# 贡献指南

> 请您勇敢地去翻译和改进翻译。虽然我们追求卓越，但我们并不要求您做到十全十美，因此请不要担心因为翻译上犯错——在大部分情况下，我们的服务器已经记录所有的翻译，因此您不必担心会因为您的失误遭到无法挽回的破坏。（改编自维基百科）

课程视频：

+ [斯坦福博弈论课程官网](http://www.game-theory-class.org/)
+ [Cousera 博弈论 1](https://www.coursera.org/learn/game-theory-1)
+ [Cousera 博弈论 2](https://www.coursera.org/learn/game-theory-2)

负责人：

+   [viviwong](https://github.com/viviwong)

## 章节列表

+   博弈论 I
    +   1-1 Game Theory Intro - TCP Backoff
    +   1-2 Self-Interested Agents and Utility Theory
    +   1-3 Defining Games
    +   1-4 Examples of Games
    +   1-5 Nash Equilibrium Intro
    +   1-6 Strategic Reasoning
    +   1-7 Best Response and Nash Equilibrium
    +   1-8 Nash Equilibrium of Example Games
    +   1-9 Dominant Strategies
    +   1-10 Pareto Optimality
    +   2-1 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium (I)
    +   2-2 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium (II)
    +   2-3 Computing Mixed Nash Equilibrium
    +   2-4 Hardness Beyond 2x2 Games - Basic
    +   2-4 Hardness Beyond 2x2 Games - Advanced
    +   2-5 Example: Mixed Strategy Nash
    +   2-6 Data: Professional Sports and Mixed Strategies
    +   3-1 Beyond the Nash Equilibrium
    +   3-2 Strictly Dominated Strategies & Iterative Removal
    +   3-3 Dominated Strategies & Iterative Removal: An Application
    +   3-4 Maxmin Strategies
    +   3-4 Maxmin Strategies - Advanced
    +   3-5 Correlated Equilibrium: Intuition
    +   4-1 Perfect Information Extensive Form: Taste
    +   4-2 Formalizing Perfect Information Extensive Form Games
    +   4-3 Perfect Information Extensive Form: Strategies, BR, NE
    +   4-4 Subgame Perfection
    +   4-5 Backward Induction
    +   4-6 Subgame Perfect Application: Ultimatum Bargaining
    +   4-7 Imperfect Information Extensive Form: Poker
    +   4-8 Imperfect Information Extensive Form: Definition, Strategies
    +   4-9 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies
    +   4-10 Incomplete Information in the Extensive Form: Beyond Subgame Perfection
+   博弈论 II
    +   1.1 Social Choice: Taste
    +   1.2 Social Choice: Voting Scheme
    +   1.3 Paradoxical Outcomes
    +   1.4 Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions
    +   1.5 Arrow's Theorem
    +   1.6 Impossibility of Non-Pardoxical Social Choice Functions
    +   1.7 Single-Peaked Preferences
    +   2.1 Mechanism Design: Taste
    +   2.2 Implementation
    +   2.3 Mechanism Design: Examples
    +   2.4 Revelation Principle
    +   2.5 Revelation Principle: Examples
    +   2.6 Impossibility of General Dominant-Strategy Implementation
    +   2.7 Transferable Utility
    +   2.8 Transferable Utility Example
    +   2.9 Mechanism Design as an Optimization Problem
    +   3.1 VCG: Taste
    +   3.2 VCG: Definitions
    +   3.3 VCG: Examples
    +   3.4 VCG: Limitations
    +   3.5 VCG: Individual Rationality and Budget Balance in VCG
    +   3.6 VCG: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem
    +   4.1 Auctions: Taste
    +   4.2 Auctions: Taxonomy
    +   4.3 Bidding in Second-Price Auctions
    +   4.4 Bidding in First-Price Auctions
    +   4.5 Revenue Equivalence
    +   4.6 Optimal Auctions
    +   4.7 More Advanced Auctions

## 流程

### 一、认领

首先查看[整体进度](https://github.com/apachecn/stanford-game-theory-notes-zh/issues/1)，确认没有人认领了你想认领的章节。

然后回复 ISSUE，注明“章节 + QQ 号”。

### 二、整理笔记

+   翻译 Coursera 课程页面的字幕，如果已有中文翻译，跳过此步

    （可以利用[谷歌翻译](https://translate.google.cn)，但一定要把它变得可读）

+   排版成段落，并添加视频截图

### 三、提交

+   `fork` Github 项目
+   将文档（**Markdown 格式**）放在`docs`中。
+   `push`
+   `pull request`

请见 [Github 入门指南](https://github.com/apachecn/kaggle/blob/master/docs/GitHub)。