Add CHANGES and NEWS for 1.1.1c

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9017)

CHANGES

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
  Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [xx XXX xxxx]
 
-  *) Added build tests for C++.  These are generated files that only do one
+  *) Add build tests for C++.  These are generated files that only do one
      thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each.  This tests that
      the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
 
@@ -17,12 +17,67 @@
      'enable-buildtest-c++'.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
+  *) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
+     [Patrick Steuer]
+
   *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
      This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
      fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
      generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
      [Kurt Roeckx]
 
+  *) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
+     EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
+     util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
+     [Paul Yang, Joshua Lock]
+
+  *) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
+     along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
+     [Lorinczy Zsigmond]
+
+  *) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
+     [Richard Levitte]
+
+  *) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
+     [Bernd Edlinger]
+
+  *) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
+
+     ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
+     for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
+     (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
+     and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
+     bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
+     bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
+     additional leading bytes are ignored.
+
+     It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
+     unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
+     serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
+     the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
+     change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
+     new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
+     messages with a reused nonce.
+
+     Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
+     integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
+     integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
+     affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
+     is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
+     applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
+     length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
+     Greef of Ronomon.
+     (CVE-2019-1543)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
+     [Paul Yang]
+
  Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019]
 
   *) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through

NEWS

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1b and OpenSSL 1.1.1c [under development]
 
-      o
+      o Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543)
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1a and OpenSSL 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019]