# Mark Zuckerberg at Startup School 2013  

> `[00:00:00]` You know I came out here earlier and they didn\'t clap as loud.

`[00:00:00]` 你知道我早些时候来的，他们没有这么大声鼓掌。

> So it\'s pretty obvious why they were clapping allowed this.

所以很明显，他们鼓掌的原因是允许这样做的。

> That was for you.

那是给你的。

> `[00:00:10]` All right.

`[00:10:00]` 好的。

> I don\'t have any songs for you.

我没有给你的歌。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> Just a few minutes ago Jack was there playing a song.

就在几分钟前杰克在那里放了首歌。

> What\'s going on in here.

这里面到底是怎么回事。

> He can pull that off I can\'t.

他能做到我做不到。

> Maybe next year.

也许明年吧。

> `[00:00:24]` So I wanted I know it it\'s probably hard to remember what it was like way way back in the beginnings of Facebook.

`[00:00:24]` 所以我想知道，很难回忆起 Facebook 开始的时候是什么样子的。

> But that\'s where these guys are in the beginnings.

但这是这些人开始的地方。

> So I\'m going to ask you questions about the early years right.

所以我会问你关于早年的问题，对吧。

> Which also have the advantage that you don\'t have to worry about saying bad things as a public company because we\'re just talking about ancient history.

这也有一个好处，那就是你不必担心作为一家上市公司会说坏话，因为我们只是在谈论古老的历史。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So I wonder if you remember when you sat down to write Facebook during that reading period.

所以我想知道你是否还记得那一段时间你坐下来写 Facebook 的事。

> What was the first thing you wrote like when you when you had enough code to test something to see if it worked.

当你有足够的代码来测试一些东西，看看它是否有效时，你写的第一件事是什么？

> What was it.

是怎么回事。

> `[00:01:01]` What did you test.

`[00:01:01]` 你测试了什么。

> I  `[00:01:05]` don\'t remember then what that was the first thing was that I wrote but it actually the first code for Facebook started way before then or so I\'d like probably a lot of you guys just built a lot of stuff for myself all throughout my childhood I built games that I wanted to play.

我不记得了，那是我写的第一件事，但实际上，Facebook 的第一段代码在那之前就已经开始了，所以我希望你们中的很多人在我童年的时候就为自己做了很多东西，我想玩的游戏都是我自己做的。

> I built a music player that I wanted I tried to build stuff that that I really wanted for myself right now.

我制作了一个我想要的音乐播放器，我现在试着为自己做一些我真正想要的东西。

> I was young I was building very high quality stuff.

我年轻的时候，我在建造高质量的东西。

> It was just stuff that that I wanted not not for anyone else.

这只是我不想给别人的东西。

> And then when I got to college I started wanting to build products that would let me get insight into the community around me and let me connect with the people around me.

当我上大学的时候，我开始想制造产品，这样我就能深入了解周围的社区，并与周围的人建立联系。

> And that had the property that you can\'t actually just build something that only you use if you want to be able to connect with people around you.

它拥有这样的特性：你不能只构建一些你想要与周围的人建立联系的东西。

> You have to start building software that other people are going to use as well.

你必须开始构建其他人也会使用的软件。

> `[00:02:00]` So I actually mean like face mash.

`[00:02:00]` 所以我的意思是像面糊一样。

> `[00:02:03]` Well before that you know it\'s actually one of the it\'s that stupid movie makes everyone think that facemask was like it was this critical thing.

`[00:02:03]` 在那之前，你知道它实际上是一部愚蠢的电影，它让每个人都认为面具就像是一件很关键的事情。

> But actually a lot earlier than that in my sophomore year one of the first things that I built that was kind of like this was actually called Match.

但实际上比我大二的时候早得多，我建造的第一件东西之一，就像这个叫做“匹配”(Match)。

> I don\'t think we\'ve talked about this that much and I know most startups.

我不认为我们已经谈了那么多，而且我知道大多数初创公司。

> `[00:02:23]` It was I was trying to figure out what classes I wanted to take my sophomore fall and I wanted to see what other people who had taken the c s classes that I\'d taken wanted to take and what my friends were planning on taking and what they had taken in the past.

`[00:02:23]` 我想弄清楚我想上什么课程，我的大二，我想看看其他人谁上过 c‘s 课程，我想参加什么课程，我的朋友们打算上什么课，他们过去学过什么。

> But there was no database like that that was out there so I thought Alright well how can I do this.

但是没有这样的数据库，所以我想，好吧，我该怎么做呢。

> So I went and I wrote this little script that scraped the course catalog and let people put in what classes they wanted and I called it the course graph.

所以我去写了一个小脚本，它刮去了课程目录，让人们输入他们想要的课程，我称之为课程图。

> And that was actually the first time.

这是第一次。

> Yeah I mean it was it was actually I made the mistake of running it running the website from a laptop in my dorm room and my desk was right next to the bathroom when there was like constantly steam pouring out of that from people showering so the laptop actually fried and I lost that one after a few weeks of running.

是的，我的意思是，实际上，我犯了一个错误：我在宿舍的笔记本电脑上运行网站，而我的办公桌就在浴室旁边，就像不断有蒸汽从洗澡的人身上冒出来，所以笔记本电脑被烧坏了，几个星期后我就把它弄丢了。

> But that was the first time that I\'d ever really set up a production Apache server.

但这是我第一次真正建立一个生产 Apache 服务器。

> My Sequel server or a lot of that stuff and then a lot of those those things you know then when I went on to build later stuff I had those lessons and I knew that I could set those things up quickly.

我的续集服务器，或者很多那些东西，然后你知道的很多东西，然后当我继续构建以后的东西时，我得到了那些教训，我知道我可以很快地设置这些东西。

> So those were just building blocks on top of which to build future things had people put their classes in it.

因此，这些只是建筑的积木，在上面建造未来的东西，让人们把他们的类放在上面。

> `[00:03:31]` Did you use it.

`[00:03:31]` 你用过它吗？

> `[00:03:32]` Oh yeah yeah.

`[00:03:32]` 哦，是的。

> No it was like 1000 or 2000 people out of was like 6000 people at Harvard.

不，在哈佛大约有 1000 人或 2000 人，而在哈佛大约有 6000 人。

> Yeah.

嗯

> Yeah.

嗯

> So it worked fine.

所以效果很好。

> It was actually really interesting.

其实真的很有趣。

> `[00:03:44]` People spend so much time just clicking through the links of people to see what classes they were in and then in the classes they clicked on people who were the roster of the people.

`[00:03:44]` 人们花了那么多时间点击人们的链接，看看他们在哪一类，然后在课堂上点击那些人的名单。

> It was just it was I thought it was going to be interesting and I wanted to solve this problem.

只是我觉得这会很有趣，我想解决这个问题。

> But it was actually just way more compelling and you know part of my theory at the time was you know I looked at all the other types of content that were out there on the Internet.

但它实际上更有说服力，你知道，我当时的部分理论是，你知道，我看了互联网上的所有其他类型的内容。

> It\'s like you could search for any Musiker news or content or reference material that you wanted.

这就像你可以搜索你想要的任何 Musiker 新闻、内容或参考资料。

> But part of my theory at the time was that people were really missing from the Internet.

但我当时的部分理论是，人们真的从互联网上消失了。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And there were no services like that.

没有这样的服务。

> And you know that\'s why I built some of these services that went in that direction but I still think people are largely missing from a lot of the software that we build which is why I\'m focused on building this development platform today as part of Facebook.

你知道，这就是为什么我建立了一些朝着这个方向发展的服务，但我仍然认为人们在很多我们开发的软件中很大程度上是缺失的，这就是为什么我现在专注于把这个开发平台作为 Facebook 的一部分来构建。

> That way the next generation of software that the industry builds can just be more human.

这样，业界构建的下一代软件就会更加人性化。

> `[00:04:33]` So every app that people build has this sort of additional dimension now where you can sort of see what other people are doing too.

`[00:04:33]` 所以每个人构建的应用程序都有这样一个额外的维度，你现在可以看到其他人也在做什么。

> We\'re trying to go in that direction.

我们正朝那个方向努力。

> So you knew by the time you started Facebook that if you made some website you could get thousands of people to show up to it.

所以，当你创建 Facebook 的时候，你就知道，如果你创建了某个网站，就会有成千上万的人出现在你的网站上。

> `[00:04:48]` Well it was I didn\'t have a choice.

`[00:04:48]` 嗯，我没有选择。

> I knew that if I wanted to do this that I had to build something that I could that would get people to use it.

我知道，如果我想这样做，我必须建立一个我可以让人们使用它的东西。

> I don\'t know if I could actually do that.

我不知道我是否真的能做到。

> `[00:04:57]` But it must have been a little bit surprising that thousands of people that are with resources on writers would show up for something that wasn\'t even intended to thousands and you probably do it again right.

`[00:04:57]` 但是，有数千名作家资源的人会出现在一些甚至不是为数千人准备的事情上，这一定有点令人吃惊，而你很可能再次正确地这样做了。

> `[00:05:08]` Well yeah.

`[00:05:08]` 是的。

> And then I did a few more and I was really focused on this idea of channeling a community\'s energy to build some kind of shared asset whether it\'s you know the course graph or you know ultimately Facebook was a good example of this.

然后我做了更多，我真的专注于将社区的能量输送到建立某种共享资产的想法上，不管是你知道课程图还是你知道最终 Facebook 就是一个很好的例子。

> I mean one of my favorite stories from from college that I actually I think I\'ve told that Startup School before as I built the first version of Facebook during reading period which is basically this two or three week period that Harvard got off they still give this but they don\'t think they\'ve stopped talking.

我的意思是，我最喜欢的大学故事之一，我想我以前告诉过创业学校，因为我在阅读期间创建了 Facebook 的第一个版本，这基本上是哈佛在这两三个星期的时间里开始的，他们仍然给出了这个，但他们认为他们并没有停止交谈。

> Well you know both Microsoft and Facebook started during reading.

你知道，微软和 Facebook 都是从阅读开始的。

> So Harvard likes to canceling things that work.

所以哈佛喜欢取消那些有用的东西。

> `[00:05:46]` Laughter.

`[00:05:46]` 笑声。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:05:49]` But so basically it\'s the period during January before your finals where you can ostensibly study for classes for your finals.

`[00:05:49]` 但基本上是在一月份期末考试之前的一段时间里，你可以表面上为期末考试的课程学习。

> And I took that period to write the first version of Facebook.

我用这段时间写了 Facebook 的第一个版本。

> I don\'t think I\'ve written any code for that project directly until really January.

我认为我没有为那个项目直接写任何代码，直到真正的一月。

> And then by the end of January it\'s basically done with it.

到了 1 月底，它基本上就完成了。

> But then one day I woke up a couple of days before this final for this class that was taken called the Room of Agusta.

但是有一天，我在这门名为“阿古斯塔教室”的期末考试前几天醒来。

> So is this some lyght in arts class.

这是艺术课的一部分吗。

> And the class was all about learning the historical significance of a bunch of pieces of art that were there and for the final they were just going to show some pieces of art from the class and you had to write an essay on the significance of them and I hadn\'t really gone to class all term I just like programmed.

这堂课的全部内容是学习一堆艺术作品的历史意义，在期末，他们将展示一些来自班上的艺术品，你必须写一篇关于它们的重要性的文章，而我并没有真正上过所有的学期，我只是喜欢编程。

> And then during reading period when I should\'ve been learning this I programmed and I\'m so pretty screwed right.

然后在阅读期间，当我应该学习这个的时候，我编程了，我非常的糟糕。

> There\'s no way that I was going to cover all this material.

我不可能涵盖所有这些材料。

> So I just went to the course Web site downloaded all the images and made a little Web site that basically would randomly show one of the images and would let you contribute your notes of what you thought was reasonable or what was important about that photo you see anyone else\'s taken by going to class what\'s up.

所以我去了课程网站，下载了所有的图片，并制作了一个小网站，基本上可以随意显示其中的一张图片，然后让你把你认为合理的或者重要的照片的笔记交给你的人，你可以通过上课看到其他人所拍摄的照片。

> Yeah there\'s other people learn through hard work.

是的，还有其他人通过努力学习。

> `[00:07:04]` And I send this out to the course e-mail list is like Hey guys I built a study tool.

`[00:07:04]` 我把这个发到课程电子邮件列表上，就像嘿，伙计们，我建立了一个学习工具。

> And within an hour the whole thing was just populated with all the information that we needed to take the class to take the final so I think I did pretty well in the final.

不到一个小时，整件事就被我们参加期末考试所需要的所有信息填满了，所以我想我在决赛中做得很好。

> `[00:07:16]` I don\'t remember the exact grade but tell us about some real world system you have had to your advantage.

`[00:07:16]` 我不记得确切的分数，但告诉我们一些真实世界的系统，你的优势。

> What\'s up.

怎么\？

> That\'s an answer.

这是个答案。

> That\'s a question on the wise application form we actually ask for people having done a trick like that that would get our attention.

这是一个问题，在明智的申请表上，我们实际上要求的人，做了这样的把戏，会引起我们的注意。

> Incidentally if you ever wanted to see.

顺便说一句如果你想看的话。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:07:38]` Laughter.

`[00:07:38]` 笑声。

> `[00:07:38]` Laughter Well it\'s funny you know the first couple times I met Mark after all this time evaluating startup founders.

`[00:07:38]` 笑声，嗯，很有趣，你知道我第一次见到马克，在这么长时间之后，我都在评估初创公司的创始人。

> I can\'t turn it off so I\'m like the first couple times I met Mark.

我不能关掉它，所以我就像第一次见到马克一样。

> There would be this like prothese side process running in my head saying except him accepting him and I would have to say stop it it\'s too late.

会有这样的事情发生在我的脑海中，除了他接受他，我不得不说停止，一切都太晚了。

> `[00:07:57]` Laughter.

`[00:07:57]` 笑声。

> Well now we get to work together on other things.

现在我们可以一起在其他事情上合作了。

> `[00:08:01]` Laughter.

`[00:08:01]` 笑声。

> All right.

好的

> No I love it.

不我喜欢。

> I love it.

我爱死它了。

> `[00:08:05]` So one of the things we talked about last year was how when you first launched Facebook the first other colleges you expanded to were ones that had competing services.

`[00:08:05]` 去年我们讨论过的事情之一是，当你第一次创建 Facebook 的时候，你扩展到的第一所大学是那些拥有竞争服务的大学。

> So I didn\'t ask you at the time but I wonder now why did you win.

所以我当时没有问你，但现在我想知道你为什么赢了。

> `[00:08:20]` What was it that Facebook had that the competing services didn\'t I think it is just this focus on real identity and the connections between people.

`[00:08:20]` Facebook 的竞争服务是什么？我不认为这只是关注真实身份和人与人之间的联系。

> `[00:08:32]` It goes back to this theme where before Facebook on the Internet there were you could find a lot of information about a lot of different types of content.

`[00:08:32]` 它可以追溯到这个主题，在互联网上 Facebook 出现之前，你可以找到很多关于许多不同类型内容的信息。

> `[00:08:40]` But the thing that we as people care the most about which is other people write it around us and our brains are just wired that way.

`[00:08:40]` 但是我们作为人最关心的事情，也就是其他人把它写在我们周围，我们的大脑就是这样的。

> It wasn\'t there.

它不在那里。

> And if you think about it.

如果你想一想。

> The reason is that you know that that information about people isn\'t just out there on the Internet to be indexed via some search engine.

原因是你知道关于人的信息并不仅仅存在于互联网上，而是通过某种搜索引擎进行索引。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> You can just send a web crawler around and learn what\'s going on with people.

你只需发送一个网络爬虫，并了解\发生了什么与人。

> You have to build tools that give people the power to share that content themselves.

你必须构建一些工具，让人们能够自己分享这些内容。

> And that stuff didn\'t exist.

那些东西根本不存在。

> And if you go back you know most of the way that people interact online was anonymous.

如果你回去，你知道人们在网上互动的大部分方式都是匿名的。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And the idea at the time was that it was pretty scary to put your name in real identity online without the right privacy controls and without kind of the right community infrastructure.

当时的想法是，在没有正确的隐私控制和适当的社区基础设施的情况下，把你的名字写在网上的真实身份是相当可怕的。

> So that\'s a lot of what we built was a framework where people would be comfortable sharing it that way and where people able to share less on these competing services.

这就是我们所建立的一个框架，在这个框架中，人们会乐于以那种方式共享它，并且人们能够在这些相互竞争的服务上共享更少的资源。

> `[00:09:32]` There were three universities you mentioned.

`[00:09:32]` 你提到过三所大学。

> Yeah I mean Stanford entered jail in Columbia.

我是说斯坦福进了哥伦比亚的监狱。

> Yeah.

嗯

> That each had different things.

每个人都有不同的东西。

> `[00:09:38]` I think some of them were just they gave people less ways to express content about themselves.

`[00:09:38]` 我认为他们中的一些只是他们给了人们更少的方式来表达自己的内容。

> None of them I think had a concept of connections.

我认为他们中没有一个人有联系的概念。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So one of the things that if you think about you know friend people yeah and if you think about friending today one of the reasons why it\'s important is because you get the person\'s content in your news feed right.

所以，如果你想到你认识朋友的人，是的，如果你想今天结交朋友，那么其中一个重要的原因就是你把这个人的内容放在你的新闻上。

> And there was no news feed back then.

当时没有新闻反馈。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So a lot of the reason that that friending was it was good it was just because you could put someone on your profile and say that you were connected to them.

所以，朋友关系之所以很好，是因为你可以把某人放到你的个人资料上，说你和他们有联系。

> So just like people were more fascinated than intuitively it seemed like they should have been about looking and clicking through the classes that people were taking.

所以，就像人们比直觉更感兴趣一样，他们应该是在观察和点击人们正在学习的课程。

> A lot of people also just wanted to see who other people knew.

很多人也只是想看看别人认识谁。

> There was nothing like that that existed.

根本就没有这样的东西存在。

> `[00:10:18]` So you had friending from the beginning.

`[00:10:18]` 所以你从一开始就有朋友。

> `[00:10:20]` Oh yeah.

`[00:10:20]` 哦，是的。

> `[00:10:21]` That was a really critical piece so the missing connections they had the nodes of the social graph but not the arcs.

`[00:10:21]` 这是一个非常关键的部分，所以缺少的连接有社交图的节点，但没有弧线。

> `[00:10:30]` Well there is that.

`[00:10:30]` 是这样的。

> And I think there\'s less emphasis on real identity in the community.

我认为社区中对真实身份的重视较少。

> So some of these communities you know just like you made it so that people could sign up with a pseudonym which is is fine.

所以有些社区，你知道，就像你做的那样，这样人们就可以注册一个假名，这很好。

> `[00:10:40]` I mean I think that there are lots of services that are good with pseudonyms but if you\'re talking about real a real community that then you want to have its drawbacks.

`[00:10:40]` 我的意思是，我认为有很多服务是好用化名的，但如果你说的是真正的一个真正的社区，那么你想有它的缺点。

> `[00:10:50]` Have you ever seen the comments on Hacker News.

`[00:10:50]` 你看过黑客新闻上的评论吗？

> Laughter.

笑声。

> I think if people were talking under their own names they might be a bit more civilized.

我想如果人们用自己的名字说话，他们可能会更文明一些。

> `[00:10:58]` And sometimes it\'s actually it goes both ways though right I mean a lot of the advantage of that is that people can be very critical.

`[00:10:58]` 有时候它是双向的，但我的意思是，它的很多优点是人们可以非常挑剔。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> If you\'re always talking into your real name it there\'s often a social penalty for being critical so it is more civilized I think.

如果你总是用你的真名说话，那就会因为批评而受到社会的惩罚，所以我认为它更文明。

> But that may not always be the most productive thing.

但这可能并不总是最有成效的事情。

> So you want a balance of these things.

所以你想要平衡这些东西。

> `[00:11:23]` At the moment I envy you so we can talk after this about getting inverted.

`[00:11:23]` 此刻，我羡慕你，所以我们可以在这之后谈谈如何倒置。

> I know what you\'re saying.

我知道你在说什么。

> `[00:11:33]` Applause Applause The Devil You Know or the devil you don\'t.

`[00:11:33]` 掌声是你认识的魔鬼还是你不认识的魔鬼。

> `[00:11:39]` OK.

`[00:11:39]` 好的。

> `[00:11:39]` The key is don\'t only use Facebook Connect.

`[00:11:39]` 关键是不要只使用 FacebookConnect。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Some people make that can use Facebook and Twitter.

有些人可以使用 Facebook 和 Twitter。

> Well you know Facebook and e-mail or whatever or whatever else thereafter Twitter is fine too.

嗯，你知道 facebook 和电子邮件，或者其他什么的，之后推特也很好。

> `[00:11:51]` Laughter.

`[00:11:51]` 笑声。

> `[00:11:53]` But you only use to you.

`[00:11:53]` 但你只用你自己。

> All right now this is a hypothetical question.

好吧，这是一个假设性的问题。

> `[00:11:57]` So if you hadn\'t started Facebook Like for example if if Harvard had already canceled reading period and you were actually kicked me out.

`[00:11:57]` 所以如果你没有启动 Facebook，比如说，如果哈佛已经取消了阅读期，而实际上你却把我开除了。

> `[00:12:05]` Right or they kicked you out of Facebook smash you know you ask this question before but what I\'ve started Facebook without smash about the only thing that I got from face smash was I met my wife because of it because my Harvard said that they were gonna kick me out and my friends really thought that they were gonna kick me out.

`[00:12:05]` 是的，或者是他们把你赶出了 Facebook，你知道你以前问过这个问题，但我在 Facebook 开始的时候并没有扣杀脸书，我从脸谱上得到的唯一好处就是我遇见了我的妻子，因为我的哈佛说他们要把我赶出去，而我的朋友们真的以为他们会把我赶出去。

> They planned this going away party for me and I actually met my wife at that party.

他们为我策划了这场送别派对，我在那次聚会上遇到了我的妻子。

> `[00:12:27]` So I didn\'t even wait for the ad board to decide before they had the going away party.

`[00:12:27]` 所以我甚至没有等到广告牌决定之后，他们才会举行送别派对。

> `[00:12:31]` They were so sure yeah my friends were just like completely positive that I was going to get kicked out of school.

`[00:12:31]` 他们很确定，是的，我的朋友们非常肯定，我会被学校开除。

> Laughter Actually you know not only that but my family was pretty confident that I was going to either get kicked out or drop out of school to before I started college.

笑声，事实上，你不仅知道，而且我的家人很有信心，我要么会被踢出学校，要么会在我上大学之前辍学。

> My little sister bet me that she would finish college before me and my mom later told me that she always knew I was going to leave college.

我妹妹跟我打赌，她会在我之前完成大学学业，我妈妈后来告诉我，她一直知道我要离开大学。

> It was like Thanks Mom laughter.

就像谢谢妈妈大笑。

> `[00:12:54]` So here\'s my hypothetical question If you hadn\'t started Facebook there would probably be something like Facebook now.

`[00:12:54]` 所以，我的假设问题是，如果你没有创建 Facebook，现在可能会出现类似 Facebook 的东西。

> Yeah.

嗯

> Would it have.

https://tmt.ap-beijing.tencentcloudapi.com/?Action=TextTranslate&Nonce=1234&ProjectId=1257710951&Region=ap-beijing&SecretId=AKIDPqCXo8hXckompwwu7EB4sWzTvJXboBh2&Source=en&SourceText=Would+it+have.&Target=zh&Timestamp=1538796634&Version=2018-03-21&Signature=890bEOjqCSWGUlZCrxGWBSYLtVo=

> Would it have to have been something that started out as a network for college students.

会不会是作为大学生网络开始的。

> Was that thermal so powerful that the winner would have had to be one of these college things where could MySpace have sort of more often grown and become it.

这是如此强大的热度，以至于获奖者必须成为大学里的一员，在那里，MySpace 可以更经常地成长并成为它。

> `[00:13:20]` I don\'t yeah I don\'t think it had to be a college thing.

`[00:13:20]` 我不认为这一定是大学的事。

> You know one of my earliest memories from Facebook was I used to get pizza almost every night with one of my friends.

你知道，我在 Facebook 上最早的记忆之一是，我几乎每天晚上都和我的一个朋友一起吃披萨。

> `[00:13:33]` I did my computer science problem sets with and we used to talk about technology and where we saw the world going and I remember one of our conversations right after I had launched Facebook was about how I was really excited to offer the service for our community but that one day clearly someone was going to build this for the world.

`[00:13:33]` 我做了我的计算机科学问题集，我们过去经常谈论技术，我们看到了世界在哪里，我记得我们在 Facebook 启动后的一次谈话是关于我是多么兴奋地为我们的社区提供服务，但是有一天很明显，有人会为世界建造这个平台。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And it hadn\'t even crossed my mind that maybe we would be the ones to do it because from my perspective it\'s like we\'re just college students What do we know about building software that hundreds of millions of people use.

我甚至没有想过，也许我们会是这样做的人，因为在我看来，我们只是大学生，我们对构建亿万人使用的软件了解多少？

> You know clearly this is going to be something that Microsoft or Google or Yahoo or someone like that who builds these services that tons of people use is going to do it.

你很清楚，这将是微软，谷歌，雅虎，或者像这样的人，谁建立了这些服务，大量的人使用它是要做到这一点。

> And when you realized you were going to do it like how many how many schools did you have before you realized this was wobbly it probably later on when we went outside of college.

当你意识到你要这么做的时候，就像在你意识到这是不稳定之前，你有多少所学校，这很可能是后来我们走出大学的时候。

> `[00:14:23]` But even to the point where you had hundreds of colleges you still thought some big company was going to come along and do this better.

`[00:14:23]` 但是即使到了你拥有数百所大学的地步，你仍然认为某家大公司会出现并做得更好。

> `[00:14:29]` Well not necessarily the college part but I didn\'t know that we were going to be the people building the community to kind of connect everyone.

不一定是大学那部分，但我不知道我们会成为建立社区的人，把每个人联系起来。

> `[00:14:36]` Right.

`[00:14:36]` 对。

> `[00:14:37]` So in retrospect though it was pretty obvious.

`[00:14:37]` 回想起来，这是相当明显的。

> `[00:14:41]` No no not at all.

`[00:14:41]` 不，一点也不。

> `[00:14:43]` You know I actually spent a bunch of time analyzing and reflecting on why it was that we were even able to do it because all like all reasons suggests that we shouldn\'t have been able to do it right because all these other companies had way more engineering power and and servers and time and money and all this stuff.

`[00:14:43]` 你知道我花了很多时间来分析和思考为什么我们能够做到这一点，因为所有的原因都表明我们不应该这么做，因为所有其他公司都有更多的工程能力、服务器、时间和金钱以及所有这些东西。

> And I actually think that this is pretty instructive thing for anything that you want to go do because this is the same properties going be true for any thing that you guys start.

实际上，我认为这对你想做的任何事情都是很有启发意义的，因为对于你们开始的任何事情来说，这都是同样的属性。

> Is that someone else is going to have more resources and be able to do it.

其他人将拥有更多的资源并能够做到这一点。

> The reason why I think we actually ended up being the ones doing it is because we just cared way more about it than everyone else.

我认为我们最终会成为做这件事的人的原因是因为我们比其他人更关心它。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So there were always projects at some of these other companies that were these hobbies.

因此，在其他一些公司，总会有一些项目就是这些业余爱好。

> But we always thought that it was this really important thing and really just like felt in our gut in our heart that we wanted to do it.

但我们一直认为这是一件非常重要的事情，就像我们内心深处的感觉一样，我们想要这样做。

> And you know early on there were all these these skeptics saying that this can\'t be a business.

你知道，早期就有很多怀疑论者说这不可能是生意。

> We don\'t actually care that much about it being a business early on.

实际上，我们并不那么关心这件事，因为我们很早就开始做生意了。

> But a lot of the reason why bigger companies didn\'t invest in it was because it wasn\'t clear that there was a model that would work for it.

但更大的公司之所以没有对其进行投资，很大程度上是因为目前还不清楚是否有一种模式适用于它。

> `[00:15:44]` It seemed like a bad idea.

`[00:15:44]` 这似乎是个坏主意。

> `[00:15:46]` And I actually think that that\'s true for a lot of the best ideas or it is that it\'s not that someone else can\'t do it.

`[00:15:46]` 事实上，我认为很多最好的想法都是这样的，或者不是别人做不到。

> They actually can.

他们真的可以。

> And the odds are stacked against you.

你的胜算很大。

> But I think often that belief in the fact that you just care so much about what you\'re doing is the only thing that kind of drives you to do it.

但我常常认为，相信你只在乎自己在做什么，这是唯一驱使你去做的事情。

> And you know to be honest that kind of drives me to this day.

老实说，这让我一直到今天。

> I mean one of the big emphasis points for the company right now is Internet dot org.

我的意思是，公司目前的重点之一是互联网网站。

> You know for a while we had this rallying cry of can we connect a billion people.

你知道，有一段时间，我们一直在呼吁，我们能把十亿人联系起来吗？

> And you know when we start talking about that we thought it was crazy and it was way bigger than any service in the world that had been built and you know as you know 10 digits longer.

你知道，当我们开始谈论它的时候，我们认为它是疯狂的，它比世界上任何已经建成的服务都要大得多，你知道，比你知道的要长 10 位数。

> It\'s just it felt crazy we\'d never get to that.

只是感觉很疯狂，我们永远也无法做到这一点。

> But then the thing is as we started to actually get closer to that we took a step back and I like art Well our mission is actually to get one in seven people in the world to be connected it\'s we want to connect everyone.

但事情是，当我们开始向后退一步的时候，我很喜欢艺术，我们的使命是让世界上每七个人中就有一个人连接起来，这就是我们想把每个人联系起来。

> So it\'s it\'s a big issue that only around a third of the people in the world had access to the Internet.

因此，世界上只有大约三分之一的人能够上网，这是一个大问题。

> And that\'s something that we think that we can do something about and similar to early Facebook.

这是我们认为我们可以做一些类似于早期 Facebook 的事情。

> We don\'t.

我们不需要。

> There\'s no business model around this.

这里没有商业模式。

> I mean all the people who have all the money in the world I mean it\'s not necessarily a fair thing.

我是说，世界上所有有钱的人，我的意思是，这不一定是一件公平的事情。

> Are already the people who were on Facebook credits in the first you know seventh of the world but we just believe really strongly it\'s like this is what we were here to do.

你知道，世界上第七名的人已经在 Facebook 上获得了信用，但我们坚信，这就是我们在这里所要做的。

> This is what our company cares about.

这就是我们公司所关心的。

> I care about it the team cares about it our culture cares about it.

我关心它，团队关心它，我们的文化关心它。

> So we\'re just going to keep pushing on it.

所以我们要继续努力。

> And I actually think a lot of the reason why great stuff gets built is because it\'s kind of irrational at the time but so it kind of selects the people who care the most about it doing it.

事实上，我认为建造伟大的东西的很多原因是因为它当时有点不合理，但是它选择了那些最关心它的人。

> `[00:17:15]` Do  `[00:17:15]` you think there is anything about you like a personal quality of yours besides sort of basic smartness and determination that made you well suited to work on this project.

`[00:17:15]` `[00:17:15]` 你认为你身上除了基本的聪明和决心之外，还有你的个人品质，这使你很适合做这个项目。

> `[00:17:27]` I  `[00:17:27]` realize this requires some introspection.

`[00:17:27]` `[00:17:27]` 认识到这需要一些反省。

> Yeah I actually think determination is probably the biggest piece.

是的，我认为决心可能是最大的一部分。

> `[00:17:34]` You know it\'s um so many things go wrong when you\'re starting a company and often I think people ask you what mistakes should you avoid making.

`[00:17:34]` 你知道，当你创办一家公司的时候，有那么多事情出了问题，我常常认为人们会问你，你应该避免犯哪些错误。

> And you know my answer to that question is don\'t even bother trying to avoid mistakes because you\'re going to make tons of mistakes.

你知道我对这个问题的回答是不要费心去避免错误，因为你会犯很多错误。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And the the important thing is actually learning quickly from whatever mistakes you make and not giving up.

重要的是要从你犯的任何错误中快速学习，而不是放弃。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> I mean there are things every single year of Facebook existence that could have killed us or made it so that it just seemed like moving forward and making a lot of progress just seemed intractable.

我的意思是，Facebook 存在的每一年都有一些事情可能会让我们丧命，甚至让它看起来像是向前迈进，取得很大进展似乎是难以解决的。

> But you just kind of bounce back and you learn.

但你只是有点反弹然后你就学到了。

> And nothing is impossible you just have to kind of keep running through the walls.

没有什么是不可能的，你只要一直跑过墙就行了。

> `[00:18:12]` So the biggest mistake is a mistake letting a mistake moralise you.

`[00:18:12]` 所以最大的错误就是让一个错误使你道德化。

> Do you think Facebook.

你觉得 Facebook。

> `[00:18:22]` Knows better.

`[00:18:22]` 更清楚。

> `[00:18:25]` Do you think Facebook had a rougher time.

`[00:18:25]` 你认为 Facebook 的日子过得更艰难吗？

> Do you think it ran into more obstacles early on than typical startups because now you\'ve known a you know a lot of other people who\'ve started startups and you\'ve heard all of ghastly stories about what goes on behind the scenes.

你认为它在一开始就遇到了比典型的初创公司更多的障碍吗？因为现在你已经认识很多其他人，他们已经开始创业，并且你已经听到了所有关于幕后发生的可怕的故事。

> Do you think it was more of a shit show or less about normal probably more.

你觉得这更像是一场糟糕的表演还是更少的关于正常的，也许更多。

> `[00:18:46]` Yeah.

`[00:18:46]` 是的。

> I mean why.

我是说为什么。

> `[00:18:49]` Well part of the reason was because I knew nothing when I got started.

`[00:18:49]` 部分原因是因为我刚开始的时候什么都不知道。

> When you have to Homer.

当你需要荷马的时候。

> I was 19 years old when I started Facebook right.

我刚开始 Facebook 的时候才 19 岁。

> So I mean probably look the same age or younger than than most of you guys I think you would be young for this actually.

所以，我的意思是，也许看起来和你们大多数人年龄相同，或者更年轻，我认为你们会因为这件事而年轻。

> And I knew nothing nothing about business at all.

我对生意一无所知。

> `[00:19:04]` I did not even think that I was starting a company actually remember when I first came out here for the summer with Dustin because we wanted to learn from Silicon Valley companies.

`[00:19:04]` 我甚至不认为我是在创办一家公司，实际上我还记得我第一次和达斯汀一起度过夏天的时候，因为我们想向硅谷的公司学习。

> I remember driving up the one to one and seeing all these great companies and thinking to myself wow views are such amazing companies.

我记得开着一对一的车，看到了所有这些伟大的公司，我自己也在想，哇，风景真是太棒了。

> Maybe one day I\'ll start a company and I\'ve already started Facebook and it hadn\'t occurred to me that that was actually.

也许有一天，我会创办一家公司，我已经创建了 Facebook，但我并没有想到这一点。

> `[00:19:28]` So how do you learn.

`[00:19:28]` 那么你是如何学习的呢？

> How did you learn from other people around me.

你是怎么从我周围的人那里学到的。

> `[00:19:32]` But there\'s so many mistakes that just come from not.

`[00:19:32]` 但是有那么多的错误只是来自于不。

> I mean like I really knew so little at the time.

我是说当时我真的知之甚少。

> I mean like when Peter TEEAL came in to invest one thing that he demanded was that all of the founders beyond vesting schedules and I didn\'t even know what a vesting schedule was.

我的意思是，当彼得·泰厄尔(PeterTEEAL)进来投资时，他要求的是，所有的创始人都超越了归属时间表，我甚至不知道归属时间表是什么。

> `[00:19:50]` I never heard of that.

`[00:19:50]` 我从来没听说过。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So I mean part of the the early conflict that I had with Tom with Eduardo who is one of our founders who then left was he was at Harvard with us.

所以我的意思是我和汤姆的早期冲突的一部分，爱德华多是我们的创始人之一，后来离开的是他和我们一起在哈佛。

> We kind of decided OK if we started a company would divide the equity up this way.

我们决定，如果我们成立了一家公司，就可以这种方式分割股权。

> We hadn\'t heard of vesting schedules and then he just bounced he never moved out to California with us.

我们没有听说过转业时间表，然后他就跳了起来，他从来没有和我们一起搬到加州去。

> So so Peter was like all you guys have to be investing schedules were like Oh shit now what do we do.

所以彼得就像你们所有的人一样，投资日程就像哦，妈的，现在我们该怎么办？

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So.

所以

> But it\'s fine.

但没关系。

> I mean it\'s like that mistake probably cost me billions of dollars.

我的意思是这个错误可能让我损失了数十亿美元。

> `[00:20:18]` But it\'s funny you just.

`[00:20:18]` 但是你只是.

> You move forward.

你继续前进。

> And you can\'t.

但你不能。

> It doesn\'t matter.

这不重要。

> I mean you just kind of keep pushing forward and that\'s how it goes.

我是说，你一直向前推进，事情就是这样的。

> `[00:20:30]` Yeah.

`[00:20:30]` 是的。

> How how did you learn.

你是怎么学到的。

> You start out.

你一开始。

> `[00:20:42]` Laughter.

`[00:20:42]` 笑声。

> It\'s good.

它很好。

> You can do it Robert.

你能做到的罗伯特。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:20:49]` So you start out as a 19 year old right.

`[00:20:49]` 所以你从 19 岁开始就对了。

> And you have this Web site just like going through the roof.

你的网站就像翻越屋顶一样。

> Ron was talking earlier about her very early on the graphs she\'s were going up very steeply and you had to learn how to create this organization.

罗恩很早就谈到了她，她的图表上升得非常快，你必须学会如何创建这个组织。

> You know you had to learn how to be a manager.

你知道你必须学会如何成为一名经理。

> That\'s the next phase after you raise money and you have something that\'s growing.

这是你筹集资金后的下一个阶段，你有一些正在增长的东西。

> How did you learn how to how to manage people.

你是怎么学会如何管理人的。

> `[00:21:14]` Well through a lot of mistakes I don\'t think anyone is like naturally good at hiring out of the box right.

`[00:21:14]` 好吧，尽管有很多错误，我不认为任何人都是天生善于从盒子里招人的。

> `[00:21:21]` So you have to learn in each role.

`[00:21:00]` 所以你必须在每一个角色中学习。

> We probably went through multiple iterations before landing on a balance of a person that made sense and the problem is made even harder by the fact that you don\'t need the same thing at each stage.

我们可能经历过多次迭代，然后才能找到一个有意义的人的平衡，而这个问题由于你在每个阶段都不需要相同的东西而变得更加困难。

> So it\'s a moving target as well.

所以它也是一个移动的目标。

> `[00:21:36]` But it\'s not just hiring though you have to somehow lead a group of people and get them all to work together.

`[00:21:36]` 但这不仅仅是招聘，尽管你必须以某种方式领导一群人，让他们一起工作。

> That\'s very hard.

那很难。

> Yeah.

嗯

> And you do now where you don\'t program much probably right.

你现在做的是你没有编程的地方-很可能是对的。

> You spend always for advantaging.

你总是把钱花在优势上。

> Yeah well it\'s or fun.

是的，这是\或有趣的。

> `[00:21:49]` Now you\'re a manager an expert.

`[00:21:49]` 现在你是一名经理，一名专家。

> No absolutely not.

不绝对不是。

> You have to be great hits.

你一定很棒。

> Yeah try telling that to my team.

是的，试着告诉我的团队。

> But how did you learn it.

但你是怎么学到的。

> Was there anyone who taught you or any book you just have to throw yourself in.

有没有人教过你或者你只需要投入你自己的书。

> So you just try linguistics.

所以你就试试语言学吧。

> `[00:22:06]` So I have you know I\'ve developed a few heuristics over time that I think are simple enough that the organization can internalize.

`[00:22:06]` 所以你知道，随着时间的推移，我已经开发了一些启发式方法，我认为这些方法很简单，可以让组织内部化。

> So in terms of hiring everyone says hire good people right.

所以在招聘方面，每个人都说雇佣好人是正确的。

> No one wants to hire like a reasonable person.

没有人愿意像一个通情达理的人那样雇用人。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:22:23]` You want to hire like a really good person but then the question is how do you like what\'s the right heuristic for determining if someone is really good.

`[00:22:23]` 你想雇佣一个真正好的人，但问题是，你喜欢什么是正确的启发，以确定某人是否真的很好。

> So over time what I figured out was that the only actual way to let someone to analyze whether someone was really good was if they would work for that person.

因此，随着时间的推移，我发现让某人分析某人是否真的很优秀的唯一实际方法是，他们是否愿意为那个人工作。

> So I don\'t think that needs to occur to many levels down in the organization but I basically think that that\'s like that\'s a really good heuristic right.

因此，我不认为这需要在组织的许多层面上发生，但我基本上认为，这是一个很好的启发式方法。

> And I believe that.

我相信。

> I mean for if you look at my management team today I mean if we were in an alternate universe and I hadn\'t started the company it would be an honor to work for any of these people.

我的意思是，如果你看看我今天的管理团队，我的意思是，如果我们处在另一个世界，而我还没有创立这家公司，那么能为这些人中的任何一个工作将是一种荣幸。

> And I think if you if you build a company that has kind of those values rather interesting.

我认为，如果你创建一家具有这些价值的公司，那是相当有趣的。

> Oh I want to hire the best person I can find or whatever.

哦，我想雇用我能找到的最好的人。

> If you hold yourself to that standard than you\'ll then I think you\'ll build a pretty strong company.

如果你坚持这样的标准，那么我认为你会建立一个相当强大的公司。

> `[00:23:08]` There are other things around management that you just kind of have to throw yourself into in different ways as well.

`[00:23:08]` 管理还有其他的事情，你也必须用不同的方式投入其中。

> I used to be really terrified of public speaking I\'m to the point where when I did all hands which at the time were like 10 or 15 people I had to sit down because I was so afraid.

我曾经非常害怕公开演讲，当我做所有的手的时候，当时大概有 10 到 15 个人，我不得不坐下来，因为我太害怕了。

> `[00:23:23]` And at the time a lot of people.

`[00:23:00]` 当时很多人。

> Which is ironic because I\'m still sitting but I\'m not because I\'m afraid just because it\'s more comfortable and laughter.

这很讽刺，因为我还在坐着，但我并不是因为我害怕，只是因为它更舒服和更笑声。

> `[00:23:33]` So what I did was I basically I threw myself into some of the stuff and you know a bunch of schools invited me to come speak and what I did was I accepted some of those invitations even though I had no real goal of doing that except for desensitising myself.

`[00:23:33]` 我所做的基本上是，我把自己投入其中，你知道，有很多学校邀请我来演讲，而我所做的是，我接受了其中的一些邀请，尽管我没有真正的目标去做这些事情，只是为了让自己冷静下来。

> `[00:23:48]` And I went up to give a speech without having prepared anything.

`[00:23:48]` 我没有准备好，就上去讲演。

> And if you do that a few times you stop being afraid really quickly and because I mean what\'s the worst thing that can happen.

如果你这样做了几次，你就会很快停止恐惧，因为我的意思是，最糟糕的事情是什么。

> You know I think a survey says that more Americans are afraid of public speaking than death.

你知道，我认为一项调查显示，比起死亡，更多的美国人害怕公共演讲。

> And it\'s so you know just throw yourself and you get over this stuff.

所以你要知道，只要把自己扔出去，你就能克服这件事。

> `[00:24:10]` I remember the first talk you gave or gave it gave at Startup School.

`[00:24:10]` 我记得你在创业学校做的第一次演讲。

> And I think it was one of these the way you describe that you went with no preparation.

我认为这就是你描述的那种毫无准备的方式。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:24:17]` Laughter.

`[00:24:17]` 笑声。

> Know actually I can tell you you know what.

其实我可以告诉你。

> But thank you.

但是谢谢你。

> What\'s the worst thing that can happen you can say something off the cuff that gets taken by the press like a football and thrown her hand and gets you.

最糟糕的事情是什么？你可以说些被媒体像足球一样抓住的话，然后把她的手扔给你。

> `[00:24:29]` That\'s fine.

`[00:24:29]` 没关系。

> Actually I actually did prepare for that and I don\'t have that excuse.

事实上，我确实为此做了准备，我没有那个借口。

> But the fact that laughter was really did all that this practice did was desensitize me it did actually make me good at public speaking as this is this is proof of like managing people you know if you work with people that you like then it\'s wonderful.

但事实上，笑声确实做到了-这一切都是让我冷静下来-它确实让我擅长于公开演讲，因为这证明了你喜欢管理人，你知道，如果你和你喜欢的人一起工作，那就太棒了。

> `[00:24:49]` Right.

`[00:24:49]` 对。

> `[00:24:49]` Because one definition that I have for a good team is a group of people that makes better decisions as a whole than would individually make as a sum of the parts.

`[00:24:49]` 因为我对一个好团队的一个定义是，作为一个整体做出更好的决策的一群人，要比个人所做的每一个部分的总和都要好。

> And when you\'re I think most smart people like learning.

我认为大多数聪明的人都喜欢学习。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And I mean that\'s like one of the thrills of starting a company right is you\'re just the learning curve can be so steep and if you can set up a team dynamic where you\'re constantly learning from the people around you then I mean what\'s better or is it these are the people I wake up every morning and I want to I want to go learn from and work from.

我的意思是，创建一家公司的兴奋之处之一是，你的学习曲线可能非常陡峭，如果你能建立一个团队动态，在那里你不断地向周围的人学习，那么我的意思是什么更好，或者是那些我每天早上醒来的人，我想向他们学习和工作。

> `[00:25:19]` Is that one of your heuristics for hiring people to hire people that you learn from.

`[00:25:19]` 这是你的一种启发，你可以雇佣别人来雇佣你从中学到的人。

> `[00:25:24]` Yeah.

`[00:25:24]` 是的。

> And when building a team you want it to you want to think about the dynamics that way you can maintain this property that the team makes better decisions as a group than any individual would.

当建立一个团队时，你想要的是你想要的动力，这样你就可以维护这个属性，团队作为一个团队比任何个人都能做出更好的决策。

> `[00:25:36]` How when you first started back in that house in Palo Alto you were a startup founder right.

`[00:25:36]` 当你第一次回到帕洛阿尔托的那所房子的时候，你是一个初创公司的创始人，对吗？

> So how I didn\'t know yet.

所以我还不知道。

> Well what was your mental model of a startup founder.

你的创业创办人心理模型是什么。

> How did it come from.

它是怎么来的。

> Did was it Bill Gates you know where Steve Jobs did it come from reading books.

是比尔·盖茨吗？你知道史蒂夫·乔布斯是在哪里读书的吗？

> Peter Teil or Sean Sean Parker.

彼得·泰尔或者肖恩·帕克。

> I mean where did it come from.

我是说它是从哪里来的。

> `[00:25:58]` The thing that was kind of interesting was there\'s this culture in Silicon Valley that kind of makes startups seem glamorous and I never really believed that.

`[00:25:58]` 有趣的是，硅谷的这种文化让初创公司看起来很有魅力，而我从未真正相信过这一点。

> `[00:26:10]` I never had a goal of starting a startup and my goal when I realized that I had a company was to get it to be a good company as quickly as possible where I can kind of get out of what you\'d call the risky startup phase where you are just like constantly about to die and where you could get to a point where you can actually do some interesting things and make make a lot more interesting bets.

`[00:26:10]` 我从来没有创业的目标，当我意识到我有一家公司时，我的目标是让它尽快成为一家好公司，在那里我可以摆脱你所称的危险的创业阶段，在这个阶段，你就像不断地死去，你可以到达一个你可以真正做到的地步。做一些有趣的事情，做更有趣的赌注。

> `[00:26:33]` So I don\'t know.

`[00:26:33]` 所以我不知道。

> I never read a lot of the literature on this.

我从来没看过很多关于这方面的文献。

> I mean maybe if I had been I would have made so many mistakes but I don\'t know if like if learning for me is the right way to go on this.

我的意思是，也许如果我是，我会犯这么多的错误，但我不知道是否喜欢为我学习是否是正确的方式去做这件事。

> But I mean but it did.

但我是说，但它做到了。

> `[00:26:43]` I think your model must come from somewhere even if it was even if it was unintentional.

`[00:26:43]` 我认为你的模型一定来自某个地方，即使它是无意的。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> Like were you influenced by Peter Teil or shawn.

就像你受到彼得·泰尔或者肖恩的影响。

> `[00:26:52]` Well yes I and even with all these people once I met them I actually I hadn\'t really heard of Peter Cheel before.

`[00:26:52]` 嗯，是的，我，甚至和这些人在一起，我一遇到他们，实际上我以前也没听说过彼得？谢尔。

> I\'m talking about.

我说的是。

> Yeah right.

对。

> But he was massively influential on my thinking right.

但他对我的思想有很大的影响。

> I mean like a lot of the the early lessons that I took on how to think about strategy came from Peter and Shawn and I did a lot of attention when I was growing up to Microsoft.

我的意思是，就像我从彼得和肖恩那里学到的很多关于战略的早期经验一样，我在微软长大时做了很多关注。

> I thought I mean I grew up using Windows three point one and then Windows 95 and I just thought that those were like the most unbelievable things.

我想我的意思是，我成长的时候使用的是 Windows 的 3 分 1，然后是 Windows 95，我只是觉得这是最令人难以置信的事情。

> `[00:27:22]` And sense they are they really were awesome right.

`[00:27:22]` 他们真的很棒，对吧。

> Well I don\'t know if you meant that positive positively but I did and I thought you know building this ecosystem was really neat and that kind of inspired me right in the way that they built a platform.

嗯，我不知道你是不是有那么积极的意思，但我这么做了，我想你知道，构建这个生态系统真的很好，这让我深受鼓舞，就像他们建造了一个平台一样。

> `[00:27:36]` I kind of thought okay well maybe one day you know the tools that I\'m building can be part of a broader ecosystem as well and I think that that has kind of gotten lost from the valley.

我想，好吧，也许有一天，你知道我正在建造的工具也可以成为一个更广阔的生态系统的一部分，我认为它已经从山谷中消失了。

> By the time that I got around to sending up Facebook as a company and Google an apple to that point hadn\'t really created platforms.

当我开始把 Facebook 作为一家公司发送出去时，谷歌(Google)还没有真正创建平台。

> They then went on to create much better platforms than anything that was created on desktop with their mobile operating systems.

然后，他们创建了比用移动操作系统在桌面上创建的任何东西都要好得多的平台。

> But that was pretty influential.

但那很有影响力。

> `[00:28:01]` So was that idea of one day making Facebook into a platform sort of implicit all along.

`[00:28:01]` 有一天把 Facebook 变成一个隐含的平台的想法也是如此。

> Was it always something you were mulling over.

是你一直在考虑的事情吗。

> Or was it something that occurred to you after you had all these people talking to one another.

或者是在你让这些人互相交谈之后你突然想到了什么。

> `[00:28:15]` Well turning Facebook into a platform was after that.

`[00:28:15]` 在那之后，Facebook 变成了一个平台。

> But the idea that there should be some social platform was pretty early on.

但是，应该有一些社交平台的想法很早就开始了。

> Right so between you know course march in the room of Agustus thing and faced Masch and like all these things when I was at Harvard it kind of became clear to me that a lot of the software that we use should have people at the center of it right and people want to learn about people.

在你们知道，在 Agustus 的房间里游行，面对 Masch，就像我在哈佛的时候一样，我逐渐意识到，我们使用的很多软件都应该以人为中心，人们想要了解人们。

> That\'s like a really core thing in our psychology.

在我们的心理学中，这是一件非常重要的事情。

> So I thought that you know whether there was a central central social network kind of at the core of that or just like some kind of social libraries or API or something that there needed to be something that made it so there was like a common framework that everyone can use to develop.

所以我想，你知道是否有一个核心的社会网络，或者就像某种社会图书馆或者 API，或者需要一些东西来实现它，所以有一个共同的框架，每个人都可以用它来开发。

> `[00:28:58]` You mentioned earlier that Peter Teil and Sean Parker both influenced your ideas about strategy.

`[00:28:58]` 你早些时候提到彼得·泰尔和肖恩·帕克都影响了你对战略的看法。

> Can you remember a particular strategic insight that you had early on.

你还记得你早期的战略洞察力吗。

> It\'s probably you know the statute of limitations for competition is probably passed now now there\'s probably stuff you can say about some insight that you had early on and you thought to yourself ha ha ha.

很可能你知道竞争的时效已经通过了，现在你可以说一些你很早就有洞察力的东西了，然后你自己想哈。

> Nobody else knows this except us but we have this we have this great this great trick.

除了我们，没人知道这件事，但我们有这么大的诀窍。

> Do you remember any of them.

你还记得他们中的任何一个吗。

> `[00:29:25]` Well Peter TEEAL was really focused on network effects and he had this model that I think is right for making decisions that as the complexity of the company grows everyday you\'re going to be faced with a hundred things that you could potentially go do and your job is to pick the one thing that actually matters because out of those 100 things it\'s really only actually going to be one or two things that actually matter.

`[00:29:25]` 彼得·泰厄尔非常关注网络效应，他有这样一个模型，我认为这个模型是正确的，因为公司的复杂性每天都在增长，你将面临着上百件你有可能去做的事情，而你的工作就是从这 100 件事情中挑出一件真正重要的事情，因为它实际上只会去做。成为一两件真正重要的事情。

> And that was pretty informative to me at the time because I hadn\'t intuitively I had a lot of some of self direction intuitively.

这对当时的我来说是非常有意义的，因为我没有直觉，我有很多直觉上的自我指导。

> `[00:29:59]` But as soon as I started getting all these people around me who all had reasonable perspectives on things was very hard for me to balance that.

`[00:29:59]` 但当我开始让那些对事物有合理看法的人在我身边时，我很难平衡这一点。

> And Peter was always very useful for that we were focused.

彼得总是非常有用，因为我们专注于此。

> `[00:30:10]` He was good at saying here\'s the one thing that matters because on the one thing that matters.

`[00:30:00]` 他擅长在这里说一件重要的事情，因为只有一件事是重要的。

> Well partially that and partially just the metal lesson of figure out the one thing that matters and do that.

好吧，部分是这样，部分是金属的教训，那就是找出重要的一件事，然后去做这件事。

> But you also know what the one thing that mattered.

但你也知道最重要的是什么。

> I wouldn\'t have gone as quickly as possible because I\'m in network effects were massively important part of this.

我不会走得越快越好，因为我在网络效应中扮演了非常重要的角色。

> One of the stories we\'re going to see is connecting everyone as quickly as possible you don\'t mean specifically getting more sign ups you mean getting people to a friend one another faster.

我们将要看到的故事之一是尽快地把每个人联系起来，你并不意味着得到更多的注册，而是意味着让人们更快地找到另一个朋友。

> Yeah.

嗯

> Well how do you do that.

那你是怎么做到的。

> `[00:30:36]` Well we\'ve built a lot of tools to enable people to do what they all are over they want it to where you can\'t push uphill on the stuff credits.

`[00:30:36]` 我们已经建立了很多工具，使人们能够做他们想做的事，你不能把它推上坡的地方。

> If we were solving a problem that people had and we just needed to remove as much friction as possible.

如果我们要解决的问题，人们有，我们只是需要消除尽可能多的摩擦。

> But there was a pretty early funny sequence where there was actually this company in 2005 that got started that was called College Facebook.

但有一个非常早期的有趣的序列，其中实际上有一家公司在 2005 年成立，被称为学院脸书。

> `[00:31:00]` It was like an exact clone of us.

`[00:31:00]` 这就像我们的复制品。

> And it even had the same name.

甚至有着同样的名字。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And their strategy because we started at Harvard and then tried to branch out to schools that we thought would have dense social connections with Harvard so we can build this network.

他们的策略，因为我们从哈佛开始，然后尝试扩展到我们认为与哈佛有紧密的社会联系的学校，这样我们就可以建立这个网络。

> Their goal was they wanted to start in places that we weren\'t right so they started on the West Coast and in the south when we started in the northeast and they tried to build up this network of different schools and it was just this race for a while and eventually the boulder Seattle.

他们的目标是想从我们不合适的地方开始，所以他们从西海岸和南方开始，当我们从东北开始，他们试图建立这个网络，不同的学校，这只是一段时间的比赛，最后是大石头西雅图。

> Yeah.

嗯

> And then we just took this stuff really seriously and I remember Dustin just took it so personally.

然后我们就把这件事当真了，我记得达斯汀把它当成了个人恩怨。

> It\'s like any time they\'d launch at some school that we were at.

就像他们任何时候在我们所在的学校里一样。

> We had this concept that we actually still have at the company today called lockdown which is whenever any other company gets ahead of us on something that we think is strategic to us back then lockdown meant we literally did not leave the house until we had addressed the problem.

我们在今天的公司仍然有这样的概念，叫做“封锁”，当任何其他公司在我们之前采取我们认为对我们来说具有战略意义的事情时，封锁意味着在我们解决问题之前，我们实际上是不会离开这座房子的。

> Now it\'s a little loose Thurbon interpretation inside the company we don\'t literally lock everyone inside the office but about as close to that as we can legally get.

现在，公司内部对瑟本的解释有点松散，我们并没有把每个人都关在办公室里，而是尽可能接近这一点。

> So laughter and you know now the funny thing is inside Facebook you know because we\'ve a lot of different initiatives teams kind of do this themselves right and just decide it\'s OK.

所以笑，你知道，有趣的是在 facebook 里面，你知道，因为我们有很多不同的主动性，团队自己也会这样做，然后决定它是可以的。

> All right.

好的

> There\'s like some competitor that has something that we feel like we really need like we\'re going into lockdown to get this thing because we\'re not going to let college Facebook get ahead of us.

就像某个竞争对手，我们觉得我们真的需要一些东西，因为我们不会让大学的 Facebook 领先于我们。

> `[00:32:26]` So in retrospect could you have completely ignored college Facebook and it wouldn\'t have made any difference.

`[00:32:26]` 回想起来，你可能完全忽略了大学的 Facebook，这不会有任何区别。

> `[00:32:32]` I don\'t know.

`[00:32:32]` 我不知道。

> Laughter is a good question.

笑是个好问题。

> `[00:32:38]` Don\'t you think like you have just eventually spread to the schools and killed them.

`[00:32:38]` 你不认为你最终已经蔓延到学校并杀死了他们。

> `[00:32:42]` I mean in theory I think they didn\'t do a perfect job copying us.

`[00:32:42]` 我的意思是，理论上，我认为他们没有完美地模仿我们。

> You know one of the things that\'s interesting is that there are some countries where folks have made such good clones of Facebook that it has been very hard for us to grow in Russia as the biggest example.

你知道其中一件有趣的事情，那就是有些国家的人们对 Facebook 做了如此好的克隆，以至于我们很难在俄罗斯发展成为最大的例子。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So we can talk.

这样我们就可以谈谈了。

> Yeah.

嗯

> These guys are just like the International Olympiad computing computing Olympiad champions and it\'s a small team and they get treated like an awesome job cloning Facebook and there are fewer content laws so they also have illegal file downloads and all this stuff and like we just have not been able to beat them.

这些家伙就像国际奥林匹克电脑奥林匹克冠军，这是一个小团队，他们被当作一份很棒的工作，克隆 Facebook，而且内容法也比较少，他们也有非法的文件下载和所有这些东西，就像我们无法打败他们一样。

> `[00:33:18]` And maybe it\'s because of the illegal file downloads and it\'s one so you should add file down the wall and try not to break the law.

`[00:33:18]` 也许是因为非法的文件下载，所以你应该把文件加到墙上，尽量不违法。

> But it\'s the growing fine writing it\'s like a linear growth and where we\'re I think slowly making a lot of progress and I\'m pretty sure we\'ll pass them eventually but it\'s been literally like almost 10 years since we got started with Facebook and we still have not beaten them in Russia.

但这是写得越来越好，就像线性增长，我认为我们正在缓慢地取得很大进展，我很肯定我们最终会通过它们，但从字面上看，自从我们开始使用 Facebook 以来，已经有近 10 年的时间了，而且在俄罗斯，我们仍然没有打败他们。

> So it is possible that if the college Facebook folks had done better and had gone faster than maybe maybe maybe.

因此，有可能的是，如果大学里的 facebook 的人做得更好，走得比可能更快。

> `[00:33:48]` No no.

`[00:33:48]` 不，不。

> But like they went the speed they did that wasn\'t affected by your lockdowns.

但就像他们的速度一样，这并不会受到你的封锁的影响。

> I\'m just wondering like maybe there\'s lockdowns were unnecessary because we always advise people basically just ignore competitors.

我只是想知道，也许没有必要进行封锁，因为我们总是建议人们基本上忽略竞争对手。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:33:59]` I do think that it\'s definitely possible to overvoted on competitors but one one caveat that I would say I think people tend to worry too much about strategic competitors who are doing something that\'s related.

`[00:33:59]` 我确实认为，在竞争对手身上投过多票是绝对可能的，但我要提醒的是，我认为人们往往过于担心那些正在做一些与之相关的事情的战略竞争对手。

> But clone\'s I think actually end up being a pretty big nuisance.

但我认为克隆人最终会成为一个很大的麻烦。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> `[00:34:15]` So there are these whole companies now in Europe that like all they do is just clone companies that have been founded in theU.S.

`[00:34:15]` 现在欧洲有很多这样的公司，就像他们所做的一样，只是克隆在美国成立的公司。

> and other places and try to bring them to Europe and have network effects and it\'s like a pain in the ass.

和其他地方，并试图把他们带到欧洲，并有网络效应，这是一个痛苦的屁股。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> And I don\'t get it.

我不明白。

> So I actually think you do want to internationalize and pay attention to that stuff fairly early because those things are really annoying once they get lodged in.

所以我认为你确实想要国际化，并且很早就注意到这些东西，因为这些东西一旦被卡在里面，就会很烦人。

> `[00:34:37]` OK.

`[00:34:37]` 好的。

> I think we have one minute left so I\'m going to ask you one more question.

我想我们还有一分钟的时间，所以我再问你一个问题。

> `[00:34:43]` It seems like the most successful founders are are sort of obsessed like they\'re a little bit.

`[00:34:43]` 似乎最成功的创始人似乎有点痴迷。

> They care a little bit too much about certain things right.

他们对某些事情太在意了。

> Like Steve Jobs cared a little bit too much about how perfect the edges of some polygon were.

就像史蒂夫·乔布斯一样，乔布斯对某些多边形的边缘有多完美太在意了。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> What is it that you care too much about.

你关心的是什么？

> `[00:35:03]` Connecting everyone is serious.

`[00:35:03]` 连接每个人都是严肃的。

> `[00:35:07]` If you think about it it\'s like this aesthetic sense of the world that I have is that you can communities of people can channel their energy to do great things and having connections between people is the infrastructure for the world to do that.

`[00:35:07]` 如果你想一想，这就像我对世界的一种审美感觉，那就是你可以让人们的社区把精力引导到伟大的事情中去，人与人之间的联系是世界实现这一目标的基础。

> And you know that\'s why at each step along the way when there was always all this uncertainty about whether it would be profitable or whether it would make sense or be good or whatever to do these thing things we always were doing it because we just cared more.

你也知道，为什么在前进的每一步中，总是有很多关于它是否有利可图，或者它是否有意义，或者是好的，或者做这些事情的任何事情的不确定性，我们总是这么做，因为我们只是更关心。

> I mean to this day and you could say that that was a start up thing but it isn\'t because now we\'re here and we connect more than a billion people.

我的意思是，直到今天，你可以说这是一个开始的事情，但不是，因为现在我们在这里，我们连接超过 10 亿人。

> But I mean we\'re pouring tons of money and resources into connecting people who can\'t even afford Internet access.

但我的意思是，我们投入了大量的资金和资源来连接那些连互联网都买不起的人。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> So I mean that\'s like there\'s no way that that\'s going to be profitable in the near term or medium term.

所以我的意思是，在短期或中期内，这是不可能盈利的。

> But we\'re doing it because we think it\'s the right thing to do and over the long term I do think that there\'s something there and it\'s going to be fundamentally important for the world and maybe we\'ll get rewarded maybe not but we just really care.

但我们这么做是因为我们认为这样做是正确的，从长远来看，我确实认为那里有一些东西，它对世界来说将是至关重要的，也许我们会得到回报，也许不会，但我们真的很在乎。

> `[00:36:03]` So it\'s a movement.

`[00:36:03]` 所以这是一场运动。

> And Facebook the company is sort of a subset of it.

而 Facebook 则是其中的一个子集。

> Well.

井

> `[00:36:11]` All right you guys I think we\'re done.

`[00:36:11]` 好了，伙计们，我想我们结束了。

> Are we done.

我们结束了吗。

> We don\'t.

我们不需要。

> All right thank you very much Mark Zuckerberg Claus.

好的非常感谢马克·扎克伯格·克劳斯。

