely different that just feels like complete bullshit.

这就像是你做你现在所做的事情的原因，你现在就像你将要做的完全不同的事情一样，完全是胡说八道。

> `[00:26:09]` Every second that you\'re doing it in less your a sociopath you\'re going to be like I hate this why do I have to do this.

`[00:26:09]` 每一秒钟，你所做的都不是你的反社会者，你会像我一样讨厌这个，为什么我要这样做呢？

> `[00:26:19]` The other thing is the incentives to think short term are so unbelievably strong the incentives to think quarterly are too strong for any company to resist.

`[00:26:19]` 另一件事是，认为短期的动机是如此强烈，认为季度的动机太强，任何公司都无法抗拒。

> I don\'t care what any public company CEO tells you they are making short term tradeoffs all the time.

我不在乎任何上市公司的 CEO 告诉你，他们一直在做短期的权衡。

> And I just think it\'s bad.

我只是觉得这很糟糕。

> I think it\'s bad for for for for business and entrepreneurship.

我认为这对商业和创业都是不利的。

> I don\'t know why anybody would want to do that.

我不知道为什么会有人想这么做。

> So I guess my advice for you is don\'t get consumed by this because you\'ve got to be successful first.

所以我想我对你的建议是，不要被这一切所消耗，因为你必须首先成功。

> But to the degree that you can be thinking about what you can do to set yourself up to to never go public or put it off as long as possible you\'ll be doing it you\'ll you\'ll thank yourself down the road.

但是，在某种程度上，你可以考虑你能做些什么，让自己永远不上市，或者尽可能地推迟它，你会这样做的，你会感谢你自己。

> I mean we were engineered from Verilli very early on because of the way that we were financed to go public relatively quickly and it\'s probably the worst thing.

我的意思是，我们是很早就从 Verilli 设计出来的，因为我们的融资方式是相对迅速地上市的，这可能是最糟糕的事情。

> `[00:27:18]` So avoid going public that I mean it\'s no support.

`[00:27:18]` 所以不要公开，我的意思是没有支持。

> And I also feel like we were a particular brand of shit show.

我也觉得我们是一个特殊品牌的狗屎秀。

> Like let me let me be clear.

让我说清楚。

> You know like there\'s all kinds of other shit that I did that I could have avoided because we grew so fast.

你知道，就像我做过的其他事情一样，我本可以避免的，因为我们成长得太快了。

> But I\'m I\'m kind of self-aware enough to I think I\'m objective enough about this to be able to be able to make this judgment universally and say that it\'s we\'re just like the worst example.

但我有足够的自我意识，我认为我对这件事足够客观，能够做出普遍的判断，并说我们就像最坏的例子。

> `[00:27:45]` OK.

`[00:27:45]` 好的。

> Finally I know I\'m going over to talk about detour quickly and any sort of we actually don\'t like I don\'t want you to think that the only way I agree to do this is to go to plug my new company I want to hear about it I\'ve been wanting to talk to you about deja forever.

最后，我知道我要去快速地谈论绕道，任何类型的我们实际上都不想让你认为我同意这样做的唯一方法就是去推销我的新公司-我想听你说我一直想和你谈 Deja 的事。

> `[00:27:59]` OK well then just you know even if you\'re going ask a question about it make sure it\'s one that does feel like it\'s in my I\'ve heard about this really cool company called me.

`[00:27:59]` 好吧，那你就知道，即使你要问一个问题，也要确保它确实是我听说过的一个很酷的公司叫我的公司。

> What I want to know is what does detour and what lessons are you now applying now that you have this blank slate.

我想知道的是，既然你有了这张白板，你现在要学的是什么“绕道”，以及你现在申请什么课程。

> Again you\'re doing a new startup.

再一次，你在做一家新的创业公司。

> What are you doing differently.

你在做什么不同的事。

> `[00:28:21]` GS so detour is their location aware audio walks you put your phone in your pocket and we have these awesome stories that walk you through San Francisco they take about 45 minutes.

`[00:28:21]` 所以绕道是他们的位置，音频步行，你把你的手机放在你的口袋里，我们有这些令人敬畏的故事，带你穿过旧金山，它们大约需要 45 分钟。

> They they tell you where to turn.

他们会告诉你在哪里转弯。

> You can take them in groups.

你可以分组带他们去。

> It\'s awesome.

太棒了。

> Like I\'m I\'m super proud of it.

好像我对此感到非常骄傲。

> It\'s the most fun thing I\'ve ever done.

这是我做过的最有趣的事。

> And I think everybody\'s really going to love it when they have a chance to use it.

我认为每个人在有机会使用它的时候都会喜欢它的。

> `[00:28:50]` Lesson\'s so many there\'s actually a lot of value value.

`[00:28:50]` 课程太多了，实际上有很大的价值。

> `[00:28:59]` One thing that someone said to me we did an off site last week and one thing that somebody said to me that I hadn\'t even thought of is there is a certain amount of like big company structure that I\'m bringing to detour like we have 90 day company goals.

`[00:28:59]` 有人对我说，我们上周在场外做了一件事，还有一件事，有人对我说，我甚至没有想过，有一种类似于大公司的结构，我正在绕道而行，就像我们有 90 天的公司目标一样。

> We do postmortems on things like nothing that\'s just just stuff to make that makes startups unnecessarily chaotic.

我们做后世的事情，就像什么都不做，只会让初创公司变得毫无必要的混乱。

> We\'re not doing that stuff.

我们不会那么做的。

> `[00:29:25]` I think the other thing is that the biggest.

`[00:29:25]` 我认为另一件事是最大的。

> There\'s certain values that you really have to like.

有一些你必须真正喜欢的价值观。

> `[00:29:38]` I think what you\'re the definition of values is there the behaviors or principles that you religiously adhere to within your company.

`[00:29:38]` 我认为你对价值观的定义是，在你的公司里，你虔诚地遵守的行为或原则。

> `[00:29:46]` When we say religious I mean that no amount of data will sway you.

`[00:29:46]` 当我们说宗教的时候，我的意思是没有多少数据会动摇你。

> It is from those principles and the degree to which that you have the courage to maintain your conviction around those ideas is the degree to which you\'re going to be successful over the long term.

正是从这些原则和你有勇气保持你对这些想法的信念的程度，你将在长期内取得成功。

> And I think there are things like around the type of people that you work with around starting with the customer and working backwards that I see startups that at Groupon We rationalized making exceptions.

我认为，在你工作的人周围，有一些东西，从客户开始，然后向后工作，我看到在 Groupon 的初创公司，我们理顺了例外情况。

> `[00:30:18]` I see why see startups rationalizing exceptions all the time because it\'s it\'s really really hard.

`[00:30:00]` 我明白为什么创业公司总是把例外合理化，因为这真的很难。

> `[00:30:26]` And everybody everybody thinks they\'re doing it.

`[00:30:26]` 每个人都认为他们在做这件事。

> We thought we were doing it like I thought I was doing and I thought I was consistently starting with the customer and working backwards.

我们认为我们是这样做的，就像我认为我正在做的一样，我认为我一直以来都是从客户开始，然后向后工作。

> `[00:30:34]` And when I wasn\'t I always had a really good excuse that I could explain to someone.

`[00:30:00]` 当我还在的时候，我总是有一个很好的借口，我可以向别人解释。

> But it didn\'t matter.

但这不重要。

> And I feel like those are the biggest mistakes.

我觉得这是最大的错误。

> And so like the biggest difference is just having the courage to stick to those convictions.

因此，就像最大的区别就是有勇气坚持这些信念。

> `[00:30:48]` And it feels so good when you see them pay off and that\'s awesome.

`[00:30:48]` 当你看到他们得到回报的时候，感觉好极了，那太棒了。

> Great way to end.

结束的好方法。

> I\'m sorry we went when everybody was too loud applause.

很抱歉，当大家掌声太大时，我们都去了。
