diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 36f46eb159ed9c473baf8e44783edad27c6acee6..639b2323fc0d7af4be887999bc9f879d674b1d27 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.9  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
+
   *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
      Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
      [Steve Henson]
@@ -377,7 +380,12 @@
   *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default.
      [NTT]
 
- Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c  [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d  [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c  [05 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
 
   *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes.
      [Ben Laurie]
@@ -1335,7 +1343,12 @@
      differing sizes.
      [Richard Levitte]
 
- Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [xx XXX xxxx]
+ Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l  [xx XXX xxxx]
+
+ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k  [05 Sep 2006]
+
+  *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
+     (CVE-2006-4339)  [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team]
 
   *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when
      possible instead of select(), since the latter has some
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index bbb29ee9eb21a272a7ef233003ee64121aa0dc88..0937c96ff91f47fb86ad3348d0cb907581f1884c 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a:
 
-      o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CAN-2005-2969
+      o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969
       o Extended Windows CE support
 
   Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8:
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
index 31f3792a4cf2c457fa1fcc099b5f136d588dacf2..c8b6a814a0983dc3ccd34a0a958483ce25a886c4 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa.h
@@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void);
 #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q			 127
 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR			 121
 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED			 114
+#define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT			 105
 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME				 128
 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME				 129
 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED		 130
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
index c6ceaee6e731689448c0d9c1ab35a43b2887b929..863a45a9758523056158ebf15fcb86e43ddce7e5 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
@@ -640,6 +640,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
 		{
 	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
+		/* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though
+		   this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard
+		   signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is
+		   small. */
+		if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n))
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT);
+			goto err;
+			}
 		break;
 	case RSA_X931_PADDING:
 		r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
index 163b143a73c3e478a9f454d9de68fdd774da1a67..1a7f8b77196ac8e8373520e77edb1945f2210585 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]=
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q)  ,"n does not equal p q"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR)   ,"oaep decoding error"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED)  ,"padding check failed"},
+{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME)           ,"p not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME)           ,"q not prime"},
 {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"},
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
index e5a015d1a66efea4c19a064b6198b9927e7e2200..e1b1714210f122d2fc9d84a3daa00d2d80721cce 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c
@@ -193,6 +193,23 @@ int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
 		sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i);
 
 		if (sig == NULL) goto err;
+
+		/* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */
+		if(p != s+i)
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		/* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to
+		   create forgeries */
+		if(sig->algor->parameter
+		   && ASN1_TYPE_get(sig->algor->parameter) != V_ASN1_NULL)
+			{
+			RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
 		sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);