# Michelle Zatlyn and Matthew Prince at Startup School SV 2014

> `[00:00:02]` Well do you think we\'d be here now.

`[00:00:02]` 你认为我们现在会在这里吗？

> `[00:00:06]` So five years ago Matthew I was sitting in your seats.

`[00:00:06]` 那么，五年前，马修，我坐在你的座位上。

> We started Clotfelter five years ago and I thought I just tell you a little bit of what\'s happened those five years and then we get into some of the things we\'ve learned along the way.

我们五年前创办了 Clotfelter，我想我只需要告诉你这五年发生了什么，然后我们就会了解到我们在这过程中学到的一些东西。

> `[00:00:19]` So you guys can build really big successful companies too.

`[00:00:19]` 这样你们就可以建立真正成功的大公司了。

> And so today.

所以今天。

> So what does Klopfer do.

那么 Klopfer 是做什么的。

> We\'re building a better Internet.

我们正在建设一个更好的互联网。

> We have 2 million customers who have signed up for a service all around the world including Y Combinator fluting Y Combinator and why people sign up is that we make their web properties load fast.

我们有 200 万用户已经在世界各地注册了一项服务，其中包括 Y Combinator、Flating Y Combinator 以及人们注册的原因是我们让他们的 Web 属性加载得更快。

> We protect them from online cyber attacks including DNS tax.

我们保护他们免受网络攻击，包括 DNS 税。

> We just make sure we load balance make it available available.

我们只需确保负载平衡，让它可用。

> We just make the Internet run better.

我们只是让互联网运行得更好。

> `[00:00:48]` We\'re Cisco as a service.

`[00:00:48]` 我们是思科的一家服务公司。

> It\'s good service.

这是很好的服务。

> `[00:00:52]` It\'s only you know 250 billion dollar market cap area.

`[00:00:52]` 只有你知道 2，500 亿美元的市值。

> `[00:00:57]` And so over these five years we have 2 million customers we have about 120 employees in San Francisco and London two offices.

`[00:00:57]` 因此，在这五年中，我们有 200 万客户，我们在旧金山和伦敦的两个办事处有大约 120 名员工。

> And everyday about 3000 new people sign up for our service.

每天约有 3000 人报名参加我们的服务。

> It\'s been definitely a rocket ship if you look at our growth numbers.

如果你看看我们的增长数字，它肯定是一艘火箭飞船。

> It is the perfect opt in to the right on all metrics just grow grow grow grow growth growth growth growth growth.

这是最完美的选择，在所有衡量标准上都是正确的，只是增长。

> `[00:01:18]` And yet last night I was at your house having dinner freaking out about what in the world where we\'re going to talk to these people about.

`[00:01:18]` 然而昨晚我在你家吃晚餐，为我们将要和这些人谈论的世界上的什么事而发狂。

> And Andrew back stage is saying is it basically just going to be the here\'s why you should sign up for CloudFlare show which we definitely don\'t want to do so.

后台的安德鲁说，这基本上就是你为什么要报名参加 CloudFlare 秀的原因，我们绝对不想这样做。

> Definitely not.

绝对不是那么回事

> What what what what what do you want to talk with.

你想和什么说话。

> Well I had no idea.

我完全不知道。

> `[00:01:43]` Truth be told he\'s very nervous.

`[00:01:43]` 事实告诉他，他很紧张。

> He\'s like how are we going to make this without seeming lame.

他就像我们怎样才能做到这一点而不显得蹩脚。

> And I was like No no I feel like we actually I think seeing cofounders together and dynamics you.

我就像，不，我觉得我们实际上，我认为看到联合创始人在一起，让你充满活力。

> Many of you probably have cofounders and I feel like there\'s a lot of stories online where things don\'t necessarily work out where they end up no longer talking or getting pushed out.

你们中的许多人可能都有共同创始人，我觉得网上有很多故事，在这些故事中，事情不一定会解决，结果他们不再说话或被排挤出去。

> I think seeing a model where five years in we still talk to one another.

我想看到一个模特，在这五年里，我们还在互相交谈。

> `[00:02:07]` We\'re at a distinct disadvantage because we\'re neither of us is very funny and neither of us has been fired.

`[00:02:07]` 我们处于一个明显的劣势，因为我们俩都不是很有趣，而且我们都没有被解雇。

> `[00:02:12]` So you know Andrew definitely has laughter.

`[00:02:12]` 所以你知道安德鲁肯定有笑声。

> He was.

他是。

> `[00:02:29]` So when we started was people come to us.

`[00:02:29]` 所以当我们开始的时候，有人来找我们。

> We talked on hours all the time like how did you do it.

我们一直在聊天，就像你是怎么做到的。

> Like how did you get to where you are today.

就像你是如何到达今天的位置的。

> And what I would say is there\'s no silver bullet.

我要说的是没有银弹。

> There\'s really no silver bullet.

真的没有银弹。

> And you know you\'ve heard lots of successful and incredible line of speakers today tell their version of what you need to do to be successful.

你知道你已经听过很多成功和难以置信的演讲者今天告诉他们你需要做些什么才能成功。

> And you know Matthew has his analogy about sharks and mosquitoes and I think that\'s a really good place to start.

马修对鲨鱼和蚊子有他的类比，我认为这是一个很好的开始。

> `[00:02:56]` So you know I think that there are three of us started CloudFlare and Micheles the person that makes the trains run on time.

`[00:02:56]` 所以你知道，我想我们有三个人开始了 CloudFlare 和 Micheles，那个让火车准时运行的人。

> She she\'s essentially our CEO although we\'ll talk about why actually that\'s not we don\'t have titles really.

她本质上是我们的首席执行官，尽管我们会讨论为什么实际上我们没有头衔。

> Lee Holloway we don\'t leave the let him leave the office.

李？霍洛威，我们不让他离开办公室。

> He\'s currently chained to his desk writing code right now.

他现在被锁在书桌上写代码了。

> And so he\'s the one actually building this stuff and my role is basically to assemble the IKEA furniture and tell the story of what we\'re doing which is actually strangely a really important role.

所以他才是真正建造这些东西的人，我的角色基本上是组装宜家的家具，讲述我们正在做的事情，这实际上是一个非常重要的角色。

> But you need those three things in order to do it.

但你需要这三件事才能做到。

> And so you know I think a lot of times in early on you know we freaked out about how are we going to raise money and how reacted you know how are we going to get media and how we\'re going to press and what you know I really have always valued in Michelle\'s role has been what Michelle worries about more than anything is you know how are we going to.

所以你知道，我想很多时候，你知道，我们害怕我们如何筹集资金，我们如何反应，你知道我们将如何获得媒体，我们将如何出版，你知道我一直很重视米歇尔的角色，而米歇尔最担心的是，你知道我们将如何去做。

> How are we going to hire people.

我们要怎么雇人。

> How are we to make sure people get along when they\'re in the office.

我们怎样才能确保人们在办公室里相处融洽。

> How are we going to make sure we\'re planning making sure things get done.

我们怎样才能确保我们的计划能够完成。

> `[00:04:05]` And again as Michelle references it\'s a little bit like worrying about sharks versus mosquitoes I tend to worry about the sharks that are out there.

`[00:04:05]` 米歇尔再次提到，这有点像担心鲨鱼和蚊子一样，我倾向于担心外面的鲨鱼。

> But it turns out that if you look at it around the world sharks only kill about six people a year tally 10 10 people a year.

但事实证明，如果你环顾世界，鲨鱼每年只杀 6 个人，每年 10 人。

> Mosquitoes kill hundreds of thousands millions of people a year and 50000 there you see says she.

她说，蚊子每年杀死数亿人，在那里杀死 50000 人。

> And so sweating those little details ends up being a significantly bigger deal in terms of being successful.

因此，从成功的角度看，汗流浃背的小细节最终是一笔大得多的交易。

> We early on I mean when we first interviewed a PR firm that we hired and we were like We need to be on stage at every event talking about how we\'re going to change the Internet.

我们很早的时候，我是说，当我们第一次采访一家我们雇佣的公关公司时，我们觉得我们需要在每一场活动中都站在舞台上，谈论我们将如何改变互联网。

> We\'re building a better internet and everyone just said Whoa whoa whoa whoa slow slow slow down.

我们正在建设一个更好的网络，每个人都说，哇，慢点。

> And again Michelle to her credit was always focused on how do we hire great people.

米歇尔的功劳总是集中在我们如何雇佣优秀的员工上。

> How do we listen to our customers.

我们如何倾听顾客的意见。

> How do we solve those little problems that aren\'t particularly sexy that don\'t get written up in the news but that are absolutely critical.

我们如何解决那些小问题，这些小问题不是特别性感，没有写在新闻上，但绝对是关键的。

> `[00:05:09]` And so you know I think that I think that that\'s part of why we\'ve made made a pretty good team.

`[00:05:09]` 所以你知道我认为这就是为什么我们组成了一支很好的球队的原因之一。

> `[00:05:15]` And so what does that mean early on.

`[00:05:15]` 那意味着什么呢？

> So again five years ago we started with literally 35 years ago and for the first year we just built built the product behind the scenes and then opened up a private data.

再一次，五年前，我们从 35 年前开始，第一年我们只是在幕后建立了这个产品，然后打开了一个私有数据。

> So does that mean that means the first version of our product that we released we were if I was literally Marista I remember cringing when I said Oh God we\'re asking someone to sign up for it.

这是否意味着我们发布的产品的第一个版本-如果我是玛莉斯塔的话-我还记得当时我说：“天哪，我们要请人报名。”

> `[00:05:38]` I wasn\'t ready yet and I knew we had this long list of features but I eventually had to ship product and so we invited you know 10 people signed up 10 friends all 10 signed up and we took all ten Web sites off line.

`[00:05:38]` 我还没准备好，我知道我们有这么长的功能清单，但最终我不得不发布产品，所以我们邀请了 10 个人，注册了 10 个朋友，所有 10 个都注册了，我们把所有 10 个网站都取消了。

> `[00:05:53]` So the exact opposite of our value proposition of making things better and we fix those problems and have them sign up again.

`[00:05:53]` 与我们的价值主张完全相反的是，我们把事情做得更好，我们解决了这些问题，并让他们重新注册。

> And then we took all 10 of them off line again.

然后我们又把所有的 10 个都调离了线。

> `[00:06:03]` So but then we fix those problems in the next 10 maybe eight went off line and we kept getting better and better and better and better.

`[00:06:03]` 但是我们在接下来的 10 天里解决了这些问题，也许是 8 点，我们做得越来越好了。

> `[00:06:11]` It\'s amazing that they tolerated us.

`[00:06:11]` 令人惊讶的是，他们容忍了我们。

> It was actually more like 90 percent of those initial customers are still users the 10 percent that dropped out just went out of business.

实际上，90%的初始客户仍然是用户，而退出的 10%刚刚倒闭。

> So it\'s now it\'s pretty boring.

所以现在很无聊。

> `[00:06:25]` And that\'s true and the way we are able to get these initial customers is often people say How do you get your first customers.

`[00:06:25]` 这是真的，我们能够得到这些最初顾客的方式通常是人们说你是如何得到你的第一批顾客的。

> It\'s really hard when we got to 100 customers we took the whole company into Vegas.

当我们有 100 个客户时，我们把整个公司都带到了拉斯维加斯，这真是太难了。

> There were six of us so it wasn\'t that many people but it was like a big celebration.

我们有六个人，所以没有那么多人，但这就像是一个盛大的庆典。

> And so for months we tried to get to 100 customers.

因此，几个月来，我们努力争取到 100 个客户。

> `[00:06:40]` It was really really hard that my father saw so when we there was no Amazon Web Services hadn\'t really taken off.

`[00:06:40]` 当我们没有亚马逊网络服务的时候，我父亲很难看到它真的没有起飞。

> We believe the guy chained to the desk and I had started an open source project a long time ago and we had about 80000 users and we needed servers to develop CloudFlare.

我们相信那个人被锁在桌子上，我很久以前就开始了一个开源项目，我们有大约 80000 用户，我们需要服务器来开发 CloudFlare。

> And I was like How are we going to get servers we don\'t have any money and what are we going to do.

我就像我们要如何得到服务器，我们没有钱，我们要做什么。

> `[00:07:01]` And Michelle said you know you always talk about how loyal this project Honeycut community is.

`[00:07:01]` 米歇尔说，你知道你总是谈论这个项目蜂蜜社区是多么的忠诚。

> What if we just asked them if they can donate servers to us.

如果我们只是问他们能不能把服务器捐赠给我们呢。

> `[00:07:12]` And that seemed absurd at the time but we emailed anyone who was within about a 50 mile radius of Palo Alto which is where our first office was and said hey if you\'ve got an extra server and we there\'s been only about 200 people.

`[00:07:12]` 当时这听起来很荒谬，但我们给帕洛阿尔托(Palo Alto)方圆约 50 英里的人发了邮件，我们的第一间办公室就在这里，如果你有额外的服务器，而我们只有大约 200 人，我们就会说嗨。

> We got a 70 percent response rate on people who said either I\'ve got some server or I know someone who does.

对于那些说我有服务器或者我认识某个人的人，我们得到了 70%的回应率。

> `[00:07:31]` And then Michelle in her Jatta which is the same car we actually drove down here and drove around from person to person to person picking up all of these servers none of which worked.

`[00:07:31]` 然后米歇尔开着她的 Jatta，也就是我们开车来这里的那辆车，从一个人开车到另一个人，捡起所有这些服务器，这些服务器都不起作用。

> Putting them in the back of a car and then we assembled this to we got essentially to what turned into these Frankin servers that that was what that was what we originally built CloudFlare on.

把它们放在一辆车的后座上，然后我们把它组装到-我们把它变成了这些 Frankin 服务器-这就是我们最初建造的 CloudFlare。

> But the most important part was Michelle actually showed up talk to these people said hey here\'s what we\'re thinking building what do you think.

但最重要的是，米歇尔真的出现了，对这些人说，嘿，这是我们的想法，你怎么想的？

> `[00:08:00]` And they were the first people that were giving us feedback on hey I\'d use it if you did this but I wouldn\'t use it if you did that and that was that was really what what that that driving around in your Jetta I think was what kind of got our first.

`[00:08:00]` 他们是第一批给我们反馈的人-嘿，如果你这么做，我会用它，但如果你那样做，我就不会用它了-这就是在你的捷达里开来开去的那辆车，我认为这是我们的第一辆车。

> First people using the service.

第一批使用这项服务的人。

> `[00:08:14]` Yeah definitely although I also couldn\'t Cozza I had nothing else to do.

`[00:08:14]` 当然，虽然我也不能，但我没有别的事可做。

> So that was a good use of time.

所以这是很好的利用时间。

> `[00:08:20]` That\'s important.

`[00:08:20]` 那很重要。

> It was like early on we had a conversation about you know Michelle Michelle\'s background was was in biochemistry and chemistry and and had worked did you know for Toshiba and Google and we had Metan in business school.

就像我们很早就聊了起来，你知道米歇尔的背景是生物化学和化学，你知道东芝和谷歌，我们在商学院有 Metan 吗？

> And you know from my perspective like I knew instantly that she was the sort of person that really filled in the blanks of the things that I wasn\'t good at.

你知道，从我的角度看，就像我马上就知道她是那种真正填补了我不擅长的东西的空白的人。

> And I had known Lee for 10 years.

我认识李十年了。

> And what Michelle did was she just she made sure we got things done.

米歇尔所做的就是她确保我们能做好所有的事情。

> `[00:08:57]` And you know what we always talk about is early on people ask us a couple of things people would ask us if we were dating which was which was strengthened when we weren\'t and we\'re not and we\'re not still don\'t say that so hard.

`[00:08:57]` 你知道，我们一直在谈论的是，人们很早就会问我们，如果我们在约会的话，人们会问我们的几件事-当我们没有约会的时候，我们变得更坚强了，我们现在还没有那么难说。

> Go hang out with Andrew.

去和安德鲁出去玩。

> `[00:09:22]` So so they asked us that and then the other would they say they\'d say How do you split up issues and if you\'re sitting in the audience and you\'re a co-founder team and you\'re fighting about who does what.

`[00:09:22]` 所以他们问我们这个问题，而另一个人会说他们会说你如何解决问题，如果你坐在观众席上，你是一个联合创始人团队，你在为谁做什么而争吵。

> I hate to tell you this but you Prai have the wrong co-founder because like we\'ve I don\'t think we at any of the three of us have ever been so clear that lead builds the stuff.

我不想告诉你，但你却错了联合创始人，因为就像我们一样，我不认为我们三个人中的任何一个人都这么清楚，领导创造了这些东西。

> Michelle make sure it gets done and I assemble Ikea furniture that that\'s.

米歇尔确保它完成，我组装宜家的家具。

> `[00:09:50]` You know think of it as a Venn diagram.

`[00:09:50]` 你知道的，把它想象成一个文恩图。

> Back to my science roots so we and I\'ve used this so many times where you know Matthew Lee and I were very different we cover so much surface area we have a little bit of overlap so we share the same vision and we trust one another and that makes an amazing founding team.

回到我的科学根源，我们和我用了这么多次，你们知道，马修·李和我很不一样，我们覆盖了如此多的表面积，我们有一点重叠，所以我们有着相同的愿景，我们彼此信任，这是一个了不起的创始团队。

> And so if you\'ve already picture cofounders I mean better to have the conversation now than in three years seriously because again five years in I now understand why cofounders get into fights and get pushed out of companies because your role changes and all these different sorts of dynamics happen.

因此，如果你已经想象过联合创始人的形象，我的意思是现在进行谈话要比三年后好，因为五年后，我再次明白为什么联合创始人会卷入争斗，被赶出公司，因为你的角色发生了变化，所有这些不同的动态都发生了。

> So today you should take a look at my cofounders.

所以今天你应该看看我的联合创始人。

> `[00:10:26]` Do we do we cover a lot of surface area.

`[00:10:26]` 我们是不是覆盖了很多表面积？

> Do we have different skill sets.

我们是否有不同的技能。

> And is it somebody that that I trust fundamentally and that those are really really really important questions to ask yourself because if so then you\'ve really strong foundation to go for it.

这是否是我从根本上信任的人，这些都是非常重要的问题，因为如果是这样的话，你就有很强的基础去追求它。

> And so I think for us we have we covered a lot of surface area whereas at first it wasn\'t obvious like that we are good co-founder.

因此，我认为，对于我们来说，我们已经覆盖了很多表面积，而在开始的时候，并不是很明显，我们是很好的联合创始人。

> `[00:10:46]` I mean we didn\'t know each other that well we weren\'t that I mean we knew each other but we weren\'t like best friends not best friends.

`[00:10:46]` 我的意思是，我们不太了解对方，我们不是说我们认识对方，而是我们不是最好的朋友，而是最好的朋友。

> `[00:10:52]` So sure we went to business school together but we were not we just didn\'t know each other and I did not know me at all.

`[00:10:52]` 我们很确定我们一起上过商学院，但我们不是，只是彼此不认识，我一点也不了解我。

> `[00:10:57]` I knew him through Manoël.

`[00:10:57]` 我是通过 Mano l 认识他的。

> At first actually Lee late when we were starting this he said I understand why we\'re going to work well but why do we need Michelle.

一开始，李，当我们开始工作的时候，他说，我理解为什么我们会工作得很好，但为什么我们需要米歇尔。

> About three months in he said I now understand why we need Michelle but we\'re not sure why we need you.

大约三个月，他说，我现在明白为什么我们需要米歇尔，但我们不知道为什么我们需要你。

> `[00:11:11]` Laughter.

`[00:11:11]` 笑声。

> Thankfully we kept all of us.

谢天谢地我们留下了我们所有人。

> `[00:11:15]` But these are the sorts of things where you know again those decisions early on helped us attract other people to fill in the gaps where we didn\'t already cover a lot of area and and make progress early on and again I think you know if you take anything away from today it\'s as a startup your greatest asset is momentum.

`[00:11:15]` 但这些都是你再次知道的事情-那些早期的决定帮助我们吸引了其他人来填补那些我们还没有覆盖很多领域的空白，并且很早就取得了进展，我想你知道，如果你从今天的创业中拿走了什么，你最大的资产就是动力。

> You have to make progress.

你必须取得进展。

> You have to make progress faster than you\'re the incumbents in the marketplace and that can mean anything from building a product or building a community of people who are like following your blog.

你必须取得比你在市场上的现任者更快的进展，这可能意味着从建立一个产品或建立一个类似于你的博客的人组成一个社区。

> Or it can mean just assembling a team that can like building scrap only that people signed up for and use and that that progress you\'ll start to gain a lot of momentum around you and that\'s how really big companies get built.

或者，它可以意味着组建一个团队，这个团队只喜欢建立废料，人们只需要注册和使用，你就会开始在你周围获得很大的动力，这才是建立大公司的真正方式。

> `[00:12:03]` But it takes a long time and since the decisions that you make early on end up affecting much later we remember our first first board meeting.

`[00:12:03]` 但这需要很长时间，因为你很早就做出的决定最终会影响到很久以后，我们还记得我们的第一次董事会会议。

> We raised money we went into the first board meeting and we were like Okay so here\'s the team in and like Michelle is going to be vice president of user experience and Leo was vice president of engineering and we were hiring this guy who is Ganem green Payton gay who was at it was at Facebook and it brilliant on their operations team at Facebook and we were we were recruiting him out to come work for us and we\'re like We want to hire this guy who is going to be vice president of technical operations.

我们筹集了资金，我们参加了第一次董事会会议，所以我们的团队在这里，米歇尔将成为用户体验的副总裁，利奥是工程部门的副总裁，我们雇佣了一个叫加内姆·格林·佩顿的家伙，他曾在 Facebook 工作过，在他们的运营团队中非常出色。我们招募他来为我们工作，我们就像我们想雇用这个即将成为技术运营副总裁的人。

> `[00:12:41]` And one of our board members said how many how many people is this guy hired how many people is this guy fired.

`[00:12:41]` 我们的一位董事会成员说，这个人雇了多少人，这个人被解雇了多少人。

> Like is this person really someone who deserves that title.

就像这个人真的应该得到这个头衔。

> And there are really two schools of thought on titles.

关于书名，确实有两种思想流派。

> `[00:12:53]` There\'s there\'s sort of the Marken Dreesen school of thought which is that when you hire someone there are only so many different variables that you can play with you can you can increase their salary you can give them moral equity you can increase their sort of span of control what it is that it is that they supervise with is that supervise and give them a bigger title and have all of those things.

`[00:12:53]` 有一种马肯·德莱森学派，那就是，当你雇用一个人时，你可以和他一起玩的变量只有那么多，你可以提高他们的工资，你可以给他们以道德公平，你可以增加他们的控制范围，他们监督的是监督，给他们更大的头衔，并拥有所有这些东西。

> The cheapest is title so make everyone you know executive senior vice president of the earth.

最便宜的是头衔，所以让你认识的每一个人都成为地球的高级副总裁。

> `[00:13:22]` Laughter.

`[00:13:22]` 笑声。

> Laughter And that\'s and that\'s that\'s one school.

笑声，那是一所学校。

> `[00:13:25]` The other school of thought is the Mark Zuckerberg school of thought which is when you joined Facebook everyone has to take a step down so you know a vice president become a director if you\'re a director you become an associate of your associate.

`[00:13:25]` 另一个学派是马克·扎克伯格思想学派，当你加入 Facebook 时，每个人都必须下台，这样你就知道，如果你是一名董事，你就会成为你的同事的助理。

> You become a like Pyon or whatever.

你变成了像派恩之类的人。

> And and so and we you know if I think if we had to do it over again we would just call every one engineer like just I don\'t care if you\'re doing customer support you\'re in engineering care doing financer you engineer and Keverian\'s sales is an engineer.

所以，你知道，如果我们不得不再做一次，我们只会打电话给每一个工程师，就像我不在乎你是否在做客户支持，你是在工程护理，做财务工程师，而凯维利亚的销售是一名工程师。

> `[00:13:53]` What we didn\'t said though was you know this first morning we\'re like everyone\'s vice president and the board feedback was honestly none of you deserved to be vice president.

`[00:13:53]` 我们没有说的是，你知道，第一天早上，我们就像每个人的副总裁，董事会的反馈是诚实的，你们都不应该成为副总裁。

> And I remember we were driving back in Michelle\'s Jeda again from from Palo Alto.

我记得我们又从帕洛阿尔托开车回米歇尔的杰达。

> And she said you know honestly I don\'t deserve that title.

她说你知道我不应该得到这个头衔。

> Lee doesn\'t deserve that title.

李不应该得到这个称号。

> We haven\'t fired or hired anyone sometimes you just get rid of titles and you have to.

我们没有解雇或雇用任何人，有时你只是摆脱头衔，你必须这样做。

> And you have to appreciate that for a second how hard that is.

你必须意识到这有多难。

> As a founder of a company to say that I\'m going to I\'m actually going to say I don\'t want that but that then set a precedent where everyone we\'ve hired sense when they say oh I want to be you know executives senior vice president of whatever I go you know Michelle is to have a title What do you get one and that has has made sure that we\'re selecting people who really want to be there.

作为一家公司的创始人，我实际上要说我不想那样做，但那就开创了一个先例，当我们雇佣的每个人都有理智的时候，他们说：哦，我想成为公司的高级副总裁，你知道的，米歇尔就是拥有一个头衔，你能得到一个头衔，这就确保了这一点。我们在挑选真正想去的人。

> But fundamentally it also meant that Michelle really had to trust trust me and trust the rest of the organization so that when it was the right time and we have now thankfully not fire that many people but hired a ton and still talked to every single candidate that we hire.

但从根本上讲，这也意味着米歇尔必须信任我，信任公司的其他成员，这样，当时机成熟的时候，我们现在已经没有解雇那么多人，而是雇佣了很多人，并且仍然和我们雇佣的每一个候选人进行了交谈。

> That that now we\'ve earned earn that title.

现在我们赢得了这个头衔。

> `[00:15:08]` And so that that early decision that really required a humility was and it was easy it was easy for me because you know they were like someone needs to be CEOs.

`[00:15:08]` 所以真正需要谦逊的早期决定对我来说是很容易的，因为你知道他们就像需要做 CEO 一样。

> `[00:15:19]` You have been CEO.

`[00:15:19]` 你是首席执行官。

> But it was really hard for Michelle and Lee but it was the right thing to do.

但这对米歇尔和李来说真的很难，但这是正确的选择。

> And that\'s I mean one of the things I admire the most about Michelle is Michelle has Michelle Michelle has ego but no vanity.

这就是我对米歇尔最敬佩的地方之一，那就是米歇尔有自尊心，但没有虚荣心。

> `[00:15:34]` And that\'s like if you can find people that are like that you want them to be around you because like a think of how we\'re building an infrastructure technology startup think about how many reporters call us every single day saying woman tech infrastructure technology startup.

`[00:15:34]` 如果你能找到那些你希望他们在你身边的人，就像思考我们是如何建立一家基础设施技术初创公司一样，想想每天有多少记者打电话给我们，说女性科技基础设施初创公司。

> I want to write a let\'s put that on the cover and Michelle has always said it\'s the company first.

我想写一篇文章，让我们把它放在封面上，米歇尔总是说这是公司的第一名。

> `[00:15:58]` It\'s not about me.

`[00:15:58]` 这不关我的事。

> It\'s not about any of that like let\'s make sure we\'re telling the right story about the company.

这不是像这样的事情，让我们确保我们讲的是关于公司的正确故事。

> And again if you can find people like that to join your founding team those are those are absolutely people you want.

再一次，如果你能找到这样的人加入你的创始团队，那绝对是你想要的人。

> `[00:16:11]` They\'re out there you can find them apply.

`[00:16:11]` 他们在外面，你可以找到他们申请。

> `[00:16:18]` The other thing like I think has been really key to our success is that there\'s that we have you know while I think we have sort of a shoe the women in tech story think that having a woman on on our board and having that for the sake of diversity is is really I mean we\'re very different people.

`[00:16:18]` 另一件事，就像我认为的那样，是我们成功的关键，我们有你知道的，而我认为我们有一只鞋，科技故事里的女人认为，我们的董事会里有一个女人，为了多样性，我们的意思是我们是非常不同的人。

> My last startup there were three of us that started it.

我上一次创业是我们三个人开的。

> We went to junior high together.

我们一起上初中。

> We were essentially three white guys that all had some combination of technology and law and we fought like cats and it was and it\'s a miracle we even talk to this day.

我们本质上是三个白人，他们都有一些技术和法律的结合，我们像猫一样战斗，这是一个奇迹，我们甚至谈到这一天。

> Whereas you grew up in Canada Lee grew up right here in Cupertino go Canada.

而你在加拿大长大，李就在加拿大库比蒂诺长大。

> `[00:17:03]` A lot.

`[00:17:03]` 很多。

> High a kind of low vanity high ego great great.

崇高一种低贱的虚荣心，崇高的自我，伟大的伟大。

> I like Canadians.

我喜欢加拿大人。

> We\'ll hire lots of names but I think having that that set of diversity.

我们会雇佣很多人，但我认为有这种多样性。

> `[00:17:14]` I mean I\'m still I\'m so proud of the fact that we walk around the office and the number of different languages that are being spoken are are just incredibly diverse and that has so much more of an effect on on how rich the product is and how we see the rest of the world in a much more unique way.

`[00:17:14]` 我的意思是，我仍然对这样一个事实感到骄傲，那就是我们在办公室里走动，人们说的不同语言的数量非常多样化，这对产品的丰富程度和我们如何以更独特的方式看待世界其他地方产生了更大的影响。

> `[00:17:35]` We do have a really diverse team and so diversity means lots of things gender\'s 1 but where they used to work where they grew up all those sorts of things really matter.

我们确实有一个非常多样化的团队，所以多样性意味着很多事情-性别 1，但是他们过去工作的地方，他们成长的地方-所有这些事情都很重要。

> And so we\'re web infrastructure a company that\'s like again that is not something you just kind of learn night but the number of people on our team that come from a web infrastructure background it\'s very it\'s it\'s very very small.

所以我们是一家网络基础设施公司，这并不是你晚上就能学到的东西，而是我们团队中来自网络基础设施背景的人数非常少。

> `[00:17:58]` In fact like for the first 25 hires no one did.

`[00:17:58]` 事实上，就像最初的 25 名雇员一样，没有人这样做。

> `[00:18:02]` And in a way.

`[00:18:02]` 在某种程度上。

> So some people early on really gave us a lot of good guy needs go viral Sun Microsystems people and Juniper people and all these people who really understand how they get are Akamai people and they are really they are really their investors who really pressured us to do that.

所以，一些人很早就给了我们很多好男人，他们需要成为病毒，SunMicrosystems 人和 Juniper 人，以及所有这些真正理解他们是如何得到阿卡迈人的人，他们真的是他们的投资者，他们给我们施加了压力，迫使我们这么做。

> We kind of said we\'re happy you know let us keep doing our thing.

我们说我们很高兴你知道让我们继续做我们的事。

> And what I hear now a lot of people is if you are trying to do something or you know a lot about the industry sometimes you don\'t check your assumptions enough and it\'s really hard to to to really find that idea that really works.

我现在听到很多人说，如果你想做些什么，或者你对这个行业了解很多，有时你对你的假设没有足够的检查，很难找到真正有效的想法。

> And so we had a lot of adjacent experience related to the industry that we\'re doing.

因此，我们有许多与我们所做的行业相关的相邻经验。

> We had people who knew Web security and we really understood developers all these different sports things and that together has made something magical but it was a very adjacent industry.

我们有了解网络安全的人，我们真正理解开发人员-所有这些不同的体育项目-一起创造了一些神奇的东西，但这是一个非常相邻的行业。

> And so if you\'re if you\'re in our seats where you\'re like trying to start something I\'m actually not an expert in it.

所以，如果你坐在我们的座位上，你就像是在尝试开始一些事情，我其实并不是这个方面的专家。

> `[00:18:58]` I would say you\'re at an advantage as long as you\'re interested and you have to actually you have to deeply be like.

`[00:18:58]` 我会说，只要你感兴趣，你就会有优势，而实际上，你必须像这样。

> I\'m fascinated by this problem.

我被这个问题迷住了。

> I don\'t feel like I necessarily understand all the different corners of it but sometimes by not understanding all of that.

我不认为我一定要理解它的所有不同的角落，但有时通过不理解所有这些。

> Like everyone who competed with us always charge on bandwidth.

就像每个和我们竞争的人一样，总是收取带宽。

> We had no idea what we were supposed to do that so we just don\'t.

我们不知道该怎么做，所以我们就不这么做了。

> And as a result you know we\'ve that\'s that\'s been a real key to us growing as quickly as we have.

因此，你知道，这对我们的成长来说是一个真正的关键。

> `[00:19:25]` We were a bit naive of how hard it would be if we had had it.

`[00:19:25]` 我们有点天真，不知道如果我们有了它会有多难。

> We\'ve come up against some very hard technical problems but you know what they if you\'re looking to hire engineers good engineers want to work on our technical problems and we\'ve found really great solutions to those technical problems and that\'s been quarter success what we always say is okay we can solve this.

我们遇到了一些非常困难的技术问题，但是你知道他们如果你想雇用工程师，优秀的工程师想要解决我们的技术问题，我们已经找到了解决这些技术问题的很好的解决方案，这是我们经常说的好办法，我们可以解决这个问题。

> That just increases the hurdle for the people that are behind us.

这只会给我们身后的人增加障碍。

> `[00:19:45]` And it is one of the things I\'m struck by when.

`[00:19:45]` 这是我所震惊的事情之一。

> Because we\'re in a fortunate position now where a lot of entrepreneurs come to us for advice and there are a lot of people that gave us advice over the years so we try and make time for that.

因为我们现在很幸运，很多企业家来找我们咨询，多年来有很多人给了我们建议，所以我们努力争取时间。

> But oftentimes the ideas that come in people try to understand all sort of four corners and have you from the beginning.

但很多时候，人们都会尝试着去理解所有的四个角落，从一开始就让你。

> And and that\'s mean if you can see all of the problems probably isn\'t a big enough idea and the reality is it takes about as much time and about as much effort to build like an iPhone app that tells people when you\'re running late which is just a really Lugia ridiculously stupid idea.

这意味着，如果你能看到所有的问题，可能不是一个足够大的想法，而现实是，它需要同样多的时间和同样的努力，就像一个 iPhone 应用程序，当你迟到的时候告诉人们，这是一个非常愚蠢的想法。

> As it does to build CloudFlare right.

就像建造 CloudFlare 一样。

> `[00:20:28]` And that\'s and that\'s you know so what you want to work on and if you\'re an employee which do you want to work on you want to work on something where you actually can really make a dent in what the universe is doing.

`[00:20:28]` 你知道你想做什么，如果你是一名员工，你想要做的事情实际上可以在宇宙所做的事情上发挥作用。

> `[00:20:41]` You know today one out of every 20 web requests 5 percent of web requests flow through our network.

`[00:20:41]` 你今天知道，每 20 个 Web 请求中就有一个通过我们的网络，5%的 Web 请求通过我们的网络。

> You know it\'s a huge huge huge organizations rely on us to be available and online.

你知道，这是一个庞大的组织，依靠我们的服务和在线。

> And it is incredibly stressful.

令人难以置信的压力。

> But at least we matter like the word the curse is if you\'re sitting around and you see people in your organization who are bored like you.

但至少我们很重要，就像“诅咒”这个词一样，如果你坐在你身边，看到你组织中的人像你一样感到无聊，那就更重要了。

> If that\'s true.

如果那是真的。

> Start firing people because you really do like that the somewhat the critique sometimes our team will will level on us is that you know we always talk about how we\'re running hot where we want to run incredibly hot based on what it is.

开始解雇别人是因为你真的喜欢，有时候我们的团队会对我们提出一些批评，你知道我们总是在谈论我们是如何运行的，而我们想要运行的地方是非常热的，这取决于它是什么。

> There\'s never been a company in history that\'s done a billion page views per employee.

历史上从来没有一家公司每名员工的页面浏览量达到 10 亿次。

> We do 5 billion.

我们做了 50 亿。

> And that\'s really really hard.

这真的很难。

> And we as a result though we end up attracting some of the most talented people in the world.

因此，我们最终吸引了一些世界上最有才华的人才。

> Just this week this guy Olafur walks into our office starts.

就在这个星期，奥拉弗走进了我们的办公室。

> Turns out he\'s one of seven people in the world that have done their cryptographic signing of the DNS route.

事实证明，他是世界上已经完成 DNS 路由加密签名的七个人之一。

> `[00:21:50]` And he holds one seventh of the DNS key and he says You guys are doing interesting things I want to come and work there work on hard things work on big challenges work on things that make you uncomfortable make it bigger and it\'s going to be hard no matter what you do.

`[00:21:50]` 他拿着 DNS 键的七分之一，他说你们正在做一些有趣的事情，我想去那里工作，在那里工作，努力工作，面对巨大的挑战，做一些让你不舒服的事情，让它变得更大，不管你做什么，都会很难。

> But if if it works you know in one case you\'ve made an iPhone app that tells people when you\'re running late in the other case you know you\'ve helped protect democracy in Hong Kong.

但如果它奏效，你知道，在一种情况下，你制作了一款 iPhone 应用程序，当你运行得很晚时，你就会告诉人们，你知道你帮助保护了香港的民主。

> And you know have have the government of the UK as a customer and and really do things that are meaningful and impactful you get to work with really incredible people.

你知道，有英国政府作为一个客户，做一些有意义和有影响的事情，你就可以和真正令人难以置信的人一起工作。

> `[00:22:29]` So again the when you think about the idea you\'re working on you want to make sure it\'s big and mountain matters because you know we started someone back and backstage asked Did you really think that was going to.

`[00:22:29]` 所以，当你再一次思考你正在研究的想法时，你想要确保这是重大的和山区的事情，因为你知道我们在后台启动了一个人，然后问你是否真的认为这会发生。

> We\'ve been doing it for five years now.

我们已经做了五年了。

> Did you not realize you were signing up for a five year term and so if you look at the data the average time to exit whether it\'s acquisition or IPO even though I know Andrew said don\'t do that.

你难道没有意识到，你的签约期为 5 年，所以如果你看一下数据，不管是收购还是 IPO，退出的平均时间-即使我知道-安德鲁说，不要这么做。

> Whatever I\'m less negative on IPO is eight years average time is eight years.

无论我对 IPO 不那么消极，都是 8 年，平均时间是 8 年。

> I did not think of that when I started Clotfelter.

当我创办 Clotfelter 的时候，我没有想到这一点。

> And you know what it doesn\'t matter because I was like This is interesting I\'m signing up for this.

你知道什么不重要，因为我觉得这很有趣，我要注册这个。

> I think if it\'s going to work it\'s going to be amazing if it doesn\'t.

我认为如果它能起作用的话，如果它不起作用的话，那就太棒了。

> I can say I tried.

我可以说我试过了。

> And so you know don\'t get too hung up on that but do pick something that you\'re going to like put your blood sweat and tears into because there\'s definitely a lot of blood sweat and tears.

所以你知道，不要太执着于此，但一定要选择一些你会喜欢的东西，把你的血汗和眼泪放进去，因为那里肯定有很多的血汗和眼泪。

> `[00:23:21]` The crazy thing is that it like early on it\'s a roller coaster.

`[00:23:21]` 疯狂的是，它就像一辆过山车。

> Yes.

是

> And it\'s up and down and up and down and up and down like by the hour.

它是上下的，就像一个小时一样。

> It\'s no different now.

现在没什么不同了。

> I mean we had a phone call this morning that didn\'t go particularly well.

我是说今天早上我们有个电话打得不太好。

> And we\'re driving down here going wow that was our finest hour.

我们开车到这里，哇，那是我们最好的时刻。

> And then the phone rang again and it was another phone call and it just completely switched the day.

然后电话铃又响了，这是另一个电话，它完全改变了一天。

> `[00:23:49]` And that\'s it.

`[00:23:49]` 就这样。

> This is Saturday.

今天是星期六。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:23:53]` And and that\'s that\'s just it\'s amazing how how much going up and down matters and that\'s why you know again coming back to having other people around you who you really trust and you really value whether they\'re are cofounders or their investors.

`[00:23:53]` 而这只是让人惊讶的是，上下波动有多重要，这也是为什么你再次认识到，身边有其他你真正信任的人，你真的很珍惜他们是共同创始人还是他们的投资者。

> `[00:24:10]` And I think actually that\'s one of the things we\'ve been really really good at is picking really great investors but having someone that you can trust and that you that you know when when you do have the worst of all possible things happen.

`[00:24:10]` 事实上，我认为这是我们真正擅长的一件事，就是挑选真正伟大的投资者，但是有一个你可以信任的人，你知道什么时候你会发生最糟糕的事情。

> `[00:24:25]` You\'re willing to call them up and say say here\'s this really horrible thing that happened.

`[00:24:25]` 你愿意打电话给他们，说发生了一件非常可怕的事情。

> `[00:24:30]` What are we talking about is there a litmus test for who we invite to be on our board which is essentially you know who your investor is is if you imagine the worst of all possible things that could happen.

`[00:24:30]` 我们要说的是，对于我们邀请谁加入董事会有一个试金石，那就是，如果你想象可能发生的最糟糕的事情，你就知道你的投资者是谁。

> And you know in our case that\'s our network gets hacked and sites on our network get redirected to something else.

你知道，在我们的例子中，我们的网络被黑客入侵，我们网络上的网站被重定向到其他的东西上。

> That\'s that\'s like our disaster scenario would we.

这就像我们的灾难场景一样。

> Would we hesitate for a second calling someone who is on our board and and if the answer is yes they probably don\'t belong there.

我们会犹豫第二次打电话给我们董事会上的人吗？如果答案是肯定的，他们可能不属于那里。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And if you have any sort of Scooby sense about someone who you\'re about to have in as an investor that like I\'m not sure I really want this person but you know they\'re going to be me a really high valuation.

如果你对你将要投资的某个人有任何感觉，我不确定我真的想要这个人，但你知道他们会给我很高的评价。

> `[00:25:11]` Run as fast as you possibly can like in our last round.

`[00:25:11]` 在我们的最后一轮比赛中，你要尽可能快地跑。

> `[00:25:15]` We actually took the lowest possible the lowest valuation that we received which was half of what the what the what the highest was because we wanted one particular person to be in the boardroom although we didn\'t actually even technically give them a board seat.

`[00:25:15]` 我们实际上得到了尽可能低的估价，也就是最高估值的一半，因为我们想让一个特定的人进入董事会，尽管我们实际上甚至没有给他们一个董事会席位。

> `[00:25:36]` So he stood still is there and he\'s and he\'s incredibly valuable and I think that that was choosing based choosing based on surrounding yourself with great people.

`[00:25:36]` 所以他静静地站在那里，他是非常有价值的，我认为这是建立在与伟大的人围绕的基础上的选择。

> `[00:25:46]` Whether again it\'s cofounders employees investors ends up being so much matter more important over the long term than sort of saying we\'re going to dial you know.

`[00:25:46]` 无论是它的共同创始人、员工、投资者最终都是如此重要，从长远来看，比说我们要拨电话要重要得多。

> You know I\'m you know maximize on how much the how much the stock is worth.

你知道我，你知道，最大限度地了解股票的价值。

> `[00:26:01]` Yeah.

`[00:26:01]` 是的。

> So if people tell you maximize on valuation the person doesn\'t matter.

因此，如果人们告诉你在估值时最大化，那么这个人就不重要了。

> That\'s not true.

那不是真的。

> All investors are not created equal.

并非所有投资者生来都是平等的。

> And you know five years in we\'ve we\'ve we\'ve done three rounds of fundraising.

你知道，在我们这五年里，我们做了三轮募捐。

> We\'ve raised over 70 million dollars.

我们筹集了七千多万美元。

> We\'ve talked to a lot of investors people who were have huge brand names you know top notch they\'re not all created equal.

我们曾与许多拥有巨大品牌的投资者交谈过，你知道，一流的品牌并不都是平等的。

> `[00:26:26]` And so you need to find the what we maximize on and when again I really strongly encourage you to do is talk to them and find out what vision for the company is you want to make sure the visions align how you the ones the Vesta\'s that we have with our visions align.

`[00:26:00]` 所以你需要找到我们最大的目标，当我再次强烈鼓励你和他们交谈，找出公司的愿景是什么，你想确保你的愿景与我们的愿景是一致的-维斯塔。

> They want to make the Internet better and that might mean making decisions today that delay revenue and all these different sorts of things are growing at a responsible rate.

他们想让互联网变得更好，这可能意味着今天做出决定，拖延收入，所有这些不同的事情都在以负责任的速度增长。

> So you know we we as as a board have said that\'s what we want to do.

所以你知道，作为一个董事会，我们说这是我们想要做的。

> We\'ve had other investors who again are really great investors who said Oh you have to go faster you have to grow faster you have to do it even higher four times no people you\'re hiring and we\'re just like we don\'t want to do that because we don\'t think that that\'s responsible.

我们有其他投资者，他们再次是真正伟大的投资者，他们说：“哦，你必须走得更快，你必须增长得更快，你必须做得更高，不需要雇佣更高的人，我们就像我们不想那样做，因为我们不认为那是责任。”

> And you get another company might choose the other and that\'s fine that you want to align if you.

你得到另一家公司可能会选择另一家公司，如果你愿意的话，那是很好的。

> But once you make a decision on who to take money from you.

但一旦你决定由谁拿你的钱。

> It is very hard to get to that decision.

很难做出那个决定。

> So it\'s OK to have those conversations upfront.

所以提前进行这些谈话是没问题的。

> And we again we\'ve again well-known investors who have gone very far down the path with energy bringing the board along with you and then you\'ve said you know we\'re not going to go that way.

我们再一次

> `[00:27:30]` We disagree with their vision and you can do that as as management of your company.

`[00:27:30]` 我们不同意他们的观点，你可以这样做，作为你公司的管理者。

> And so these are just the sorts of things that if you pick the right people along the way the other people around the world say OK well I trust you guys.

所以，如果你选择正确的人，世界各地的其他人都会说，好吧，我相信你们。

> So that\'s it then we\'re we back you and let\'s and let\'s find the right partner for us to build the company into everything it can.

就这样，我们支持你，让我们找到合适的合作伙伴，把公司建设成它所能做的一切。

> And so those are examples of where people really do matter.

因此，这些就是人们真正重要的地方的例子。

> `[00:27:55]` So we\'re out of time out of time.

`[00:27:55]` 所以我们没有时间了。

> Thank you so much for tolerating our sort of rambling discussion Gelhaus.

非常感谢你容忍我们漫不经心的讨论，盖尔豪斯。
