Update from 1.0.0-stable.

CHANGES

@@ -808,9 +808,10 @@
 
  Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l  [xx XXX xxxx]
 
-  *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert():
-     it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect
-     self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
+  *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert()
+     by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without
+     adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs
+     with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode.
      [Steve Henson]
 
   *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message

apps/apps.c

@@ -2256,6 +2256,8 @@ int args_verify(char ***pargs, int *pargc,
 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS;
 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-policy_print"))
 		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "-check_ss_sig"))
+		flags |= X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE;
 	else
 		return 0;
 

apps/x509.c

@@ -1130,6 +1130,7 @@ static int x509_certify(X509_STORE *ctx, char *CAfile, const EVP_MD *digest,
 	/* NOTE: this certificate can/should be self signed, unless it was
 	 * a certificate request in which case it is not. */
 	X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(&xsc,x);
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xsc, X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE);
 	if (!reqfile && X509_verify_cert(&xsc) <= 0)
 		goto end;
 

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

@@ -1610,10 +1610,11 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 		{
 		ctx->error_depth=n;
 
-		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates. It
-		 * doesn't add any security and just wastes time.
+		/* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
+		 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
+		 * just wastes time.
 		 */
-		if (!xs->valid && xs != xi)
+		if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
 			{
 			if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
 				{

crypto/x509/x509_vfy.h

@@ -387,6 +387,9 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
 #define X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT	0x1000
 /* Delta CRL support */
 #define X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS			0x2000
+/* Check selfsigned CA signature */
+#define X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE		0x4000
+
 
 #define X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT			0x1
 #define X509_VP_FLAG_OVERWRITE			0x2

doc/apps/cms.pod

@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
 then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
 address matches that specified in the From: address.
 
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
 
 Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
 L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.

doc/apps/s_client.pod

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ also used when building the client certificate chain.
 A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
 and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
 
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
 
 Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
 L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.

doc/apps/smime.pod

@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing
 then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
 address matches that specified in the From: address.
 
-=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy>
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy -check_ss_sig>
 
 Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
 L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.

doc/apps/verify.pod

@@ -135,6 +135,11 @@ signing keys.
 
 Enable support for delta CRLs.
 
+=item B<-check_ss_sig>
+
+Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
+because it doesn't add any security.
+
 =item B<->
 
 marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be