# Patrick Collison at Startup School 2012  

> `[00:00:00]` Morning them.

`[00:00:00]` 早上好。

> Hopefully this clicker works.

希望这个按键能起作用。

> When I sat down to write this talk I really racked my brains to try to figure out what the most interesting and relevant and useful content would be for a lot of people who were sort of interested in web startups.

当我坐下来写这篇演讲的时候，我真的绞尽脑汁想弄清楚，对于很多对网络初创公司感兴趣的人来说，最有趣、最相关、最有用的内容是什么。

> When I thought about it in those terms.

当我用这些术语来思考这件事的时候。

> The topic of my talk became fairly obvious but then.

我演讲的主题变得相当明显，但后来。

> I thought about it more and the Algren doesn\'t even seem to be deterministic.

我想得更多了，阿尔金人似乎并不是决定性的。

> I\'m not sure anyone even knows how it works.

我不确定是否有人知道它是如何工作的。

> So I guess I\'ll actually have to talk about stripe instead.

所以我想我得去讨论条纹了。

> Two years ago Brian from Airbnb Inbee spoke at Sahib\'s school.

两年前，Airbnb 的布莱恩在萨希布的学校演讲。

> In 2010 he opened his talk by showing a picture of Startup School in 2008.

2010 年，他在演讲开始时展示了一张 2008 年创业学校的照片。

> Two years previously and that picture showed a snapshot of the audience and he picked out one particular head.

两年前，这张照片展示了观众的快照，他挑出了一个特定的头部。

> He was just sitting there and anonymous had in the audience and I know this because I was at his talk in 2010.

他只是坐在那里，匿名者在观众席上，我知道这一点，因为我在 2010 年参加了他的演讲。

> And so two years later he was on stage outside of school and somehow two years later here I am and I\'m sure there\'s at least one person here who who\'ll be on stage in two years time and stripe definitely isn\'t as far along as air being.

两年后，他在校外的舞台上，不知何故，两年后，我来到这里，我确信至少有一个人将在两年后登上舞台，身上的条纹绝对不像空气那么远。

> But it drove home the point to you when I realized this that startups are very unpredictable.

但当我意识到创业公司是非常不可预测的时候，我就明白了这一点。

> You know software is really hard to get your head around somebody telling me not all that long ago that that evidence was just becoming a huge success.

你知道，就在不久之前，软件真的很难让你了解到有人告诉我，证据只是一种巨大的成功。

> They were making something like ten thousand dollars a week and we\'re thinking man that\'s really impressive.

他们每周挣一万美元左右，我们认为这是令人印象深刻的。

> And now I\'ve no idea what urban Ebony\'s actual revenue figures are today but it wouldn\'t at all shock me if they\'re making ten thousand dollars an hour.

现在我不知道城市埃伯尼现在的实际收入数字是多少，但如果他们每小时挣一万美元，我一点也不吃惊。

> Like what Dad even liked to try to build a company for that kind of growth is possible.

就像爸爸所喜欢的那样，为了这样的增长而努力建立一家公司是有可能的。

> Startups are strange for a whole bunch more reasons.

创业公司很奇怪，因为还有很多原因。

> They\'re usually kind of counterintuitive because they were counterintuitive.

他们通常是违反直觉的，因为他们是违反直觉的。

> Somebody else would probably solved the problem is already on top of that.

其他人可能会解决问题，问题已经解决了。

> Startups often don\'t actually want don\'t actually want to be all that well understood it can actually be quite helpful to be sort of under estimated and under comprehended.

初创企业通常不想被完全理解-实际上，被低估和被理解是很有帮助的一件事。

> But I think the biggest reason that startups are hard to understand is that so few people still get to see them up close during those first couple orders of magnitude.

但我认为，创业公司之所以难以理解，最大的原因是，在最初的几个数量级中，几乎没有人能近距离地看到它们。

> And when people do tell the stories or from the stories are told they often tend to be kind of wrong.

当人们讲故事或从故事中讲述时，他们往往是错误的。

> They\'re about sort of rocketships and frantically holding on and trying to add more server capacity as quickly as you can to handle the next million users.

它们是某种程度上的火箭，疯狂地坚持和试图尽快增加更多的服务器容量，以处理下一个百万用户。

> They\'re not about the late night arguments and wondering if your product could ever possibly work more.

他们不是关于深夜的争论，而是想知道你的产品是否还能发挥更大的作用。

> Trying to figure out when you launch your product why it\'s not growing.

试图弄清楚你什么时候推出你的产品，为什么它没有增长。

> The thing is even the really successful startups have this phase that that famous summer when Facebook moved out to Palo Alto in 2004.

事实是，即使是真正成功的初创企业，也有着著名的夏季阶段，当时 Facebook 在 2004 年搬到了帕洛阿尔托(PaloAlto)。

> Most people don\'t realize this but there were other people in the same house working in other startups like this is the most successful technology company started in the 21st century and in the same house there were people working at a startup ideas six months after launch.

大多数人没有意识到这一点，但在同一家公司里的其他人在其他初创公司工作，这是 21 世纪创立的最成功的科技公司，而在同一家公司，在成立 6 个月后，也有人在创业点子上工作。

> It\'s it really takes a while.

这真的需要一段时间。

> And so stripe is obviously very very different to Facebook and urban bee and nowhere near as far along as they are.

因此，条纹显然与 Facebook 和城市蜜蜂非常不同，而且与它们相去甚远。

> But we\'ve now gone through a small bit of growth.

但我们现在经历了一小部分增长。

> And so I want to try to describe how it actually works.

所以我想试着描述一下它是如何工作的。

> In October of 2009 John and I were walking home from dinner in Potrero up in the city.

2009 年 10 月，我和约翰在波特雷罗市吃完晚饭步行回家。

> I\'ve been kicking around this idea of starting an online payments company.

我一直在考虑创建一家在线支付公司的想法。

> We\'re really kind of fascinated by the concept of Internet payments and all the other companies in the space seemed like total dinosaurs.

我们对互联网支付的概念非常着迷，而在这个领域的所有其他公司似乎都像恐龙一样。

> And as the web sort of spread around the world and more deeply into our lives through mobile devices it seemed kind of obvious there should be some kind of universal payment infrastructure for the Internet to be just really easy to transact online.

随着网络在世界各地传播，并通过移动设备深入到我们的生活中，似乎很明显，互联网应该有某种通用的支付基础设施，才能真正容易地在网上进行交易。

> And John just turned to me he said you know while the debate about you know what I would just go build it won\'t be all that hard.

约翰转过身来对我说，你知道，虽然关于你的辩论知道我会去建造什么，但它不会那么难。

> `[00:04:00]` He actually said that if I won\'t be all that hard and so I said okay sure why not backtracked a little bit here.

`[00:04:00]` 他实际上说，如果我不那么难的话，所以我说，好吧，为什么不在这里退一步呢。

> `[00:04:09]` John is my co-founder at stripes.

约翰是我的创立者之一。

> He\'s ulting my brother.

他在打我弟弟。

> And people often ask me about how this works in practice.

人们经常问我这在实践中是如何运作的。

> And so for the record started a company with your brother.

所以为了记录在案，你和你哥哥开了一家公司。

> Turns out to be a really good idea.

原来是个好主意。

> John is not only the most brilliant people I know.

约翰不仅是我认识的最聪明的人。

> I think he got the highest results in Irelands university entrance examinations but he\'s also someone with whom I\'ve literally decades of experience building things.

我认为他在爱尔兰大学入学考试中取得了最高的成绩，但他也是一个我有几十年经验的人。

> `[00:04:33]` Here\'s an earlier venture that we worked on together.

`[00:04:33]` 这是我们一起工作过的一个早期冒险项目。

> `[00:04:38]` And so it\'s October 2009 we decide to work in this online payments company.

`[00:04:38]` 所以 2009 年 10 月我们决定在这家在线支付公司工作。

> We decided to call it slash dev slash payments.

我们决定叫它斜杠开发削减付款。

> The API should be just as straightforward as any other node endeavor Fasth were kind of OK had programming and definitely not at naming things.

API 应该和任何其他节点的努力一样简单，Fasth 是某种程度上可以编程的，而不是在命名方面。

> But everyone else seriously have been targeting their product.

但其他人都在认真地瞄准他们的产品。

> They told us a finance sector product they were targeting chief foes and business people.

他们告诉我们一个金融部门的产品，他们的目标是主要敌人和商人。

> And we thought the international just moving in a completely different direction.

我们认为国际社会正在向一个完全不同的方向发展。

> We decided to target makers the people actually building things.

我们决定把目标对准制造者-实际上是建造东西的人。

> We thought that Internet payments was a technology problem and we wanted to build a completely new stack for anybody transacting online.

我们认为互联网支付是一个技术问题，我们想为任何在线交易的人建立一个全新的堆栈。

> So we worked nights and weekends.

所以我们晚上和周末都工作。

> We were both in college at the time I was at MIT.

我在麻省理工学院的时候我们都在上大学。

> And John was off the road at Harvard and so we\'d code together in the evenings between problem sets and writing papers.

约翰离开了哈佛大学，所以我们在晚上一起写习题和写论文之间的代码。

> January rolls around switch for both of those schools.

这两所学校的一月轮流上课。

> You sort of have that month off but of course anybody who knows Boston knows a January in Boston is unbelievably freezing.

你有几个月的假期，但当然，任何知道波士顿的人都知道波士顿的一月是令人难以置信的寒冷。

> And so we decide to go somewhere else to work for the month.

所以我们决定去其他地方工作一个月。

> We read a few blogs that claim the one Azarias was surprisingly a really good place to get things done.

我们读了一些博客，声称只有一个 Azarias 是一个非常好的地方来完成事情。

> It\'s it\'s pretty cheap it\'s really warm it\'s friendly.

很便宜，很暖和，很友好。

> For some reason I don\'t know why those Wi-Fi everywhere everything happens on a really late schedule like the bars up until 5:00 AM nobody has dinner until midnight and nothing starts before noon.

出于某种原因，我不知道为什么到处都是 Wi-Fi，一切都是按很晚的时间表进行的，就像酒吧直到早上 5 点，没有人要到午夜才吃晚饭，中午之前什么也不开始。

> It\'s Veazey a city on a programers schedule.

这是维西，一个按节目编排的城市。

> So we read all of this really great.

所以我们读到了所有这些非常好的东西。

> We\'ve got to run as our eyes.

我们得像眼睛一样奔跑。

> And so we did and we just worked nonstop in cafes for three weeks.

所以我们做到了，我们只是不停地在咖啡馆里工作了三个星期。

> I still never seen a single one of the tourist attractions and one Azarias or I presume they exist and then read like we could all day and we go to dinner at 11:00 o\'clock or something and then go to bed.

我还从来没有见过一个旅游景点和一个阿扎里亚斯，或者我认为它们存在，然后像我们整天一样阅读，然后我们在 11：00 或什么时候去吃晚饭，然后睡觉。

> I can\'t emphasize this enough if you want to get something done consider going to an Atari\'s.

我不能强调这一点，如果你想要完成某件事，可以考虑去 Atari‘s。

> On January 9.

1 月 9 日。

> We got our first production user for sloughed slushed such payments.

我们得到了我们的第一个生产用户的落水，这样的付款。

> Like I say it.

就像我说的。

> This is only a few weeks after we started working on it but we really wanted to get production users shaping the product as quickly as we could.

这是仅仅几个星期后，我们开始工作，但我们真的想让生产用户尽快塑造产品。

> The user was a friend of ours.

用户是我们的朋友。

> I called Ross Bouchet who was working in a company called Tweetie north at the time.

我打电话给罗斯·布切特，他当时在一家叫 Twetie North 的公司工作。

> Results also actually wisely funded.

结果实际上也得到了明智的资助。

> Funnily enough he actually became the seventh person to work at stright but that\'s a separate story.

有趣的是，他实际上成了第七个在斯特赖特工作的人，但那是另外一个故事。

> Here\'s a screenshot of what DIAF payment looked like at the time and this screenshot you can see that John and I are definitely programmers and not designers but OK.

这是一个关于 diaf 付款的截图，这个截图你可以看到，约翰和我绝对是程序员，不是设计师，但没问题。

> So January 9th we now have one user.

所以 1 月 9 日我们有了一个用户。

> This great story from the early days of Amazon how a celebrated when they got their first buyer who wasn\'t any of their moms.

这个伟大的故事发生在亚马逊的早期，当他们找到第一个不是妈妈的买家时，他们是多么有名。

> And you know Ross wasn\'t exactly our mom but he was a good friend.

你知道罗斯不是我们的妈妈，但他是个好朋友。

> So we definitely weren\'t out of the woods just yet.

所以我们肯定还没脱离险境。

> So we went back to school and we can do to work on debt payments in our spare time.

因此，我们回到学校，我们可以做的工作，在我们的业余时间偿还债务。

> There was this one cafe that I worked out of so much they took pity on me and I\'m still Facebook friends with a bunch of the Bristow\'s.

有一家咖啡馆是我工作的地方，他们很同情我，而我仍然是一群布里斯托的 Facebook 好友。

> Yeah like strivings that kind of unusual company.

是啊，就像拼搏，那种不寻常的公司。

> We\'re about technology but roles about payments and the technology side requires good reliability and you know clean baby eyes and a really nice product and have lots of technology things Wheatley\'s hoped to know something about.

我们是关于技术的，但是关于支付和技术方面的角色需要很好的可靠性，你知道干净的婴儿眼睛和一个非常好的产品，并且有很多技术的东西，Wheatley 希望了解一些东西。

> But the Peyman side requires working with banks and dealing with credit card companies and just generally handling a slew of finance industry issue issues.

但佩曼方面要求与银行合作，与信用卡公司打交道，一般只需处理一系列金融业问题。

> We really had no new experience with no idea how to handle.

我们真的没有新的经验，不知道如何处理。

> We love meetings where I sort of sat somebody down and said Right.

我们喜欢让我坐下来说对的会议。

> So payments how do they work.

所以支付是如何运作的。

> Programmers often and this is unfortunate looked down at the folks who are trying to learn to code of.

程序员经常-这是不幸的-瞧不起那些试图学习代码的人。

> I want to learn real for my web startup crowd but actually a lot of sympathy for them because we were that bad.

我想学习真实的我的网络创业人群，但实际上很多同情他们，因为我们是那么糟糕。

> But in finance summer came around to of six months and we moved out to Palo Alto though we hadn\'t actually yet decided to take leave from school.

但在金融界，夏天已经过去了六个月，我们搬到了帕洛阿尔托，尽管我们还没有决定从学校休假。

> We found a tiny bungalow just off university and the living room and the kitchen became our office.

我们在大学附近发现了一间小平房，起居室和厨房成了我们的办公室。

> It was pretty hot didn\'t have any air conditioning and so John just slept in the garden most nights wouldn\'t allow me to post a picture of this.

天气很热，没有空调，所以约翰大部分晚上都睡在花园里，不允许我贴这张照片。

> And by and large we just kept on writing code because I mean that\'s mostly what sauteing a software company looks like in the early days or through the writing code or you\'re talking to people who use the code or you\'re wasting time.

总的来说，我们只是继续编写代码，因为我的意思是，这主要是软件公司早期的样子，或者是通过编写代码，或者你在和使用代码的人交谈，或者你在浪费时间。

> And here\'s a chart of our transaction volume over the first six months.

这是我们前六个月交易量的图表。

> And that\'s not a technical error.

这不是技术上的错误。

> If you look really closely you can see a tiny little wiggly line at the bottom.

如果你仔细观察，你会看到底部有一条小小的摇摆线。

> It\'s admittedly not wiggling all that much around this time though we did have our first person join and we\'re based in Silicon Valley home to the best international talent from Berlin to Beijing to Bangalore and so of course we took full advantage of it.

诚然，在这段时间里，我们并没有摇摆不定，尽管我们确实有第一人加入，我们总部位于硅谷，拥有最好的国际人才，从柏林到北京，再到班加罗尔，我们当然充分利用了这一点。

> We heard a guy called Dara Butley who was one of my smartest friends from college and he grew up in a small town called Limerick in Ireland.

我们听到一个叫达拉·布特利的家伙，他是我大学里最聪明的朋友之一，他在爱尔兰的一个叫利默里克的小镇长大。

> About 2 miles from here John and I grew up.

离这里大约 2 英里，我和约翰长大了。

> Raised our first investment for our first real investment I guess.

为我们的第一笔真正的投资筹集了我们的第一笔投资。

> Why see it obviously already invested.

为什么看到它显然已经投资了。

> This was from from Peter Till then we hadn\'t told very many people about DIAF payments and those we had told had reacted mostly by telling us we were crazy.

这是彼得·蒂尔写的，当时我们并没有告诉很多人有关节食付款的事情，而我们告诉过的那些人的反应主要是告诉我们疯了。

> But of course luckily Peter Teal is crazy.

当然，幸运的是彼得·提尔疯了。

> So he invested and it\'s been really helpful to have him on board.

所以他投资了，让他上飞机真的很有帮助。

> Soon after that moved into our first office which looked something like this.

在那之后不久，我们的第一间办公室就变成这样了。

> It\'s actually sort of said Ramona and university and Parlato just sort of Cubitt cafe.

实际上，拉莫纳、大学和帕拉托只是一种立体咖啡馆。

> It\'s actually a converted house and because it was a house it had this wonderful fireplace the world light in the winter.

它实际上是一座改造过的房子，因为它是一座房子，它有一个美妙的壁炉-冬天的世界之光。

> The fireplace looked something like this which I think may have contravened some fire in the workplace codes and baozi were just working nonstop.

壁炉看起来像这样，我认为这可能违反了工作场所的一些规定，而且包子只是不停地工作。

> We acted to we we became four people around this time.

我们这个时候变成了四个人。

> The first person fourth person was a guy named Greg.

第一人称第四人是一个叫格雷格的人。

> I remember when Greg was sort of considering joining and dropping out of school he asked me about our work schedule and whether or not we worked weekends.

我记得格雷格在考虑加入和辍学的时候，他问我们的工作时间表，以及我们周末是否工作。

> Obviously we did work weekends but he really didn\'t want to make this sort of scare him off and make it seem like he\'d have to answer.

很明显，我们周末确实工作过，但他真的不想让这种事吓跑他，让人觉得他必须回答。

> So I sort of said well you know we usually work some of the weekend we really care about work life balance and we just cut me off means I\'m great.

所以我说，嗯，你知道，我们通常在周末工作，我们真的很关心工作和生活的平衡，我们只是切断了我的关系，这意味着我很棒。

> I\'m not on the same page and working all day everyday.

我已经不一样了，每天都在工作。

> And so we knew he\'d fit in.

所以我们知道他会加入。

> We decide to change our name.

我们决定改名。

> I can\'t even begin to list the problems that flashed such payments had somehow it turned out that not everyone immediately got the devil S analogy.

我甚至不能开始列出那些闪现这种付款的问题，如果事实证明不是每个人都立即得到了魔鬼 S 的类比的话。

> Nobody was really able to get their head around the whole slash thing and we started to get Mayeux with things like this.

没有人真的能把他们的头绕在这整条斜线上，而我们开始用这样的东西来对付 Mayeux。

> And then there was the admittedly pretty inconvenient fact that Amazon had launch a product an online payments product called Amazon dev pay and so it precursory just wasn\'t going to work out and so we spent hours brainstorming names and we eventually came up with the name stripe and we didn\'t actually think that stripe was all that great an aim for come up with it but we decided to just put a date in the calendar and if we didn\'t come up with a better name by that date then we\'d stick with stripe.

还有一个不可否认的非常不方便的事实，那就是亚马逊已经推出了一款名为 Amazondev Pay 的在线支付产品，所以它的先兆是不可能实现的，所以我们花了几个小时的头脑风暴名字，最终我们想出了 stripe 这个名字，我们并不认为这个 stripe 是想出它的伟大目标，但我们决定了。只要在日历上放一个日期，如果我们没有在那个日期之前想出一个更好的名字，我们就会坚持使用条纹。

> And sure enough it became striped and actually a few months later I learned that this is how Apple ended up with a name Apple with the exact same thing.

果然，它变成了条纹，实际上几个月后，我了解到，这就是苹果的最终名称-苹果的名字与之完全相同。

> Jeremy reached the end of our first year mostly intact.

杰瑞米到了第一年年底，基本上完好无损。

> A bunch of Y Combinator companies started to use Stripe and those was pretty good where we\'re getting some real feedback.

一群 Y 组合公司开始使用 Stripe，在这里我们得到了一些真正的反馈。

> And here\'s another chart.

这是另一张图表。

> This are transaction volume through the first year.

这是第一年的交易量。

> And so it\'s still kind of a ways to go.

所以这仍然是一段路要走。

> We spent January of 2011 our one year anniversary in Rio de Janeiro because January in South America was becoming a tradition as anyone who\'s been to Rio de Janeiro knows it\'s when most beautiful places on earth.

2011 年 1 月，我们在里约热内卢度过了一周年纪念日，因为南美洲的一月正成为一种传统，任何去过里约热内卢的人都知道，这是世界上最美丽的地方。

> `[00:12:11]` And of course we took full advantage of it.

`[00:12:11]` 我们当然充分利用了它。

> `[00:12:18]` At this point we\'re an invite only private beta and so there probably is something obvious we could have done to grow at least a little bit faster are you to launch a friend refers to invite only private beta as the baby blankets of startups.

`[00:12:18]` 在这一点上，我们只是一个私人的测试版，所以很明显，我们可以做一些事情，至少能更快地成长，你会不会把一个朋友当作初创公司的婴儿毯子来邀请私人测试版？。

> And I think that\'s about right.

我认为这是正确的。

> But the beta period was actually really helpful to stripe and were Paul Buchheit saying that should start out by making hundred people really happy rather than many more people.

但测试期实际上对条纹很有帮助，保罗·布切特(PaulBuchheit)曾说过，这应该从让一百人真正快乐开始，而不是让更多人快乐。

> Only a little bit happy you really took this to heart and took advantage of the small number of users to really focus on them as much as we could and really try to figure out what they wanted.

只是有点高兴，你真的把这个放在心上，利用少数用户的优势，真正关注他们，尽可能多，并真正地试图找出他们想要什么。

> Forgiveable not long after we launch the first version of strife we had a Peter duty so we\'d all get called from the site with down pretty standard and pretty reasonable.

可原谅后不久，我们推出了第一个版本的冲突，我们有一个彼得的职责，所以我们都会被打电话从网站上下来，相当标准和相当合理。

> But then we realized that any time a user gets any kind of error or like even if the site is down that\'s actually a really bad experience for them and we could probably make them much happier if we went and investigated the error and sort of proactively reach out to them and help them fix it.

但后来我们意识到，每当用户遇到任何错误，甚至是网站瘫痪时，这对他们来说都是一次非常糟糕的体验。如果我们去调查错误，主动地联系他们，帮助他们解决错误，我们可能会让他们更开心。

> `[00:13:14]` And so we changed the code a little bit so that any time anyone hit any error it would send an e-mail that would go sort of straight the top of everybody\'s inbox and I would also phone everybody and we\'d go and fix it no matter what.

`[00:13:14]` 所以我们对代码做了一点改动，每当任何人遇到任何错误时，它都会发送一封电子邮件，这种邮件会直接发送到每个人的收件箱顶部，我也会给每个人打电话，不管发生什么，我们都会去修复它。

> And I really mean that I would get out of bed if necessary.

我的意思是如果必要的话我会起床的。

> We\'re basically never without a laptop and the means to tether.

我们基本上从来没有笔记本电脑和捆绑的手段。

> Here\'s a photo of one such incident.

这是一张这样的事件的照片。

> This is Greg and I have gone to the cinema in Redwood City a user encountered an error.

这是格雷格和我去了雷德伍德市的电影院，一个用户遇到了一个错误。

> And so of course out came our laptops and we had to go fix it.

所以，当然，我们的笔记本电脑出来了，我们必须去修理它。

> I think Greg I think Greg is here so much.

我想格雷格经常来这里。

> `[00:13:46]` I mean I think he still feels a little bit bitter about missing the start of the movie over this movie may or may not have been Twilight Breaking Dawn start after high stress you need to unwind.

`[00:13:46]` 我的意思是，我认为他仍然对错过这部电影的开头感到有点痛苦，因为这部电影可能是或可能不是“暮光之城”，黎明开始于你需要放松的高度压力之后。

> `[00:14:00]` We also realize that ending with an engineer is basically the best support experience possible.

`[00:14:00]` 我们也意识到，以工程师为结尾基本上是最好的支持经验。

> Like it\'s really frustrating to have to go into to file a ticket and find the support email address and then wonder does this come to reply to those who bought e-mails or if they do reply.

就像它真的很令人沮丧，必须要去提交一张罚单，找到支持的电子邮件地址，然后想知道这是来回复那些购买电子邮件的人，或者如果他们真的回复。

> How long does it take them or all of these issues.

他们需要多长时间或者所有这些问题。

> Like it\'s much nicer you can just start sort of directly chatting with somebody.

更好的是，你可以直接和别人聊天。

> And it\'s also way more productive for us because we can then go and sort of try to figure out what the underlying issue is rather than having to sort of guess based on the user\'s initial description.

这对我们来说也更有效率，因为我们可以尝试找出潜在的问题是什么，而不是根据用户的初始描述进行猜测。

> So we just opened up this chat system on our Web site where anyone can jump in and just start asking questions and we actually still have this today and that was it was really good but then we thought why stop there.

所以我们刚刚在我们的网站上打开了这个聊天系统，任何人都可以跳进来问题，实际上我们今天仍然有这个，这是真的很好，但是我们想为什么停在那里。

> Isn\'t it really a really bad experience when somebody asks a question and there\'s nobody there to answer them.

当有人问题，却没有人回答问题时，这难道不是一次非常糟糕的经历吗？

> And so we a hot pager duty.

所以我们要负责传呼。

> And so we hooked it up so that if you asked a question in the Streib chat room and there was nobody there to answer you it would go and phone one of us after 30 seconds.

所以我们把它连接起来，如果你在 Streib 聊天室问了一个问题，没有人回答你，30 秒后，它会给我们中的一个人打电话。

> And so I don\'t think many of you will know this but like for many months that stripe if you asked a question in our chat room there\'s no one there to answer someone would be woken up if necessary to help you.

所以我不认为你们中的很多人会知道这一点，但就像几个月以来，如果你们在我们的聊天室问了一个问题，没有人会回答，如果有必要的话，他们会被唤醒来帮助你。

> `[00:15:02]` We don\'t do that today.

`[00:15:02]` 我们今天不这么做。

> `[00:15:07]` So those strike wasn\'t yet publicly available to everyone.

`[00:15:07]` 所以那些罢工还不是每个人都能看到的。

> We really tried to sort of turn up the dial on our users feedback and to force ourselves to be extremely sensitive to what they wanted and what their experience was like.

我们真的试着打开用户反馈的刻度盘，强迫自己对他们想要的东西和他们的体验非常敏感。

> We our users talking to us during every waking hour.

在每个清醒的时间里，我们的用户都在和我们交谈。

> And if anything went wrong for them they were like literally interrupting our sleep.

如果他们出了什么问题，他们就像是打断了我们的睡眠。

> The other thing that comes in bated was the fact we weren\'t just building a fin software layer.

另一件事是，我们不仅仅是在构建一个 FIN 软件层。

> We thought that stripes would encompass everything from the API requests to have the money ended up in your bank account and we wanted to able to define the experience.

我们认为条形码将包含从 API 请求到将钱放在您的银行帐户中的所有内容，我们希望能够定义这种体验。

> And we wanted to be able to do it at scale.

我们想要在规模上做到这一点。

> We were really influenced by things like Amazon Web Services and easy to watch.

我们确实受到像 AmazonWebServices 这样的东西的影响，而且很容易观看。

> It\'s really interesting innovation because you see two is fantastic you\'re a smaller company or a startup startup or a side project or something like this but it scales right through to be a Netflix or a Zynga or indeed an Amazon.

这是一个非常有趣的创新，因为你看到两个很棒，你是一个较小的公司，一个创业公司，一个类似的项目，但它一直延伸到一个 Netflix，一个 Zynga，甚至亚马逊。

> `[00:15:58]` It\'ll work for a company of any size and we decided we wanted to do that.

`[00:15:58]` 它将为任何规模的公司工作，我们决定这样做。

> But for internet payment infrastructure we wanted to make something that was really easy to start with but something would also work for the largest companies in the world.

但对于互联网支付基础设施，我们想要做的东西，是真的很容易开始，但也会对世界上最大的公司工作。

> Until that meant working with really good banks.

直到这意味着要和真正好的银行合作。

> The problem is that banks and startups are basically the business equivalent of oil and water and figuring out how to combine them is pretty hard.

问题是，银行和初创企业基本上相当于石油和水，要想把它们结合起来是相当困难的。

> The best bank in the business is like Wells Fargo which powers some of the largest payments companies in the world and almost it was pretty tough to get them to talk to us or even to return our e-mails.

业务中最好的银行是富国银行(WellsFargo)，富国银行为世界上一些最大的支付公司提供了动力，几乎很难让它们与我们交谈，甚至很难回复我们的电子邮件。

> Their price hardware some strange kind of Nigerian scam like Make Money Online Fast from the comfort of your own home.

他们的价格，硬件，一些奇怪的尼日利亚骗局，像网上赚钱快速从您自己的舒适的家。

> So we asked a friend an investor and now a partner at Y Combinator.

于是我们问了一位朋友，一位投资者，现在是 YCombinator 的合伙人。

> Jeff Ralston to help out.

杰夫·拉斯顿来帮忙。

> Jeff had previously been CEO of a company called Lalah an online music startup and they had negotiated successfully with the record labels and we thought that if you could as a technology startup negotiate successfully with the record labels you could basically convince anyone in the world to do anything ever.

杰夫以前是一家名为 Lalah 的在线音乐初创公司的首席执行官，他们成功地与唱片公司进行了谈判。我们认为，如果你能作为一家技术初创企业，成功地与唱片公司谈判，你基本上可以说服世界上的任何人做任何事情。

> And here\'s a picture of Jeff on a conference call with Wells Fargo.

这是杰夫和富国银行电话会议的照片。

> That\'s Dhara.

那是达哈拉。

> They\'re on the other side and you might wonder why is Jeff on the floor.

他们在另一边，你可能会想为什么杰夫在地板上。

> Well Jeffrey on the floor.

杰弗里躺在地上。

> Because our office was also flooded at the time.

因为我们的办公室当时也被淹了。

> We also had a security audit that day sometimes trucks are just like a reality TV show.

那天我们还进行了一次安全审查，有时卡车就像真人秀一样。

> It\'s like negotiate with one of the biggest banks in the world.

这就像和世界上最大的银行之一谈判一样。

> While Undergoing a security audit while wading through water and the water is full of Trina\'s or something.

当你在水中涉水时进行安全审计时，水中充满了 Trina‘s 之类的东西。

> But thanks to Jeff and a bunch of others we eventually convinced Wells Fargo to become one of our backhands in moving all of our systems to work out of their platform.

但多亏了杰夫和其他一些人，我们最终说服富国银行成为我们的反手之一，把我们所有的系统都移出了他们的平台。

> It was a couple of weeks of honestly really intense work we had to hit a particular deadline.

这是几个星期的真诚的紧张工作，我们必须在一个特定的最后期限。

> This is the night of our first successful transaction.

这是我们第一次成功交易的夜晚。

> This is John after another particularly long all nighter in general I mean this seriously.

这是约翰，一个接一个，通宵，我的意思是认真的。

> This is the unglamorous side of startups that people do not get to see all that much.

这是创业公司平淡无奇的一面，人们看不了那么多。

> You really want to make something work and lots of other people think that it\'s a bad idea and it\'s really hard.

你真的想让一些东西发挥作用，很多人认为这是个坏主意，而且真的很难。

> And everything happens much much slower than you\'d like and you\'ve sort of many late night discussions like this and sort of soul searching debates and wondering like Is this actually a good idea or maybe it is a good idea but it\'s just too hard for us to pull off and Tharp\'s are hard.

每件事发生的速度都比你想象的要慢得多，你像这样在深夜里讨论了很多次，还想知道这到底是个好主意，还是一个好主意，但对我们来说太难了，而 Tharp 的想法也很难。

> And the thing is this doesn\'t actually go away.

问题是这件事并没有消失。

> This is the thing I didn\'t realize before doing a startup.

这是我在创业之前没有意识到的。

> I thought the two of you have all these doubts in the early days and then it was hard to take off and things would get easy.

我以为你们两人在最初的日子里都有这些疑虑，然后很难摆脱，事情会变得容易。

> But no matter how successful you will have lots of doubts.

但无论你多么成功，你都会有很多疑问。

> The first American to win the Tour de France was a guy called Greg Lamond and he has a quote I\'ve always really liked.

第一个赢得环法自行车赛的美国人是一个叫格雷格·拉蒙德的人，他有一句我一直很喜欢的话。

> It doesn\'t get easier you just get to go faster and it\'s kind of like this with startups like the startup might start going faster.

它不会变得更容易，你只要走得更快，就像这样，初创公司可能会更快地发展起来。

> It doesn\'t really get easier.

这并不是很容易。

> In our case we\'ve got the pieces in place and we got to the point were ready to launch we launch on the twenty ninth of September 2011.

在我们的例子中，我们已经做好了准备，准备在 2011 年 9 月 29 日发射。

> So just over a year ago at the time striated in predict had been in production use for 19 months and we\'ve been working on it fulltime for four year and three months.

所以就在一年多以前，在预测的时候，我们已经投入生产使用了 19 个月，我们已经全职工作了四年零三个月。

> We\'re 10 people whom we launched Eisele to fit all the names in a tweet.

我们是 10 个人，我们推出了 Eisele，把所有的名字都放在推特上。

> And by the end of the year here\'s our daily transaction volume looks like promising but launching is definitely not a panacea.

到今年年底，我们每天的交易量看起来很有希望，但推出肯定不是万灵药。

> But the signs were positive and we kept going.

但迹象是积极的，我们继续前进。

> And over the last few months two and a half years in stripe has finally started to become an overnight success.

在过去的几个月里，两年半的条纹终于开始在一夜之间取得成功。

> Jessica talked about how startups are roller coasters and there\'s a lot of downs but there\'s also ups the next slide is our daily transaction volume through today and it looks like this.

杰西卡谈到了创业公司是如何过山车的，有很多的下降，但也有上升，下一次下滑是我们今天的每日交易量，看起来是这样。

> From being for people not all that long ago stripe is now 34 people.

就在不久以前，条纹已经是 34 个人了。

> Which is actually twice as many people as are in this picture because everything is all behind them a start up and we haven\'t got around to taking our newgroup shot yet and many thousands of companies are using Stripe and a lot of new things go live everyday.

这实际上是这张照片中人数的两倍，因为一切都在他们的背后，我们还没来得及尝试我们的新团队，成千上万的公司都在使用 Stripe，每天都会有很多新的东西出现。

> I mean it\'s a bunch of well-known brands like Foursquare and boxy and Hipmunk and the Afaf and New York MoMA but loved less well-known ones too.

我的意思是，这是一群知名品牌，如 Foursquare 和 Boxy，Hipmunk，Afaf 和纽约现代艺术博物馆，但也喜欢不太知名的人。

> And they actually tend to be sort of just as interesting as things like good eggs which enables you to buy directly from local farmers or Samasource which brings computer based work to people living in poverty or even stuff like the Bedford cheese shop which is now just selling its cheese online.

事实上，它们和好鸡蛋一样有趣，它可以让你直接从当地农民那里购买，或者把电脑工作带给生活贫困的人，甚至像贝德福德奶酪店，它现在只是在网上销售奶酪。

> I guess I\'m just hungry and I\'m making these slides she seemed like a good idea.

我想我只是饿了，我在做这些幻灯片-她看起来是个好主意。

> If anyone here ever looked into the history of container shipping sir I know there\'s a bit of context for trom cheese container shipping and the shipping container like with those 40 foot shipping containers.

如果说这里有谁研究过集装箱运输的历史，先生，我知道这里有一些关于特伦奶酪集装箱运输的背景，还有像 40 英尺集装箱那样的集装箱。

> On some level they\'re the most mundane thing in the world and we see them around all the time but there were actually an absolutely enormous innovation 60 years ago before shipping containers transportation was a massive issue with physical goods transportation costs often accounted for up to 25 percent of the final cost of a physical item.

在某种程度上，它们是世界上最平凡的东西，我们一直都看到它们，但在 60 年前，在集装箱运输成为一个巨大问题之前，我们确实有了一项巨大的创新，实物运输成本往往占到实物最终成本的 25%。

> Overall transportation costs and shipping costs were like 10 percent of the value of all the imports in theU.S.

总体运输成本和运输成本相当于美国所有进口商品价值的 10%。

> Think about that read 10 percent.

想想看，读 10%吧。

> That means your margins 20 percent just by bringing your goods to another market.

这意味着，你的利润 20%，只要把你的产品带到另一个市场。

> You cut your profit in half.

你把利润减半了。

> So unsurprisingly most manufacturing happens at a very close to our physical price was consumed.

因此，毫不奇怪，大多数制造业发生在一个非常接近我们的实物价格被消费。

> And so the shipping container and then in the mid 1950s essentially eliminated the cost of shipping physical goods.

因此，集装箱运输，然后在 20 世纪 50 年代中期，实质上消除了运输实物货物的成本。

> It cut the costs of loading and unloading ships by 95 percent.

它使船舶装卸成本降低了 95%。

> And it\'s now at the point for and actually cutting this from aU.S.

现在它已经到了从美国开始削减的时候了。

> government report.

政府报告。

> It\'s better to assume that moving goods is essentially costless.

最好假设货物运输基本上是无成本的。

> Really the history here is Vaselines a few kind of good books about it.

真的，这里的历史就是关于它的几本好书。

> But the point is this technological breakthrough is sort of this elimination of friction.

但关键是这个技术上的突破是某种程度上消除了摩擦。

> And in particular this abstraction over geography.

尤其是对地理的抽象。

> It played an enormous role in facilitating the rise of Singapore and South Korea and Taiwan and Japan and China as manufacturing hubs and my point is really that a technology that doesn\'t just monetize itself but actually enables new commerce can really enormous impact the shipping container literally reshape the world economy.

它在促进新加坡、韩国、台湾、日本和中国作为制造业中心的崛起方面发挥了巨大的作用。我的观点是，一种不仅能使自身货币化，而且实际上能够实现新商业的技术，能够对航运集装箱真正重塑世界经济产生巨大影响。

> We sometimes describe we\'re doing with stripe as building economic infrastructure for the Internet.

我们有时会把我们的做法描述为互联网建设经济基础设施。

> It\'s not very flashy but for most of human history we\'ve had to buy from the people beside us.

这并不是很华而不实，但在人类历史的大部分时间里，我们不得不从我们身边的人那里买东西。

> But thanks to the Internet that\'s no longer true.

但多亏了互联网，\不再是真的了。

> We have a new way to abstract over place.

我们有了一种抽象概念的新方法。

> Anyone can now build a global business.

现在，任何人都可以建立一家全球性的企业。

> But yet while the Internet has revolutionized how we communicate and how we collaborate and how we share we\'ve only sort of started to explore how it can change what we create and how we transact and what kind of business is possible.

然而，尽管互联网已经彻底改变了我们的沟通方式、协作方式和共享方式，但我们只是开始探索它如何改变我们的创造和交易方式，以及什么样的业务是可能的。

> And a lot of the other companies whose founders are speaking today are are pretty good examples of that thrived.

许多创始人今天发表讲话的其他公司都是这方面的一个很好的例子。

> We simply want to turn payment\'s into a ubiquitous utility.

我们只是想把支付变成一种无处不在的实用工具。

> We won more commerce on the internet but it\'s still really early days and honestly most the time we\'re not thinking at these kinds of problems we\'re trying to figure out how to decrease the load on DBI 3 or trying to get some particular design just right and working through the 20th iteration or wondering if some particular product is a is a good idea or having some debate in Gmail that\'s so long We\'ve overflowed the Gemalto thread limit.

我们在互联网上赢得了更多的商业，但它还真的还处于早期阶段，而且老实说，大多数时候我们并不是在考虑这些问题，我们试图找出如何减少 dbi 3 的负载，或者试图得到一些正确的特定设计，并在第 20 次迭代中工作，或者想知道某个特定的产品是否是一个好主意，还是有一些争论。在 Gmail 中，我们已经超过了 Gemalto 线程的限制。

> And it\'s now become a completely new thread.

现在它变成了一个全新的线索。

> It\'s all the day to day stuff.

日复一日的事情。

> You know it turns out that all the high level stuff the the larger motivations and and the bigger ideas and the day to day implementation like the debates and the tweaking and the iterations both of them are really addictive and that\'s why we keep doing this.

你知道，所有高层次的东西，更大的动机，更大的想法，以及日复一日的实现，比如辩论、调整和迭代，都是令人上瘾的，这就是我们一直这样做的原因。

> Thank you.

谢谢。