Close #3993.

Close #3927.

Otherwise, as it was, it will overwrite whatever the user set.

Close #3703.

And many other related Github issues... all reporting the same problem.
There was probably just not enough backlog in certain unlucky runs.
I'll ask people that can reporduce if they see now this as fixed as
well.

Close #3804.

This reverts commit 153f2f00.

Jemalloc 4.4.0 is apparently causing deadlocks in certain
systems. See for example https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3799.
As a cautionary step we are reverting the commit back and
releasing a new stable Redis version.

After investigating issue #3796, it was discovered that MIGRATE
could call migrateCloseSocket() after the original MIGRATE c->argv
was already rewritten as a DEL operation. As a result the host/port
passed to migrateCloseSocket() could be anything, often a NULL pointer
that gets deferenced crashing the server.

Now the socket is closed at an earlier time when there is a socket
error in a later stage where no retry will be performed, before we
rewrite the argument vector. Moreover a check was added so that later,
in the socket_err label, there is no further attempt at closing the
socket if the argument was rewritten.

This fix should resolve the bug reported in #3796.

Ziplists had a bug that was discovered while investigating a different
issue, resulting in a corrupted ziplist representation, and a likely
segmentation foult and/or data corruption of the last element of the
ziplist, once the ziplist is accessed again.

The bug happens when a specific set of insertions / deletions is
performed so that an entry is encoded to have a "prevlen" field (the
length of the previous entry) of 5 bytes but with a count that could be
encoded in a "prevlen" field of a since byte. This could happen when the
"cascading update" process called by ziplistInsert()/ziplistDelete() in
certain contitious forces the prevlen to be bigger than necessary in
order to avoid too much data moving around.

Once such an entry is generated, inserting a very small entry
immediately before it will result in a resizing of the ziplist for a
count smaller than the current ziplist length (which is a violation,
inserting code expects the ziplist to get bigger actually). So an FF
byte is inserted in a misplaced position. Moreover a realloc() is
performed with a count smaller than the ziplist current length so the
final bytes could be trashed as well.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS:

Currently it looks like an attacker can only crash a Redis server by
providing specifically choosen commands. However a FF byte is written
and there are other memory operations that depend on a wrong count, so
even if it is not immediately apparent how to mount an attack in order
to execute code remotely, it is not impossible at all that this could be
done. Attacks always get better... and we did not spent enough time in
order to think how to exploit this issue, but security researchers
or malicious attackers could.

REPRODUCING:

The bug can be reproduced with the following commands.

    redis-cli del list
    redis-cli rpush list one
    redis-cli rpush list two
    redis-cli rpush list
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    redis-cli rpush list
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    redis-cli rpush list three
    redis-cli rpush list a
    redis-cli lrem list 1
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    redis-cli linsert list after
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    10
    redis-cli lrange list 0 -1

Instead of "rpush list a", use "rpush list 10" in order to trigger a
data corruption instead of a crash.

The original jemalloc source tree was modified to:

1. Remove the configure error that prevents nested builds.
2. Insert the Redis private Jemalloc API in order to allow the
Redis fragmentation function to work.

getExpire calls dictFind which can do rehashing.
found by calling computeDatasetDigest from serverCron and running the test suite.

Fixes https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3639

This problem was properly solved in 4.0 / unstable. Here is just a quick
fix for the warning.

This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.

For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.

This happens if the server (mysteriously) returns an unexpected response
to the COMMAND command.

After the fix for #3673 the ttl var is always initialized inside the
loop itself, so the early initialization is not needed.

Variables declaration also moved to a more local scope.

Before, if a previous key had a TTL set but the current one didn't, the
TTL was reused and thus resulted in wrong expirations set.

This behaviour was experienced, when `MigrateDefaultPipeline` in
redis-trib was set to >1

Fixes #3655

The test now uses more diverse radius sizes, especially sizes near or
greater the whole earth surface are used, that are known to trigger edge
cases. Moreover the PRNG seeding was probably resulting into the same
sequence tested over and over again, now seeding unsing the current unix
time in milliseconds.

Related to #3631.

A bug was reported in the context in issue #3631. The root cause of the
bug was that certain neighbor boxes were zeroed after the "inside the
bounding box or not" check, simply because the bounding box computation
function was wrong.

A few debugging infos where enhanced and moved in other parts of the
code. A check to avoid steps=0 was added, but is unrelated to this
issue and I did not verified it was an actual bug in practice.

Compiling Redis worked as a side effect of jemalloc target specifying
-ldl as needed linker options, otherwise it is not provided during
linking and dlopen() API will remain unresolved symbols.

This commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis
of Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference.

CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class "master"
which is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The "master" class
has ID 3. What happens is that the global structure:

    server.client_obuf_limits[class]

Is accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing
the 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory *after* the end
of the array, since the structure is defined as:

    typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig {
        unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes;
        unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes;
        time_t soft_limit_seconds;
    } clientBufferLimitsConfig;

EVALUATION OF IMPACT:

Checking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global
'server' structure, we find AOF state fields:

    clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT];
    /* AOF persistence */
    int aof_state;                  /* AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */
    int aof_fsync;                  /* Kind of fsync() policy */
    char *aof_filename;             /* Name of the AOF file */
    int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite;    /* Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. */
    int aof_rewrite_perc;           /* Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... */
    off_t aof_rewrite_min_size;     /* the AOF file is at least N bytes. */
    off_t aof_rewrite_base_size;    /* AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. */
    off_t aof_current_size;         /* AOF current size. */

Writing to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in
Redis persistence that should not escalate to security problems.
However unfortunately writing to "aof_filename" could be potentially a
security issue depending on the access pattern.

Searching for "aof.filename" accesses in the source code returns many different
usages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the
Redis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall.

It looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations
disclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the
attacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that,
it looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used
to mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF
data (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here:
http://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the
AOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded
in order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed
with untrusted input (no known issue known currently).

The fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf in
order to access configuration data structures, and return an error in
this cases.

WHO IS AT RISK?

The "master" client class was introduced in Redis in Jul 28 2015.
Every Redis instance released past this date is not vulnerable
while all the releases after this date are. Notably:

    Redis 3.0.x is NOT vunlerable.
    Redis 3.2.x IS vulnerable.
    Redis unstable is vulnerable.

In order for the instance to be at risk, at least one of the following
conditions must be true:

    1. The attacker can access Redis remotely and is able to send
       the CONFIG SET command (often banned in managed Redis instances).

    2. The attacker is able to control the "redis.conf" file and
       can wait or trigger a server restart.

The problem was fixed 26th September 2016 in all the releases affected.

This commit attempts to fix a problem with PR #3467.