1. 06 8月, 2019 5 次提交
    • W
      x86: uaccess: Inhibit speculation past access_ok() in user_access_begin() · e28b4155
      Will Deacon 提交于
      commit 6e693b3ffecb0b478c7050b44a4842854154f715 upstream.
      
      Commit 594cc251fdd0 ("make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()'")
      makes the access_ok() check part of the user_access_begin() preceding a
      series of 'unsafe' accesses.  This has the desirable effect of ensuring
      that all 'unsafe' accesses have been range-checked, without having to
      pick through all of the callsites to verify whether the appropriate
      checking has been made.
      
      However, the consolidated range check does not inhibit speculation, so
      it is still up to the caller to ensure that they are not susceptible to
      any speculative side-channel attacks for user addresses that ultimately
      fail the access_ok() check.
      
      This is an oversight, so use __uaccess_begin_nospec() to ensure that
      speculation is inhibited until the access_ok() check has passed.
      Reported-by: NJulien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      e28b4155
    • L
      make 'user_access_begin()' do 'access_ok()' · aba1b548
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      commit 594cc251fdd0d231d342d88b2fdff4bc42fb0690 upstream.
      
      Originally, the rule used to be that you'd have to do access_ok()
      separately, and then user_access_begin() before actually doing the
      direct (optimized) user access.
      
      But experience has shown that people then decide not to do access_ok()
      at all, and instead rely on it being implied by other operations or
      similar.  Which makes it very hard to verify that the access has
      actually been range-checked.
      
      If you use the unsafe direct user accesses, hardware features (either
      SMAP - Supervisor Mode Access Protection - on x86, or PAN - Privileged
      Access Never - on ARM) do force you to use user_access_begin().  But
      nothing really forces the range check.
      
      By putting the range check into user_access_begin(), we actually force
      people to do the right thing (tm), and the range check vill be visible
      near the actual accesses.  We have way too long a history of people
      trying to avoid them.
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      
      [ Shile: fix following conflicts by adding a dummy arguments ]
      Conflicts:
      	kernel/compat.c
      	kernel/exit.c
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      aba1b548
    • L
      i915: fix missing user_access_end() in page fault exception case · 22698330
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      commit 0b2c8f8b6b0c7530e2866c95862546d0da2057b0 upstream.
      
      When commit fddcd00a49e9 ("drm/i915: Force the slow path after a
      user-write error") unified the error handling for various user access
      problems, it didn't do the user_access_end() that is needed for the
      unsafe_put_user() case.
      
      It's not a huge deal: a missed user_access_end() will only mean that
      SMAP protection isn't active afterwards, and for the error case we'll be
      returning to user mode soon enough anyway.  But it's wrong, and adding
      the proper user_access_end() is trivial enough (and doing it for the
      other error cases where it isn't needed doesn't hurt).
      
      I noticed it while doing the same prep-work for changing
      user_access_begin() that precipitated the access_ok() changes in commit
      96d4f267e40f ("Remove 'type' argument from access_ok() function").
      
      Fixes: fddcd00a49e9 ("drm/i915: Force the slow path after a user-write error")
      Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
      Cc: Joonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org # v4.20
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      22698330
    • C
      drm/i915: Force the slow path after a user-write error · 5cbce514
      Chris Wilson 提交于
      commit fddcd00a49e9122a3579247151e9cb3ce5a1a36e upstream.
      
      If we fail to write the user relocation back when it is changed, force
      ourselves to take the slow relocation path where we can handle faults in
      the write path. There is still an element of dubiousness as having
      patched up the batch to use the correct offset, it no longer matches the
      presumed_offset in the relocation, so a second pass may miss any changes
      in layout.
      Signed-off-by: NChris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
      Reviewed-by: NJoonas Lahtinen <joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>
      Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20180903083337.13134-3-chris@chris-wilson.co.ukSigned-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      5cbce514
    • A
      userfaultfd: allow get_mempolicy(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR) to trigger userfaults · c15f4d67
      Andrea Arcangeli 提交于
      commit 3b9aadf7278d16d7bed4d5d808501065f70898d8 upstream.
      
      get_mempolicy(MPOL_F_NODE|MPOL_F_ADDR) called a get_user_pages that would
      not be waiting for userfaults before failing and it would hit on a SIGBUS
      instead.  Using get_user_pages_locked/unlocked instead will allow
      get_mempolicy to allow userfaults to resolve the fault and fill the hole,
      before grabbing the node id of the page.
      
      If the user calls get_mempolicy() with MPOL_F_ADDR | MPOL_F_NODE for an
      address inside an area managed by uffd and there is no page at that
      address, the page allocation from within get_mempolicy() will fail
      because get_user_pages() does not allow for page fault retry required
      for uffd; the user will get SIGBUS.
      
      With this patch, the page fault will be resolved by the uffd and the
      get_mempolicy() will continue normally.
      
      Background:
      
      Via code review, previously the syscall would have returned -EFAULT
      (vm_fault_to_errno), now it will block and wait for an userfault (if
      it's waken before the fault is resolved it'll still -EFAULT).
      
      This way get_mempolicy will give a chance to an "unaware" app to be
      compliant with userfaults.
      
      The reason this visible change is that becoming "userfault compliant"
      cannot regress anything: all other syscalls including read(2)/write(2)
      had to become "userfault compliant" long time ago (that's one of the
      things userfaultfd can do that PROT_NONE and trapping segfaults can't).
      
      So this is just one more syscall that become "userfault compliant" like
      all other major ones already were.
      
      This has been happening on virtio-bridge dpdk process which just called
      get_mempolicy on the guest space post live migration, but before the
      memory had a chance to be migrated to destination.
      
      I didn't run an strace to be able to show the -EFAULT going away, but
      I've the confirmation of the below debug aid information (only visible
      with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y) going away with the patch:
      
          [20116.371461] FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY missing 0
          [20116.371464] CPU: 1 PID: 13381 Comm: vhost-events Not tainted 4.17.12-200.fc28.x86_64 #1
          [20116.371465] Hardware name: LENOVO 20FAS2BN0A/20FAS2BN0A, BIOS N1CET54W (1.22 ) 02/10/2017
          [20116.371466] Call Trace:
          [20116.371473]  dump_stack+0x5c/0x80
          [20116.371476]  handle_userfault.cold.37+0x1b/0x22
          [20116.371479]  ? remove_wait_queue+0x20/0x60
          [20116.371481]  ? poll_freewait+0x45/0xa0
          [20116.371483]  ? do_sys_poll+0x31c/0x520
          [20116.371485]  ? radix_tree_lookup_slot+0x1e/0x50
          [20116.371488]  shmem_getpage_gfp+0xce7/0xe50
          [20116.371491]  ? page_add_file_rmap+0x1a/0x2c0
          [20116.371493]  shmem_fault+0x78/0x1e0
          [20116.371495]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x3a1/0x450
          [20116.371498]  __do_fault+0x1f/0xc0
          [20116.371500]  __handle_mm_fault+0xe2e/0x12f0
          [20116.371502]  handle_mm_fault+0xda/0x200
          [20116.371504]  __get_user_pages+0x238/0x790
          [20116.371506]  get_user_pages+0x3e/0x50
          [20116.371510]  kernel_get_mempolicy+0x40b/0x700
          [20116.371512]  ? vfs_write+0x170/0x1a0
          [20116.371515]  __x64_sys_get_mempolicy+0x21/0x30
          [20116.371517]  do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
          [20116.371520]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
      
      The above harmless debug message (not a kernel crash, just a
      dump_stack()) is shown with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y to more quickly identify
      and improve kernel spots that may have to become "userfaultfd
      compliant" like this one (without having to run an strace and search
      for syscall misbehavior).  Spots like the above are more closer to a
      kernel bug for the non-cooperative usages that Mike focuses on, than
      for for dpdk qemu-cooperative usages that reproduced it, but it's still
      nicer to get this fixed for dpdk too.
      
      The part of the patch that caused me to think is only the
      implementation issue of mpol_get, but it looks like it should work safe
      no matter the kind of mempolicy structure that is (the default static
      policy also starts at 1 so it'll go to 2 and back to 1 without crashing
      everything at 0).
      
      [rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com: changelog addition]
        http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180904073718.GA26916@rapoport-lnx
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180831214848.23676-1-aarcange@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
      Reported-by: NMaxime Coquelin <maxime.coquelin@redhat.com>
      Tested-by: NDr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
      Reviewed-by: NMike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      c15f4d67
  2. 01 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  3. 29 7月, 2019 3 次提交
  4. 25 7月, 2019 1 次提交
    • J
      ptrace: Fix ->ptracer_cred handling for PTRACE_TRACEME · 4cf85eef
      Jann Horn 提交于
      commit 6994eefb0053799d2e07cd140df6c2ea106c41ee upstream.
      
      This fixes CVE-2019-13272.
      
      Fix two issues:
      
      When called for PTRACE_TRACEME, ptrace_link() would obtain an RCU
      reference to the parent's objective credentials, then give that pointer
      to get_cred().  However, the object lifetime rules for things like
      struct cred do not permit unconditionally turning an RCU reference into
      a stable reference.
      
      PTRACE_TRACEME records the parent's credentials as if the parent was
      acting as the subject, but that's not the case.  If a malicious
      unprivileged child uses PTRACE_TRACEME and the parent is privileged, and
      at a later point, the parent process becomes attacker-controlled
      (because it drops privileges and calls execve()), the attacker ends up
      with control over two processes with a privileged ptrace relationship,
      which can be abused to ptrace a suid binary and obtain root privileges.
      
      Fix both of these by always recording the credentials of the process
      that is requesting the creation of the ptrace relationship:
      current_cred() can't change under us, and current is the proper subject
      for access control.
      
      This change is theoretically userspace-visible, but I am not aware of
      any code that it will actually break.
      
      Fixes: 64b875f7 ("ptrace: Capture the ptracer's creds not PT_PTRACE_CAP")
      Signed-off-by: NJann Horn <jannh@google.com>
      Acked-by: NOleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NShile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      4cf85eef
  5. 24 7月, 2019 5 次提交
  6. 20 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  7. 18 7月, 2019 1 次提交
    • X
      ext4: unlock unused_pages timely when doing writeback · 404ed43a
      Xiaoguang Wang 提交于
      commit a297b2fcee461e40df763e179cbbfba5a9e572d2 upstream.
      
      In mpage_add_bh_to_extent(), when accumulated extents length is greater
      than MAX_WRITEPAGES_EXTENT_LEN or buffer head's b_stat is not equal, we
      will not continue to search unmapped area for this page, but note this
      page is locked, and will only be unlocked in mpage_release_unused_pages()
      after ext4_io_submit, if io also is throttled by blk-throttle or similar
      io qos, we will hold this page locked for a while, it's unnecessary.
      
      I think the best fix is to refactor mpage_add_bh_to_extent() to let it
      return some hints whether to unlock this page, but given that we will
      improve dioread_nolock later, we can let it done later, so currently
      the simple fix would just call mpage_release_unused_pages() before
      ext4_io_submit().
      Signed-off-by: NXiaoguang Wang <xiaoguang.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Signed-off-by: NTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
      Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Reviewed-by: NLiu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
      404ed43a
  8. 10 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 05 7月, 2019 21 次提交