Remove duplicate CHANGES entry

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9844)

CHANGES

@@ -24,18 +24,6 @@
      (CVE-2019-1549)
      [Matthias St. Pierre]
 
-  *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt(). In situations
-     where an attacker receives automated notification of the success or failure
-     of a decryption attempt an attacker, after sending a very large number of
-     messages to be decrypted, can recover a CMS/PKCS7 transported encryption
-     key or decrypt any RSA encrypted message that was encrypted with the public
-     RSA key, using a Bleichenbacher padding oracle attack. Applications are not
-     affected if they use a certificate together with the private RSA key to the
-     CMS_decrypt or PKCS7_decrypt functions to select the correct recipient info
-     to decrypt.
-     (CVE-2019-1563)
-     [Bernd Edlinger]
-
   *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
      used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key
      or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/
@@ -66,6 +54,7 @@
      certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
      The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
      CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
+     (CVE-2019-1563)
      [Bernd Edlinger]
 
   *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been

NEWS

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenSSL 1.1.1d [under development]
 
       o Fixed a fork protection issue (CVE-2019-1549)
-      o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_decrypt() and CMS_decrypt()
+      o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
         (CVE-2019-1563)
       o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is
         used even when parsing explicit parameters