# Reid Hoffman at Startup School SV 2014

> `[00:00:02]` Thank you for coming to get started.

`[00:00:02]` 谢谢你的到来。

> I wanted to just ask you about how LinkedIn got funded so let\'s see.

我只想问你 LinkedIn 是如何获得资金的，让我们看看。

> `[00:00:13]` I\'ll give this even.

`[00:00:13]` 我会把这个给你的。

> I know it come back on time.

我知道它会准时回来。

> The slightly longer answer because it\'s entertaining.

稍长一点的答案，因为它很有趣。

> So in September of 2000 Peter Teil Max Levchin Loopt Nosik and I did an off site at my grandparents house and Gualala California where were like Okay how do we say PayPal because in August of 2009 burned 12 million dollars in one month without any revenue with an exponentiation cost line.

所以在 2000 年 9 月，彼得·泰尔·马克斯·莱文·洛普·诺西克和我在我祖父母的房子和加州的瓜拉拉做了一个场外的网站，我们怎么说贝宝呢？因为 2009 年 8 月，贝宝在一个月内就消耗了 1200 万美元，没有任何收入，并且有指数成倍的成本线。

> And that worked out fortunately that was day one.

幸运的是，那是第一天。

> Day two was if this blows up we will have created a mushroom cloud of 200 million plus in venture capital going to zero.

第二天，如果这一幕破灭，我们将创造出一个 2 亿多万的蘑菇云，风险投资将降至零。

> And so you know we might as well do something together.

所以你知道我们最好一起做点什么。

> `[00:00:50]` So we pitched each other our best ideas and an earlier version of LinkedIn was one of them for me.

`[00:00:50]` 所以我们互相推介自己最好的想法，而早期版本的 LinkedIn 就是其中之一。

> And then they three went on for a hike and then before we come back to work.

然后，他们三个继续徒步旅行，然后在我们回来工作之前。

> `[00:01:03]` And then what happened is we sold PayPal to eBay in October of 0 2 and Silicon Valley had gone crazy then which is they\'d basically concluded that consumer unit the classic pattern for investing in the last few decades had been you have one big tech wave and everyone runs out to get the big companies the most tech ways and then that tech wave goes away and there\'s a new one whether it\'s networking equipment you know you know medical staff or enterprise software or clean tech or anything else and anyone including consumer and it was over.

`[00:01:03]` 发生的事情是，我们在 02 年 10 月把贝宝卖给了 eBay，硅谷疯了，他们基本上得出结论，过去几十年里，传统的投资模式-消费单元-只有一次大科技浪潮，每个人都跑出去，让大公司以最先进的技术手段，然后科技浪潮消失了，有一个新的，无论是网络设备，你知道，医疗人员或企业软件或清洁技术或其他任何东西，包括消费者，这一切都结束了。

> `[00:01:39]` Right.

`[00:01:39]` 对。

> So they said I was on Google eBay you know Yahoo.

所以他们说我在谷歌易趣你知道雅虎。

> These are dead that we read on that net now anyway.

不管怎么说，我们现在网上读到的这些都是死的。

> And what I realized was actually in fact the consumer and it was just starting.

事实上，我意识到的是消费者，这才刚刚开始。

> And in fact the social platforms were kind of a key thing and so I said well actually in fact the links and ideas that works so as opposed to taking a year off I took three weeks off and then started working on Linka.

事实上，社交平台是一件很关键的事情，所以我说得很好，事实上，链接和想法是有效的，而不是放一年的假，我放了三个星期的假，然后开始研究 Linka。

> `[00:02:03]` What about that idea about the particular idea Lincoln had made you sure at least highly convicted enough that it was going to work in this world where everyone had given up on consuming it.

`[00:02:03]` 林肯让你确信至少在这个人人都放弃消费的世界里，它会奏效。

> `[00:02:14]` Well so I actually think that if you have had a m at the back of the napkin stage you have a high conviction that\'s going to work you\'re mostly deluding yourself.

`[00:02:14]` 那么我实际上认为，如果你在餐巾纸舞台的后面有一个 m，你有一个很高的信念：你会工作的，你大部分是在欺骗自己。

> But self-delusion is a positive attribute in many entrepreneurial circumstances.

但在许多创业环境中，自我妄想是一个积极的因素。

> `[00:02:31]` And so for me it was I tend to think in terms of economic ecosystems like how the world should be out frequently a mistake and plans as well.

`[00:02:31]` 所以对我来说，我倾向于从经济生态系统的角度来思考，比如世界应该如何经常外出-这是一个错误，也是一个计划。

> If all you know hundreds millions people using it as this product would be awesome.

如果你知道数亿人把它当作这个产品使用，那就太棒了。

> The real question is how you get the first million Muza because if you don\'t get the first million then the hundreds of millions that it never happens.

真正的问题是你如何得到第一个百万的穆萨，因为如果你没有得到第一个百万，那么数亿它永远不会发生。

> Now being said is like OK.

现在被说成是好的。

> Everyone should have a public professional identity.

每个人都应该有一个公开的职业身份。

> That should all be open and transparent.

这一切都应该是公开和透明的。

> That should be a platform by which you navigate how you work and your work life that should exist.

这应该是一个平台，你可以通过这个平台来导航你的工作方式和你应该存在的工作生活。

> And there are a bunch of cultural things against it.

还有很多文化因素反对它。

> There\'s a bunch of people just kind of.

有一群人只是有点。

> When you explain that idea even today they scratch their head and go oh I didn\'t really think about it that way.

当你解释这个想法的时候，即使是今天，他们也会挠头而去，哦，我不是这么想的。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And so what gave me conviction was because there was a lot less noise back then that one could start a idea like this where most people even today don\'t really fully understand how to use the tool.

因此，让我确信的是，当时的噪音要小得多，当时人们可以开始这样的想法，即使是在今天，大多数人也不完全理解如何使用这个工具。

> Then you can slowly build and ramp to that which is much harder in an environment where it\'s noisy and tons of things are happening.

然后，你可以慢慢地建造和坡道，在一个嘈杂和大量事情正在发生的环境中，这要困难得多。

> `[00:03:37]` How did you get the first million or even the first thousand users Rillington.

`[00:03:37]` 你是如何得到第一个百万，甚至是第一个 1000 个用户的里灵顿？

> `[00:03:41]` So first thousand was easy.

`[00:03:41]` 所以第一千是容易的。

> We just sent out like 13 people who are working at the company at the time kind of sent out invitations.

我们刚发出了 13 个人，他们当时在公司工作，发出邀请函。

> And that ended up at a rate of 2000 per week which of course is nothing them.

每周以 2000 美元的速度结束，这当然不算什么。

> In it.

在里面。

> Probably the key thing that we innovated we were the first people to do this.

可能是我们创新的关键，我们是第一个这样做的人。

> That then caused the growth curve to change was upload your address book and see who else you knew was on LinkedIn.

于是增长曲线发生了变化，上传你的通讯录，看看你在 LinkedIn 上认识的其他人。

> `[00:04:11]` Because what we\'re thinking about what was the problem that people were trying to solve when they showed up.

`[00:04:11]` 因为当人们出现时，我们正在思考的问题是什么。

> Is this an interesting place.

这是个有趣的地方。

> Are there interesting people here as you know should I be here.

就像你所知道的，这里有趣的人，我应该在这里。

> Well one of the primary questions is who else is here.

最主要的问题之一是还有谁在这里。

> And so that was the quickest way to do that.

所以这是最快的方法。

> Once they went Oh Sam\'s here and so forth then they go OK.

一旦他们去了，哦，萨姆，等等，然后他们就可以走了。

> Let me invite some other people let me check this out.

让我邀请其他人让我看看这个。

> `[00:04:30]` And so that essentially changed our growth curve and without that we probably would have we would be here we had that off site when PayPal was burning tautly dollars a month.

`[00:04:30]` 因此，这基本上改变了我们的增长曲线，如果没有这些，我们可能会在这里，当贝宝(PayPal)一个月烧紧美元的时候，我们就会离开这里。

> An explanation an expert that was 12000 in August.

一个专家在八月份 12000 岁的解释。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And you pitched LinkedIn as your best startup idea what WiMax and Peters best ideas.

你还把 LinkedIn 说成是你最好的创业点子，就像 WiMax 和 Peters 的最佳创意。

> `[00:04:49]` Laughter I\'m not allowed to say.

`[00:04:49]` 笑声我不能说。

> I\'ll take the Fifth.

我要第五辆。

> `[00:04:57]` All right.

`[00:04:57]` 好的。

> `[00:04:59]` You know we\'re talking a little bit before we started about some of the current myths of Silicon Valley entrepreneurship and I thought that was really interesting so maybe you could talk about some of those.

`[00:04:59]` 你知道，在我们开始讨论硅谷创业的一些目前的神话之前，我们正在谈论一些，我认为这真的很有趣，所以也许你可以谈谈其中的一些。

> `[00:05:07]` So there\'s a bunch of means going around in the valley in the last three to five years that I think were actually harmful.

`[00:05:07]` 所以在过去的三到五年里，山谷里有一堆我认为是有害的东西。

> So how you think about these things.

所以你是如何看待这些事情的。

> So for example one of them is let\'s start with that actually a open capital market is a good thing for entrepreneurs.

例如，其中之一是，首先，开放的资本市场对企业家来说是一件好事。

> `[00:05:30]` And by the way it\'s not and it\'s a terrible thing.

`[00:05:30]` 顺便说一句，这不是一件可怕的事。

> But as entrepreneurs.

但作为企业家。

> Basically if the problem of an open capital market is they always think about in terms just my startup like me.

基本上，如果一个开放的资本市场的问题是，他们总是用术语来思考，就像我一样，我的创业公司。

> So there\'s more capital that\'ll make my job easier.

所以有更多的资本可以让我的工作更轻松。

> The problem is is if you now have is a function of open capital market 5 x the number of companies competing with you.

问题是，如果你现在有一个函数开放的资本市场，5 倍的公司与你竞争。

> Not just for your actual products but for talent for relevancy for breaking signal through the noise and all the rest of it.

不仅是为了你的实际产品，也是为了你的相关人才，因为它可以通过噪音和其他所有的声音来打破信号。

> Actually in fact if you do a historical analysis over the last 50 years and you say when are the majority of the of the game changing companies founded there actually in downturns because they have enough time to have a ramp to agree to a whole bunch of stellar talent around the time starting and so forth.

事实上，如果你对过去 50 年的历史进行分析，你会说，什么时候大多数的游戏都在改变，而这些公司实际上是在衰退中成立的，因为他们有足够的时间在开始的时候同意一大群优秀的人才，以此类推。

> And so actually open capital markets are actually not the ideal time to be starting company unless you have an idea that you or your you know you simply couldn\'t get finance otherwise.

因此，事实上，开放的资本市场并不是创办公司的理想时机，除非你有一个你或你自己知道的想法，否则你就无法获得资金。

> And you know look you start the company when you want to start the company.

你知道，当你想创业的时候，你就创办公司。

> `[00:06:31]` Another myth would be that before we leave that one what should founders do if they\'re starting a company in times like these to best counteract that.

`[00:06:31]` 另一个神话是，在我们离开这个公司之前，如果创始人在这样的时候创办了一家公司，他们应该怎么做才能最好地抵消这一点。

> `[00:06:40]` So there\'s two or three strategies.

`[00:06:40]` 所以有两三种策略。

> So one of them is you really have to think about how do you break through the noise.

其中之一就是你必须考虑如何突破噪音。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So the number of companies that really matter every year is probably between zero and 5 right in terms of like the industry change.

因此，每年真正重要的公司数量可能在 0 到 5 之间，就像行业的变化一样。

> So if you look at an audience like this which is what 14 other people.

所以，如果你看看这样的观众，这是其他 14 个人的作品。

> Seventeen hundred people.

一千七百人。

> You say it\'s an average of two founders per.

你说平均每人有两位创始人。

> Companies presume everyone\'s doing it.

公司认为每个人都在这么做。

> You get 850 in the room.

房间里有 850 块。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And so then that\'s only the people who here let alone everything else.

所以，那就只有在这里的人，更不用说其他的人了。

> And so the question is is how do you break through the noise is a really really key thing whether it\'s financing talent aggregation go to marketetc.

因此，问题是，你如何突破噪音是一个真正关键的事情，它的融资，人才聚集，走向市场。

> so that then becomes a central problem.

因此，这就成了一个核心问题。

> So one of them is is to say well do something very contrary.

其中之一就是说得好，做一些完全相反的事情。

> Do something that is kind of like not like where people say well you know it\'s it\'s it\'s Air B and B but for dogs right.

做一些不像人们说的那样的事情，你知道它是空气 B 和 B，但对狗来说是对的。

> `[00:07:34]` You know that kind of thing is not the kind of thing to do generally right.

`[00:07:34]` 你知道这类事情一般都是不对的。

> `[00:07:39]` As a very rare that does ever become the big company.

`[00:07:39]` 成为大公司的一件非常罕见的事。

> `[00:07:41]` Yes extremely rare.

`[00:07:41]` 是的，非常罕见。

> The second thing would be is to look quare really look where there\'s one of the reasons why both you and I are fans of Peter\'s question of you know what do you believe that other people don\'t.

第二件事是，看看你和我都是彼得的粉丝的原因之一，你知道你相信别人不相信什么。

> But look where other people really aren\'t right whether it\'s you know hard science or if it was two and a half years ago Bitcoin you knowetc.

但是，看看其他人真的不对的地方，不管是你知道硬科学，还是两年半前的比特币，你都知道。

> You know those sorts of things were actually something could be really bigger because by the way if you end up being right you end up having access to the town.

你知道，这些事情实际上可能会更大，因为顺便说一句，如果你是对的，你最终会有机会进入这个小镇。

> That\'s really that\'s really focused on that you have a ramp to actually get a whole bunch of stuff and get a big headstart from other possible competitive efforts and these sorts of things.

这就是你真正关注的问题，你需要从其他可能的竞争努力和诸如此类的努力中获得一个很大的优势。

> `[00:08:23]` And then I think the last is to really focus on the not while like my earlier comment about self-delusion is one of the paradoxes entrepreneurship as you do these kind of two things that are in contradiction in balance.

`[00:08:23]` 然后我认为最后一件事是真正专注于“不”，就像我早些时候对自我妄想的评论一样，创业精神是一种悖论，因为你做了这两件矛盾的事情，在平衡中是矛盾的。

> `[00:08:40]` So `[00:08:40]` one of them is you actually want to have some self-delusion like yes I\'m sure I can make it work.

`[00:08:40]` 所以`[00:08:40]` 其中之一是，你真的想有一些自我妄想，比如是的，我确信我能让它发挥作用。

> On the other hand you want to be asking yourself everyday.

另一方面，你想每天问自己。

> Every week is my confidence is going up or down and if it\'s not going up what do I need to do and learn and pivot in order to get in order to have it and doesn\'t have to be that goes up every week.

每周我的信心都在上升或下降，如果没有上升，我需要做些什么，学习和支点才能得到它，而不是每周都在上升。

> Pape how linked in.

爸爸是怎么联系在一起的。

> We\'ve had weeks every valuable startup has a has.

我们每一家有价值的初创公司都有好几周的时间。

> Weeks and months of Valley of the shadow which is why did I ever think this was a good idea.

几周几个月的阴影谷，这就是为什么我曾经认为这是一个好主意。

> And so that happened.

就这样发生了。

> So the conference can go down that\'s fine but you get the part of the reason you\'re asking the question is in order to know what problem do I need to tackle aggressively to think that I\'m on the right path.

所以会议可以进行下去，但你知道你提出这个问题的部分原因是为了知道我需要积极地解决哪些问题，才能认为我走在正确的道路上。

> `[00:09:23]` All right so back to the myths.

`[00:09:23]` 好吧，回到神话。

> `[00:09:24]` OK.

`[00:09:24]` 好的。

> So like another one frequently tends to be so entrepreneurs tend to treat financing rounds as a combination of.

因此，就像另一种情况一样，企业家往往会把融资轮看作是一种组合。

> Well the highest possible valuation is the most expression of I\'m succeeding and or I\'m loved and valued and the absolute most amount of capital.

那么，最高可能的估值是 I‘m 成功和或我被爱和价值的最充分的表达，也是绝对的、最多的资本。

> Because you know why isn\'t two dollars better than one dollar kind of thing.

因为你知道为什么两美元比一美元好。

> Both of those are subtle mistakes.

这两个都是微妙的错误。

> It\'s not to say that valuation doesn\'t matter.

这并不是说估值不重要。

> Not to say that the amount of dollars doesn\'t matter.

并不是说美元的数量不重要。

> But let\'s take the dollars 1 for some dollars one the kind of question is frequently what you really want to do is you want to raise more money than you think you need in order to get to a milestone where that milestone makes a very big difference in the company.

但让我们以美元 1 美元为例-通常情况下，你真正想要做的是，你想筹集比你认为需要的更多的资金，以达到一个里程碑，在这个里程碑上，这个里程碑对公司产生了很大的影响。

> I have yet to see the company that it\'s actually like literally anywhere in all of my experience where if you weighs way too much capital you actually get ineffective in the way you operate it.

我还没有看到这家公司，在我所有的经验中，它实际上就像任何一个地方，如果你的资本太重，你的运营方式实际上就会变得无效。

> It changes a certain level of sharpness and the way you think and so you don\'t want to go like if you said well I need 10 Rayson 15 or 20 is fine don\'t raise 50.

它改变了一定程度的敏锐和你的思维方式，所以你不想去，如果你说，我需要 10，雷森，15 或 20 是好的，不要提高 50。

> `[00:10:32]` The track record of these companies they raise these like 30 million dollar rounds is their first casualty.

`[00:10:32]` 这些公司的业绩记录-他们筹集了大约 3000 万美元-是他们的第一个牺牲品。

> Awful.

糟透了。

> `[00:10:37]` Yeah it\'s completely.

`[00:10:37]` 是的，完全是这样的。

> Every single one trainwreck.

每一辆火车失事。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And so it\'s kind of like yes I need this amount of money and I\'ll do it I\'ll give myself some cushion but that\'s it.

所以这有点像，我需要这么多钱，我会给自己一些缓冲，但仅此而已。

> And then I really focus and the whole team is UNILORIN not because one of the problems it happens is not just you as a founder it\'s your whole team going oh you got an extra 20 or 30 in the bank so it\'s ok.

然后我真的很专注，整个团队都是 UNILORIN，不是因为问题之一不仅仅是你作为一个创始人，而是你整个团队都在前进，哦，你在银行里多出了 20 或 30 美元，所以没关系。

> This month the metrics and our confidence didn\'t go up so we got a lot of time to figure this out.

这个月的指标和我们的信心没有上升，所以我们有很多时间来解决这个问题。

> We don\'t right because the money isn\'t what actually gives you the time it\'s the market.

我们不正确，因为钱不是真正给你时间的东西，而是市场。

> `[00:11:06]` There\'s the question of time how much did Lincoln raise in its first round.

`[00:11:06]` 林肯在第一轮中筹集了多少钱，这是一个时间问题。

> `[00:11:09]` We raised four point seven million or so.

`[00:11:09]` 我们筹集了大约 470 万英镑。

> `[00:11:13]` And was there a particular milestone you were trying to hit with that.

`[00:11:13]` 你想用它来达到一个特殊的里程碑吗？

> `[00:11:16]` Yes.

`[00:11:16]` 是的。

> That particular milestone that we were ironic because part of what you do in a financing strategy is when you\'re raising money.

我们之所以具有讽刺意味，是因为你在融资策略中所做的部分是在你筹集资金的时候。

> `[00:11:21]` And I you know you published a series B decoupling in some of us if you have not seen this read published his series bedeck for LinkedIn and we make all we see founders raising be around look at it you should definitely check it out.

`[00:11:21]` 你知道你在我们中有些人出版了 B 系列脱钩-如果你没看过这本书，出版了他为 LinkedIn 做的系列文章，我们让我们看到的所有创始人都在身边，看看吧-你应该去看看。

> `[00:11:32]` So part of what you when you\'re doing this round of finance and you need to be thinking about the next round of financing.

`[00:11:32]` 所以当你做这一轮融资的时候，你需要考虑下一轮的融资。

> And part of that is what condition what range of outcomes can I get to then make that next round of financing work.

部分原因在于，我可以获得什么样的结果，然后让下一轮融资发挥作用。

> And for us it was when we raised our series A It was during a time Friendster and so everyone was like okay you\'re kind of like Friendster but for business and we don\'t really get what you are.

对我们来说，那是当我们提出我们的 A 系列的时候，它是在一个时间友谊，所以每个人都是好的，你有点像 Friendster，但在商业上，我们没有真正得到你是什么。

> `[00:11:54]` Well we wanted to be as our top goal which we got to was we wanted to clearly establish a separate category of professional network from Friendster that we were the market leader in.

`[00:11:54]` 我们想成为我们的首要目标，我们必须明确地建立一个与 Friendster 不同的专业网络类别，我们是市场的领先者。

> `[00:12:06]` We actually knew that even though our classic thing is well you revenue.

`[00:12:06]` 事实上，我们知道，即使我们的经典之处是“好你”的收入。

> We said no we\'re going to punt on revenue we\'ll do revenue post series B.

我们说不，我们要押注收入，我们要做 B 系列的收入。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> They said well you should have really really clear use cases is that we should have some inroads.

他们说，好吧，你应该有真正清楚的用例，那就是我们应该有一些进展。

> But but we don\'t have to have them all we only have to have some of them in terms our.

但是我们不需要拥有所有的东西，我们只需要用我们的术语来拥有其中的一些。

> And so we get really focused on this is what we\'re gonna do because if we can solve that problem no other problem worked.

所以我们要把注意力集中在这个问题上，因为如果我们能解决这个问题，其他的问题就没有用了。

> So which problem really matters.

所以哪个问题才是最重要的。

> That then raises the confidence from us and from the investors and then we can do a good series B.

这就提高了我们和投资者的信心，然后我们就可以做一个很好的 B 系列了。

> `[00:12:37]` Any other myths you want to talk about before we move on to the next topic.

`[00:12:37]` 在我们进入下一个话题之前，你想要谈论的任何其他神话。

> `[00:12:43]` Let\'s say there\'s a stack.

`[00:12:43]` 让我们说这里有一堆。

> And here\'s one that I think is actually pretty good irrelevant since what I\'m normally asked to invest in.

这里有一个我认为是很好的不相关的，因为我通常被要求投资。

> I say networks are marketplaces because those are the kinds of things that I know very well.

我说网络是市场，因为这些都是我非常了解的东西。

> `[00:12:53]` And I think there\'s still a ton of opportunity in them.

`[00:12:53]` 我认为他们还有很多机会。

> `[00:12:56]` However one of the things that people frequently think is network equals network effect.

`[00:12:56]` 然而，人们经常认为网络等于网络效应。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> They say it is a network and I can describe it as a network.

他们说这是一个网络，我可以把它描述为一个网络。

> It has a network effect.

它有网络效应。

> That\'s actually not true right now in terms of a tautology and equations statement.

从重言式和等式的陈述来看，这是不正确的。

> And the reason is is precisely what makes something of the network effect is the more nodes that you have in the system.

究其原因，正是网络效应产生的原因在于系统中的节点越多。

> In this case usually people that it raises the value of the system in a super linear value proposition that then makes leaving more and more you know like oh this is the place I do this this is really what it\'s valuable to do that marketplaces ah ah ah I think the clearest example of this because essentially is like well I\'m offering this kind of good for sale or for rent or anything else and and all the buyers who are looking for the broad distribution what\'s possible are coming here.

在这种情况下，人们通常认为它在一个超线性的价值命题中提高了系统的价值，这使得离开越来越多，你知道，哦，这就是我做的地方，做这个市场是很有价值的，啊，我认为这是最明显的例子，因为本质上来说，我提供的是这样的好东西供出售。或者租房或其他任何东西，所有寻找广泛分布的买家都会来到这里。

> Will you go to where the distribution of buyers are the buyers go to where the sellers are the seller go with the buyers.

你会去哪里，哪里的买家才是买家，哪里是卖方，哪里是买家。

> And so it becomes very difficult to trade off in that I think payment networks can have.

因此它变得非常困难，因为我认为支付网络可以做到这一点。

> I think you know social networks don\'t have that.

我想你知道社交网络是没有的。

> `[00:14:04]` I think there\'s all but but just because you say I have a network doesn\'t mean you have a network at I want to talk a little bit about you as an investor and sort of what you mentioned a few things throughout this but you know a founder says I want Reid Hoffman to invest in my startup.

`[00:14:04]` 我认为这一切，但仅仅因为你说我有一个网络，并不意味着你有一个网络，我想谈谈你作为一个投资者，以及你在整个过程中提到的一些事情，但你知道，一位创始人说我希望里德·霍夫曼(Reid Hoffman)对我的创业公司进行投资。

> What do you need to get convinced of.

你需要说服什么。

> `[00:14:25]` So let\'s see.

`[00:14:25]` 让我们看看。

> It\'s always a little bit idiosyncratic.

总是有点特别。

> So for example I\'m always more interested in that great idea that I haven\'t thought of.

所以，例如，我总是对那个我没有想到的好主意更感兴趣。

> So we might say networks in marketplaces those are things I\'m interested in but it\'s it\'s really a fact a great entrepreneur with a really fascinating idea.

因此，我们可能会说，市场上的网络是我感兴趣的东西，但这确实是一个事实，一个伟大的企业家，有一个非常迷人的想法。

> Frequently it\'s cannot get to the scale of millions to hundreds of millions of people.

通常情况下，它无法达到数百万到数亿人的规模。

> Does it actually in fact when it defines that desire to find a new aspect of human human ecosystem that changes individuals lives and the groups lives in a positive vector.

事实上，当它定义了寻找人类生态系统的一个新方面的愿望时，它是否改变了个人的生活，而这些群体生活在一个积极的载体中。

> And is it the way the world should be.

世界应该是这样的吗？

> Then you get to okay.

那你就没事了。

> Does the initial plan for how to possibly get a strong shot on that goal work and are the is the team and the founders the people that you know have a good shot at that.

最初的计划是如何在这个目标上获得一个强有力的机会，是团队和创建者，你知道的人在这方面有很好的机会。

> That\'s roughly what the shape of it looks like.

这大概就是它的形状。

> And it\'s the more that it has the like for example when I started LinkedIn and I went to Almight because you should go to all your smart friends and ask them when I went all my smart friends and ask them.

而且它有更多的相似之处，例如，当我创建 LinkedIn 的时候，我去了阿尔瓦，因为你应该去找你所有的聪明朋友，问他们我什么时候去了我所有的聪明朋友，问他们。

> They basically two thirds of them said I was an idiot.

他们中三分之二的人说我是个白痴。

> Starting him it was like a crazy idea.

对他来说这是个疯狂的想法。

> That\'s um that\'s a good signal right.

那是个很好的信号对吧。

> And the reason it\'s a good signal is because of 100 percent of people think it\'s good that\'s almost always problems that you\'re not seeing and that among other people think it\'s good too that the competition pile around it is here.

它之所以是一个好信号，是因为百分之百的人认为它是好的，它几乎总是你看不到的问题，而且在其他人当中，竞争也是很好的。

> So I like the fact that you say Why would smart people think this is not a good idea.

所以我喜欢你说为什么聪明人会认为这不是个好主意。

> But actually in fact there\'s something that makes it a good idea even despite that what was that then what did most people think.

但事实上，有一些东西使它成为一个好主意，尽管如此，那是什么，那时大多数人是怎么想的。

> `[00:15:58]` Why did most people think it was a dumb idea.

`[00:15:58]` 为什么大多数人认为这是个愚蠢的主意。

> `[00:16:00]` Most who I thought was a dumb idea because all of the problems digitally linked in are critically you have to get to a critical mass.

`[00:16:00]` 我认为大多数人都是个愚蠢的主意，因为所有与数字有关的问题都是关键的，你必须达到一个临界的质量。

> And so the question is you have an imitation product where you have no value proposition 8 critical mass.

所以问题是，你有一个仿制产品，你没有价值命题，8 临界质量。

> So you join Alington no value.

所以你加入了阿灵顿没有价值。

> Until then you invite me.

在那之前你邀请我。

> We had already no value either.

我们也已经没有价值了。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So how do you get to the first million people is the key thing.

所以，如何才能接触到第一个百万人是关键。

> `[00:16:20]` Got it for specific to specific examples I want to talk about for investing Facebook first.

`[00:16:20]` 我想先谈谈 Facebook 投资的具体例子。

> Could you talk about how your investment Facebook happened.

你能谈谈你的投资 Facebook 是怎么发生的吗？

> `[00:16:29]` Yes so I tracked Facebook when it was in Boston.

`[00:16:29]` 是的，当 Facebook 在波士顿的时候，我跟踪了它。

> That\'s a super interesting project but because I was very busy with windows I well you know it\'s in Boston.

这是一个非常有趣的项目，但因为我非常忙于窗户，所以你知道它在波士顿。

> We\'ll see how it plays out.

我们会看看结果如何。

> `[00:16:41]` And then Sean Parker called me and said it\'s really interesting investment opportunity at Facebook Gabz in Boston.

`[00:16:41]` 然后肖恩·帕克打电话给我，说在波士顿的 Facebook Gabz，这是一个非常有趣的投资机会。

> I don\'t know how to help them.

我不知道如何帮助他们。

> Now over here they\'ve rented a house you know and I was like Oh that\'s great.

现在这里，他们租了一所房子，你知道的，我就像哦，那太好了。

> And at the time yeah it was maybe a little bit more enthusiastic than that.

当时，是的，也许比这更热情一些。

> `[00:17:02]` But at the time I had been a little beleaguered because I\'d gotten a lot of pushback from the investment and friends group saying well you try to have your cake and eat it too because you\'re doing too even though I view social professional networks to be very different.

`[00:17:02]` 但是在那个时候，我受到了一些困扰，因为我受到了投资和朋友团体的强烈抵制，他们说，好吧，你试着吃蛋糕，因为你做得太过了，尽管我认为社会职业网络是很不一样的。

> And one of the things about integrity is not only important that you have integrity but also that you that you seem to have integrity like the substance that the appearance matters as well as the substance.

正直的其中一件事不仅重要的是你有正直，而且你似乎有正直，就像外表和物质一样重要的物质。

> And so I go look I don\'t want to lead this investment as great as it is and all the rest of them.

所以我去看看，我不想领导这项投资，因为它是伟大的，所有的其他人。

> I think Peter should lead the investment and I will actually in fact you know follow in.

我认为彼得应该领导这项投资，事实上我会的，你知道的。

> `[00:17:39]` And so it\'s a very expensive example of integrity.

`[00:17:39]` 所以这是一个非常昂贵的正直的例子。

> `[00:17:42]` I think it\'s probably one of the most expensive examples of integrity I know.

`[00:17:42]` 我认为这可能是我所知道的最昂贵的正直的例子之一。

> But since you know Peter\'s a close friend it\'s all good.

但既然你知道彼得是个亲密的朋友，一切都很好。

> `[00:17:50]` And so Parker Zork Peter about core and I met because Matt was working for me at the time going down and.

`[00:17:50]` 帕克·佐克·彼得和我见面是因为马特当时在为我工作。

> And we\'re like this is you know there\'s a lot there\'s a lot that can go wrong with his was very early was still in some number colleges like 10 or 12 or some small number of colleges.

我们是这样的，你知道，有很多事情可能会出错，他很早就在一些数字学院，比如 10 或 12 所大学，或者是少数几所大学。

> `[00:18:13]` But one of the pieces of conviction that I had which is the reason why New that Facebook was awesome even before that specific meeting was that I knew that social network as a platform was intrinsic.

`[00:18:13]` 但是我的信念之一-这也是为什么在那次会议之前 Facebook 就很棒的原因-是因为我知道社交网络作为一个平台是固有的。

> Now isn\'t that I had an idea for how it came about and the internal part there was a bunch of things I learned from how they\'re thinking about that.

现在不是我对它是如何发生的有一个想法，而内在的部分-我从他们的思考中学到了很多东西。

> But the notion that your identity and your network is a platform for the apps that transform your life that was something that I already had.

但是你的身份和你的网络是改变你生活的应用程序的平台，这是我已经拥有的。

> And so once like Facebook started saying look we were already on track for that.

因此，就像 Facebook 开始说的那样，看，我们已经走上了这条道路。

> That was pretty.

太漂亮了。

> `[00:18:44]` It was probably one of the most straightforward investment decisions we had been thinking about this since you started a company called The Social Network in 1997 right.

`[00:18:44]` 自从你在 1997 年创办了一家名为“社交网络”的公司以来，这可能是我们一直在考虑的最直接的投资决策之一。

> Yes social social net.

是的社交网络。

> Yeah okay.

好吧。

> How did did that experience that why you knew so much like that in you prepared for us.

为什么你对我们的了解如此之深，这是如何为我们做好准备的呢？

> `[00:19:02]` And when I started when I started social net because part of a macro level what I think of myself as doing is helping found build invest in design human ecosystems using principally software technology Internet technologies and medium and so social that had a bunch of errors.

`[00:19:02]` 当我开始社交网络的时候，在宏观层面上，我认为自己所做的就是帮助建立投资于人类生态系统的设计，主要是软件技术、互联网技术和媒体等，这些都有很多错误。

> One of them was not understanding that your distribution has to be organic right.

其中之一就是不明白你的分配必须是有机的。

> So organic morality is a natural organic ASIOs organic was a set of these techniques that are natural organic techniques and was six degrees that actually saw six degrees hotter.

因此，有机道德是一种自然有机的 ASIO，有机是这些技术的集合，这些技术是自然的有机技术，是六度，而实际上是六度。

> Oh my god that brilliant.

哦，天哪，真是太棒了。

> Like that\'s what we should be doing.

就像我们应该做的那样。

> And so I\'d had the idea of everyone establishing an identity and then having this this electronic space transforming their lives.

于是我想到了每个人都要建立自己的身份，然后让这个电子空间改变他们的生活。

> But I didn\'t have the concept of a network.

但我没有网络的概念。

> I didn\'t have the concept of real identity.

我没有真实身份的概念。

> I didn\'t have a concept of all of these things being a Malkmus when I started social media was still cyber space right.

当我开始使用社交媒体的时候，我并没有把所有这些东西都当成马尔克摩斯的概念，那就是网络空间是正确的。

> `[00:19:59]` You go through cyber space right.

`[00:19:59]` 你穿过网络空间是对的。

> And now it\'s like know this is actually the way we live.

现在就像知道了这就是我们的生活方式。

> This is this is this is part of our life.

这是我们生活的一部分。

> And that was that.

就是这样。

> `[00:20:07]` Those are the things that are how social and had already had me thinking about this category but also to recognize which things would work.

`[00:20:07]` 这些都是社交的方式，已经让我思考了这个范畴，但也认识到哪些东西会起作用。

> `[00:20:16]` When I got to the second phase I saw them from you many many years ago where you had said that the most important thing Facebook had done that was new and innovative was really identity separately from everything that had done before.

`[00:20:16]` 当我进入第二阶段时，我在很多年前从你那里看到了他们，你说 Facebook 做的最重要的事情是新的和创新的，那就是真正的身份，和以前做过的所有事情都不一样。

> Do you still believe that.

你还相信吗。

> `[00:20:29]` I think real identity was one of the really we had been doing real identity too and and Bransford been doing a version real identity is definitely part of it.

`[00:20:29]` 我认为真实身份也是我们一直在做的真实身份之一，而 Bransford 一直在做一个版本，真实身份肯定是其中的一部分。

> The other part of it is that they had gotten the accidents of it started and were also super useful was that it got to a high trust and real identity by strolling in colleges like I don\'t think Facebook could have established where I got to it hadn\'t started in colleges.

另一个原因是他们发现了它的意外，而且也非常有用，因为它通过漫步在大学里获得了高度的信任和真实的身份，就像我认为 Facebook 不可能确定我在大学里没有开始的地方)。

> Everyone\'s like resemble an early days on Facebook which of course doesn\'t happen anymore for obvious reasons people would post their cell phone numbers to their profiles.

每个人都像 Facebook 上的早期一样，当然，由于明显的原因，人们会把自己的手机号码张贴到个人资料中，这种情况不会再发生了。

> Because like this is a trusted community like you know no one\'s going to get me nothing weird by my posting my cell phone to my profile and so they would do that.

因为就像你所知道的那样，这是一个值得信赖的社区，没有人会把我的手机贴到我的个人资料上，不会让我觉得奇怪，所以他们会这么做。

> Now that doesn\'t happen as much anymore probably right.

现在这种情况不再发生了，也许是对的。

> `[00:21:08]` Right.

`[00:21:08]` 对。

> And then the other example front investment you made is can you talk about how you ended up investing in Zinga.

另外一个例子是你所做的正面投资，你能谈谈你是如何在 Zinga 投资的吗？

> `[00:21:14]` Yeah.

`[00:21:14]` 是的。

> So Facebook launched the FIA platform and their description was where social utility.

因此，Facebook 推出了国际汽联(FIA)平台，他们的描述正是社会效用所在。

> It\'s a social graph and there\'s a whole stack of applications built on top of it.

这是一张社交图，上面有一堆应用程序。

> The question is which of the applications going to be most most applicable.

问题是哪一项申请最适用。

> And also which are the applications that are going to be that are essentially going to like.

还有，哪些应用程序将成为本质上会喜欢的应用程序。

> There\'s always a tension between apps and platform in terms of the primacy to the user which which apps are going to be the most important ones on the platform now.

在用户的首要地位上，应用程序和平台之间总是存在紧张关系，而这些应用程序将是目前平台上最重要的应用程序。

> Photo sharing was clearly one of them but Facebook isn\'t safe.

照片分享显然是其中之一，但 Facebook 并不安全。

> We all know that we\'re talking allow anything else in that.

我们都知道我们说的是允许任何其他东西。

> And so what are the other ones.

其他的是什么。

> Now the primary one that I thought Facebook was this is an unimportant app is not we care about we care about utility and productivity and much other things was games and the intersection of having Pincus who is massively creative.

我认为 Facebook 最主要的一点是，这是一个不重要的应用程序，我们不关心效用和生产力，还有很多其他的东西是游戏和让 Pincus 拥有巨大创造力的交叉点。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And it\'s kind of like an idea a minute kind of like what is this what about this what about this.

这有点像一个想法，一分钟，这是怎么回事？

> One of the best.

最棒的人之一。

> Which is awesome.

太棒了。

> This is kind of this space in games.

这是游戏中的空间。

> And the fact that Facebook was like yeah games without games is irrelevant.

而 Facebook 就像没有游戏的游戏是不相关的。

> We don\'t care about games gave you an opportunity to build a really serious company on top.

我们不关心游戏给了你一个机会在上面建立一个非常严肃的公司。

> And so it was this is the kind of thing you know people it\'s a social network people care about the social experience how you share entertainment share connection Incat lightweight entertaining ways is one of the things that matters the users.

所以，这就是你认识的人，它是一个社会网络，人们关心社会经验，如何分享娱乐，分享，Incat 轻量级娱乐方式，是关系到用户的事情之一。

> `[00:22:37]` Pincus and his crew understand morality well within the Facebook platform and games is actually one of things that if you innovate and business model while you can actually make really interesting cash and so all of that put it together to making a very straightforward question Why do you think Facebook has such a blind spot in games.

`[00:22:37]` 平卡斯和他的团队很好地理解了 Facebook 平台上的道德，而游戏实际上是一种东西，如果你能创新和商业模式，而你实际上可以赚到真正有趣的现金，那么所有这些都是为了提出一个非常直截了当的问题，为什么你认为 Facebook 在游戏中有这么一个盲点。

> `[00:22:54]` Oh I think it\'s you know hopefully doesn\'t mind things on camera but I think Zuckerberg is not himself a game player.

`[00:22:54]` 哦，我想你知道的，我希望他不介意镜头里的东西，但我认为扎克伯格自己并不是一个游戏玩家。

> Like I like what he\'s really trying to do is figure out how to make the world more open and transparent and to actually have efficiency of information and connection and communication flows.

就像我喜欢的那样，他真正想要做的就是弄清楚如何让这个世界变得更加开放和透明，并使信息、连接和交流的效率更高。

> And so he thinks a lot about those sorts of things.

所以他想了很多这类事情。

> And so games are like that\'s not the kind of thing he does.

所以游戏是这样的\不是他做的那种事。

> And so he\'s like Man that doesn\'t that like not it\'s bad it just doesn\'t matter right.

所以他就像人，不喜欢，不好，只是不重要。

> I think that was the primary one that now obviously they\'ve seen a lot of the utility of how to build games or the thing the right way so that\'s now got married in the corpus if you were going to start a new company today.

我认为这是最主要的，很明显，他们已经看到了如何构建游戏或正确的方式的许多功用，如果你今天要成立一家新公司，那么现在已经在语料库中结婚了。

> `[00:23:31]` Any thoughts on what you would start.

`[00:23:31]` 任何关于你将要开始的事情的想法。

> `[00:23:34]` Well since I\'m pretty focused on LinkedIn and pretty focused on the the investments I made it Graylock I don\'t spend a lot of time computing that particular question.

`[00:23:34]` 既然我非常专注于 LinkedIn，也非常专注于我所做的投资，Graylock，我不会花太多时间计算这个特定的问题。

> `[00:23:47]` I do think that people still probably underrate where the ubiquity of everyone having a phone means in terms of networks in marketplaces.

`[00:23:47]` 我确实认为，人们可能仍然低估了市场中每个人拥有电话的普遍存在意味着网络的普遍存在。

> Now that being said probably two years ago I might have done something in bitcoin but it\'s too late and I don\'t think it\'s too late.

这么说大概是在两年前，我可能用比特币做了点什么，但为时已晚，我不认为为时已晚。

> But it\'s not a secret anymore.

但这不再是秘密了。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Amongst the intelligent folks is a whole bunch of stuff going on.

在那些聪明的人当中，有一大堆事情在发生。

> So you have to have a very angled shot so if you\'re showing up saying I\'ve got another wallet or I\'ve got another merchant processor I\'ve got another one of those.

所以你必须有一个非常角度的拍摄，所以，如果你出现说我有另一个钱包或我有另一个商人处理器，我有另一个这样的。

> The likelihood that that\'s going to play out well is low.

结果很好的可能性很小。

> `[00:24:21]` Do you have high conviction that bitcoin will be big.

`[00:24:21]` 你相信比特币会很大吗？

> `[00:24:24]` I have high convention conviction that a big coin isn\'t zero.

`[00:24:24]` 我有很高的传统信念：一枚大硬币不是零。

> It will be big but Bitcoin is not zero it\'s not zero.

它将是大的，但比特币不是零，它不是零。

> `[00:24:30]` We\'ve got it.

`[00:24:30]` 我们拿到了。

> So I think it\'s a very high data outcome.

所以我认为这是一个非常高的数据结果。

> Now I think the most interesting question of all the questions that people ask about bitcoin is is is it the first or last crypto currency and what this means is not of course because of course there\'s you know what is now referred to.

现在，我认为在人们提出的关于比特币的所有问题中，最有趣的问题是比特币是第一种或最后一种密码货币，而这意味着什么当然不是，因为当然，你知道现在提到的是什么。

> I\'m always entertained by how doggy coin becomes dogecoin.

我总是被狗币变成狗食的乐趣。

> You know these kinds of things you know.

你知道这些你知道的事情。

> There\'s a whole stack of these things and it\'s very possible because of you know new better ideas or different ideas and rails.

有一堆这样的东西，这是很可能的，因为你知道新的更好的想法或不同的想法和铁路。

> Now overall I think one of things that\'s going on with big companies I think big coin is largely adding more wallets per game per week than the other coins have in Walton told in total.

总的来说，我认为大公司正在进行的事情之一，我认为大硬币在很大程度上是每周增加更多的钱包，比其他硬币在沃尔顿告诉总计。

> Right so network effects have a kind of a runaway kind of characteristic.

所以网络效果有一种失控的特点。

> But the question is first or last cryptocurrency last one super interesting because that will be interesting crypto currencies.

但问题是第一个还是最后一个密码货币，最后一个超级有趣，因为那将是有趣的密码货币。

> `[00:25:25]` First one.

`[00:25:25]` 第一个。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Well then how.

那是怎么做的。

> That\'s interesting.

这很有趣。

> `[00:25:30]` All right.

`[00:25:30]` 好的。

> Closing question since you brought it up earlier what is one thing that you believe that most people don\'t.

既然你早些时候提出了这个问题，那么你认为大多数人不相信的一件事是什么。

> `[00:25:35]` So obviously Peter and I talk about this question a lot and it\'s worth reading Peter is 0 1 book it\'s you know there\'s a bunch of pretty good things in that.

`[00:25:35]` 很明显，彼得和我经常谈论这个问题，值得一读，彼得是一本书，你知道，这里面有很多很好的东西。

> Laughter Well I\'d say that there\'s great thinking just to respond.

笑，好吧，我会说，有伟大的想法，只是为了回应。

> But there are some things where Peter and I have differences of views on some of the things but that\'s great.

但有一些事情，彼得和我在一些事情上有不同的看法，但那是伟大的。

> I mean that\'s part of thinking and having you know clear bold you know sometimes contain thoughts.

我的意思是，这是思考的一部分，让你知道清楚，大胆，你知道，有时包含思想。

> The key nuance on that question that I have is against which audience right because there\'s is against the world against theU.S.

这个问题的关键之处在于我反对哪些观众是对的，因为他们反对世界反对美国。

> against.

反对。

> Now I\'m going to answer that question again Silicon Valley because I think there\'s at least two threads that are classically Silicon Valley threads that I have a different point of view on.

现在，我要再次回答这个问题，硅谷，因为我认为至少有两个线程是经典的硅谷线程，我有不同的观点。

> One of them is the role of government.

其中之一是政府的作用。

> So basically Silicon Valley tends to go oh government is this large cruddy bureaucratic impossible to deal with thing that you should just run around and badly.

所以，基本上，硅谷倾向于去，政府是这个庞大的，粗糙的官僚，不可能处理的事情，你应该跑来跑去，糟糕。

> Yes yes yes yes.

是的，是的。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> That\'s not saying no.

那不是拒绝。

> I don\'t see those things.

我看不见那些东西。

> But it is actually in fact what creates the platform environment that we operate in.

但事实上，正是它创造了我们在其中运行的平台环境。

> It\'s what creates the legal structure.

正是它创造了法律结构。

> It\'s what creates the set of services which creates the educational environment which creates the financing law right.

正是它创造了一套服务，创造了教育环境，创造了财政法律权利。

> `[00:26:52]` There\'s a whole stack of services that are part of the.

`[00:26:52]` 有一个完整的服务堆栈，它们是

> It\'s like we\'re fish in an aquarium we say who needs water and you like the water is important but it\'s important that the water is cleaner than dirtier it\'s more like there\'s a set of things and so actually in fact I think there\'s a set of things that we should be thinking about how do we help positively impact government.

就像我们在水族馆里钓鱼，我们说谁需要水，你喜欢水是很重要的，但重要的是水比脏水更干净，它更像是一套东西，所以实际上，我认为有一套东西，我们应该考虑如何帮助积极影响政府。

> `[00:27:11]` You can imagine these services as a you know as a prize and government as a platform that can hold a set of different things but we are the fish that are in this aquarium and we need it is a collectively all of our responsibility to make the aquarium better and it\'s not just a Oh that\'s a nasty problem.

`[00:27:11]` 你可以把这些服务想象成一个奖品，把政府想象成一个平台，可以容纳一系列不同的东西，但我们是这个水族馆里的鱼，我们需要它是我们共同的责任，让水族馆变得更好，这不仅仅是一个糟糕的问题。

> And think about that.

好好想想。

> Second one related is now I\'m pretty sure that it\'s difficult to teach entrepreneurship peer out I think you can teach skills that help entrepreneurship.

第二个相关的问题是，我现在很确定，教创业是很困难的，我认为你可以教授有助于创业的技能。

> And this woman\'s a lot of what I see.

这个女人就是我看到的很多东西。

> I think entrepreneurship clearly can be learned.

我认为创业精神显然是可以学到的。

> Right now I think there\'s always a doing component.

现在，我认为总是有一个正在做的部分。

> Now that being said I think you think that government can add things that are that are positive to entrepreneurship so entrepreneurship is much better in where networks have dense connections.

话虽如此，我认为你认为政府可以增加一些有利于创业精神的东西，所以在网络连接紧密的地方，创业精神要好得多。

> It\'s another thing I like about Weiss\'s.

这是我喜欢韦斯的另一件事。

> How do you create density of connections to facilitate financing talent understanding markets getting advisors the building the network around the around the entrepreneurs in the companies governments can facilitate that.

你如何创造密集的联系，以便于融资，人才，了解市场，得到顾问，建立网络周围的企业家在公司，政府可以促进这一点。

> There\'s a bunch of different things they can do.

他们可以做很多不同的事情。

> They can say okay we will help entrepreneurship is not just a number of days to form a formulated company.

他们可以说，好吧，我们将帮助创业，而不仅仅是在几天内形成一家公司。

> It\'s not just labor laws.

这不仅仅是劳动法。

> It\'s not just bankruptcy laws and these kind of things.

这不仅仅是破产法之类的事情。

> I think a number of positive things that governments can do also that this deal facilitate entrepreneurship and those are two contrarian from Silicon Valley.

我认为政府也可以做一些积极的事情-这一交易有利于企业家精神-这是硅谷的两件相反的事情。

> `[00:28:33]` Great.

`[00:28:33]` 太好了。

> Thank you so much for coming spend some time with us.

非常感谢你的到来，花点时间和我们在一起。

> Thank you.

谢谢。

> Klaus.

克劳斯。
