# Dan Siroker at Startup School 2013  

> `[00:00:00]` Thank you.

`[00:00:00]` 谢谢。

> I have the privilege of saying this is my sixth Startup School and the first time as a presenter and today I\'m going to be sharing with you what I would have wanted to hear of the first five times while I was sitting in your seat.

我很荣幸地说，这是我的第六所创业学校，也是我第一次作为演讲者。今天，我将与大家分享我坐在你座位上时想听到的前五次。

> So I\'m going to start by telling you my story.

所以我先告诉你我的故事。

> The story of my entrepreneurial career starts while I was in college and I had the opportunity to do research in machine learning and sentiment classification and what I did was to try to use that technology to apply to the stock market.

我的创业生涯始于我上大学的时候，我有机会对机器学习和情感分类进行研究，我所做的就是尝试将这种技术应用于股票市场。

> And so this is a article that Stanford magazine published while I was a junior at Stanford and talks about how they created a computer program that Poris through newspaper articles gauges how well a company is doing based on the amount of positive or negative language used to describe it invest accordingly.

这是我在斯坦福大学三年级时发表的一篇文章，讲述了他们是如何创建一个计算机程序的，Poris 是通过报纸的文章来衡量一家公司做得有多好，依据的是用来描述公司投资的积极或消极的语言数量。

> So far so good.

到目前一切尚好。

> According to the article.

根据这篇文章。

> Well here\'s what was actually going on that year after I graduated focused entirely on this one startup by myself.

好吧，这是我毕业后的第二年发生的事情，我完全专注于一家创业公司。

> I was actually starting this company and this is the algorithm I used.

我实际上是在创办这家公司，这就是我使用的算法。

> `[00:01:01]` Did a bunch of research dot dot dot profit.

`[00:01:01]` 做了一堆研究点利润。

> And we didn\'t quite achieve profit by we I mean me because I was by myself this is a graph that shows the amount of time between when I first wrote a line of code for this company and the time we got our first paying customer laughter for those in the back that\'s not eight months.

我们没有实现利润，我是说我，因为我是一个人，这是一个图表，显示了从我第一次为这家公司写一行代码到我们第一次为后面没有八个月的客户发笑的时间。

> `[00:01:25]` That\'s infinity months.

`[00:01:25]` 那是无限月。

> `[00:01:28]` So this is a very valuable lesson for me in recognizing the value in having paying customers.

`[00:01:28]` 对我来说，这是一个非常宝贵的教训，让我认识到拥有付费客户的价值。

> And so I decided to stop working on sentiment solutions and go to Google and my goal of going to Google was to try to learn the skills that would make me successful as an entrepreneur.

所以我决定停止研究情感解决方案，去谷歌，我去谷歌的目的是努力学习那些能让我成为一名企业家的技能。

> In particular I wanted to understand what to do in the dot dot dot.

特别是，我想知道在圆点上该做些什么。

> And today I\'m going to share with you what I learned both at Google and then several other startups.

今天，我将和大家分享我在谷歌和其他几家初创公司学到的东西。

> Since.

从那以后。

> This is my algorithm at Google basically had opportunity to build some great products.

这是我在谷歌的算法基本上有机会建立一些伟大的产品。

> I was one of the first product managers on Google Chrome and so we built a product.

我是谷歌 Chrome 的第一批产品经理之一，所以我们制作了一款产品。

> Google Chrome.

谷歌 Chrome

> A good strategy that Google has for distribution is to put the word google in front of the products they build and by doing that you end up getting about 100000 people trying your product right off the bat.

谷歌有一个很好的分销策略，就是把谷歌这个词放在他们生产的产品前面，这样你就能让大约 100000 人马上试用你的产品。

> That was very valuable not only because if the product was any good you would grow much faster and you\'d be successful.

这是非常有价值的，不仅因为如果产品是好的，你会增长得更快，你就会成功。

> But because of the feedback that those people would provide as you\'re incrementally improving the product and this is the biggest lesson I learned was that Google as a product manager is the value of a feedback loop.

但是，由于这些人会在你逐步改进产品的过程中提供反馈，这是我学到的最大的教训，谷歌作为产品经理是反馈回路的价值所在。

> This is one critical thing I was missing at sentiment solutions because I didn\'t have any customers to tell me what they liked or what they didn\'t like.

这是我在情感解决方案中错过的一件关键事情，因为我没有任何客户可以告诉我他们喜欢什么或者不喜欢什么。

> I didn\'t even try to sell the products I had no idea what I actually should be building.

我甚至没有试着去销售我根本不知道该做什么的产品。

> `[00:02:43]` While I was at Google.

`[00:02:43]` 我在谷歌的时候。

> I got lucky enough to be able to sneak in and see Barack Obama speak in November of 2007.

2007 年 11 月，我有幸溜了进来，看到了巴拉克·奥巴马(BarackObama)的讲话。

> `[00:02:51]` At the time he was a senator running for president he had won the Democratic nomination yet and he came to Google and he gave a talk that described how he wanted to take what we\'re doing at Google with evidence and science and feedback and data and bring that to the government.

`[00:02:51]` 当他还是一名参议员竞选总统时，他还赢得了民主党的提名，他来到谷歌，做了一次演讲，描述了他想如何用证据、科学、反馈和数据来看待我们在谷歌所做的事情，并将其提交给政府。

> After I saw this talk two weeks later I flew to Chicago and signed up as a volunteer.

两周后，我看到了这个演讲，然后飞往芝加哥，报名成为一名志愿者。

> And so I want to share with this audience a few short clips of what Barack Obama said in November 2007 at Google and what inspired me to quit my job fly to Chicago in the dead of winter and join his campaign.

所以我想和大家分享几段关于巴拉克·奥巴马 2007 年 11 月在谷歌说过的话，是什么激励了我辞去工作，在严冬飞到芝加哥参加他的竞选活动。

> `[00:03:30]` What is the most efficient way to sort of a million 32 bit integers.

`[00:03:30]` 什么是最有效的方法来处理百万 32 位整数。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:03:37]` Well I\'m sorry.

`[00:03:37]` 我很抱歉。

> Maybe not.

也许不会。

> No no no no no.

不。

> I think that\'s not it.

我想不是这样的。

> I think I think the bubble sort would be the wrong way to go.

我认为泡沫是错误的。

> I\'m not a big believer in reason and facts and evidence and science and feedback.

我不太相信理性、事实、证据、科学和反馈。

> `[00:03:56]` Everything that allows you to do what you do.

`[00:03:56]` 一切允许你做你所做的事。

> That\'s what we should be doing in our name.

这就是我们应该以我们的名义做的事。

> Now I want I want people in technology I want innovators and engineers and scientists like yourselves I want you helping us make policy based on facts based on reason.

现在我要技术人员，我要创新者，工程师和科学家，像你们一样，我想要你们帮助我们根据理性的事实制定政策。

> And  `[00:04:18]` I think that many of you can help me.

`[00:04:18]` 我认为你们中的许多人可以帮助我。

> So I want you to be involved.

所以我想让你参与进来。

> Thank you so much everybody.

非常感谢大家。

> `[00:04:24]` Well he had me at bubble sort laughter and I decided to fly to Chicago and sign up as a volunteer.

`[00:04:24]` 嗯，他让我在泡泡式的笑声中，我决定飞到芝加哥，注册成为一名志愿者。

> And I was lucky enough to be able to join a team that was called the new media team.

我很幸运能够加入一个被称为新媒体团队的团队。

> And while I was there I got it opportunity to run several experiments called A B tests and those were quite successful so they gave me a job as the Director of Analytics and in this job my mission was to try to figure out how to use data to help make better decisions on the campaign.

当我在那里的时候，我有机会做了几个叫做 A，B 测试的实验，这些实验非常成功，所以他们给了我一份分析主任的工作，在这份工作中，我的任务是找出如何利用数据来帮助我在竞选中做出更好的决定。

> `[00:04:55]` Here\'s a picture of our team.

`[00:04:55]` 这是我们队的照片。

> We are part of the new media analytics team and new media was the phrase The campaign used to describe everything they didn\'t really understand.

我们是新媒体分析团队的一员，而新媒体是这个运动用来描述他们真正不懂的东西的短语。

> So if it wasn\'t TV or radio you fit in new media.

所以，如果不是电视或收音机，你可以加入新媒体。

> And we had the most monitors per square inch of any part of the campaign.

在竞选的任何部分，我们每平方英寸都有最多的监视器。

> Here\'s another photo of our team I\'m there in the middle with my back to the TV.

这是我们队的另一张照片，我背对着电视站在中间。

> This is during the Democratic National Convention.

这是在民主党全国代表大会期间。

> Well Bill Clinton is giving the keynote speech and broader new media team is watching.

比尔·克林顿(BillClinton)正在做主旨演讲，更广泛的新媒体团队正在关注。

> I\'m busy setting up anA.B test comparing a picture of Bill Clinton to a picture of Barack Obama on.

我正忙着设置一个 A.B 测试，把比尔·克林顿的照片和巴拉克·奥巴马的照片进行比较。

> This photo I please ask you to ignore all the bad lights.

这张照片请你不要理会所有的坏光。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:05:35]` And so the campaign I learned quite a bit.

`[00:05:35]` 所以我学到了很多。

> I learned the value of a b testing.

我学到了 b 测试的价值。

> We used products like Google Web site optimizer Omniture test and target now Adobe tests and Target and got a ton of value out of those products.

我们使用了 GoogleWeb 站点优化器、Ombench 测试和目标值等产品，现在使用 Adobe 测试和 Target，从这些产品中获得了大量的价值。

> But we were constantly bottlenecked on requiring developers to be part of the process.

但在要求开发人员参与这一过程时，我们经常遇到瓶颈。

> And so that pain was the original inspiration for starting optimizing.

所以疼痛是开始优化的最初灵感。

> It took me a while to come to that realization.

我花了一段时间才意识到这一点。

> We actually started several other companies before that and so I got to tell you those stories.

在此之前，我们实际上成立了其他几家公司，所以我要告诉你们这些故事。

> After the campaign I came back to San Francisco.

竞选结束后，我回到了旧金山。

> I convinced a good friend of mine Pete Cuman who is a product manager at Google as well to quit his job and to start a company with me.

我说服了我的一位好朋友皮特·库曼(PeteCuman)，他也是谷歌(Google)的一名产品经理，他辞去了自己的工作，并与我

> `[00:06:14]` The first company we started together it was called carrot sticks and it was an online math game for kids.

`[00:06:14]` 我们一起创办的第一家公司叫做胡萝卜棒，这是一个为孩子们提供的在线数学游戏。

> This made it easy for kids to learn math in a social way create an avatar field compete with one another and it was for us an opportunity to try to apply technology to something we really cared about which was education.

这使得孩子们很容易以一种社交的方式学习数学，创造一个相互竞争的化身领域，对我们来说，这是一个尝试将技术应用到我们真正关心的东西上的机会，那就是教育。

> `[00:06:33]` This was a product we really were still very proud of it still exists out in the world.

`[00:06:33]` 这是一个我们真的很自豪的产品，它仍然存在于世界上。

> You can go to care six ICOM and beat up on a bunch of small kids playing math and it slowly loses money over time and we learned a valuable lesson in building carrot sticks and this is the algorithm that describes the time on carrot sticks which was that we would basically build a product.

你可以去照顾六个 ICOM，和一群玩数学的小孩子打架，然后慢慢地赔钱，我们学到了制作胡萝卜棒的宝贵经验，这个算法描述了胡萝卜棒上的时间，也就是说，我们基本上要制作一个产品。

> `[00:06:57]` Sell the product.

`[00:06:57]` 出售产品。

> In this case we were selling it to parents.

在这种情况下，我们把它卖给了父母。

> Take their feedback and then try to make our company and our product better.

接受他们的反馈，然后努力使我们的公司和我们的产品更好。

> One challenge here was we were selling to several different constituents of which we were none of we were parents we weren\'t teachers and we weren\'t kids.

我们面临的一个挑战是，我们卖给了几个不同的选民，我们都不是家长，我们不是老师，我们也不是孩子。

> And so this made it very difficult for us to know what to prioritize what to do and what not to do.

因此，这使得我们很难知道该做什么和不该做什么。

> And as a startup it\'s really really important to focus on the one or two things that make you really really valuable and unique so in that process we learned the value of the feedback loop we could get better over time but because we didn\'t really build a product for ourselves is very hard for us to understand how to prioritize.

作为一家初创公司，关注一两件让你真正有价值和独特的事情是非常重要的，因此在这个过程中，我们学会了反馈回路的价值，随着时间的推移，我们可以变得更好。但是，因为我们没有真正为自己打造一个产品，所以我们很难理解如何确定优先级。

> We also had a really big challenge with distribution.

我们在分销方面也面临着很大的挑战。

> It\'s very difficult to get parents and teachers to adopt our technology.

让家长和老师采用我们的技术是非常困难的。

> And if you do you have to do it one at a time.

如果你这样做了，你必须一次只做一次。

> There\'s no scale there\'s no leverage and distribution.

没有规模，没有杠杆和分配。

> And so here is a graph of our second venture Musak my second venture carrot sticks and this is the time between our first line of code and our first paying customer.

这是我们第二次创业的图表 Musak，我的第二次冒险，胡萝卜棒，这是我们的第一行代码和我们的第一个付费客户之间的时间。

> So we improved dramatically from infinity to six months.

所以我们从无穷大提高到了六个月。

> And in that we also had the opportunity to recognize that even though we were getting some customers the pace at which we were growing wasn\'t gonna justify a large impactful company.

在这一点上，我们也有机会认识到，尽管我们得到了一些客户，但我们增长的速度并不能证明一家大而有影响力的公司是正当的。

> So we learned a lesson here which was it now we decided to try to build a product.

因此，我们在这里学到了一个教训，那就是，现在我们决定尝试制造一种产品。

> We wish we needed Ruesch we had in karats 6.

我们希望我们需要用克拉 6 的鲁斯奇。

> And so that\'s when we started Spratley.

那就是我们开始斯普拉特利的时候。

> Spreadsheet was the company that we apply to Y Combinator in winter of 2010.

电子表格是我们在 2010 年冬天向 YCombinator 申请的公司。

> `[00:08:29]` And I want to share with you the short version of the demo video or the video we submitted in our Y Combinator application that describes our experience with distribution and carrot sticks.

`[00:08:29]` 我想和大家分享我们在 Y 组合器应用程序中提交的演示视频或视频的简短版本，其中描述了我们在分发和胡萝卜棒方面的经验。

> And then why we were inspired to start Spratley.

然后我们为什么会被激励去启动斯普拉特利。

> `[00:08:43]` High and he darn we\'re both former product managers at Google and studied a bunch of computer science in college.

`[00:08:43]` 高中，我们都是谷歌的前产品经理，在大学里学过一堆计算机科学。

> I also worked a little bit on the Obama campaign and then the presidential transition doing a startup with people here in some Jusco called cassocks.

我还在奥巴马竞选团队中做了一些工作，然后在总统换届期间与 Jusco 的一些人一起创办了一家名为“锡克”的公司。

> `[00:08:57]` So we started working on Keres six about four or five months ago.

`[00:08:57]` 所以我们大约四五个月前就开始研究 Keres 了。

> And the biggest problem we ran into was distribution so getting people to use the software and getting people to talk about the software with their friends.

我们遇到的最大问题是分发，所以让人们使用软件，让人们和他们的朋友谈论软件。

> And so we started thinking very hard about that problem and how we would try to solve it.

于是我们开始非常认真地思考这个问题，以及我们将如何解决这个问题。

> We came up with an idea that recalling spread the Strelley is very simply a discount a merchant can give to a customer if that customer is willing to tell their friends through Twitter or through Facebook through e-mail about the product that they\'ve just popped today.

我们想出了一个想法，如果顾客愿意通过 twitter 或通过 facebook 通过电子邮件告诉他们的朋友他们今天刚刚推出的产品，Strelley 很简单，商家就可以给客户打折扣。

> Lime and carrot sticks you can buy Scroope from the critics and if you do that you can get a discount if you tell your friends.

石灰和胡萝卜棒，你可以从评论家那里买到卷轴，如果你这样做，你可以得到一个折扣，如果你告诉你的朋友。

> `[00:09:30]` So this video I wanted to share with you because I think it shows a couple things.

`[00:09:30]` 所以这个视频我想和你们分享，因为我认为它展示了一些东西。

> One is that the human body can only withstand one presidential campaign.

一是人体只能承受一场总统竞选。

> Here I had this image of me after gaining 50 pounds on the campaign from just eating deep dish pizza and drinking beer every night.

在这张照片中，我每天晚上只吃深盘比萨饼和喝啤酒，在竞选中体重增加了 50 磅。

> So I wanted to share that.

所以我想和大家分享。

> And we also had the opportunity working.

我们也有机会工作。

> It spread.

它扩散了。

> We now wanted to really focus on this feedback loop and getting distribution for our own product.

我们现在想要真正专注于这个反馈循环，并得到我们自己的产品的分发。

> And so we built a product spreadsheet that enabled what we just described and it took us about a month to get our first paying customer.

因此，我们建立了一个产品电子表格，它启用了我们刚才描述的内容，我们花了大约一个月的时间才得到我们的第一个付费客户。

> We were also very critical and very focused on understanding whether or not this could be a big sustainable business as fast as we could.

我们也非常挑剔，非常专注于理解这是否能尽快成为一项可持续发展的大企业。

> And so that\'s part of the mantra of Y Combinator which is to build something people want and I\'ll show you in a second.

这是 YCombinator 咒语的一部分，那就是构建人们想要的东西，我马上就会给你展示。

> The algorithm we use to do that for Smedley we realized after.

我们为 Smedley 所使用的算法是我们后来实现的。

> `[00:10:20]` Joining Y Combinator we got.

`[00:10:20]` 加入 Y 组合器。

> This is the algorithm pretty straightforward.

这是一个非常简单的算法。

> You get some money and you keep trying to build something people want you learn to improve constantly improve the product based off the feedback from trying to sell it and if it\'s no good if it\'s investing less than insanely great you come up with a better idea.

你得到了一些钱，你一直在努力制造人们想要的东西-你学会了不断改进，根据试图销售它的反馈不断改进产品。如果它的投资少于疯狂的伟大，那么你会想出一个更好的主意。

> With spread early.

传播得早。

> The one insight we got pretty quickly was that the the fundamental model didn\'t work.

我们很快得到的一个洞察力是，基本模型不起作用。

> `[00:10:43]` The social capital it took for somebody to spam their friends about a new product or service was almost always more always worth more than any amount of discount or incentive a business would be willing to pay to get them to do it.

`[00:10:43]` 一个人为了推销新产品或新服务而向朋友发短信所需的社会资本，几乎总是比一家企业愿意支付的任何折扣或奖励都更值钱。

> So fundamentally the product didn\'t work so after a month we started thinking about what are some other products we wish we would have had.

因此，从根本上说，这个产品不起作用，所以一个月后，我们开始考虑其他一些我们希望拥有的产品。

> This is a lesson we learned was friendly boy was easy it\'s friendly because we would have wanted that and carrot sticks and so we learned that with optimized optimizes the product.

这是我们学到的一个教训，友好的男孩很容易，这是友好的，因为我们会想要它和胡萝卜棒，所以我们学会了优化产品。

> I wish we had in 2008 to make it easy for anybody to doA.B testing.

我希望我们在 2008 年能让任何人都容易做 A.B 测试。

> And so we started optimizing.

所以我们开始优化。

> And I remember the first time I even had a conversation about optimizing.

我还记得我第一次谈论优化。

> We actually spoke to a person I worked with on the Obama campaign Andrew Bleeker.

我们实际上和我在奥巴马竞选活动中共事的一个人谈过了安德鲁·布里克。

> I called them on the phone while working on Spratley.

我在斯普拉特利工作的时候打电话给他们。

> And I pitched him the idea for something that would enable his team without technical resources to do a b testing the same stuff we did back in the Obama campaign.

我向他提出了一个想法，让他的团队在没有技术资源的情况下可以做一个测试，和我们在奥巴马竞选时做的一样。

> But with a visual interface one time implementation no technical resources and ability for them to continue to iterate and get better.

但是有了一个可视化的接口，一次实现，没有技术资源，也没有能力让他们继续迭代，变得更好。

> Over and over and over again.

一遍又一遍。

> And about 20 minutes into the phone call Andrew stopped me and he said that sounds great.

打完电话大约 20 分钟，安德鲁拦住了我，他说这听起来很棒。

> Send me an invoice.

给我寄一张发票。

> He thought this was a sales call and I responded by saying how much do you think this is worth.

他认为这是一个销售电话，我回答说，你认为这值多少钱。

> He said oh about a thousand dollars a month sounds right.

他说，哦，一个月大约一千美元听起来是对的。

> Which is way more money than we ever made on carrot sticks and Freddy and so what we realized we had the time until our first paying customer was one day.

这比我们用胡萝卜条和弗雷迪赚的钱还多，所以我们意识到我们有时间，直到我们的第一个付费客户有一天。

> We actually had our first paying customer before we wrote a single line of code that Tuesday.

实际上，我们有了第一个付费客户，然后我们在周二编写了一行代码。

> Thank you.

谢谢。

> So that weekend I built the first prototype and that Tuesday at dinner I showed it to Paul Graham and he looked at it got really excited pointed at this and said this is it.

所以那个周末，我制作了第一个原型，在周二的晚宴上，我把它给保罗·格雷厄姆看了看，他非常兴奋地指着这个，说就是这个。

> This is it.

就是这个

> This isA.B testing for marketers.

这是营销人员的 A.B 测试。

> Forget that other idea.

忘了另一个想法吧。

> Do this.

做这个。

> And so we followed his advice and we did this.

所以我们听从了他的建议做了这件事。

> The first year of optimizing we grew to a team of four people and an annual run rate of point one million dollars.

在优化的第一年，我们成长为一个四人的团队，年运转率为一百万美元。

> We did Y Combinator hired my brother as our first engineer and we were we had some great press on Tech Crunch top hacker news a couple times and this entire year we were focused on the product continually improving the product and it was so much easier to do that because we were building a product.

我们做了 Y Combinator，雇佣了我的兄弟作为我们的第一工程师，我们有几次在 TechCrunch 顶级黑客新闻上有过很大的压力，而今年我们一直专注于产品的不断改进，这是非常容易的，因为我们正在开发一种产品。

> I would have wanted myself back in 2008 on the campaign and so we ran a pretty simple algorithm.

我希望自己回到 2008 年的竞选活动中，所以我们运行了一个非常简单的算法。

> We kept trying to sell the product.

我们一直在努力推销这个产品。

> Me and my co-founder Pete were the main salespeople we kept selling it over and over again.

我和我的共同创始人皮特是主要的销售人员，我们一遍又一遍地销售。

> And then these conversations potential customers would ask us oh this is cool but can you do targeting.

然后这些对话，潜在的客户会问我们，哦，这很酷，但你可以做目标。

> Can you do analytics integration.

你能做分析整合。

> Can you do traffic allocation.

你能做流量分配吗。

> Can you do X Y and Z.

你能做 X Y 和 Z 吗？

> And we would take that take that as input and initially we would respond well that we are not doing that right now but that might be something we do in the future and that pattern kept continuing until that phrase that response changed from 0 actually.

我们会把它作为投入，一开始我们会很好地回应，我们现在没有这样做，但这可能是我们将来要做的事情，这种模式一直延续到这个短语从 0 实际上变为 0。

> Great question.

问得好。

> Here\'s exactly how you do that.

你就是这样做的。

> And we would show them in the interface.

我们会在界面上展示它们。

> Oh you want to do targeting here\'s how you do that and that tight feedback loop of listening closely to price prospective customers.

哦，你想在这里进行定位\是你如何做到的，以及密切倾听潜在客户价格的严密反馈回路。

> Knowing ourselves what we would have wanted in 2008 made this much much easier journey than carrots spread or even sentiment solutions.

了解我们自己在 2008 年会想要什么，这比胡萝卜传播甚至情感解决方案要容易得多。

> The next year we grew to a team of ten and an annual run rate of one point two million dollars but a 9 percent increase in revenue.

第二年，我们成长为一个 10 人的团队，年运营率为 120 万美元，但收入增长了 9%。

> And this year was first time we hired a salesperson.

今年是我们第一次雇佣销售人员。

> So we had been doing all the selling for the first year and a half.

所以，在第一年半的时间里，我们一直在做所有的销售工作。

> And one of the things I learned this year which I think is really valuable as you get bigger and bigger as a company.

而我今年学到的一件事，我认为这是非常有价值的，因为作为一个公司，你会变得越来越大。

> The most important thing for me is to focus on hiring.

对我来说，最重要的是专注于招聘。

> And so we had a pretty standard algorithm for hiring which was a good interview candidate and we would ask ourselves is this candidate better than the mean.

因此，我们有了一个非常标准的招聘算法，这是一个很好的面试候选人，我们会问自己，这个候选人是否比平均水平好。

> Are they better than the average people the average people who already work at optimizing.

他们是否比那些已经在优化工作中工作的普通人更好。

> And if we strive for this goal we will constantly get better or at least stay as good as we\'ve been when we first started.

如果我们为这个目标而奋斗，我们会不断地变得更好，或者至少和我们刚开始的时候一样好。

> And so this is the algorithm we use we said every candidate we hired but we would ask ourselves Are they better than the mean and if so we would hire them.

这就是我们使用的算法，我们说，我们雇用的每个候选人，但我们会问自己，他们是否比平均水平更好，如果是，我们会雇用他们。

> And as we actually got better at hiring we would improve the process in our startup.

事实上，随着我们在招聘方面做得更好，我们将改进我们的创业流程。

> We really focused on continuous fruit.

我们真的把注意力集中在持续的水果上。

> We made not only a feedback loop in the product but a feedback loop in our hiring machine which was critical because in the next year we actually grew substantially by the end of the year we were 42 people and an annual run rate of seven point six million dollars.

我们不仅在产品中建立了反馈环，而且在我们的雇佣机器中建立了反馈环，这是至关重要的，因为在接下来的一年中，我们实际上在年底前实现了实质性的增长，我们只有 42 人，年运转率为 760 万美元。

> We also in this year had a huge opportunity when it comes to press 2008.

我们在今年也有一个巨大的机会，当谈到 2008 年。

> We had a couple of stories that were really appealing to reporters.

我们有几个对记者很有吸引力的故事。

> The first was the Obama campaign and the Mitt Romney campaign were in full swing and we are lucky enough to have both of them as customers.

第一个是奥巴马的竞选活动，米特罗姆尼的竞选活动正如火如荼地进行，我们很幸运，他们都是我们的客户。

> So the Obama campaign in 2008 came full circle and that was really gratifying and also very gratifying that the head of the digital team for the Romney campaign said that the hardest decision he had to make was to use optimized for a testing knowing the origin story of it coming from the Obama campaign.

所以奥巴马 2008 年的竞选活动是一个完整的循环，这是令人欣慰的，也是非常令人欣慰的，罗姆尼竞选团队的数字团队负责人说，他必须做出的最艰难的决定是使用优化后的测试，知道它的起源来自奥巴马竞选团队。

> So we\'re thrilled about that story which was really helpful early on on CNN.

所以我们对这个故事感到非常兴奋，这在 CNN 早期是非常有帮助的。

> We got on a bunch of other main mainstream media outlets but then there\'s another story that was also really appealing to reporters especially tech reporters and that story was this David versus Goliath story spoon feed them this idea that we are the davit in this battle against Adobe the big evil Adobe who had the time had a product called Omniture Tessanne target which I used a lot in the Obama campaign.

我们接触到了许多其他主流媒体，但还有另外一个故事对记者也很有吸引力，特别是科技记者，这个故事是大卫和歌利亚的故事勺子给他们灌输了这样的观点：我们是这场对抗 Adobe 的战斗中的匕首。Adobe 有时间开发了一款名为 OmkitTessanne Target 的产品，我在奥巴马的竞选中经常用到它。

> This story was very popular and it actually stoked some fires with Adobe which is we\'re really proud of.

这个故事非常流行，实际上它用 Adobe 引发了一些火灾，这是我们非常自豪的。

> And it also gave us a lot of press and legitimacy and we had many of the customers who were beaten up and tired and frustrated with the incumbent move to us as a product and in some ways their response really validated our existence.

这也给我们带来了很多压力和合法性，我们有很多客户被殴打、疲惫和沮丧，因为现任者将我们作为一种产品转移到我们这里，在某些方面，他们的反应确实验证了我们的存在。

> `[00:16:22]` And so that brings us to today.

`[00:16:22]` 这样我们就到了今天。

> So if you take this graph and you shrink it down and you add a couple more quarters you\'ll get to where we were this is where we were at the end of the year.

如果你拿着这张图，把它缩小，再加上几个四分之一，你就会得到我们现在的位置，这就是年底的情况。

> We had a team 42 and this is where we are today.

我们有一支 42 队，这就是我们今天的状态。

> `[00:16:37]` With have a team of 130.

`[00:16:37]` 有一支 130 人的队伍。

> We\'ve now launched and we have the product available in 10 different languages.

我们现在已经推出了这个产品，我们有 10 种不同的语言。

> My co-founder and I actually wrote a book to try to get distribution called A B testing the most powerful way to turn clicks into customers.

实际上，我和我的联合创始人写了一本书，试图得到一本叫做“A-B 测试”的书，它是把点击变成客户的最有力的方法。

> And we really continue to focus on all of the things that made us great from the beginning constantly trying to improve in this year.

我们真的继续专注于所有从一开始就让我们变得伟大的事情，在这一年里，我们一直在努力改进。

> We also realize that our opportunity as entrepreneurs is not just to run the same algorithms every other startup or every other business runs but to define our own and in particular one thing we did in 2000 and 2013 that I think is pretty unique to the process we used to raise our Series A.

我们还意识到，作为企业家，我们的机会不仅仅是运行相同的算法，每一个其他的创业公司或其他的业务运行，而是定义我们自己的，特别是我们在 2000 年和 2013 年所做的一件事，我认为这是我们提高 A 系列的过程中非常独特的。

> The process we use looks something like this we would host a mock board meeting with potential investors.

我们所使用的过程看上去就像这样，我们将与潜在投资者举行模拟董事会会议。

> So we had try it.

所以我们试过了。

> We actually spent three hours with each of the partners that we thought were finalists had them spend time with us have them send time with our management team and really put them through the paces of exactly what they would be like as board members for our company.

我们实际上花了三个小时与每一个合伙人，我们认为是决赛，让他们花时间与我们，让他们发送时间与我们的管理团队，并真正地让他们的步伐，他们将是什么样的，他们会是什么样的董事会成员，我们的公司。

> This is a completely different setting than most entrepreneurs have when they\'re working with an investor which is over dinner or it\'s a pitch meeting down on Tannahill Road.

这是一个完全不同的环境，当大多数企业家工作时，他们与一个投资者，而这是在晚餐，或这是一个在坦纳希尔路的推销会议。

> From this we realize what we really wanted an investor and in fact we found an investor.

由此我们意识到我们真正想要的是一个投资者，事实上我们找到了一个投资者。

> We never thought we would have won it from the beginning because he wasn\'t technical.

我们从未想过我们会从一开始就赢得比赛，因为他不是技术人员。

> He didn\'t have operational experience and he wasn\'t all of the things we thought we wanted in the board member.

他没有操作经验，他也不是我们认为我们希望成为董事会成员的所有东西。

> But what he did have was a very very good way of helping us get better which is in the feedback he gave us in the smart board meeting.

但他所做的是帮助我们变得更好的一种非常好的方式，那就是他在智能董事会会议上给我们的反馈。

> He focused on asking the right questions not prescribing the right answers.

他专注于提出正确的问题，而不是给出正确的答案。

> And that really impressed me and my co-founder Pete.

这给我和我的联合创始人皮特留下了深刻的印象。

> And so we asked Peter Fenton from benchmark to join us on the board and we haven\'t looked back.

因此，我们请基准的彼得芬顿加入我们的董事会，我们没有回头。

> We\'ve been very happy with that decision.

我们对这个决定非常满意。

> So this is what the product is today I\'ll show some quick screenshots today through this process of continuous improvement in innovation.

所以，这就是今天的产品，通过不断改进创新的过程，我将在今天展示一些快速的屏幕截图。

> We\'ve built a product that allows you to put in any you are rallying to our home page open up in a visual editor click on any part of that page make a change to it and then run an experiment to see whether that change improves your conversion rate.

我们已经建立了一个产品，让你可以把任何你聚集到我们的主页，打开在视觉编辑器，点击该网页的任何部分，对其进行更改，然后运行一个实验，看看这个变化是否提高了你的转化率。

> This fundamental model is the same model that now we\'re applying to other mediums as well and we\'re really excited to continue to grow Knabe enable every business to use data to make better decisions.

这个基本模型和我们现在应用于其他媒体的模型是一样的，我们非常兴奋地继续发展 Knabe，使每个企业都能够使用数据来做出更好的决策。

> The vision for our product is to enable the world to turn data into action and we think A B testing is a great first step toward that.

我们产品的愿景是使世界能够将数据转化为行动，我们认为 A、B 测试是实现这一目标的第一步。

> One of the things again that has helped us quite a bit as I said earlier is having customers who give us great feedback but not only great feedback but our customers who not only are delighted but our evangelists for our company.

正如我早些时候所说，其中一件事对我们帮助很大，那就是有客户给我们很好的反馈，但不仅仅是很好的反馈，还有我们的客户，他们不仅很高兴，还为我们的公司传道者。

> So we have a great sales team and optimize.

所以我们有一个伟大的销售团队和优化。

> But our real sales team in fact in fact our biggest secret to our success is the sales team of the 5000 happy customers who sing our praise wherever they go.

但我们真正的销售团队，事实上，我们成功的最大秘诀是 5000 名快乐客户的销售团队，他们无论走到哪里，都会为我们喝彩。

> A word of mouth referral from the director of marketing of Starbucks is much more valuable than even the best sales guy at our building.

来自星巴克营销总监的口头推荐信比我们大楼里最优秀的销售人员更有价值。

> So these are a bunch of algorithms.

这些是一堆算法。

> I just showed you a bunch of algorithms and some of you are probably computer science students here and you might be noticing a pattern.

我刚刚给你们展示了一堆算法，你们中的一些人可能是这里的计算机科学专业的学生，你们可能注意到了一种模式。

> This pattern is something that only recently realized.

这种模式是直到最近才意识到的。

> And this is what I\'m describing actually as in my mind the universal startup algorithm.

这就是我所描述的，在我心目中通用的启动算法。

> This is an algorithm you can apply to almost any decision you have to make as an entrepreneur.

这是一个算法，你可以应用到几乎任何决定，你必须作为一个企业家。

> And it\'s critical for you as a company to get better over time.

作为一家公司，随着时间的推移，要想变得更好，对你来说是至关重要的。

> And this is what that simple algorithm is.

这就是那个简单的算法。

> Everything you do get feedback use that feedback to make you better focus on continuous improvement.

你所做的每一件事都会得到反馈，利用这些反馈让你更好地专注于持续改进。

> You\'re not going to make the right decisions are not going to do the right things in the beginning but constantly trying to get better is the only way you\'re gonna build a lasting company.

你不会做出正确的决定，也不会在一开始就做正确的事情，但不断努力变得更好是你建立一家持久公司的唯一途径。

> This is something that I\'ve seen now from hiring to raising our Series A to building a product and getting press.

这是我现在看到的，从雇佣到提升我们的 A 系列，到制造产品和得到媒体。

> This algorithm is fundamental to all of the greatest companies.

这个算法是所有最伟大的公司的基础。

> They\'ve all focused on continuous improvement.

他们都专注于不断改进。

> The second thing I\'ll say about this universal startup algorithm is that a common mistake many entrepreneurs make and I make this mistake all the time is they get trapped in something known as the activity trap.

关于这个通用的创业算法，我要说的第二件事是，许多企业家经常犯的一个常见错误就是他们陷入了所谓的“活动陷阱”。

> They think their job is to execute the algorithm constantly execute the algorithm.

他们认为他们的工作是不断地执行算法。

> Your job as an entrepreneur is to write the algorithm.

作为一名企业家，你的工作就是编写算法。

> Great example of this is Tesla.

特斯拉就是一个很好的例子。

> Tesla has decided that they\'re not going to do the same distribution model that every other car company in the world.

特斯拉已经决定，他们不会像世界上其他任何一家汽车公司那样，做同样的分销模式。

> They\'re going to sell cars directly.

他们将直接出售汽车。

> They\'re not going to negotiate prices and they\'re going to cut out the middleman.

他们不打算谈判价格，他们将取消中间商。

> Elon Musk defined the algorithm he wrote the algorithm for his company and now that\'s going to be a huge advantage for them as they continue to grow.

埃隆·马斯克(ElonMusk)定义了他为自己的公司编写的算法，随着它们的不断增长，这对它们来说将是一个巨大的优势。

> `[00:21:00]` Thank you very much applaud.

`[00:21:00]` 非常感谢你鼓掌。

