# Jim Goetz and Jan Koum at Startup School SV 2014

> `[00:00:02]` So this is really cool.

`[00:00:02]` 所以这真的很酷。

> This is the first time we have had a founder and a board member up here together and I think it\'ll be a really interesting talk for that.

这是我们第一次有一个创始人和一个董事会成员在这里，我认为这将是一个非常有趣的谈话。

> It\'s also the first time these two guys have ever spoken.

这也是这两个人第一次说话。

> Actually like other potential landfall.

实际上就像其他可能登陆的地方一样。

> So there is a lot to talk about here.

所以这里有很多要讨论的话题。

> This is you know one of the most exciting startups of the last many years.

你知道，这是过去几年中最令人兴奋的初创公司之一。

> But before we jump into what happened on WhatsApp I want to talk a little bit about Yan\'s background and so maybe you talk about sort of growing up in Ukraine and how that influenced your thoughts about coming to Silicon Valley and startups and what\'s up.

但在我们开始讨论 WhatsApp 上发生的事情之前，我想谈一下燕的背景，也许你会谈论一下在乌克兰长大的经历，以及这是如何影响你进入硅谷和创业公司的想法的。

> `[00:00:35]` Sure.

`[00:00:35]` 当然。

> So thanks for sharing.

谢谢你的分享。

> Thank you for coming here.

谢谢你来这里。

> Exciting to see so many people here.

看到这么多人真让人兴奋。

> Yeah I grew up in Ukraine and I came to United States in 1992.

是的，我在乌克兰长大，1992 年来到美国。

> I was 16 at a time and I left my dad stayed in Ukraine and they\'ve left a lot of friends and people I went to school with.

我 16 岁的时候，我离开了爸爸，留在了乌克兰，他们给我留下了很多朋友和我一起上学的人。

> And so part of it part of what I experienced was it was really hard trying to keep in touch with people back then like Think back to 1992.

因此，我所经历的部分原因是，想要和人们保持联系是非常困难的，那时候，就像回想 1992 年那样。

> There is no internet there\'s no emails there\'s no skydives there is nothing you just you just have a phone you don\'t even have a cell phone.

没有互联网，没有电子邮件，没有跳伞，没有任何东西，只有手机，甚至连手机都没有。

> `[00:01:05]` For the most part you just have a look at this landline and you know to call somebody else like sign up as MCI or AT&T and it was just like all this us like we\'re weird international dialing stuff to do it.

`[00:01:05]` 大多数情况下，你只要看一下这个固定电话，你就知道给别人打电话，比如注册为 MCI 或 AT&T，就像我们所有的人一样，我们都是奇怪的国际拨号设备。

> And I think part of it is part of that influenced me.

我认为这部分影响了我。

> `[00:01:19]` And then I think also growing up in a country where educational is so valuable and there was a lot of kind of focus on just learning and studying influenced me like I came here and I was able to quickly start learning about computers and computer science and also growing up in a country which didn\'t have a whole lot of advertising we were going to clean very basic live and then you actually have a slide of this thing called we got Yanzu resmi.

`[00:01:19]` 然后我想，我也是在一个教育很有价值的国家长大的，那里有很多关于学习和学习的关注，就像我来到这里一样，我能够迅速地开始学习计算机和计算机科学，并且成长在一个没有大量广告的国家。基本生活，然后你实际上有一张幻灯片，这个东西叫做我们有延祖雷米。

> `[00:01:56]` Wow.

`[00:01:56]` 哇。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:01:59]` So you have a somewhat non-traditional path to starting a company or at least in the current world I think this is probably happened for a long time and you spent it looks like nine years nine years.

`[00:01:59]` 所以你有一种非传统的方式来创办一家公司，或者至少在当前的世界里，我认为这可能发生了很长一段时间，你花了 9 年的时间。

> Yeah.

嗯

> And you also dropped out of college to join Yahoo.

你还从大学退学加入雅虎。

> You had in common.

你们有共同之处。

> Yeah.

嗯

> Well I think it is like WhatsApp.

我觉得就像 WhatsApp。

> So I was wondering if you could talk about sort of your path from how you decided to drop out of college and go to Yahoo and then how your experience at Yahoo shaped WhatsApp and how you came together with Brian there.

所以我想知道你能不能从你决定从大学退学到雅虎，然后你在雅虎的经历如何塑造 WhatsApp，以及你是如何和 Brian 在一起的，来谈谈你的道路。

> `[00:02:31]` Sure.

`[00:02:31]` 当然。

> Actually a funny story about me and Brian that we met even before I joined Yahoo because he technically intrigued me.

事实上，在我加入雅虎之前，我们就认识了一个关于我和布莱恩的有趣故事，因为他在技术上吸引了我。

> He was my co-founder was like someone is people going through me back in 1998.

他是我的联合创始人，就像 1998 年有人通过我。

> `[00:02:42]` And I think well some had earlier when I worked at this interesting young auditing auditing company I was doing like computer security audit.

`[00:02:42]` 我想，早些时候我在一家有趣的年轻审计公司工作时，我做过一些类似于计算机安全审计的工作。

> And so I was actually recruited into Yahoo by one of the founders at Yahoo.

因此，我实际上是被雅虎的一位创始人招募到雅虎的。

> David phyla who I worked with for a long time and who was a big role model and a mentor in many ways.

大卫·菲拉，我和他一起工作了很长一段时间，他在很多方面都是一个很大的榜样和导师。

> Because when I joined Yahoo.

因为当我加入雅虎的时候。

> It was a pretty small company we had like maybe 500 servers or 400 servers and over nine years we grew to thousands of servers and so to see that gross and to experience all the technical issues that you have to deal is when it comes to scaling the company was was extremely useful and we ended up starting WhatsApp because we didn\'t have to make the same mistake twice.

这是一家规模很小的公司，我们有大约 500 台服务器或 400 台服务器，在过去的 9 年里，我们发展到了数千台服务器，因此要看到这一点，并体验到所有你必须处理的技术问题-当涉及到扩大公司规模时-是非常有用的，我们最终启动 WhatsApp 是因为我们不需要犯两次相同的错误。

> We were able to basically look at what worked at Yahoo and what didn\'t work at Yahoo.

我们基本上能够看到什么在雅虎起作用，什么在雅虎不起作用。

> And we were also able to tap into our network.

我们还可以利用我们的网络。

> `[00:03:36]` We had a really good network of very skilled very senior server engineers who joined us with what\'s up some who already left Yahoo at a time some who were still at Yahoo that we were able to recruit and convince them to to join us and we were able to have a very small team of engineers supporting obviously a lot of users outside because we learned so much about scaling and managing servers and so that experience in that mentorship from David and Geria at Yahoo was really valuable to us.

我们有一个非常好的网络，由非常熟练的非常高级的服务器工程师组成，他们加入了我们的行列很多关于扩展和管理服务器的工作，所以雅虎的 David 和 Geria 在这方面的经验对我们来说是非常有价值的。

> `[00:04:05]` How many engineers do you have at the time of the WhatsApp acquisition.

`[00:04:05]` 在 WhatsApp 收购时，你有多少工程师。

> `[00:04:10]` Engineers probably.

`[00:04:10]` 可能是工程师。

> `[00:04:12]` 2025 is supporting about 400 million active users.

`[00:04:12]` 2025 年支持大约 4 亿活跃用户。

> Yeah that\'s pretty incredible.

是啊，真是太不可思议了。

> `[00:04:18]` Just a couple quick anecdotes about his resume.

`[00:04:18]` 只是一些关于他简历的趣闻轶事。

> He did know we\'re going to present it today.

他知道我们今天要展示它。

> This was in the Sequoia archives we collect resumes at times and try to share with the portfolio.

这是在红杉档案中，我们有时收集简历，并试图与投资组合分享。

> But a lot of you are thinking about starting a company which is wonderful but I also think you took a different path.

但是你们很多人都在考虑创办一家很棒的公司，但我也认为你们走了一条不同的道路。

> He actually joined a great company during their growth years and I think learned a great deal from David.

实际上，在他们成长的年代，他加入了一家伟大的公司，我认为他从大卫那里学到了很多东西。

> And there\'s the whole experience that much of the approach to leadership that I think John embraced it WhatsApp was formed at Yahoo.

我认为约翰很大程度上接受了 WhatsApp 成立于雅虎的全部经验。

> He was a Yahoo hire hundreds of engineers every month and realized a lack of focus was creating challenges for the company.

他是雅虎的一员，每月雇佣数百名工程师，并意识到缺乏关注给公司带来了挑战。

> And then over time Yahoo.

然后随着时间的推移雅虎。

> As they look to monitise as a public company he spent a lot of energy on advertising which created a distraction if you will for the consumer and I think John\'s passion around simplicity and no advertising and also the approach to focus came from that experience at Yahoo.

当他们将 Monitise 视为一家上市公司时，他花费了大量精力在广告上，如果你愿意的话，这会分散消费者的注意力。我认为，约翰对简单而不做广告的热情，以及专注于雅虎的那种方式，都来自于雅虎的经历。

> I want to share one final anecdote for those of you that are looking at crucible moments.

我想分享最后一个轶事给那些正在看坩埚时刻的人。

> Yohn was seen as a statement killer science class and finally called him and said.

Yohn 被视为杀手科学课的陈述，最后打电话给他说。

> `[00:05:22]` Where the fuck are you.

`[00:05:22]` 你他妈的在哪？

> And John said while I\'m in class and David said Get your ass in here.

约翰说，我上课的时候，大卫说，给我滚进来。

> And that was a crucible moment that I think set you on this wonderful journey and I think it\'s great to have kind of file in a mixin.

那是一个坩埚的时刻，我认为这让你踏上了这段美妙的旅程，我认为在一个混合文件中有这样的文件是很棒的。

> `[00:05:37]` She doesn\'t remember that it were happening.

`[00:05:37]` 她不记得发生了什么。

> I think that was what drove it me to drop out.

我想这就是促使我辍学的原因。

> I was like well okay I guess I have a real job to do.

我很好，好吧，我想我有一份真正的工作要做。

> Laughter.

笑声。

> `[00:05:46]` You thought you were working while you were still a student.

`[00:05:46]` 当你还是个学生的时候，你以为你在工作。

> I was trying to do both.

我想两者兼得。

> I was trying to go to school part time and work full time.

我试着去学校做兼职和全职工作。

> And that only lasted for about two weeks and I was like well said I really like working at Yahoo.

这只持续了大约两周，我说得很好，我真的很喜欢在雅虎工作。

> `[00:05:55]` So using a freebie as the operating system which was a really was and still am really passionate about and it was like a dream job for me and the learning experience that I was getting there was just like mind blowing.

`[00:05:55]` 所以使用一个免费的操作系统，它曾经是，现在仍然是一个充满激情的操作系统，对我来说就像一份梦寐以求的工作，而我在那里获得的学习经历就像在发人深省。

> `[00:06:06]` Can you tell us about the moment that you decided to start this company.

`[00:06:06]` 你能告诉我们你决定创办这家公司的那一刻吗？

> `[00:06:12]` So the interesting thing is I don\'t think I ever decided to start a company.

`[00:06:12]` 有趣的是，我从来没有决定过要开一家公司。

> In fact now that I look back I was like wow I never thought that I\'ll be starting a company.

事实上，现在我回想起来，我就像哇，我从来没有想过我会创办一家公司。

> `[00:06:21]` I thought I was just building a product.

`[00:06:21]` 我以为我只是在制造一个产品。

> And I think a lot of great companies actually start out that way people just want to build a product and I\'m thinking of starting a company because starting a company requires that you have a general consul and biz dev team and a char and they have to look for office space and make sure your employees are getting paid.

我认为很多伟大的公司实际上都是这样开始的，人们只是想制造一种产品，而我正在考虑创办一家公司，因为创建一家公司需要有一个总领事、一个专业开发团队和一个 char，他们必须寻找办公空间，并确保您的员工获得报酬。

> It\'s a lot of kind of complicated and you\'ve been there you\'ve done that.

这很复杂，你去过那里-你做过那件事。

> `[00:06:41]` It\'s very not that exciting as compared to building a product.

`[00:06:41]` 与生产产品相比，它并不那么令人兴奋。

> So we started out just trying to build a messaging app.

所以我们一开始只是想建立一个即时通讯应用程序。

> And you know now looking back it must have been so naive to think that I couldn\'t build an app that millions of people would use.

你知道，现在回想起来，想到我不能开发出一款数以百万计的人会使用的应用程序，那一定是太天真了。

> I was just like oh yeah it\'s easy to do this.

我就像哦，是的，这很容易做到。

> `[00:06:59]` Turns out it\'s not so easy.

`[00:06:59]` 事实证明，这并不容易。

> Well a lot of challenges during the day on our way.

在我们的路上有很多挑战。

> But it basically started out as me buying an iPhone in January of 2009.

但基本上是我在 2009 年 1 月买了一部 iPhone。

> I took a year off after Yahoo and a kind of travel and spent a lot of time just figuring out what to do.

在雅虎(Yahoo)和一种旅行之后，我休了一年假，花了很多时间思考该做什么。

> And in January of 2009 about an iPhone and this was literally like three or four months after STK for AOL came out and people were trying to figure out what they can do was it.

2009 年 1 月，关于一部 iPhone，这简直就像是 AOL STK 上市后的三四个月，人们正试图弄清楚他们能做些什么。

> And we started just playing around was was the fallen and as you began trying to build an app and our original idea was actually not messaging our original idea was established and to get out enough people know about this but because we\'ve built all this quality code that could figure out who your contacts are who you are your.

当你开始尝试开发一个应用程序时，我们最初的想法实际上不是发短信，而是让足够多的人知道我们的想法，但是因为我们已经建立了所有的质量代码，可以知道你的联系人是谁。

> `[00:07:44]` Friends are based on your contact list.

`[00:07:44]` 朋友是根据你的联系方式。

> We\'re able to pivot into messaging because already had that foundation we had a separate piece written and we had a client code written for iPhone and so in the summer of 2009 when when the status thing wasn\'t working out so well for us were like well let\'s try messaging.

我们能够转向消息传递，因为我们已经有了这个基础，我们已经编写了一篇单独的文章，我们有一个为 iPhone 编写的客户端代码，所以在 2009 年夏天，当状态的事情对我们来说不太好的时候，我们就像我们试着发送消息一样。

> We were able to just kind of put the end piece and drop it in and just go from there.

我们可以把最后的部分放进去，然后从那里开始。

> `[00:08:08]` So I figured exactly when you two met each other and decided to work together.

`[00:08:08]` 所以我想，你们俩什么时候见面，决定一起工作。

> But I know it happened relatively quietly and there weren\'t a lot of people in it.

但我知道这件事发生得相对平静，而且里面没有多少人。

> I\'d love to just hear the story of how you guys met and decided to partner together.

我很想听听你们是如何相遇并决定一起合作的。

> `[00:08:22]` Well to be clear I think Yanto was interested in talking to anybody in the investment community nor anybody in the carrier community including CEOs or handset manufacturers including CEOs.

`[00:08:22]` 显然，我认为延藤有兴趣与投资界的任何人交谈，也不愿与运营商中的任何人交谈，包括首席执行官或手机制造商，包括首席执行官。

> He essentially ignored those e-mails and he had phenomenal focus on any customer female but certainly my initial e-mails were rebuffed without a reply no response at all.

他基本上忽略了那些电子邮件，他对任何客户女性都有惊人的关注，但当然，我最初的电子邮件被拒绝了，没有回复，没有任何回应。

> `[00:08:46]` Clearly there were enough people at Yahoo.

`[00:08:46]` 雅虎显然有足够的人手。

> `[00:08:51]` I think we collectively knew together along with Brian where we eventually were able to secure a brief interaction at the Red Rock Cafe.

`[00:08:51]` 我想我们共同知道，在红岩咖啡厅，我们最终能够获得短暂的互动。

> For those of you that are in Mountain View and Yon was in a beanie in his first.

对于你们中那些在山景城的人来说，Yon 在他的第一次被发现的时候，是在一个小豆子里。

> `[00:09:06]` Stair it was a bit intimidating and I didn\'t get him to smile for maybe five minutes and I thought I\'m definitely in trouble.

`[00:09:06]` 楼梯有点吓人，我大概五分钟都没让他笑，我想我肯定有麻烦了。

> `[00:09:15]` I remember Redrock that definitely happened and I remember laughter they have an amazing coffee by the way.

`[00:09:15]` 我记得红石确实发生了，我记得笑声，顺便说一下，他们有一杯很棒的咖啡。

> And yeah I remember of our interactions and were trying to figure out.

是的，我记得我们的互动，并试图找出。

> Me and Brian has always kind of focused on building a company and building a product that can sustain itself.

我和 Brian 总是把精力集中在建立一家公司和建立一种能够自我维持的产品上。

> `[00:09:36]` And we\'re actually getting revenue is up already because our iPhone app was paid and our hours of platforms were free.

`[00:09:36]` 事实上，我们的收入已经增长了，因为我们的 iPhone 应用程序是付费的，我们的平台时间也是免费的。

> We were actually doing like Brand Nokia.

实际上我们做的就像诺基亚品牌。

> I don\'t think we had Android at that point yet but we\'re probably one of the few companies that decided to build up for Blagg brain kids a time and I think that gamble paid off for us because a lot of those people who were using Nokia five years ago who were WhatsApp users are now using Android or AOL Icelanders.

我认为那时我们还没有 Android，但我们可能是少数几家决定为 Blagg Brain 的孩子们打造的公司之一，我认为这场赌博为我们带来了回报，因为五年前使用诺基亚的很多人都在使用 WhatsApp 用户，现在他们正在使用 Android 或 AOL 冰岛人。

> They\'re keeping.

他们在保存。

> Are still using whatsapp because of the connections and group chat to the app.

还在使用 WhatsApp，因为它与应用程序的连接和群聊。

> But I think.

但我觉得。

> We were able to.

我们能做到。

> Choose our partnership and our investors because we were able to monetize our IPO Asaph or actually having revenue and we were able to pay for electricity and pay for servers and base salaries to somewhere early employees and so we weren\'t in this situation we\'re like while we need to raise money.

选择我们的合作伙伴和我们的投资者，是因为我们能够将我们的首次公开募股(Asaph)货币化，或者实际上我们有了收入，而且我们能够支付电费，支付服务器和基本工资给一些早期的员工，所以我们没有在这种情况下，我们需要筹集资金。

> Otherwise we\'re going to go out of business tomorrow so we were able to kind of leverage.

否则，我们明天就会倒闭，这样我们就能有某种杠杆作用了。

> Our situation and take our time and make sure that we careful and partner with the people who we think will support us in building what were set out.

我们的情况，并采取我们的时间，确保我们小心和合作的人，我们认为谁将支持我们在建设所制定的。

> `[00:10:43]` And do you remember what about Jim and Sinclair made you want to partner with them.

`[00:10:43]` 你还记得吉姆和辛克莱让你想和他们合作的事情吗？

> `[00:10:48]` I think I think nervous laughter from Jim in general is it first of all that have been an amazing partner for us.

`[00:10:48]` 我认为吉姆的神经质笑声，首先是我们一个令人惊奇的伙伴。

> `[00:10:58]` But I think in general if you look at the history of Sequoyah you know I\'ve supported companies like Cisco Apple and Google and Yahoo.

`[00:10:58]` 但是总的来说，如果你看看 Sequoyah 的历史，你知道我曾经支持过思科、苹果、谷歌和雅虎这样的公司。

> And I think growing up in Silicon Valley and I lived here for 22 years there is there is this heritage that Sequoia has that and pedigree is that a lot of other venture funds don\'t have.

我认为在硅谷长大的我和我在这里生活了 22 年，红杉有这样的传统，而血统是很多其他风险基金所没有的。

> `[00:11:25]` And I remember I remember sitting after we got a few different term sheets.

`[00:11:25]` 我记得我们有几张不同的学期表后坐着。

> `[00:11:30]` I remember sitting and talking to Brian and I was like trying to figure out what to do.

`[00:11:30]` 我记得我坐着和布赖恩聊天，我就像想找出该做什么。

> I was like Brian look like five years ago I\'ve somebody it\'s all about who would how would term sheets from Sequoia and we were starting this company we would be like nobody would believe us we wouldn\'t believe this ourselves and now has this opportunity we should just we should just do it and go for it.

我就像五年前的布莱恩，我有了一个人

> And so.

而且如此。

> `[00:11:51]` We also got some advice.

`[00:11:51]` 我们也有一些建议。

> Mean Jeff Ralston who is one of our course co-workers at Yahoo.

杰夫·拉斯顿是雅虎的同事之一。

> I remember I mean Brian drove over to Jeff Ralston\'s house.

我记得我是说布莱恩开车去了杰夫·拉斯顿的家。

> `[00:12:00]` It was like Colwin and it was like a scene from a James Bond movie because nobody knew about us and we didn\'t want to tell anybody as we were raising we didn\'t want to getting our attention and we got to have Schuyler\'s at 11:00p.m.

这就像科温，就像詹姆斯·邦德电影里的一幕，因为没人知道我们的事，我们也不想在我们提出的时候告诉任何人，我们不想引起我们的注意，我们得在晚上 11 点让斯凯勒来。

> when everybody was asleep on like Jaroff was kind of looking at various options like Square companies I was a quiet company and we were like Okay well that makes us kind.

当每个人都在睡觉的时候，就像 Jaroff 在看各种各样的选择，比如 Square 公司，我是一个安静的公司，我们就像好的，好吧，这让我们很善良。

> `[00:12:19]` And Jim what about WhatsApp made you so excited at that point.

`[00:12:19]` 吉姆，WhatsApp 在这一点上让你如此兴奋，那是怎么回事？

> `[00:12:23]` Well look we were looking at the messaging space we were at the time we had built a system we called earlybird that was tracking the activity on the app stores and WhatsApp had become dominant globally not theU.S.

`[00:12:23]` 看，当我们建立一个名为“早起鸟”的系统时，我们看到的是我们当时所处的信息空间，它跟踪应用商店的活动，WhatsApp 已经在全球而不是美国占据了主导地位。

> in fact they were well down the charts in theU.S.

事实上，他们在美国名列前茅。

> but in maybe 35 60 countries Romanones time they were one or two and we had been looking at the messaging space and group messaging and it concluded that this pay model that they had crafted and just the utility experience it reminded me and many of my partners are chrome just as simplicity.

但在大约 3560 个国家，罗马人的时间是一两个，我们一直在观察信息传递空间和群发信息，我们得出的结论是，他们制作的这种付费模式，以及它提醒我和我的许多合作伙伴的实用体验，都是同样简单的。

> `[00:12:59]` And then for the next few months it was all about trying to get to John and Brian because they didn\'t have an address that was publicly available.

`[00:12:59]` 接下来的几个月里，这一切都是为了找到约翰和布莱恩，因为他们没有公开的地址。

> There was no signage on the building.

大楼上没有标牌。

> I knew that they were in Mountain View but where we literally walked the streets of Mountain View to see if we could intersect with these guys that you actually had people just acquired partners what we have on the street it was actually the partners walking around.

我知道他们在山景城，但我们在山景城的街道上走来走去，看看我们能不能和这些人交汇-实际上，人们只是找到了我们在街上拥有的伴侣-实际上是伙伴们在四处走动。

> Yes but I\'ll say this about Brian and Yon\'s being too modest the level of focus we all talk about focus but the level of focus that John had at WhatsApp to the product and to the client is absolutely shocking I\'ve ever had an entrepreneur as focus as John and whether it was executives from various companies or CEOs or partners from various firms Yohn ignored the vast majority of that activity including the PR inbound and stayed focused on the product.

是的，但我会这样说，布莱恩和杨太谦虚了，我们都在谈论焦点，但约翰在 WhatsApp 上对产品和客户的关注程度是绝对令人震惊的，我曾经有一位企业家像约翰一样专注，不管是来自不同公司的高管，还是来自不同公司的 CEO 或合伙人，Yohn 忽略了绝大多数人。该活动，包括公关入境，并保持对产品的关注。

> And I think that serve the cultural incredibly well.

我认为这能很好地服务于文化。

> `[00:13:52]` We just didn\'t have time we were such a small team.

`[00:13:52]` 我们只是没有时间，我们是一支如此小的队伍。

> You know Brian and me would spend hours answering customer support e-mails right.

你知道我和布莱恩会花几个小时回复客户支持的电子邮件。

> So you know he\'s fine how long did that last.

所以你知道他很好那持续了多久。

> `[00:14:00]` How many users did WhatsApp have the last time you answered regularly answered customer support e-mails.

`[00:14:00]` WhatsApp 上一次定期回复客户支持电子邮件的用户有多少？

> `[00:14:04]` I still do a little bit today I was late and spent hours answering customers e-mails and about people who write into me to somehow find my e-mails.

`[00:14:04]` 我今天还有点迟到，花了好几个小时回复顾客的电子邮件，以及那些给我写信的人，不知怎么找到了我的电子邮件。

> `[00:14:12]` Right.

`[00:14:12]` 对。

> And I try to answer and try to help.

我试着回答和尝试帮助。

> And I still runs iPhone data programs to this day.

我至今还在运行 iPhone 数据程序。

> So but I think at around.

所以我想在周围。

> 150 200 million was started hiring dedicated customers folks.

一亿五千万人开始雇佣忠实的顾客。

> `[00:14:24]` Laughter And we actually have a lot.

`[00:14:24]` 笑声，我们实际上有很多。

> `[00:14:29]` We\'ve focused a lot on our customer support and localization our customer support team is probably one of the most diverse teams.

`[00:14:29]` 我们非常重视客户支持和本地化，我们的客户支持团队可能是最多样化的团队之一。

> That is because we have to support Italian French Turkish Arabic Hebrew.

这是因为我们必须支持意大利语、法语、土耳其语、阿拉伯语、希伯来语。

> All these languages and they help users and that translates at the same time.

所有这些语言，他们帮助用户，并在同一时间翻译。

> `[00:14:48]` So this is actually something I want to dig in.

`[00:14:48]` 这实际上是我想要挖掘的东西。

> You know Whatsapp had this approach that was very different than most startups.

你知道 Whatsapp 有着与大多数初创公司截然不同的方法。

> You know like ignoring Stickley I mean most startups do ignoring the presses and that\'s me most startups do charging for a consumer product.

你知道，就像忽略 Stickley 一样，我的意思是，大多数初创企业都忽略了印刷机，而这就是我，大多数初创公司都会为消费产品收费。

> I remember in Nike 2011 or whatever people would still say well what\'s app is never going to work because they charge a dollar.

我记得在耐克，2011 年，或者其他人仍然会说，什么\的应用是永远不会工作，因为他们收取一美元。

> And it\'s a viral app and that\'s just going to killer right there.

这是一款病毒应用程序，它就会在那里杀人。

> `[00:15:11]` So how how did this sort of culture of being sort of likeA.I.

`[00:15:11]` 那么，这种文化是如何像 A.I 一样的呢？

> sort of Silicon Valley standards come about.

硅谷的标准来了。

> `[00:15:18]` And how important was that to the company.

`[00:15:18]` 这对公司来说有多重要。

> `[00:15:21]` I think what first all I mean are engineers so by definition we just hate meetings behind our computer.

`[00:15:21]` 我想首先我指的是工程师，所以从定义上说，我们只是讨厌电脑后面的会议。

> If I can work right.

如果我能正常工作的话。

> `[00:15:28]` Thank you.

`[00:15:28]` 谢谢。

> `[00:15:30]` Don\'t make us go to meetings with what you have to meet Brasserie you have to meet other people and it takes you away from being in front of a computer or getting work done.

`[00:15:30]` 不要让我们去开会，你必须遇到其他人，这会让你远离在电脑前或完成工作。

> And when when you\'re writing add 80 to 90 hours a week speed and all you do is want to work.

当你写作时，每周增加 80 到 90 个小时的速度，而你所做的只是想工作。

> `[00:15:48]` You don\'t have a lot of time to take meetings.

`[00:15:48]` 你没有太多的时间去开会。

> The thing about charging is actually very interesting.

收费的问题其实很有趣。

> `[00:15:55]` We used this lever to charge structuralist slower growth.

`[00:15:55]` 我们用这个杠杆来推动结构主义者较慢的增长。

> And I know it sounds very counterintuitive because like well why would you want to slow your growth will want it to slow growth so we could better support our existing users so we could build servers that don\'t crash so that we could build product that doesn\'t drop messager so that we could answer to their customer support e-mails and not a lot of people were telling us what you\'re doing it wrong you should really be growing as fast as he can and we\'re like no no no no we want to build the infrastructure first and then it\'s very similar to a little bit of Facebook in early days.

我知道这听起来很违背直觉，因为就像你为什么要放慢你的增长速度一样，我们希望它能减缓增长，这样我们就可以更好地支持我们现有的用户，这样我们就可以建立不崩溃的服务器，这样我们就可以生产出不需要发送消息的产品，这样我们就可以对他们的客户支持的电子邮件负责，而不是很多人告诉我们什么。你做错了，你真的应该像他那样快速增长，我们不想，我们想先建设基础设施，然后它非常类似于 Facebook 早期的一点点。

> They were doing colleges online and they weren\'t open to the entire world and that that\'s kind of similar to what we did.

他们在网上做大学，对整个世界都不开放，这和我们的做法有点相似。

> `[00:16:34]` We wanted to slower growth so we could really focus on existing users and wanted to make sure that the Hower existing users happy and that when people sign up they have a great experience and that the app works and it\'s fast and the servers are up and running all the time.

`[00:16:34]` 我们希望放慢增长速度，这样我们才能真正关注现有用户，并确保 Hower 现有用户感到高兴，并确保当人们注册时，他们有很好的体验，应用程序运行迅速，服务器一直在启动和运行。

> `[00:16:48]` And that\'s part of why we charge for IAW and sometimes Woodlark promotions at the end of the year which would make it free and have like an implied new influx of new user.

`[00:16:48]` 这也是我们对 IAW 收取费用的原因之一，有时还会在年底向 Woodlark 促销，这将使其免费，并有一个隐含的新用户涌入。

> `[00:16:58]` But overall we\'re just kind of wanted to standardize radar which is why I would have been depressed.

`[00:16:58]` 但是总的来说，我们只是想标准化雷达，这就是为什么我会沮丧的原因。

> `[00:17:04]` We felt that.

`[00:17:04]` 我们感觉到了。

> Why did you want to Standardbred.

你为什么想要标准的。

> `[00:17:06]` Right.

`[00:17:06]` 对。

> `[00:17:07]` So we felt that even if people were talking about us writing about us from the press it\'s a distraction to employees.

`[00:17:07]` 所以我们觉得，即使人们在谈论我们，从媒体上谈论我们，也会分散员工的注意力。

> `[00:17:13]` It will be distraction to me and Brian because we would have to comment on it internally.

`[00:17:13]` 这会分散我和布莱恩的注意力，因为我们必须在内部发表意见。

> Or you know do something about it.

或者你知道做点什么。

> `[00:17:22]` And we just felt that if you if we don\'t talk to the press which we tried not to do for the most part we would be able to focus on a product.

`[00:17:22]` 我们只是觉得，如果你不和媒体谈话，而我们大部分时间都不这么做的话，我们就能把注意力集中在一种产品上。

> And that was our strategy and I think that worked for us because we really were able to focus on what.

这就是我们的策略，我认为这对我们有效，因为我们真的能够专注于什么。

> `[00:17:37]` So I think there\'s no marketing inside of WhatsApp right.

`[00:17:37]` 所以我认为 WhatsApp 的内部没有市场营销。

> I don\'t believe there is in finance individual or organization.

我不相信金融界有个人或组织。

> `[00:17:45]` There are essentially two people who are in non-technical roles.

`[00:17:45]` 本质上有两个人在非技术角色中。

> One is right here in Iran.

其中一个就在伊朗。

> I think we describe his role as business operations and over time with regulatory issues we begrudgingly or yond begrudgingly hired a wonderful GC.

我认为，我们把他的角色描述为业务运作，随着时间的推移，我们在监管问题上勉强或勉强地聘请了一位出色的 GC。

> So this is a company that\'s very rare in terms of its functional structure and one of our challenges a Sequoia was to avoid encouraging on to go hire a marketing team or follow up on that tech crunch request because the authentic Yone.

因此，这是一家在功能结构上非常罕见的公司，而红杉公司面临的挑战之一是避免鼓励它聘请营销团队或跟进技术危机的要求，因为它是真正的 Yone。

> `[00:18:12]` And Brian was a very different Antich ballet company in a number of ways.

`[00:18:12]` 布赖恩在许多方面都是一个非常不同的安蒂克芭蕾舞团。

> `[00:18:18]` Related to this approach other than deciding the charge.

`[00:18:18]` 除决定指控外，与此方法有关。

> Could you talk about you know the best or one of the best product decisions you made that sort of is somewhat counterintuitive.

你能谈谈你知道最好的产品还是你做出的最好的产品决策吗？这有点违背直觉。

> `[00:18:26]` Or was it the time man there are so many I think the two biggest ones that people couldn\'t wrap their mind their head around were to First we chose not to do user names.

`[00:18:26]` 或者说是时候了，男人有那么多人，我认为，人们无法思考的最大的两件事是，首先，我们选择了不做用户名。

> `[00:18:42]` We wanted to use phone number and we had a lot of people asking us to do usernames and I was like wow why would you want to introduce an extra layer of handshake between two people when you already have our phone number and your address book.

`[00:18:42]` 我们想使用电话号码，我们有很多人要求我们做用户名，我想哇，为什么你想在两个人之间多介绍一层握手，因为你已经有了我们的电话号码和你的通讯录。

> Well look we always looked at as a mass as this very simple way for people to communicate and stay in touch.

好吧，你看，我们总是把它看作是一种非常简单的方式，人们可以通过这种方式进行交流和保持联系。

> And you know by actually growing up in Russia and Ukraine I would go visit every couple of years and I would like I remember going back to Ukraine in 2004 and 2005 when my basic everybody was using this mass and then I came back to United States and I was told my friends about and are like What is this.

你知道，在俄罗斯和乌克兰长大，我每隔几年去一次，我想记得 2004 年和 2005 年，当我的基本每个人都在使用这个弥撒的时候，我回到了美国，我被告知我的朋友们，这是怎么回事。

> That\'s right.

那是正确的。

> And so we wanted to have that simplicity of of just using the phone numbers like if you know somebody\'s phone number and it\'s in your address book you probably calls me Prahlad tags.

所以我们想简单地使用电话号码，比如，如果你知道某人的电话号码，而且它在你的地址簿上，你可能会叫我普拉拉德标签。

> Well you should also be able to what\'s them.

你也应该知道他们是什么。

> And the second one was that we didn\'t want to use usernames to think think the ability to tap into your address book and use that as a graph to build a network and not to use usernames was probably the biggest one.

第二个问题是，我们不想使用用户名来认为点击你的地址簿并使用它作为一个图表来建立一个网络而不使用用户名的能力可能是最大的。

> `[00:19:43]` Yeah.

`[00:19:43]` 是的。

> At the time I remember no one else was using the phone book yeah yeah.

当时我记得没有其他人在用电话簿，是的。

> And then remind us now what the worst product decision is a worse product.

然后提醒我们，最糟糕的产品决定是更糟糕的产品。

> `[00:19:52]` Susan and I have all like we try was ever released to get rid of a feature that we don\'t think that useful or get rid of the settings that are on.

`[00:19:52]` 苏珊和我都像我们曾经尝试过的那样，发布了一个我们认为没有用的特性，或者去掉了设置。

> It\'s not that you solve the problems like when you have the number of people that we have.

这并不是说你解决的问题就像我们有这么多人一样。

> `[00:20:08]` You can\'t just like easily remove stuff because there is always like a million people or 2 million people to find something useful and so while you don\'t want to sound like a small percentage point one percent absolute numbers it\'s a lot.

`[00:20:08]` 你不能就像轻易移除东西一样，因为总有一百万人或两百万人在寻找有用的东西，所以当你不想听起来像一个小的百分点-百分之一的绝对值时，它就会很大.=。

> `[00:20:20]` And so I think there are probably a couple of things that I think are not that great.

`[00:20:00]` 所以我认为可能有几件事情我认为没有那么好。

> `[00:20:26]` We have this broadcast feature that we can probably improve on or maybe at some point get rid of it altogether or maybe improve it probably is the better thing to do.

`[00:20:26]` 我们有这个广播功能，我们也许可以改进它，或者在某个时候完全摆脱它，或者改进它，也许是更好的做法。

> `[00:20:36]` The smartest thing we have.

`[00:20:36]` 我们拥有的最聪明的东西。

> `[00:20:37]` You know we started with that site like be very negative about it because that\'s how I was started by the status functionality is there it\'s legacy.

`[00:20:37]` 你知道，我们从那个网站开始，好像对它非常消极，因为这是我从状态功能开始的方式，它的遗产在那里吗？

> But I don\'t think anybody uses it.

但我不认为有人会用它。

> At some point we really need to clean it up.

总有一天我们真的需要把它清理干净。

> `[00:20:50]` And then three people asked me you asked this this morning why did you choose our line.

`[00:20:50]` 然后有三个人问我，你今天早上问我，你为什么选择我们的队伍？

> `[00:20:58]` It\'s one of those I was intuition intuition thing.

`[00:20:58]` 这是那种我是直觉的东西。

> I knew nothing about Erlang.

我对 Erlang 一无所知。

> And when we actually still don\'t have a lot of engineers who do laugh and we actually have like a really small surging we really have like seven or eight people supporting our entire user base on a backhand core insanely brilliant who wake up in the middle of the night and fix servers.

当我们还没有很多工程师笑的时候，我们真的有一个非常小的高潮，我们真的有七八个人支持我们的整个用户基础在反手的核心，疯狂的聪明谁半夜醒来，并修复服务器。

> The thing about Erlang is that I was looking for an open source chat server to drop into these back end up with Bill that could identify which of your contacts were WhatsApp users and I would think I could get well we can probably use someP.P.

关于 Erlang 的问题是，我正在寻找一个开源聊天服务器，让它进入这些后端，最终由 Bill 来识别您的联系人中哪些是 WhatsApp 用户，我想我会很好，我们也许可以使用一些 P.P。

> which was.

曾经是。

> An open protocol for messaging and I was looking for an open source company server and I couldn\'t find what was written and see what it was like how dated there was unwritten purling I knew that wouldn\'t be able to scale.

一种开放的消息传递协议，我正在寻找一台开源公司服务器，我找不到所写的内容，也看不出它是如何过时的，我知道它是不成文的，我知道它无法扩展。

> And then like I came across Earling I\'m like What is this.

然后我遇到了厄林，我就像这是什么。

> And I was like at first the first time I heard of it.

我第一次听说它的时候就觉得。

> So I started researching it and it turned out probably what was the best engineering decision we ever made by just we were forced to because there was nothing else to use.

所以我开始研究它，结果很可能是我们做出的最好的工程决定，我们被迫这样做，因为没有其他的东西可以使用。

> `[00:22:08]` It allowed us to scale Rala while it\'s like build for what when you do it.

`[00:22:08]` 它允许我们在你做的时候就像为什么而建造一样的拉腊。

> `[00:22:12]` It\'s a functional programming language.

`[00:22:12]` 这是一种函数式编程语言。

> It has message passing it lets you like cluster servers into nodes and you have just like Gevalia database built into it call them newsier that is really cool like synchronizes all the data across the servers and we obviously tweeted a lot internally.

它有消息传递，它可以让您喜欢集群服务器到节点中，您也有类似于 Gvalia 数据库的内置在其中的消息，它称为新的，非常酷，像同步服务器上的所有数据一样，我们在内部很明显地发了很多推文。

> `[00:22:30]` We have a couple of guys who specialize in tuning Erlang but part of it was just like we had no choice there was only one available at a time and it worked really well for us.

`[00:22:30]` 我们有几个专门调谐 Erlang 的人，但其中的一部分就像我们别无选择，一次只有一个，对我们来说效果很好。

> `[00:22:41]` OK.

`[00:22:41]` 好的。

> `[00:22:42]` So I want to talk about the Facebook acquisition and how that all came to be.

`[00:22:42]` 所以我想谈谈 Facebook 的收购，以及这一切是如何发生的。

> But I actually have another slide all right on this is that a third.

但实际上我有另一张幻灯片，这是第三张。

> `[00:22:54]` That\'s your car.

那是你的车。

> `[00:22:56]` This is the night before the final signing yon it sent me a picture we had just left Fenwick and West and Mountain View and for the prior four days we were kind of cooped up 18 20 hours a day because we had no finance function and we were responsible for all the diligence materials and we left around 230a.m.

`[00:22:56]` 这是最后一次签约的前一天晚上，它给我发了一张我们刚刚离开芬威克、西和山景城的照片，在前四天里，我们每天被关起来 18，20 小时，因为我们没有财务职能，我们负责所有的勤务材料，我们大约在凌晨 230 点离开。

> after things were wrapped up and Yeun on his way home didn\'t have a flat tire blew out at 75 miles per hour.

事情结束后，Yeun 在回家的路上没有爆胎，每小时 75 英里。

> He almost died that night.

那晚他差点死了。

> And this is the exchange thankfully Yarm was able to pull over and change the tire.

这是交换，谢天谢地，亚姆能够停车并更换轮胎。

> But this is one of those little things that happened in the deal dynamics when people talk about the deal almost blow up.

但当人们谈论这笔交易时，这是在交易动态中发生的小事情之一。

> Yes it did actually.

是的实际上是的。

> `[00:23:42]` Laughter.

`[00:23:42]` 笑声。

> So if you could rewind a little from this start of the you know very end of the deal.

所以，如果你能从这一开始向后退一小步，你就会知道这笔交易已经结束了。

> How did that conversation first begin with you and Mark and how did you think about that and becoming part of another company.

那次谈话是如何从你和马克开始的，你是怎么想的，成为另一家公司的一员。

> `[00:23:54]` We met probably two years ago and you know as time went on we got to know each other and realize that Facebook has kind of gone through a lot of stuff that we would probably have to go through like going IPO or something and it also builds us tremendous infrastructure.

`[00:23:54]` 我们大概是在两年前认识的，你知道，随着时间的推移，我们认识了对方，并意识到 Facebook 经历了很多我们可能要经历的事情，比如 IPO 或者什么的，它也为我们建立了巨大的基础设施。

> `[00:24:12]` And they have a lot of people doing things like finance that we didn\'t have and they have an amazing legal team and I have a busy corp dev and biz dev team and when me and Mark would talk we realized that we we share a lot of kind of common goals and common vision.

`[00:24:12]` 他们有很多人在做我们没有的事情，比如金融，他们有一个了不起的法律团队，我有一个忙碌的公司开发和专业开发团队，当我和马克交谈的时候，我们意识到我们有很多共同的目标和共同的愿景。

> Our Facebook mission is to make the world more open and more connected.

我们的 Facebook 使命是让这个世界更加开放，更加互联。

> `[00:24:33]` And when you think about what WhatsApp is doing it\'s helping people to stay in touch it\'s helping people to stay connected.

`[00:24:33]` 当你想到 WhatsApp 在做什么的时候，它就是帮助人们保持联系，帮助人们保持联系。

> `[00:24:39]` And the other thing that would kind of realize that you know we would always talk about is how a lot of companies are very focused on building product for Silicon Valley and kind of thinking about well if I can build a product that will take off in Silicon Valley or maybe even can have users in United States Markkula says this like vision about while there is 6 billion people in the world which is why he has taken initiative was enshrined at all because he wants to have everybody connected.

`[00:24:39]` 还有另一件事，你知道我们会一直在谈论的是，很多公司都非常专注于为硅谷开发产品，并在想，如果我能开发出一种在硅谷腾飞的产品，或者甚至可以让用户在美国使用，Markkula 说的就像在硅谷的时候一样。世界上有 60 亿人，这就是他之所以采取主动的根本原因，因为他希望每个人都能联系起来。

> And we always grew internationally really fast in the early days and we still continue to do that.

在早期，我们在国际上的发展非常快，而且我们仍然在继续这样做。

> And so we always kind of had this like world view of our products and so it made sense as we got to know each other and kind of shared our visions to merge.

所以我们总是对我们的产品有类似的世界观，所以这是有意义的，因为我们认识了彼此，分享了我们的愿景。

> `[00:25:19]` And now that slide gone.

`[00:25:19]` 现在幻灯片不见了。

> `[00:25:22]` Yeah.

`[00:25:22]` 是的。

> And the night before the announcement obviously as Jim said I had a little accident.

就像吉姆说的那样，在宣布的前一天晚上，我出了点小意外。

> `[00:25:28]` Were there other are there were there other companies that you would have sold.

`[00:25:28]` 如果有其他公司，你会卖掉其他公司吗？

> What was it that their particular vision matched with market that made you want to do this.

是什么使他们的特殊愿景与市场相匹配，使你想要这样做。

> `[00:25:34]` I think we just really decided that we wanted to do it together.

`[00:25:34]` 我想我们只是真的决定要一起做。

> I think it was a really good fit philosophically and than just cultural wise as well.

我认为这是一个非常合适的哲学和文化智慧，以及。

> `[00:25:42]` I mean they are so focused on what they\'re doing and we\'re always been so focused on our mission that it just makes sense for us to do it together how the conversation between you to go as you were thinking through that well I think you know a lot of a lot of people talk about tend to focus on guns and numbers.

`[00:25:42]` 我的意思是，他们如此专注于他们正在做的事情，而我们总是如此专注于我们的使命，所以我们一起做这件事是合情合理的-你们之间的对话就像你们思考的那样-我想你们知道很多人谈论的焦点往往是枪支和数字。

> But you know we were never focused on the numbers we were more focused on how can we make it work so successful how can we make it work so that we continue to grow.

但你知道，我们从来没有把注意力放在数字上，我们更关注的是，如何才能使它如此成功，如何才能使它发挥作用，从而使我们继续成长。

> `[00:26:12]` And you know me and Brian are still obviously around and we\'ll be around them.

`[00:26:12]` 你知道我和布莱恩显然还在附近，我们会在他们身边的。

> We continue to lead what\'s and we\'re in Montagues so we\'re a little bit separate from that memo Park office because it will allow us to focus on completing a mission which we still don\'t think is.

我们继续领导我们的工作，我们在蒙塔格，所以我们与备忘录公园办公室有点不同，因为这将使我们能够专注于完成一个我们仍然不认为是的任务。

> I mean we really do want to connect everybody and everybody was a smartphone when it was started out people would ask us What\'s your goal in the early days in 2009 2010.

我的意思是，我们真的想把每个人联系起来，当智能手机问世时，每个人都是智能手机，人们会在 2009 到 2010 年初问我们你的目标是什么。

> And I would say while I want what\'s up to be on every single smartphone.

我会说，当我想在每一部智能手机上做些什么的时候。

> `[00:26:39]` Backdowns was like on a 200 million smartphones so it was easy.

`[00:26:39]` 倒退就像在 2 亿部智能手机上，所以很容易。

> But today if you think about it like we we\'re not on every single smartphone by far.

但是今天，如果你像我们这样想的话，到目前为止，我们并不是每一部智能手机都在使用。

> In fact I think we should be doing a much better job.

事实上，我认为我们应该做得更好。

> I\'m sure a lot of you here probably don\'t use WhatsApp and you know that\'s partially our fault and we should make sure that no matter how much success we had that will stay focused on keep keep our eye on making sure that every single person has WhatsApp on their phone.

我相信在座的很多人可能不使用 WhatsApp，你们知道这部分是我们的错，我们应该确保，无论我们取得了多大的成功，我们都要专注于确保每个人的手机上都有 WhatsApp。

> `[00:27:03]` It\'s just interject them I think.

`[00:27:03]` 我想只是插话而已。

> Yun was never focused on the money at a human dimension.

云从来没有从人的角度来关注金钱。

> `[00:27:10]` The first stop he had here in Mountain View was that the food stamps line the welfare office and social services.

`[00:27:10]` 他在山景城的第一站是福利办公室和社会服务部门的食品券。

> And if you think about being an immigrant and starting in the bottom 1 percent and having this ambition to connect to your family and friends and Yan didn\'t mention this but you lost his mom and his grandmother while I was at Yahoo.

如果你想成为一名移民，从最低的 1%开始，并有与你的家人和朋友建立联系的野心-颜没有提到这一点，但我在雅虎的时候，你失去了他的妈妈和祖母。

> And I think that formed a big part of who he was and as important as monetary gain can be to the people in the audience I think ganj passion really started with connecting the world and creating it in an economically attractive way that would allow people to interact with one another across country boundaries.

我认为，这是他的重要组成部分，对观众来说，金钱收益同样重要。我认为，甘吉的热情是从连接世界开始的，并以一种经济上有吸引力的方式创造它，这样人们就可以跨越国界相互交流。

> And I think getting out of the Facebook team and Zach a lot of credit I think they understood how important that was on and I think that\'s reflected in the board seat.

我认为，离开 Facebook 团队和扎克，我认为他们明白这是多么重要，我认为这反映在董事会的席位上。

> And two years of wonderful conversations were over time I think they came together on the business and I think that\'s what allowed the two companies to come together.

经过两年的精彩交谈，我认为他们在生意上走到了一起，我认为这就是让这两家公司走到一起的原因。

> `[00:28:08]` We\'ve definitely seen it.

`[00:28:08]` 我们肯定看到了。

> I see the people that make the most money from start ups are the ones where that is not even the you know number two number three goal.

我看到，那些从初创企业中赚得最多的人，就是那些你知道的第二、第三目标的人。

> Right.

右（边），正确的

> You kind of have to not be shooting at it for it to really work out it\'s this crazy thing.

你不一定要向它开枪才能真正解决这件疯狂的事情。

> So to wrap up to whatever you can talk about it what\'s what\'s sort of in the future for WhatsApp and what are you most excited to besides getting an phone.

所以，总结一下你可以谈论的任何事情，WhatsApp 未来的发展趋势，以及除了手机之外，你最兴奋的是什么。

> `[00:28:29]` Oh yeah.

`[00:28:29]` 哦，是的。

> `[00:28:32]` Our job is very sexy.

我们的工作很性感。

> We come into work and we just try to fix crashes and to make our protocol faster and more efficient on the wire and we just focus on little details like how can we make our applications start up faster.

我们开始工作，我们只是试图修复崩溃，使我们的协议更快和更有效的线路，我们只关注一些小细节，例如，我们如何使我们的应用程序更快地启动。

> How can we make our application more reliable.

如何使我们的应用更加可靠。

> How can we make sure that our cloud backup works or that we do the right thing when you switch phones or when you switch SIM cards there is a lot of kind of edge cases that we need to think about.

我们如何确保我们的云备份工作，或者我们做正确的事情，当您切换电话或当您切换 SIM 卡，有很多种边缘情况，我们需要考虑。

> And we\'re we\'re we\'re far from getting it right.

我们还远没有把它做好。

> `[00:29:00]` And you know for us for us to get it right is a lot of hard work and that\'s what everybody is focused on.

`[00:29:00]` 你知道，对我们来说，做好这件事是一件很辛苦的工作，这也是每个人都关注的问题。

> We still have a lot of work to do.

我们还有很多工作要做。

> All right.

好的

> Thank you so much for calling you.

非常感谢你打电话给你。

> Thank you.

谢谢。
