1. 05 6月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 23 5月, 2015 2 次提交
  3. 20 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 16 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 13 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  6. 03 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 30 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  8. 09 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  9. 25 3月, 2015 1 次提交
    • M
      Deprecate RAND_pseudo_bytes · 302d38e3
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality
      is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in
      the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may
      return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then
      both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the
      error queue. They both return 1 on success.
      Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an
      error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not.
      Frequently there are constructions of this form:
      
      if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1)
      	goto err;
      
      In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so
      RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use.
      
      This form is also seen:
      if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...))
      	goto err;
      
      This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is
      incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as
      an error.
      
      Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy
      pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes.
      Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded
      entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off
      using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes
      being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by
      insufficient entropy.
      
      If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the
      same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case.
      
      Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security,
      RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated.
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      302d38e3
  10. 24 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 19 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  12. 11 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 03 2月, 2015 2 次提交
  14. 01 2月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 24 1月, 2015 3 次提交
  16. 23 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 15 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • R
      Cleanup OPENSSL_NO_xxx, part 1 · 4b618848
      Rich Salz 提交于
      OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
      OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
      Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
      	OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
      	OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      4b618848
  18. 13 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  19. 12 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  20. 07 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  21. 06 1月, 2015 6 次提交
  22. 05 1月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. · 684400ce
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
      certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
      Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
      this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
      certificate fingerprint for blacklists.
      
      1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.
      
      If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
      the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.
      
      2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.
      
      Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
      certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
      errors for some broken certificates.
      
      3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.
      
      Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
      signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.
      
      This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
      (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
      program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
      (negative or with leading zeroes).
      
      CVE-2014-8275
      Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
      684400ce
  23. 28 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  24. 26 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  25. 23 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  26. 22 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  27. 20 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  28. 19 12月, 2014 2 次提交
  29. 18 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  30. 08 12月, 2014 1 次提交