提交 5e3ff62c 编写于 作者: D Dr. Stephen Henson

Experimental encrypt-then-mac support.

Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt

To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x10 for the test server)
using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x10

For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
effect.
上级 226751ae
......@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@
Changes between 1.0.x and 1.1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support.
Experimental support for encrypt then mac from
draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt
To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x10 for the test
server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x10
For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no
effect.
WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.
[Steve Henson]
*) Add callbacks supporting generation and retrieval of supplemental
data entries.
[Scott Deboy <sdeboy@apache.org>, Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie]
......
......@@ -1023,6 +1023,11 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
extname = "next protocol";
break;
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac:
extname = "encrypt-then-mac";
break;
#endif
default:
extname = "unknown";
......
......@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ static int client_master_key(SSL *s)
if (s->state == SSL2_ST_SEND_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY_A)
{
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL, 0))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
......
......@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ int ssl2_enc_init(SSL *s, int client)
const EVP_MD *md;
int num;
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL, 0))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
......
......@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ static int get_client_master_key(SSL *s)
is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->session->cipher);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL))
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&md,NULL,NULL,NULL, 0))
{
ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY,SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS);
......
......@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return(1);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,NULL,NULL,&comp))
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,NULL,NULL,&comp, 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return(0);
......
......@@ -408,6 +408,30 @@ fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
/* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
rr->data=rr->input;
rr->orig_len=rr->length;
/* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record.
* All the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
*/
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash)
{
unsigned char *mac;
mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
if (rr->length < mac_size)
{
al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
rr->length -= mac_size;
mac = rr->data + rr->length;
i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
{
al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
goto f_err;
}
}
enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
/* enc_err is:
......@@ -430,7 +454,7 @@ printf("\n");
/* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
if ((sess != NULL) &&
(s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
(EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s))
{
/* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
unsigned char *mac = NULL;
......@@ -820,7 +844,7 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
* from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
* wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
if (mac_size != 0)
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
{
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
goto err;
......@@ -840,6 +864,13 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
/* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0)
{
if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,p + wr->length,1) < 0)
goto err;
wr->length+=mac_size;
}
/* record length after mac and block padding */
s2n(wr->length,plen);
......
......@@ -422,6 +422,8 @@ typedef struct ssl3_buffer_st
* effected, but we can't prevent that.
*/
#define SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE 0x0040
/* Set if we encrypt then mac instead of usual mac then encrypt */
#define TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 0x0080
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN
......
......@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void load_builtin_compressions(void)
#endif
int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size,SSL_COMP **comp)
const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, int *mac_secret_size,SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm)
{
int i;
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
......@@ -617,6 +617,9 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
{
const EVP_CIPHER *evp;
if (use_etm)
return 1;
if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR ||
s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
return 1;
......
......@@ -460,6 +460,12 @@
((SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION) || \
(!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION))
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
#define SSL_USE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
#else
#define SSL_USE_ETM(s) (0)
#endif
/* Mostly for SSLv3 */
#define SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC 0
#define SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN 1
......@@ -982,7 +988,7 @@ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth,
const char *rule_str, CERT *c);
void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode);
int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s,const EVP_CIPHER **enc,
const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp);
const EVP_MD **md,int *mac_pkey_type,int *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm);
int ssl_get_handshake_digest(int i,long *mask,const EVP_MD **md);
int ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(const SSL_CIPHER *c);
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr);
......
......@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *bp, const SSL_SESSION *x)
{
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
ssl_cipher_get_evp(x,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,&comp);
ssl_cipher_get_evp(x,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL,&comp, 0);
if (comp == NULL)
{
if (BIO_printf(bp,"\n Compression: %d",x->compress_meth) <= 0) goto err;
......
......@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
return(1);
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp, SSL_USE_ETM(s)))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
return(0);
......@@ -874,7 +874,7 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
ret = 1;
if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
if ((bs != 1) && !send)
ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
......@@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
if (!send &&
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) &&
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
{
......@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (!send && FIPS_mode())
if (!send && !SSL_USE_ETM(ssl) && FIPS_mode())
tls_fips_digest_extra(
ssl->enc_read_ctx,
mac_ctx, rec->input,
......
......@@ -1465,6 +1465,10 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
ret += outlen;
}
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
#endif
if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2) == 0)
return p;
......@@ -1700,6 +1704,21 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha
}
}
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
{
/* Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD: might want
* to disable for other ciphersuites too.
*/
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD)
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
else
{
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac,ret);
s2n(0,ret);
}
}
#endif
if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
{
......@@ -1934,6 +1953,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
......@@ -2452,6 +2475,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
}
}
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
data+=size;
}
......@@ -2538,6 +2565,10 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
#endif
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
......@@ -2789,6 +2820,14 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char
}
}
}
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
{
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
}
#endif
data += size;
}
......
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