# Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2012  

> `[00:00:00]` Welcome everybody.

`[00:00:00]` 欢迎大家。

> I\'m bigger.

我更大。

> Yeah yeah I hear you guys are you.

是的，我听说你们就是你们。

> Okay.

好的。

> So these are the questions that I was curious about and I think they\'ll be the questions you guys were curious about too.

所以，这些是我很好奇的问题，我认为它们也会是你们感兴趣的问题。

> I\'m going to ask a lot about the very early days of Facebook.

我会问很多关于 Facebook 早期的问题。

> We were just talking about them in the back.

我们只是在后面讨论他们。

> It was fascinating.

很吸引人。

> Wish you could have heard it.

真希望你能听到。

> We\'ll do our best to try to he said.

他说：“我们会尽我们最大的努力去做。”

> So here\'s a question might be a little bit difficult.

所以这里有个问题可能有点难。

> `[00:00:30]` How long before 2004 could something like Facebook have succeeded like what was the last thing that was needed to fall into place.

`[00:00:30]` 在 2004 年之前的多久，像 Facebook 这样的东西就能成功，就像最不需要的事情。

> Could someone have done it in 1995 or 2000.

可能有人在 1995 年或 2000 年做过这件事。

> Yeah I know it\'s an interesting question.

我知道这是个有趣的问题。

> `[00:00:45]` There were certain elements that we certainly bootstrapped off of and kind of used to pack early identity right.

`[00:00:45]` 有一些元素，我们当然是从这些元素中引导出来的，它们被某种程度上用来包装早期的身份验证。

> `[00:00:53]` So one of the things that that people don\'t think about that often today is early on we wanted to establish this culture of real identity on the surface.

`[00:00:53]` 所以今天人们不常想的事情之一是，我们希望在表面上建立真正身份的文化。

> And you know there weren\'t really any other online services or communities where people were openly their real self before that.

你也知道，在此之前，没有任何其他的在线服务或社区能让人们公开他们真正的自我。

> And one of the ways that we kind of determined that someone was really who they said they were in their credentials were real where everyone had school email addresses.

我们确定某人确实是他们所说的人的方式之一是真实的，每个人都有学校的电子邮件地址。

> I don\'t know how much before.

我不知道以前有多少。

> 2004 I assume you know around 2000 all schools started issuing e-mail addresses.

2004 年，我想你应该知道，大约在 2000 年左右，所有学校都开始发电子邮件地址了。

> But that was really the critical thing that made it so that we could get this counterintuitive thing that not many other services were using school e-mail addresses where the original source of identity.

但这确实是关键的事情，它使我们可以得到这个违反直觉的东西，没有很多其他服务使用学校的电子邮件地址，其中的原始身份来源。

> `[00:01:34]` Well that\'s how we knew what school you were in.

`[00:01:34]` 我们就是这样知道你在哪所学校的。

> Right and you weren\'t just a sockpuppet because you can\'t get the school to keep an annual address.

是的，你不只是一个社会傀儡，因为你不能让学校保持一个年度地址。

> `[00:01:42]` And so it also admitted that people can sign up for fake accounts.

`[00:01:42]` 所以它也承认人们可以注册假账户。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> People typically only of one school account so having it being able to bootstrap off of that was this really nice early thing that helped us establish this culture of real identity.

人们通常只拥有一个学校账户，所以让它能够从这个账户中走出来，这是一件非常美好的早期事情，帮助我们建立了这种真实身份的文化。

> And once we got to a few million people or 10 million people where that culture was established it was able to bootstrap into something that was much bigger.

一旦我们接触到几百万人或一千万人，这种文化就建立起来了，我们就能够把它引导到更大的东西上。

> That kept most of that culture even though now obviously most people in the world don\'t have e-mails that are issued by some institution that vouches for their identity.

尽管现在世界上的大多数人都没有电子邮件，但这些电子邮件是由某一机构签发的，这些电子邮件可以证明他们的身份。

> `[00:02:10]` Now people log in through Facebook.

`[00:02:10]` 现在人们通过 Facebook 登录。

> `[00:02:12]` Now you are the source of identity.

`[00:02:12]` 现在你是身份的来源。

> Well you know it comes out.

你知道它会出来的。

> `[00:02:16]` Yes but you know but to your question about when would it have been possible.

`[00:02:16]` 是的，但你知道，但你要问的是，什么时候才有可能。

> You know one of the big trends that we see is that.

我们看到的一个大趋势就是。

> The amount that any individual shares in a given year seems to be growing of it\'s exponentially increasing rate.

在给定的一年里，任何个人股票的数量似乎都在以指数的速度增长。

> `[00:02:30]` Kirghiz Yeah I don\'t call it that but other people do.

`[00:02:30]` 柯尔克孜：是的，我不这么叫它，但其他人叫它。

> You heard it here first.

你先在这里听到的。

> But you know I mean it is this kind of social networking version of Moore\'s Law.

但你知道，我的意思是，这是一种社交网络版的摩尔定律。

> `[00:02:39]` It\'s interesting and you know what would that suggest to me is if we expect that this rate is going to double every year then look out 10 years to the 10th is 10 24.

`[00:02:39]` 这很有趣，你知道这对我来说意味着什么，如果我们预计这个比率每年会翻一番，那么看看 10 年到 10 岁是 1024 岁。

> `[00:02:49]` Right.

`[00:02:49]` 对。

> So ten years from now people will be sharing about 1000 times as many things.

所以十年后，人们分享的东西将是现在的 1000 倍。

> `[00:03:00]` If you want to get our season next year I feel like everything will be cool anyway.

`[00:03:00]` 如果你想明年参加我们的赛季，我觉得一切都会很好。

> I just have a good have a good feeling about today.

我只是对今天感觉很好。

> I don\'t think that\'s a bad omen.

我不认为那是个坏兆头。

> `[00:03:08]` Now that\'s wonderful.

`[00:03:08]` 现在那太棒了。

> `[00:03:11]` So anyway so I think the question is not Would Facebook have not been possible before 2004 it would have been in some capacity but people would have shared less.

所以无论如何，我认为问题不是 Facebook 在 2004 年之前不可能的，它本来是以某种身份存在的，但人们会分享的更少。

> And if you fast forward five years there\'s going to be a version of all these social services that people are using to share way more.

如果你快进五年，就会有一个版本的社会服务，人们用它来分享更多。

> And I think that anyone here could be can kind of think about ten years from now people are going to be sharing a thousand times as much stuff a day.

我认为这里的任何人都可以想象十年后人们每天会分享上千倍的东西

> This is this trend continues.

这种趋势还在继续。

> What\'s what things are going to have to exist in the world and what kind of services are going to have to exist in order for that to be possible.

什么样的东西才能在这个世界上存在，需要什么样的服务才能成为可能。

> Instagram for toilets.

上厕所的 Instagram。

> `[00:03:43]` That\'s the final frontier.

`[00:03:43]` 那是最后的边界。

> Instagram is killing it.

Instagram 杀了它。

> I mean they\'re they\'re doing really well.

我是说他们做得很好。

> So that\'s a good frontier.

所以那是个很好的边疆。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:03:53]` When you first launched in the very beginning the features were sort of profile with like a profile photo and your name and who you are.

`[00:03:53]` 当你第一次发布的时候，你的特征就像一个侧面照片，你的名字和你是谁。

> And also you included things like what house you lived in what dorm you lived in and what courses you were taking.

你还包括了你住在哪所房子，住在什么宿舍，上了什么课。

> What do you think it would have worked without that.

你觉得没有那个会有什么效果。

> `[00:04:08]` Would it have been enough just to have profiles.

`[00:04:08]` 只要有个人资料就够了吗？

> `[00:04:11]` You know it\'s a really interesting question and we certainly since then have evolved and wanted to make a more general service.

`[00:04:11]` 你知道这是一个非常有趣的问题，从那以后，我们当然已经进化，想要做一个更全面的服务。

> So we\'ve dropped some of those things.

所以我们放弃了其中的一些东西。

> But I remember there\'s this early debate that Dustin and I had where we had to do some manual work for every school that we that we released Facebook at.

但我记得有一次早期的争论，达斯汀和我在那里为我们发布 Facebook 的每所学校都做了一些手工工作。

> `[00:04:30]` And in order to do that we basically went through and we passed the course catalogs of the schools to make sure that it was clean.

`[00:04:30]` 为了做到这一点，我们基本上通过了学校的课程目录，以确保它是干净的。

> And I remember having this debate where Dustin was like we could just expend so much faster or it would just be easier.

我记得有一场辩论，达斯汀就像我们可以花得更快，否则就会更容易。

> I mean we were bound by server capacity but it would be easier to launch new schools if we didn\'t have to have course catalogs four for each school and we just had this really long debate about what quality meant for us and the community that we wanted to establish.

我的意思是说，我们受到服务器容量的约束，但是如果我们不需要为每所学校提供四种课程目录，那么创建新学校就更容易了，我们只是就我们想要建立的质量对我们和社区的意义进行了一场漫长的辩论。

> And the culture of it and you know in retrospect you know maybe you wouldn\'t have had a huge difference on how things played out.

你知道，回想起来，你知道，在事情的发展过程中，你可能不会有太大的不同。

> But it definitely kind of set the tone where there\'s a lot of kind of clean data on Facebook.

但它确实为 Facebook 上有大量干净数据的地方定下了基调。

> You can rely on it.

你可以依靠它。

> It feels like a college specific thing which was valuable early on for setting the culture even though obviously since then we\'ve grown beyond that.

这感觉就像大学特有的东西，在建立文化的早期是很有价值的，尽管很明显，从那以后，我们已经超越了这一点。

> And you know I think you guys in the projects that you work on you\'re gonna have a lot of similar questions.

你知道，我认为你们在工作的项目中会有很多类似的问题。

> I mean there\'s the famous 80 20 rule where you know you get 80 percent of the benefit by doing 20 percent of the work.

我的意思是，有一条著名的 8020 法则，你知道你做了 20%的工作就能得到 80%的收益。

> But.

但

> You can\'t just 80 20 everything.

你不能每样东西都 8020 块。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> I mean there have to be certain things that you just are the best at right and that you go way further than anyone else that you establish this kind of quality bar and have your product be the best thing that\'s out there so you know whether we had to do that one or had to do something we had to do I think enough of those things or else we just wouldn\'t have the best service out there.

我的意思是，一定有一些事情你是最擅长的，你比任何人都要走得更远，你建立了这样的优质酒吧，让你的产品成为最好的东西，所以你知道我们是必须做那件事，还是必须做一些我们必须做的事，我觉得这些事情都够了，或者否则我们就没有最好的服务了。

> `[00:05:47]` Do you remember when you got rid of courses when you used up part including course time probably when we expanded beyond colleges really so you kept doing courses.

`[00:05:47]` 你还记得当你用掉包括课程时间在内的部分课程的时候吗？

> Yeah.

嗯

> All through girl was like hundreds of colleges.

整个女孩就像几百所大学。

> `[00:06:01]` I think we eventually figured out a way that just crowdsourced it and made it a bit easier once we had enough data that we could extrapolate from the colleges that we had in place but we did it for probably way longer than was rational.

`[00:06:01]` 我想我们最终想出了一种方法，只要我们有足够的数据可以从我们现有的大学中推断出来，我们就会更容易做到这一点，但我们这么做的时间可能比理性的时间要长得多。

> `[00:06:15]` Do you do you remember how much your first server cost.

`[00:06:15]` 你还记得你的第一台服务器花了多少钱吗？

> You said that eighty five dollars.

你说了 85 美元。

> Eighty five.

八十五。

> And I remember that because that was the gating factor for us launching new schools.

我记得这一点，因为这是我们开办新学校的关键因素。

> `[00:06:25]` I mean we had this philosophy from the very beginning that we didn\'t want to be this project.

`[00:06:25]` 我的意思是，我们从一开始就有这样的哲学，我们不想成为这个项目。

> It wasn\'t even a company at the very beginning but we didn\'t want to be burning a lot of money.

一开始它甚至不是一家公司，但我们不想花很多钱。

> We weren\'t planning on raising a lot of money we didn\'t want to be one of these things that raised a bunch of money and was losing a bunch of money and decided that we\'d somehow pull it through the end.

我们不打算筹集很多钱，我们不想成为那些筹集了一大笔钱，并且损失了一大笔钱的人之一，我们决定以某种方式把它拖到最后。

> And so you know so.

所以你知道的。

> `[00:06:44]` Eighty five dollars for the first survey put out ads on the site and the ads at the beginning were we just were running some kind of ad network and you wonder what the first day had was.

`[00:06:44]` 第一次调查花费 85 美元在网站上投放广告，一开始我们只是在运行某种广告网络，你想知道第一天是什么。

> Now I don\'t.

现在我不想了。

> Know how much you get ads.

知道你收到了多少广告。

> This was Eduardo\'s job early on was I mean with your ad sales.

这是爱德华多早期的工作，我指的是你的广告销售。

> Yeah.

嗯

> He basically like he was responsible for making sure that we had enough money to keep things running in the beginning and you basic them.

他基本上喜欢他负责确保我们有足够的钱让事情在一开始就持续运行，而你则是基本的。

> `[00:07:10]` So it was the server was eighty five dollars and you know Duson and I basically worked on kind of efficiency in making sure that we can fit more schools onto each server and in Edwardo worked on selling more ads or making a deal so we can get an ad network so that where we can we can make more money than whenever we had more money we rented another eighty five dollar a month server and we kind of went from there.

`[00:07:10]` 所以服务器是 85 美元，你知道，杜松和我基本上都致力于提高效率，确保我们可以在每台服务器上安装更多的学校；在 Edwardo，我们致力于销售更多的广告或做交易，这样我们就可以得到一个广告网络，这样我们就可以比我们有更多钱的时候赚到更多的钱。一个月又租了 85 美元的服务生然后我们就从那里走了。

> `[00:07:30]` And know is some interesting way of seeing ever spent money you didn\'t have in the beginning not the beginning now and then then I mean even how was the constraint on your growth rate.

`[00:07:30]` 知道是一种有趣的方式，可以看到你一开始就没有花过的钱，而不是现在的开始，我的意思是，你的增长率是如何受到限制的。

> How many new eighty five dollars is you could get.

你能得到多少新的 85 美元？

> Yeah I mean it was actually good because you know sometimes it\'s really nice to have the time to get your product to be awesome and deal with scaling problems.

是的，我的意思是，它实际上是很好的，因为你知道，有时它真的很好，有时间让你的产品变得很棒，并处理缩放问题。

> `[00:07:50]` And one of the things that was interesting was at the time I don\'t know how many people remember this and Friendster was the service that had massive scaling problems the idea was they were big too quickly and it was really hard for them to scale and you know the fact that we could kind of go college buy College in and kind of optimize the service and make it more efficient and offer new features for make sure that they worked.

`[00:07:50]` 其中一件有趣的事情是，当时我不知道有多少人还记得这件事，Friendster 是存在大规模缩放问题的服务，他们的想法是，他们太快了，他们很难扩大规模，你知道，我们可以在大学里买一所大学，在某种程度上优化服务让它更有效率，并提供新的功能，以确保他们的工作。

> I think was really key.

我觉得真的很关键。

> I mean we\'re talking my people would never built a company before we never built any large scale software or anything.

我的意思是，我们说的是，我的人民从来不会建立一个公司之前，我们从来没有建立任何大型软件或任何东西。

> So having that period where we could just bake it and you know people these days like to talk about how these services grow super quickly and Facebook did grow quickly.

因此，有了这段时间，我们可以直接烘焙它，你知道，现在人们喜欢谈论这些服务是如何快速发展的，而 Facebook 却发展得很快。

> But I think it took a year for us to get a million users and we thought that that was incredibly fast.

但我认为我们花了一年时间才获得了 100 万用户，我们认为这是非常快的。

> But and I think it is but it wasn\'t as quick as a lot of things grow today and I think actually having that time to bake it was really valuable for nearly 2000 users at Harvard.

但是我认为是的，但它不是像今天很多事情发展得那么快，我认为实际上有那么多时间来烘焙它对于哈佛的近 2000 名用户来说是非常有价值的。

> `[00:08:43]` That\'s 500 x a year.

`[00:08:43]` 那是每年 500 倍。

> That\'s pretty fast older I think around 4000 or 5000 undergrads at Harvard.

我想哈佛大学大约有 4000 或 5000 名本科生。

> I remember reading you that half of them.

我记得我读过其中的一半。

> I mean presumably we\'ll know there was two thirds or three quarters or something in the first two weeks.

我的意思是，我们大概会知道在前两周有三分之二或四分之三左右。

> `[00:08:55]` So I mean the thing that we found was that basically we opened it up at a school and within a couple of weeks then the vast majority of students would it would be on the server.

`[00:08:55]` 所以我的意思是，我们发现，基本上我们在一所学校里打开了它，在几周内，绝大多数学生都会把它放在服务器上。

> `[00:09:04]` Was there a school ever that you opened it and it didn\'t work didn\'t stick.

`[00:09:04]` 曾经有一所学校，你开过它，但它没有工作，没有坚持。

> `[00:09:09]` Some schools took longer than others depending on the size of the school.

`[00:09:09]` 一些学校花的时间比其他学校长，这取决于学校的规模。

> So what we basically did was lunch at Harvard first because I wanted it right.

所以我们主要做的是先在哈佛吃午饭，因为我想吃的对。

> `[00:09:17]` And I built it for myself.

`[00:09:17]` 我自己造的。

> I like I really wanted to use the service and you know this is one of the ironies is I started building Facebook because I wanted to use it in college and then I immediately left college so I didn\'t really get to do that but just expanded to everybody else outside.

我喜欢我真的很想使用这个服务，你知道，这是一个讽刺，我开始建立 Facebook，因为我想在大学使用它，然后我立即离开了大学，所以我没有真正做到这一点，只是扩大到其他人以外的人。

> `[00:09:32]` So it worked out.

`[00:09:32]` 所以它成功了。

> `[00:09:34]` But you know so then after Harvard all these schools started all a lot of students from other schools started writing tests and asking for us to expand and we were looking to start a company.

`[00:09:34]` 但是你知道吗，在哈佛大学之后，所有这些学校的学生都开始写测试，并要求我们扩大规模，我们正在寻找一家公司。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And I figured that eventually something like this would would exist at large scale but you know one of the interesting juxtapositions that was going on at the time was I remember distinctly I had this one friend who I went and got pizza with almost every night.

我想，这样的东西最终会大规模存在，但你知道，当时发生的一个有趣的并列现象是，我清楚地记得，我有一个朋友，我几乎每天晚上都和他一起去吃比萨饼。

> `[00:10:02]` We did all our computer science problem sets together at Harvard and at the time I remember talking to him about Taiwan.

`[00:10:02]` 我们在哈佛一起做了我们所有的计算机科学问题，我记得当时我和他谈过台湾。

> `[00:10:10]` I was working on this Facebook thing and I thought it would be cool for Harvard and I really was excited about it because I wanted to use it.

`[00:10:10]` 我在 Facebook 上工作，我觉得这对哈佛来说很酷，我真的很兴奋，因为我想用它。

> But at the same time how I thought that over time someone would definitely go build this version of this for the world.

但与此同时，我是怎么想的，随着时间的推移，一定会有人为世界建造这个版本的。

> But it was going to be so was going to be you know Microsoft or you know someone who built the software for hundreds of millions of people who were we were college students sorry were not qualified in any way to build this.

但情况会是这样，你知道微软，或者你知道有人为数亿人(我们是大学生)建造了这个软件，很抱歉，在任何方面都没有建立这个软件的资格。

> Now I think a lot of my takeaway from that was that we just kind of cared more than those other companies about making it exist.

现在，我认为我对此的很多看法是，我们比其他公司更关心它的存在。

> So I\'ll be back to you back kind of question and off that tangent.

所以我会回到你的问题和切线。

> `[00:10:42]` The first set of schools that we launched after Harvard were schools that had other kind of school specific social networks.

`[00:10:42]` 我们在哈佛之后创办的第一批学校是那些有其他学校特有的社交网络的学校。

> I think it was Stanford had something Columbia had something.

我想是斯坦福有哥伦比亚大学的东西。

> And I think Yale had something.

我觉得耶鲁有什么。

> So why does you choose ones that had schools specific social network.

那么，你为什么要选择那些有学校特定社交网络的人呢？

> Because you don\'t want to do competitors.

因为你不想做竞争对手。

> Well I wanted to go to the schools I thought would be the hardest for us to succeed at.

嗯，我想去那些我认为是我们最难取得成功的学校。

> Because I knew that if we had a product that was better than everything else that other students were making at other colleges then it would be worth investing in and putting in putting time into.

因为我知道，如果我们有一个比其他学生在其他大学做的任何东西都更好的产品，那就值得投资并投入时间。

> But I didn\'t want to just kind of get into a project where there would end up being this huge legacy of maintaining it if ultimately there were just gonna be different things that were as good as it.

但我不想只进入这样一个项目，如果最终会有不同的东西和它一样好的话，它最终会成为维护它的巨大遗产。

> So we thought that this was going to be good.

所以我们认为这会是件好事。

> `[00:11:21]` And you know we launched it at was Yale Stanford Columbia and.

`[00:11:21]` 你知道我们在耶鲁、斯坦福、哥伦比亚和.

> `[00:11:27]` And yeah I mean pretty quickly I think it just so you felt probably that you could have just gone to some random school and it would have succeeded.

`[00:11:27]` 是的，我的意思是，很快，我想你就会觉得你可能只是去了一所随机的学校，它就会成功。

> You chose those because they had nascent competitors.

你选择这些是因为他们有初生的竞争对手。

> `[00:11:37]` Yeah I mean I think what we saw in those schools was people wanted to use something like this.

`[00:11:37]` 是的，我是说，我认为我们在那些学校看到的是人们想使用这样的东西。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:11:43]` So we just wanted to make sure that what we had was like way better than anything else that was out there worth you know putting time into.

`[00:11:43]` 所以我们只是想确保我们拥有的一切比任何值得投入时间的东西都要好得多。

> `[00:11:50]` Do you think.

`[00:11:50]` 你认为。

> I know I read in the crimson article about when you first launch hundreds of people sign up for new how hundreds hundreds signed up for new Facebook Web site.

我知道我在那篇深红的文章中读到过，当你第一次发布的时候，数百人注册了新的 Facebook 网站，而数百人注册了新的 Facebook 网站。

> `[00:12:01]` That is not the onion that is the crimson.

`[00:12:01]` 那不是洋葱，而是深红色。

> Sometimes hard to distinguish Harvard students.

有时很难区分哈佛学生。

> OK.

好的

> `[00:12:09]` So do you think though they said in this article that Harvard the Harvard computer services people were working on a university wide Facebook.

`[00:12:09]` 所以你认为，尽管他们在这篇文章中说，哈佛大学的计算机服务人员正在为一所大学范围的 Facebook 工作。

> Their problem was like they couldn\'t figure out how to restrict information enough.

他们的问题是，他们不知道如何限制足够的信息。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Do you think if that had already existed if you had gone a couple years younger and you\'d come to Harvard and this already exist do you think you would have ever started Facebook.

你是否认为，如果你已经存在了，如果你年轻几岁，你会来到哈佛，而且这已经存在了，你认为你会创建 Facebook 吗？

> `[00:12:29]` I don\'t know.

`[00:12:29]` 我不知道。

> I mean there\'s this trend that I was talking about before where each year people share more and more.

我的意思是，有一种趋势，我曾经说过，每年都有越来越多的人分享。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So I think that you can kind of map out at any given point and I think you can look at the Internet and say OK there\'s enough sharing to support certain products right so Wikipedia came really before Facebook because there was a smaller amount of sharing could support information about older public entities and Reynolds right.

所以我认为你可以在任何给定的时间点绘制地图，我认为你可以在互联网上说，有足够的共享来支持某些产品，所以维基百科在 Facebook 之前就出现了，因为少量的共享可以支持关于较老的公共实体和 Reynolds Right 的信息。

> But in order to have enough sharing to support some basic information so you can look up anyone and find some interesting stuff about them then that required more sharing.

但是为了有足够的共享来支持一些基本的信息，所以你可以查找任何人并找到一些关于他们的有趣的东西，这就需要更多的分享。

> So we had to be further along this curve.

所以我们必须沿着这条曲线走得更远。

> And you know in a couple of years earlier someone might have been able to do something that was more basic but a couple of years later even a couple of years from now someone will be able to build something that is just so much more encompassing and allows people to learn so much more about the people around them than what is even built today.

你知道，在几年前，也许有人能够做一些更基本的事情，但几年后，甚至几年后，有些人将能够建立一个更包容的东西，让人们能够更多地了解他们周围的人，而不是今天所建造的东西。

> So our kind of continual mission and job is to keep on building that next thing and I mean that\'s what we live for at Facebook and what excites us.

因此，我们持续不断的使命和工作就是继续构建下一件事情，我的意思是，这就是我们在 Facebook 上生活的目的，也是我们的兴奋之处。

> `[00:13:26]` So even if Harvard even if the university had built something there would always you could have built the next thing.

`[00:13:26]` 即使哈佛大学在那里建造了一些东西，你也可以建造下一个东西。

> `[00:13:32]` Yeah.

`[00:13:32]` 是的。

> And it\'s obviously always hard to tell exactly how things would have played out.

很明显，很难准确地判断事情会怎样发展。

> But I mean one of the interesting things about Facebook was it wasn\'t just a picture and some basic information pretty quickly gave people the ability to share more stuff.

但我的意思是，Facebook 的一个有趣之处在于，它不仅仅是一张照片，一些基本信息很快就让人们有了分享更多东西的能力。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And one of the early stories that I think is pretty instructive for anyone who\'s trying to build a start up is you know we really listen to what our users wanted to read and listening means both kind of qualitatively listening to the words that they say and quantitatively looking at the behaviors that they take.

我认为其中一个早期的故事对那些试图建立起一个新的开端的人来说是很有教育意义的，你知道我们真的在倾听我们的用户想要读的东西，而倾听意味着，无论是定性地听他们说的话，还是定量地观察他们所采取的行为，都意味着从质量上听他们说的话。

> And at the beginning we we we had one profile picture that you could have on on your on your profile based on what we observed was there was this behavior where a lot of people would everyday upload a new profile picture and you\'d take away from this was that you know people there was this very strong demand to have a service where people could share more photos.

一开始，我们有一张你可以在你的个人资料上看到的个人资料照片，我们观察到，有一种行为，很多人每天都会上传一张新的个人资料图片，而你会从中拿走，你知道，人们强烈要求提供一项服务，让人们可以分享更多的照片。

> And it actually wasn\'t until we had the server capacity and the engineering team bandwidths actually built a full photo sharing service.

直到我们有了服务器容量和工程团队的带宽，我们才真正建立了一个完整的照片共享服务。

> But that\'s become obviously one of the key parts of Facebook.

但这显然已经成为 Facebook 的关键部分之一。

> I think we\'re over 3 or 400 million photos shared a day now.

我想我们现在已经有三四亿张照片分享了一天。

> So I mean it\'s pretty crazy.

所以我是说这很疯狂。

> But you know obviously no facebook that that any university would have built would have supported that.

但很明显，任何一所大学都不会支持这一点。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And you know even just like any right any incremental thing that would have just tied whatever mugshot you have on your your card it would have been your picture.

你知道，就像任何权利一样，任何增量的东西都会绑住你卡上的任何一张照片，那就是你的照片。

> `[00:14:48]` So they would have chosen the picture which is in the picture.

`[00:14:48]` 所以他们会选择图片中的图片。

> Yeah I can totally see Hoeh added in.

是的，我完全可以看到 Hoeh 加入了。

> `[00:14:56]` Do you remember when you first showed up in college what you plan to do afterwards.

`[00:14:56]` 你还记得你第一次出现在大学的时候，你以后打算做什么吗？

> Do you think you were going to go to graduate school or did you think you\'re going to get a job we only got verst went to college.

你认为你是要去读研究生，还是你认为你会找到一份我们刚上过大学的工作。

> `[00:15:06]` I actually was planning on being a classics major.

`[00:15:06]` 事实上，我正计划成为一名经典专业的学生。

> I loved classics and high school Latin and Greek.

我喜欢古典文学和高中拉丁文和希腊文。

> I just picked on it fascinating.

我只是挑了它的迷人之处。

> And my sister actually did go on and do that and now tune in classics and we talk about this all the time is still fascinating to me when I was in college I actually wasn\'t a computer science major I was a psychology major.

而我姐姐确实是这样做的，现在我们一直在谈论经典歌曲，这对我来说仍然很有趣，当我上大学的时候，我实际上不是计算机科学专业，我是心理学专业的学生。

> I didn\'t really get around to taking that many classes and I left pretty quickly and I actually ended up taking more computer science classes than then psychology classes but I was never you know I don\'t know.

我没有真正参加那么多的课程，我很快就离开了，实际上我上的计算机科学课程比心理学课程还多，但我从来没有你知道我不知道。

> `[00:15:38]` So you had no plan.

`[00:15:38]` 所以你没有计划。

> No.

否

> I mean you\'re going to be a barista.

我是说你会成为咖啡师。

> `[00:15:42]` No I probably would have.

`[00:15:42]` 不，我可能会的。

> `[00:15:44]` I probably would have gotten an engineering job.

`[00:15:44]` 我可能会得到一份工程工作。

> Is my sense and I would have gotten sucked into programming.

是我的感觉，我就会沉迷于编程。

> Well I mean I like programming and I really you know growing up I always had a lot of respect for Microsoft and what they\'ve built and a lot of people from Harvard go to Microsoft and went to Microsoft and I maybe I would\'ve done that.

嗯，我的意思是，我喜欢编程，我真的，你知道，在成长过程中，我一直很尊重微软和他们建立的东西，很多哈佛大学的人都去了微软，也许我会这么做。

> I don\'t know.

我不知道。

> It\'s it\'s really obviously hard to say.

很显然很难说。

> Later I made this bet with my sister Donna.

后来我和我妹妹唐娜打赌了。

> The classics pitched to you I was talking about before who I bet her when I was starting college before she was that she bet me that she would finish college before me.

当我开始上大学的时候，我和她打赌，她一定会比我先完成大学学业。

> And I was like alright I\'ll take the bad like you know.

我会像你知道的那样接受坏消息。

> And then after after I dropped out I was talking to my mom and she\'s like yeah no I always knew you would drop out of college.

然后我退学后，我和我妈妈说话，她说：是的，不，我一直知道你会退学。

> Thanks mom.

谢谢妈妈。

> Know that you would zoom out of the top or fall out of the bottom.

要知道你会从顶部放大或者从底部掉下来。

> I\'d never ask.

我从没问过。

> `[00:16:42]` Do you think your parents knew that you would always run your own show.

`[00:16:42]` 你认为你的父母知道你总是自己主持节目吗？

> `[00:16:46]` Because I asked them I think they\'d probably say yes.

`[00:16:46]` 因为我问他们，我想他们可能会答应。

> But yeah I want to start startups.

但我想开始创业。

> No I mean I think that\'s actually a really interesting part of this for me is that I mean being in a place like this where obviously a lot of you guys are thinking about starting these starting companies and you know for me so much of the lesson that I feel like I\'ve learned is I feel like it\'s really hard to decide to start a company.

不，我的意思是，我认为这对我来说是一个非常有趣的部分，我的意思是，在这样一个地方，很明显，你们中的很多人都在考虑创办这些新公司，你们知道，对我来说，我学到的很多东西是，我觉得自己很难决定创办一家公司。

> `[00:17:11]` Right.

`[00:17:11]` 对。

> You know Facebook I didn\'t start it to start a company I started it because I really wanted this thing personally and I believed that it should exist globally although I wasn\'t quite sure that we would be able to play a role in doing that.

你知道，我创建 Facebook 不是为了创办一家公司，而是因为我真的很想要这件事，我相信它应该在全球范围内存在，尽管我不太确定我们是否能够在这方面发挥作用。

> And it was mostly just through kind of like wanting to build it and having it be this hobby and getting people around me excited that it eventually kind of evolved into and got the momentum to become a company.

大多数情况下，就像想要建立它，让它成为我的业余爱好，让周围的人兴奋，它最终演变成一家公司，并获得了成为一家公司的动力。

> But I never really understood the psychology of deciding that you want to start a company before you understand what you want to do.

但我从来没有真正理解在你明白自己想要做什么之前就决定要创业的心理。

> And I know that that\'s not that that\'s different from your philosophy.

我知道这和你的哲学没什么不同。

> `[00:17:43]` No no.

`[00:17:43]` 不，不。

> Believe me I wish we could get more people who wear the company started them rather than Vice\'s or isn\'t one of the issues is just that once you get back to a question of why did we why did we first open it at colleges that had competitors.

相信我，我希望我们能找到更多的穿着公司的人，而不是成立公司的人，或者说，问题之一不是，一旦你回到了一个问题，为什么我们首先在有竞争对手的大学开设这个公司？

> `[00:17:56]` I have this big fear I think of getting locked into doing things that aren\'t actually the most impactful things.

`[00:17:56]` 我有一种很大的恐惧，我想我会被锁在做那些实际上并不是最有影响的事情上。

> To me this is like the treat that entrepreneurs have as they just have this like laser like ability to go find where they can have the most impact.

对我来说，这就像企业家的待遇，就像他们拥有的激光一样，能够找到他们能产生最大影响的地方。

> And you know when you take on a new project especially if you hire people or start a company you\'re doing a project.

你知道，当你开始一个新的项目时，尤其是当你雇佣员工或开始一家公司的时候，你就在做一个项目。

> And I mean there are other ways they\'re obviously different ways that it can exert and all that.

我的意思是，有其他的方式，他们\显然是不同的方式，它可以发挥和所有这些。

> But I think having the flexibility to explore a lot of different things which you can do when you\'re in college which is one of the amazing things about being in college is you can work on all of these hobbies and code a lot of stuff and try a lot of different things.

但是我认为，当你在大学的时候，有足够的灵活性去探索很多不同的事情，这是大学生活中令人惊奇的事情之一，那就是你可以在所有这些爱好上工作，编写很多东西，尝试很多不同的事情。

> It\'s this amazing flexibility that I think most people take for granted and once you decide OK I\'m going to start a company I\'m going to do it with someone else.

这是一种令人惊讶的灵活性，我认为大多数人都认为这是理所当然的，一旦你决定好了，我就会和其他人一起创办一家公司。

> You immediately now need to convince someone else if you want to change your mind on something and I think people really undervalue the option value and flexibility.

如果你想在某些事情上改变主意，你现在就需要马上说服别人，我认为人们真的低估了期权的价值和灵活性。

> So as I stay in college I think explore what you want to do before committing is really like that.

所以，当我留在大学的时候，我想，在承诺之前，探索一下你想做的事情就是这样的。

> The key thing and keep yourself flexible.

关键是要保持自己的灵活性。

> `[00:18:55]` And I think that that\'s I agree.

`[00:18:55]` 我认为这是我同意的。

> But I think you can do that within the framework of a company.

但我认为你可以在公司的框架内做到这一点。

> `[00:19:01]` But I think you have to be wary about starting a company too rigidly because you\'re going to change what you do.

`[00:19:01]` 但我认为，你必须小心，不要太刻板地创办一家公司，因为你要改变你所做的事情。

> I mean people talk about Pivot\'s all the time as if it\'s like a dozen didn\'t you do your thing didn\'t work.

我的意思是，人们总是在谈论 Pivot，就好像它就像一打一样-你不做你的事，没有用

> So you pivoted Facebook pivoted many times just that you know we kind of we were college and then we were not college and then we were just a Web site and then we were a platform right.

所以你把脸书旋转了很多次，只是你知道我们是大学，然后我们不是大学，然后我们只是一个网站，然后我们是一个平台，对。

> You\'re going to change what you do.

你会改变你的工作。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:19:23]` And we\'re going to make sure you have.

`[00:19:23]` 我们会确保你有。

> There\'s another word for the kind of pivots you\'re talking about expansion\'s help.

还有一个词是指你所说的“扩张的帮助”。

> `[00:19:29]` That\'s what people usually mean by that.

`[00:19:29]` 这就是人们通常所说的意思。

> Well you know.

你知道的。

> Flexibility.

灵活性。

> `[00:19:37]` I\'m curious when you first started.

`[00:19:37]` 你刚开始的时候我很好奇。

> Like there\'s a difference between making something where people sign up and making something where people keep coming back.

就像在做一些人们注册的事情和人们不断回来的事情之间有区别一样。

> Yeah right.

对。

> What was it you were talking about the way you measured people\'s behavior.

你在说什么？你衡量人们行为的方式。

> What was the feature that kept people coming back to Facebook over and over again once they created their profile.

什么功能让人们在创建个人资料后一次又一次地回到 Facebook。

> `[00:19:57]` I mean I think it really just gets down to what makes humans human right.

`[00:19:57]` 我的意思是，我认为真正的原因只是人类的人权。

> I mean this comes back to the my my studying psychology and all that but the human brain is kind of uniquely wired to process things about people.

我的意思是，这又回到了我学习的心理学和所有的东西，但是人类的大脑有一种独特的思维方式来处理关于人的事情。

> `[00:20:12]` It\'s like when I see you when I look out I see faces I don\'t see.

`[00:20:12]` 就像当我看到你的时候，当我向外看时，我看到的是我看不到的面孔。

> You know chairs or the room around people it\'s like we\'re hardwired to think about people I mean there are whole parts of the visual cortex that just process the slightest kind of micro movements of your face to process emotion and this is like what people are and what fascinates them and it\'s how we how we process the world actually I heard the study recently that I think is interesting which is that most humans if you if you take an MRI when they\'re dreaming they dream about social interactions and humans are the only animal that does that.

你知道，椅子或周围的房间-就像我们对人一成不变的思考-我的意思是，视觉皮层的整个部分只是处理你面部最细微的细微运动来处理情绪，这就像是人们是什么人，什么东西让他们着迷，这就是我们对待世界的方式-我最近听到了一项研究，我认为。有趣的是，大多数人，如果你做核磁共振成像，当他们做梦的时候，他们会梦到社交互动，而人类是唯一这样做的动物。

> So no.

所以没有。

> OK.

好的

> But there was no service online that I mean when I when I thought about the Internet before Facebook there were all these things that I thought Google and search engines were amazing.

但没有任何在线服务，我的意思是，当我想到 Facebook 之前的互联网时，我觉得谷歌和搜索引擎都很棒。

> You can type in something and get access to any information that you wanted but you couldn\'t learn about the people around you.

你可以输入一些东西，访问你想要的任何信息，但是你不能了解周围的人。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Because most of that information isn\'t public and just out there ready to be indexed by some search engine.

因为大部分的信息都不是公开的，只是外面的一些搜索引擎已经准备好索引了。

> So there had to be a service that gave people the power to share the things that they wanted and control it in the way that they wanted.

所以必须有一种服务，让人们能够分享他们想要的东西，并以他们想要的方式来控制它。

> And Facebook did that and I think that it\'s not a one one definition of technology that I think is interesting as it extends some natural human capacity.

Facebook 做到了这一点，我认为这并不是一个我认为有趣的技术定义，因为它扩展了一些自然的人类能力。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:21:22]` So glasses or contacts extend your ability to see where Steve Jobs once famously compared a computer to being a bicycle for your mind.

`[00:21:22]` 因此，眼镜或联系人扩大了你看史蒂夫·乔布斯(SteveJobs)曾经把电脑比作头脑中的自行车的能力。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And basically extending your ability to think and I mean the word computer is the Latin thing together.

基本上扩展了你的思考能力，我的意思是，计算机这个词是拉丁语的统称。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:21:38]` So it\'s like you\'re you\'re thinking together the a social network I think extends people\'s very real social capacity.

`[00:21:38]` 所以这就像你们在一起思考一个社交网络，我认为它扩展了人们非常真实的社会能力。

> I mean you hear all these approximations I mean there\'s this famous Dunbar\'s number.

我的意思是，你听到了所有的近似，我的意思是，有一个著名的邓巴数字。

> Humans have the capacity to maintain empathetic relationships with about 150 people communities about 150 people.

人类有能力与大约 150 人、社区(约 150 人)保持移情关系。

> `[00:21:56]` I think Facebook extends that when you see how others have that within Facebook by the way do you see certain things that stop it 150.

`[00:21:56]` 我认为 Facebook 扩展了它，当你看到其他人是如何在 Facebook 中拥有它的时候，你会看到某些阻止它的东西吗？

> `[00:22:03]` Naturally when people sign up the average amount of friends that they get is around 150 but then over time it can expand and you can keep in touch and stay in touch with many more people.

`[00:22:03]` 当然，当人们注册朋友的平均数量在 150 左右，但随着时间的推移，它可以扩大，你可以保持联系，并与更多的人保持联系。

> So I think it\'s so given that I actually think one of the lessons from that is I do something that\'s fundamental right.

所以我认为它是如此的，考虑到我实际上认为其中的一个教训是，我做了一些基本权利的事情。

> I mean I think a lot of people in a lot of the companies that I see are operating on on small problems.

我的意思是，我认为很多公司里的很多人都在处理一些小问题。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And it\'s cool if you want to be an entrepreneur and solve what you\'re primarily trying to do is build a company and solve some tangible problem.

如果你想成为一名企业家，并解决你主要想做的事情，那就是建立一家公司，解决一些实实在在的问题，这是很酷的。

> But but I think that the most interesting things operate on this phenomenon in the world which are really just fundamental to how humans or the world operate.

但我认为，世界上最有趣的事情是关于这个现象的，这是人类或世界如何运作的根本。

> `[00:22:40]` So what you did with something that was fundamental for a small market and then used to expand the market from beyond Harvard students to everyone but Harvard students who are sufficiently like.

`[00:22:40]` 所以你所做的事情对于一个小市场来说是基本的，然后用来把市场从哈佛学生扩大到每个人，除了哈佛学生。

> `[00:22:49]` Well it was.

`[00:22:49]` 是的。

> GROSS Yeah it was fundamental for me.

恶心，是的，对我来说是最基本的。

> Right it\'s like I like I felt this need really acutely I really wanted this certain and so yeah.

是的，就像我觉得这是非常迫切的需要，我真的很想这样肯定，所以是的。

> And then I think it just I mean that\'s one of the things that I think we were lucky about in kind of the expansion of the market was that it turned out that this wasn\'t something that was just for college students.

然后我想，我的意思是，这是我认为我们幸运的事情之一，在某种程度上，市场的扩张是，事实证明，这并不仅仅是对大学生而言的事情。

> Almost everyone in the world has friends and family and want to stay in touch with those people.

世界上几乎每个人都有朋友和家人，并希望与这些人保持联系。

> So it ended up being a pretty ubiquitous service.

因此，它最终成为了一项相当普遍的服务。

> `[00:23:12]` In retrospect this is a bit of a controversial question perhaps but in retrospect do you think MySpace had a chance once you started and you got all the college students and the college deans are arguably like the center of gravity socially right.

`[00:23:12]` 回想起来，这也许是一个有争议的问题，但回想起来，你是否认为 MySpace 在你一开始就有机会，你让所有的大学生和大学院长都可以说是社会权利的重心。

> You own all the college students.

你拥有所有的大学生。

> It feels like you know from the point you start expanding out of Harvard MySpace might not have known it.

就像你知道，从你开始从哈佛扩展到 MySpace 的那一刻起，你可能就不知道了。

> Maybe you didn\'t even know it but it seems like in retrospect they were doomed.

也许你甚至不知道，但回想起来，他们已经注定了。

> You know I don\'t.

你知道我不想。

> `[00:23:39]` I don\'t see it that way actually.

`[00:23:39]` 实际上我不这么认为。

> They could have won.

他们本可以赢的。

> `[00:23:42]` No it\'s not about winning and losing it\'s about doing something that\'s valuable.

`[00:23:42]` 不，这不是胜利和失败的问题，而是做一些有价值的事情。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> There were more than one more than one social network.

有不止一个社交网络。

> `[00:23:51]` Not very many.

`[00:23:51]` 不多。

> `[00:23:53]` I mean my view the world is that almost every product in category is going to get transformed and reimagined to be social.

`[00:23:53]` 我的意思是，我的观点是，世界上几乎所有的产品都会被改造和改造成社会产品。

> So there were things that MySpace did that Facebook has never done.

因此，Facebook 从未做过 MySpace 做过的一些事情。

> You know MySpace I think was it was a much better service early on for meeting new people right.

你知道，我的空间，我认为这是一个更好的服务，在早期认识新的人是对的。

> Facebook was never primarily about meeting new people it was about staying connected with the people that you knew and kind of mapping out the real relationships that existed.

Facebook 从来都不是为了结识新的人，而是要与你认识的人保持联系，并勾勒出存在的真正的人际关系。

> Now I think part of the issue is the source growing and they felt threatened by that and tried to copy what we were doing and that\'s like you\'re never going to win that way.

现在我认为问题的一部分是来源的增长，他们感到受到威胁，并试图复制我们正在做的事情，这就好像你永远不会那样赢。

> Why is that.

那是为什么。

> I mean I think of all these interesting social services and apps that are getting built today.

我的意思是，我想到所有这些有趣的社会服务和应用程序，正在建设今天。

> I mean think of all the new apps that you guys install on your phones.

我是说，想想你们在手机上安装的所有新应用。

> There are so many interesting things in there.

里面有很多有趣的东西。

> Eight out of the top 10U.S.

美国前十名中有八名。

> apps plug into Facebook.

应用程序可以插入 Facebook。

> 50 percent of the top 400 apps plug into Facebook.

在前 400 名应用中，有 50%的应用程序插入了 Facebook。

> They\'re all kind of socially integrated and in these ways.

他们都融入了社会，在这些方面。

> But companies that are getting started now that are just trying to copy the stuff that that the other companies are doing just aren\'t aren\'t successful.

但是，那些现在才刚刚起步的公司，只是试图模仿其他公司正在做的事情，却并不成功。

> By the way how we do it for time is anybody in charge of time.

顺便说一句，我们是如何为时间做这件事的，谁都是时间的掌权者。

> `[00:25:00]` 12 27.

`[00:25:00]` 12 27。

> What time do we start.

我们什么时候开始。

> A few more minutes.

再等几分钟。

> All right.

好的

> We\'ll ask you a few more questions.

我们再问你几个问题。

> So you think do you think MySpace could have survived if they had gone off into some marginal territory like how do you do it all.

所以你认为如果他们进入边缘地区，你认为 MySpace 还能存活下来吗？你是怎么做到的。

> `[00:25:13]` Somehow I think that there is a real value in the world.

`[00:25:13]` 不知何故，我认为世界上有一种真正的价值。

> People have a fundamental need I think to stay connected with the people they know.

人们有一个基本的需要，我认为与他们认识的人保持联系。

> And I think people have many fundamental needs to meet new people and expand their horizons as well.

我认为，人们有许多基本的需求，以满足新的人，并扩大他们的视野。

> And that\'s never been the primary problem that Facebook is trying to solve.

这从来就不是 Facebook 试图解决的首要问题。

> And I think it\'s something that we can do.

我认为这是我们可以做的事情。

> It\'s something that someone else could do using our platform or that someone else can do using it building it independently and you know I never bought the music thing for MySpace.

这是别人可以用我们的平台做的事情，或者是其他人可以独立使用的东西，你知道我从来没有为 MySpace 买过音乐。

> So I mean they they you kind of always say that they were a music service.

所以我的意思是，他们你总是说他们是一家音乐服务公司。

> I\'m not sure why did they do that.

我不知道他们为什么这么做。

> I don\'t know if you have to ask them but.

我不知道你是否要问他们，但是。

> `[00:25:49]` Maybe they can\'t.

`[00:25:49]` 也许他们不能。

> `[00:25:49]` They counted on bands to spam their fans or something like that.

`[00:25:49]` 他们指望乐队给他们的粉丝发垃圾邮件或诸如此类的东西。

> That\'s that\'s a powerful force in the world.

那是世界上一股强大的力量。

> So.

所以

> Before we go I want to ask you about how you ended up out here.

在我们走之前，我想问你是怎么在这里结束的。

> Do you.

你是

> What was what was the sort of how did how did you end up in that house in Palo Alto.

你是怎么在帕洛阿尔托的那栋房子里结束的。

> Was it something you decided at the last minute.

是你在最后一刻决定的吗。

> I don\'t actually remember.

我真的不记得了。

> `[00:26:11]` You know I remember bits of the story but you know so first I wrote the first version of Facebook.

`[00:26:11]` 你知道我记得故事的一些细节，但你知道，所以首先我写了 Facebook 的第一个版本。

> January of 2004 and released in February.

2004 年 1 月，2 月发布。

> And the reason why I did in January was was because at the time Harvard had this intersession thing.

我在一月份这么做的原因是因为当时哈佛大学有这样的闭会期间的事情。

> It\'s kind of weird.

有点奇怪。

> I think that they don\'t have that reading period anymore.

我想他们已经没有那个阅读时间了。

> I think they\'ve changed it.

我想他们已经改变了。

> `[00:26:33]` So now we know now is that all you know now because they try to kick out everyone who starts anything interesting there.

`[00:26:33]` 现在我们知道的是，你们现在所知道的一切，是因为他们试图驱逐那些在那里开始任何有趣事情的人。

> But but that\'s.

但那.

> Why.

为什么

> `[00:26:47]` I think that I think that they\'re actually trying to change that.

`[00:26:47]` 我认为他们实际上是在试图改变这种状况。

> But.

但

> But it is striking.

但这是惊人的。

> So now they admit it.

所以现在他们承认了。

> `[00:26:56]` I think so finals are.

`[00:26:56]` 我认为期末考试是这样的。

> Before you go away for holidays but they had this thing before where in January you basically just have this dead month where you could study for finals so you could study for five series but hypothetically you could you could study for finals.

在你去度假之前，他们有这样的事情，在一月份，你基本上只有一个死胡同，你可以学习期末考试，所以你可以学习五个系列，但假设你可以学习期末考试。

> `[00:27:12]` I wondered when I sort we started in January it was starting and reading period.

`[00:27:12]` 我在想，当我在一月份开始排序的时候，它是开始和阅读的时期。

> And it was because you had this time where you weren\'t too busy with stuff.

这是因为你这一次不太忙。

> `[00:27:18]` Yeah although I actually I probably should have been studying there\'s this other story that I think is very funny which is I was taking this course room of Agustus and it was it was one of the core curriculum classes that we had in the final was that these pieces of art that you study throughout the class and then they give you some on the final day they show you some of the pieces of art you have to write about the historical significance of them and you know I hadn\'t really done much of the reading in the class.

是的，尽管我实际上应该学习这个故事，但我觉得另一个非常有趣的故事是，我正在上阿古斯都的这门课，这是我们期末的核心课程之一，就是你在全班学习的这些艺术品，然后他们在最后一天给你一些。他们向你展示了一些你必须写的关于它们的历史意义的作品，你知道我在课堂上没有做太多的阅读。

> `[00:27:47]` I mostly just spent my time programming and building stuff that I enjoyed.

`[00:27:47]` 我大部分时间只是花在编程和制作我喜欢的东西上。

> And you know I could have used reading period to study for this but instead a spent reading building Facebook.

你知道，我本可以利用阅读时间来研究这个问题，而不是花了很多时间在 Facebook 上阅读。

> So instead what I did was I\'m I hacked together this Web site where I went and downloaded from the court\'s website the 200 or so images that we\'re going to be potentially on the final.

所以我所做的是，我黑了这个网站，我去了那里，从法庭的网站下载了大约 200 张我们可能会出现在决赛中的图片。

> And I just built this very simple page the site where it showed one of the images and then you could contribute what you thought was significant about it and then you can see what other people thought was significant about it.

我刚刚创建了一个非常简单的页面，它展示了其中的一张图片，然后你可以贡献出你认为重要的东西，然后你就可以看到其他人对它有什么重要的看法。

> `[00:28:19]` And then and then you could go next and pull up a random one and then I emailed it to the classlessness Okay guys I built a study tool if you wanted to find this interesting.

`[00:28:19]` 然后你就可以随便找出一个随机的，然后我发邮件给无班学生，好吧，伙计们，如果你们想找到这个有趣的东西的话，我做了一个学习工具。

> `[00:28:27]` And then everyone just populated this thing for me.

`[00:28:27]` 然后每个人都给我装了这个东西。

> And it was wonderful.

真是太棒了。

> And the professor after that thing mentioned that the greed\'s on the final had never been higher before.

在那件事之后的教授提到，期末考试的贪婪程度从来没有这么高过。

> So.

所以

> So yes it\'s crowdsourced studying so yeah.

所以是的，这是众包学习，所以是的。

> `[00:28:50]` And you know a lot of interesting social dynamics that you can apply to almost any category that you choose to build for.

`[00:28:50]` 你知道很多有趣的社会动态，你可以把它应用到你所选择的任何类别中。

> But yeah so it\'s I built I build the first version in January.

但是的，所以我在一月份建造了第一个版本。

> Some of the time I was at Harvard.

我在哈佛的时候。

> Supposed to be studying.

应该在学习。

> I actually went and visited a couple of friends or one who was at Stanford and one who is out at Caltech.

我去拜访了几个朋友，一个在斯坦福，一个在加州理工学院。

> And at the time I had never really been out to California before.

那时我从来没有真正去过加州。

> `[00:29:17]` And you went in January and January.

`[00:29:17]` 你在一月和一月去了。

> And what did you think.

你是怎么想的。

> `[00:29:19]` Well you know I remember you know coming in to the food at SFO and was driving down one to one and I saw these buildings for all these companies like wow this is like where these technology companies these technology companies come from this is amazing.

`[00:29:19]` 嗯，你知道，我记得你知道你走进 SFO 的食物，开着一辆接一辆的车，我看到了这些公司的建筑，哇，这些科技公司就是从这里来的，真是太棒了。

> `[00:29:33]` And and then just like oh the weather also was awesome and I remember I had been at Harvard for freshman year and I stayed there for the summer and then sophomore year.

然后，就像哦，天气也很棒，我记得我在哈佛大学读了一年，我在那里待了一个夏天，然后是大二。

> So by the time that sophomore summer kind of came around my friends and I were just like Okay well let\'s let\'s go somewhere else.

所以，当大二的夏天来临的时候，我的朋友们和我一样，好吧，我们去别的地方吧。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And let\'s rent a place in California.

我们在加州租个地方吧。

> So we decided to get a place in Palo Alto and the idea the time wasn\'t that we actually were not thinking about moving to California or dropping out the actually the actual thought that had crossed that there was in our mind.

所以我们决定在帕洛阿尔托找到一个地方，当时的想法不是，我们实际上没有考虑搬到加利福尼亚，也没有放弃我们脑海中所想的实际想法。

> It\'ll be neat to be around some of these other great companies that are getting built.

与其他一些正在建设的伟大公司在一起，这将是一件很棒的事情。

> One day maybe you will find something that will build a company out of.

也许有一天，你会找到一些东西来建立一个公司。

> But surely this isn\'t it.

但这肯定不是。

> And so we went out to California and Dharm and we just I remember this conversation where one day Dustin pulled me aside and was like you know we\'re getting to have a lot of users and where we are have an increasing number of servers we have no ops guy.

所以我们去了加州和达姆沙姆，我们只记得有一天达斯汀把我拉到一边，你知道我们有很多用户，我们有越来越多的服务器，我们没有行动人员。

> `[00:30:31]` It\'s a weird the ops guy and and this was before kind of easy to write so you didn\'t have to.

`[00:30:31]` 这是一个奇怪的行动小组的家伙，这以前很容易写，所以你不必写。

> So you had to do more to manage manage your your own servers at that point and just like you know this is this is really hard.

所以你必须做更多的事情来管理你自己的服务器，就像你知道的那样，这真的很难。

> `[00:30:44]` I don\'t think that we can do this and take a full course load so let\'s say Harvard does this policy where you can take as much time as you want off from school.

`[00:30:44]` 我不认为我们能做到这一点，并承担一个完整的课程负荷，所以让我们假设哈佛执行这个政策，你可以花你想要的多少时间离开学校。

> `[00:30:53]` So why don\'t we just take one term off and then just try to get it under control and build the rulings that way we can go back for spring semester and run it more autonomously and will grow and we\'ll be able to run more autonomously.

`[00:30:00]` 那么，为什么我们不休息一学期，然后试着控制它，建立规则，这样我们就可以回到春季学期，更加自主地运行它，我们就能更自主地运行了。

> So we did that and of course we raised money from Peter Tioba we told him the plan right and kind of explained what you told him you might go back to school.

所以我们做到了，当然我们从彼得·蒂巴那里筹到了钱，我们告诉他这个计划是正确的，并且解释了你告诉他你可能会回到学校。

> Yeah I think he didn\'t believe us but.

是的，我想他不相信我们，但是。

> `[00:31:15]` You know where you want to work my life just this long history of people thinking I was going to drop out.

`[00:31:15]` 你知道你想在哪里工作，我的生活就是这么长的历史，人们认为我要退学了。

> `[00:31:20]` Well before I did but.

`[00:31:20]` 早在我这么做之前。

> `[00:31:24]` So then you know spring term came along and you know we hadn\'t quite built the tooling and automation so you know let\'s take another term off and then finally at some point we we just figured that we were that we were out there.

`[00:31:24]` 然后你知道春天这个词出现了，你知道我们还没有完全建立起工具和自动化，所以让我们再放一个学期，最后我们就会发现我们已经在那里了。

> But by then I mean we had millions of users.

但我的意思是我们有数百万的用户。

> `[00:31:39]` So you didn\'t definitely decide not to go back home until you had millions of users.

`[00:31:39]` 所以直到你有了数百万的用户，你才决定不回家。

> Yeah.

嗯

> `[00:31:44]` Wow I think I could still go back Harvard Harvard does this policy where you can go back for as long as you want.

`[00:31:44]` 哇，我想我还能回到哈佛，做这个政策，你可以想回去多久就回去多久。

> `[00:31:50]` Whatever their policy was I\'m sure they would bend the rules.

`[00:31:50]` 无论他们的政策是什么，我确信他们会改变规则。

> In your case.

在你的案子里。

> Are we are we done or are we over.

我们结束了还是结束了。

> Is there anybody watching the time.

有人在看时间吗。

> We have to go to market as a wedding.

我们得去市场办婚礼。

> Yes I do.

是的。

> `[00:32:02]` It\'s actually the guy who I who I said before I used to go to pizza with him every almost every night.

`[00:32:02]` 实际上是我以前说过的那个人，我以前几乎每天晚上都和他一起去吃比萨饼。

> We were doing our CSI problems.

我们在做犯罪现场调查的问题。

> That\'s what he is he joined Facebook and we\'re really good friends and he\'s getting married right after this.

这就是他加入 Facebook 的原因，我们是真正的好朋友，他马上就要结婚了。

> So I have to go and run off to that.

所以我得去做那件事了。

> But thank you guys.

但是谢谢你们。
