Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

SSL_set_SSL_CTX is used to change the SSL_CTX for SNI, keep the
supported signature algorithms and raw cipherlist.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Facilitate switch to custom scatter-gather routines. This modification
does not change algorithms, only makes it possible to implement
alternative. This is achieved by a) moving precompute table to assembly
(perlasm parses ecp_nistz256_table.c and is free to rearrange data to
match gathering algorithm); b) adhering to explicit scatter subroutine
(which for now is simply a memcpy). First implementations that will use
this option are 32-bit assembly implementations, ARMv4 and x86, where
equivalent of current read-whole-table-select-single-value algorithm
is too time-consuming. [On side note, switching to scatter-gather on
x86_64 would allow to improve server-side ECDSA performance by ~5%].
Reviewed-by: NBodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NSteve Marquess <marquess@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL.  We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things.  This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc2.  Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.

CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org>

so the Win32 compile picks it up correctly.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/Makefile

The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
	crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
	crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NBodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3568
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3567
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Related to CVE-2014-3513

This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	util/mkdef.pl
	util/ssleay.num

CVE-2014-3513

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.

The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RT: 3553
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

handling out of #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 section.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Patch supplied by Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>, and modified to also
remove duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_digest.

PR#3551
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NGeoffrey Thorpe <geoff@geoffthorpe.net>

If data is NULL, return the size needed to hold the
derived key.  No other API to do this, so document
the behavior.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

RT: 3541
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.

Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Also add comment to Configure reminding people to do that.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>