提交 3b0648eb 编写于 作者: D Dr. Stephen Henson

Rename Suite B functions for consistency.

New function X509_chain_up_ref to dup and up the reference count of
a STACK_OF(X509): replace equivalent functionality in several places
by the equivalent call.
上级 3ad344a5
......@@ -233,7 +233,6 @@ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_def_policy(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, ASN1_OBJECT *def_policy)
int TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
{
int i;
if (ctx->certs)
{
......@@ -241,16 +240,11 @@ int TS_RESP_CTX_set_certs(TS_RESP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
ctx->certs = NULL;
}
if (!certs) return 1;
if (!(ctx->certs = sk_X509_dup(certs)))
if (!(ctx->certs = X509_chain_up_ref(certs)))
{
TSerr(TS_F_TS_RESP_CTX_SET_CERTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->certs); ++i)
{
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->certs, i);
CRYPTO_add(&cert->references, +1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return 1;
}
......
......@@ -966,11 +966,12 @@ int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm);
int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int X509_check_suiteb_chain(int *perror_depth,
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth,
X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags);
int X509_check_suiteb_crl(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk,
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk,
unsigned long flags);
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain);
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b);
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a);
......
......@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
}
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
{
EVP_PKEY *xk;
......@@ -383,7 +384,7 @@ static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
return X509_V_OK;
}
int X509_check_suiteb_chain(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
......@@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ int X509_check_suiteb_chain(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
return rv;
}
int X509_check_suiteb_crl(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
{
int sign_nid;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
......@@ -464,4 +465,19 @@ int X509_check_suiteb_crl(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
}
/* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref
* of each X509 structure.
*/
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
int i;
ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++)
{
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return ret;
}
......@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
if(!ok) goto end;
i = X509_check_suiteb_chain(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
i = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
ctx->param->flags);
if (i != X509_V_OK)
{
......@@ -1486,7 +1486,7 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
else
{
int rv;
rv = X509_check_suiteb_crl(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
{
ctx->error=rv;
......@@ -1934,16 +1934,9 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return chain;
if (!ctx->chain)
return NULL;
return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
}
X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
......
......@@ -321,18 +321,12 @@ CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
if (cpk->chain)
{
int j;
rpk->chain = sk_X509_dup(cpk->chain);
rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
if (!rpk->chain)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(rpk->chain); j++)
{
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(rpk->chain, j);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
}
rpk->valid_flags = 0;
if (cert->pkeys[i].authz != NULL)
......@@ -562,18 +556,11 @@ int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
X509 *x;
int i;
if (!chain)
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
dchain = sk_X509_dup(chain);
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (!dchain)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dchain); i++)
{
x = sk_X509_value(dchain, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain))
{
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
......
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