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前往新版Gitcode,体验更适合开发者的 AI 搜索 >>
提交
ed65f7dc
编写于
9月 11, 2006
作者:
B
Bodo Möller
浏览文件
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电子邮件补丁
差异文件
ensure that ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" match the SSL 2.0
ciphersuite as well
上级
4d50a2b4
变更
2
隐藏空白更改
内联
并排
Showing
2 changed file
with
43 addition
and
13 deletion
+43
-13
CHANGES
CHANGES
+27
-1
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+16
-12
未找到文件。
CHANGES
浏览文件 @
ed65f7dc
...
...
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 0.9.8
c
and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 0.9.8
d
and 0.9.9 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names.
Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible.
...
...
@@ -379,6 +379,32 @@
Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites
match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted
as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too since we currently only
have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap.
That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as
"RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites --
namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones
from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0.
So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit
ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar
ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions.
Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0
ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite.
Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the
128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now.
The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and
AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning;
however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release
(not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER
definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into
multiple values to extend the available space.
[Bodo Moeller]
Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006]
*) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher
...
...
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
浏览文件 @
ed65f7dc
...
...
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
*
ca_curr
=
NULL
;
/* end of list */
}
static
void
ssl_cipher_apply_rule
(
unsigned
long
cipher_id
,
static
void
ssl_cipher_apply_rule
(
unsigned
long
cipher_id
,
unsigned
long
ssl_version
,
unsigned
long
algorithms
,
unsigned
long
mask
,
unsigned
long
algo_strength
,
unsigned
long
mask_strength
,
int
rule
,
int
strength_bits
,
...
...
@@ -665,9 +665,10 @@ static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(unsigned long cipher_id,
cp
=
curr
->
cipher
;
/* If explicit cipher suite match that one only */
/* If explicit cipher suite, match only that one for its own protocol version.
* Usual selection criteria will be used for similar ciphersuites from other version! */
if
(
cipher_id
)
if
(
cipher_id
&&
(
cp
->
algorithms
&
SSL_SSL_MASK
)
==
ssl_version
)
{
if
(
cp
->
id
!=
cipher_id
)
continue
;
...
...
@@ -789,7 +790,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
*/
for
(
i
=
max_strength_bits
;
i
>=
0
;
i
--
)
if
(
number_uses
[
i
]
>
0
)
ssl_cipher_apply_rule
(
0
,
0
,
0
,
0
,
0
,
CIPHER_ORD
,
i
,
ssl_cipher_apply_rule
(
0
,
0
,
0
,
0
,
0
,
0
,
CIPHER_ORD
,
i
,
head_p
,
tail_p
);
OPENSSL_free
(
number_uses
);
...
...
@@ -803,7 +804,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
unsigned
long
algorithms
,
mask
,
algo_strength
,
mask_strength
;
const
char
*
l
,
*
start
,
*
buf
;
int
j
,
multi
,
found
,
rule
,
retval
,
ok
,
buflen
;
unsigned
long
cipher_id
=
0
;
unsigned
long
cipher_id
=
0
,
ssl_version
=
0
;
char
ch
;
retval
=
1
;
...
...
@@ -894,6 +895,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
*/
j
=
found
=
0
;
cipher_id
=
0
;
ssl_version
=
0
;
while
(
ca_list
[
j
])
{
if
(
!
strncmp
(
buf
,
ca_list
[
j
]
->
name
,
buflen
)
&&
...
...
@@ -908,12 +910,6 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
if
(
!
found
)
break
;
/* ignore this entry */
if
(
ca_list
[
j
]
->
valid
)
{
cipher_id
=
ca_list
[
j
]
->
id
;
break
;
}
/* New algorithms:
* 1 - any old restrictions apply outside new mask
* 2 - any new restrictions apply outside old mask
...
...
@@ -928,6 +924,14 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
(
algo_strength
&
ca_list
[
j
]
->
algo_strength
);
mask_strength
|=
ca_list
[
j
]
->
mask_strength
;
/* explicit ciphersuite found */
if
(
ca_list
[
j
]
->
valid
)
{
cipher_id
=
ca_list
[
j
]
->
id
;
ssl_version
=
ca_list
[
j
]
->
algorithms
&
SSL_SSL_MASK
;
break
;
}
if
(
!
multi
)
break
;
}
...
...
@@ -956,7 +960,7 @@ static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
}
else
if
(
found
)
{
ssl_cipher_apply_rule
(
cipher_id
,
algorithms
,
mask
,
ssl_cipher_apply_rule
(
cipher_id
,
ssl_version
,
algorithms
,
mask
,
algo_strength
,
mask_strength
,
rule
,
-
1
,
head_p
,
tail_p
);
}
...
...
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