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Third Party Openssl
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a9ed4da8
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Third Party Openssl
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前往新版Gitcode,体验更适合开发者的 AI 搜索 >>
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a9ed4da8
编写于
9月 06, 2001
作者:
B
Bodo Möller
浏览文件
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电子邮件补丁
差异文件
improve OAEP check
上级
e1a4814c
变更
2
隐藏空白更改
内联
并排
Showing
2 changed file
with
35 addition
and
13 deletion
+35
-13
CHANGES
CHANGES
+8
-1
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
+27
-12
未找到文件。
CHANGES
浏览文件 @
a9ed4da8
...
...
@@ -12,11 +12,18 @@
*) applies to 0.9.6a/0.9.6b/0.9.6c and 0.9.7
+) applies to 0.9.7 only
*) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid
'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf.
James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the
RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use
encoding paramters and hence was not vulnerable.
[Bodo Moeller]
+) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to
be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from
ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API
functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE.
[Geoff]
[Geoff
Thorpe
]
+) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and
"openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This
...
...
crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
浏览文件 @
a9ed4da8
...
...
@@ -43,20 +43,20 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
{
RSAerr
(
RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP
,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE
);
return
(
0
)
;
return
0
;
}
if
(
emlen
<
2
*
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+
1
)
{
RSAerr
(
RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP
,
RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL
);
return
(
0
)
;
return
0
;
}
dbmask
=
OPENSSL_malloc
(
emlen
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
if
(
dbmask
==
NULL
)
{
RSAerr
(
RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP
,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
return
(
0
)
;
return
0
;
}
to
[
0
]
=
0
;
...
...
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
db
[
emlen
-
flen
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-
1
]
=
0x01
;
memcpy
(
db
+
emlen
-
flen
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
from
,
(
unsigned
int
)
flen
);
if
(
RAND_bytes
(
seed
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
)
<=
0
)
return
(
0
)
;
return
0
;
#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
memcpy
(
seed
,
"
\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f
"
,
...
...
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
MGF1
(
dbmask
,
emlen
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
seed
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
emlen
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
i
++
)
db
[
i
]
^=
dbmask
[
i
];
MGF1
(
seedmask
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
db
,
emlen
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
);
for
(
i
=
0
;
i
<
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
i
++
)
seed
[
i
]
^=
seedmask
[
i
];
...
...
@@ -96,21 +96,34 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const
unsigned
char
*
maskeddb
;
int
lzero
;
unsigned
char
*
db
=
NULL
,
seed
[
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
],
phash
[
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
];
int
bad
=
0
;
if
(
--
num
<
2
*
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+
1
)
/* 'num' is the length of the modulus, i.e. does not depend on the
* particular ciphertext. */
goto
decoding_err
;
lzero
=
num
-
flen
;
if
(
lzero
<
0
)
goto
decoding_err
;
{
/* lzero == -1 */
/* signalling this error immediately after detection might allow
* for side-channel attacks (e.g. timing if 'plen' is huge
* -- cf. James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA Optimal
* Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001),
* so we use a 'bad' flag */
bad
=
1
;
lzero
=
0
;
}
maskeddb
=
from
-
lzero
+
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
dblen
=
num
-
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
;
db
=
OPENSSL_malloc
(
dblen
);
if
(
db
==
NULL
)
{
RSAerr
(
RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP
,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE
);
return
(
-
1
)
;
return
-
1
;
}
MGF1
(
seed
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
,
maskeddb
,
dblen
);
...
...
@@ -122,8 +135,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
db
[
i
]
^=
maskeddb
[
i
];
EVP_Digest
((
void
*
)
param
,
plen
,
phash
,
NULL
,
EVP_sha1
());
if
(
memcmp
(
db
,
phash
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
)
!=
0
)
if
(
memcmp
(
db
,
phash
,
SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
)
!=
0
||
bad
)
goto
decoding_err
;
else
{
...
...
@@ -134,6 +147,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
goto
decoding_err
;
else
{
/* everything looks OK */
mlen
=
dblen
-
i
;
if
(
tlen
<
mlen
)
{
...
...
@@ -146,7 +161,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
}
OPENSSL_free
(
db
);
return
mlen
;
decoding_err:
/* to avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal
* which kind of decoding error happened */
...
...
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